{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1544","id":"T1544","name":"Ingress Tool Transfer","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"146535b0e664c39d202575761f7ebeafccdffd50b776938e924b31aeb59f4da9","description":"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system onto a compromised device to facilitate follow-on actions. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the command and control channel  or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544","external_id":"T1544"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Application state and lifecycle observations such as foreground/background transitions.","collection_focus":"Instrument the owned app lifecycle and corroborate permitted service snapshots; distinguish app events from inferred gateway activity.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","state_before","state_after","source"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1544","id":"T1544","name":"Ingress Tool Transfer","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1544/","page":"detections/mobile/T1544/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0718","name":"Detection of Ingress Tool Transfer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--5aa9f16e-253d-4ca6-b5e2-8311e5a76290","relationship_id":"relationship--6f8ae8db-9657-45d9-bad8-5aef68644e76","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1848","name":"Analytic 1848","guidance":"For Android, detect Ingress Tool Transfer by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; Application State via Android Enterprise / EMM [Managed package inventory/status and package metadata]; File Creation via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App writes newly retrieved binary, archive, native library (.so), DEX, or script to /data/data//files/, cache, or shared storage within $IngressWriteWindow$ of network retrieval from non-CDN source]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1848","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"30-day per-app network destination baseline. Any download from outside this list is anomalous."},{"field":"ApprovedDownloadApps","description":"Browser, MDM agent, enterprise content apps approved for remote retrieval. Derive from MDM catalog."},{"field":"IngressWriteWindow","description":"Default 60s between network retrieval and local file write. Tightening: 15s — synchronous download-write."},{"field":"IngressExecWindow","description":"Default 120s between local file write and exec invocation. Tightening: 30s — immediate load after write."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1848","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1848","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"android:EMM","channel":"Managed package inventory/status and package metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1848","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1848","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"mobile:ForensicArtifacts","channel":"Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App writes newly retrieved binary, archive, native library (.so), DEX, or script to /data/data/<app>/files/, cache, or shared storage within $IngressWriteWindow$ of network retrieval from non-CDN source","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1848","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1848","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1848","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1848","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes DownloadManager, URLConnection, or OkHttp download to write retrieved content to app-controlled path outside original APK scope — programmatic download of executable artifact","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1848","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1848","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]},{"id":"AN1849","name":"Analytic 1849","guidance":"For iOS, detect Ingress Tool Transfer by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Application State via Apple MDM [InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList]; File Creation via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: Managed app writes newly retrieved container-local file, dylib-like resource, or opaque payload after download from non-CDN source]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1849","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"30-day per-app network destination baseline. Any download from outside this list is anomalous."},{"field":"ApprovedDownloadApps","description":"Browser, MDM agent, enterprise content apps approved for remote retrieval. Derive from MDM catalog."},{"field":"IngressWriteWindow","description":"Default 60s between network retrieval and local file write. Tightening: 15s — synchronous download-write."},{"field":"IngressExecWindow","description":"Default 120s between local file write and exec invocation. Tightening: 30s — immediate load after write."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1849","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1849","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1849","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1849","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"mobile:ForensicArtifacts","channel":"Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: Managed app writes newly retrieved container-local file, dylib-like resource, or opaque payload after download from non-CDN source","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1849","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1849","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1849","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1849","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: Managed app performs post-download processing, dynamic resource handling, or module preparation immediately after retrieval from non-CDN source on supervised device","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1849","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0718#AN1849","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","tag":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0326","name":"RedDrop","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0326","kind":"malware","description":"[RedDrop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0326) uses ads or other links within websites to encourage users to download the malicious apps using a complex content distribution network (CDN) and series of network redirects. [RedDrop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0326) also downloads additional components (APKs, JAR files) from different C2 servers.(Citation: Wandera-RedDrop) ","relationship_id":"relationship--a20493e1-4699-405d-a291-c28aae8ed737","references":[{"source_name":"Wandera-RedDrop","description":"Nell Campbell. (2018, February 27). RedDrop: the blackmailing mobile malware family lurking in app stores. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20180618225805/https://www.wandera.com/reddrop-malware/"}]},{"id":"S0407","name":"Monokle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407","kind":"malware","description":"[Monokle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407) can download attacker-specified files.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) ","relationship_id":"relationship--d0c21324-62e3-46e5-823b-ea0c03a4885d","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-Monokle","description":"Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0418","name":"ViceLeaker","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0418","kind":"malware","description":"[ViceLeaker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0418) can download attacker-specified files.(Citation: SecureList - ViceLeaker 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--6176a297-3097-42e2-b1c2-815e7fd8c81c","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList - ViceLeaker 2019","description":"GReAT. (2019, June 26).  ViceLeaker Operation: mobile espionage targeting Middle East. Retrieved November 21, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/fanning-the-flames-viceleaker-operation/90877/"}]},{"id":"S0485","name":"Mandrake","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485","kind":"malware","description":"[Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) can install attacker-specified components or applications.(Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)","relationship_id":"relationship--f0a0005e-cc38-4f7a-ba49-21a4c48ae1a1","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Mandrake","description":"R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/329/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-Mandrake-creat4464-en-EN-interactive.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1055","name":"SharkBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055","kind":"malware","description":"[SharkBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055) can download attacker-specified files.(Citation: nccgroup_sharkbot_0322)","relationship_id":"relationship--a1a9db79-4a80-4e65-91bf-72e358d2ce41","references":[{"source_name":"nccgroup_sharkbot_0322","description":"RIFT: Research and Intelligence Fusion Team. (2022, March 3). SharkBot: a “new” generation Android banking Trojan being distributed on Google Play Store. Retrieved January 18, 2023.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/03/03/sharkbot-a-new-generation-android-banking-trojan-being-distributed-on-google-play-store/"}]},{"id":"S1061","name":"AbstractEmu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061","kind":"malware","description":"[AbstractEmu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061) can receive files from the C2 at runtime.(Citation: lookout_abstractemu_1021)","relationship_id":"relationship--dbeff88d-441f-47f9-8afc-60400ee3ab97","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_abstractemu_1021","description":"P Shunk, K Balaam. (2021, October 28). Rooting Malware Makes a Comeback: Lookout Discovers Global Campaign. Retrieved February 6, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-global-rooting-malware-campaign"}]},{"id":"S1082","name":"Sunbird","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1082","kind":"malware","description":"[Sunbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1082) can download adversary specified content from FTP shares.(Citation: lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221)","relationship_id":"relationship--8f142643-0448-4b04-8260-8e4e62ad80bb","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221","description":"Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-novel-confucius-apt-android-spyware-linked-to-india-pakistan-conflict"}]},{"id":"S1083","name":"Chameleon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083","kind":"malware","description":"[Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has downloaded HTML overlay pages after installation.(Citation: cyble_chameleon_0423)","relationship_id":"relationship--25466097-53c6-4dc7-8409-197758e88673","references":[{"source_name":"cyble_chameleon_0423","description":"Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs. (2023, April 13). Banking Trojan targeting mobile users in Australia and Poland. Retrieved August 16, 2023.","url":"https://cyble.com/blog/chameleon-a-new-android-malware-spotted-in-the-wild/"}]},{"id":"S1126","name":"Phenakite","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1126","kind":"malware","description":"[Phenakite](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1126) can download additional malware to the victim device.(Citation: fb_arid_viper) ","relationship_id":"relationship--84ece53a-eb31-4c2e-9257-a055e0a190c0","references":[{"source_name":"fb_arid_viper","description":"Flossman, M., Scott, M. (2021, April). Technical Paper // Taking Action Against Arid Viper. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20231126111812/https:/about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Technical-threat-report-Arid-Viper-April-2021.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1185","name":"LightSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185","kind":"malware","description":"[LightSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185) has retrieved files from the C2 server.(Citation: MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024)(Citation: Threatfabric LightSpy 2024) Examples of files from the C2 are ` amfidebilitate` (jailbreak component), ` jbexec ` (executable to verify jailbreak), `bb` (FrameworkLoader), `cc` (launchctl binary for persistence), `b.plist` (configuration for auto-start), and `resources.zip`, which contains additional jailbreak-related components.(Citation: LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--15706c6d-803b-4857-9fcb-ce9af2c9d73b","references":[{"source_name":"LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025","description":"Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy's iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025.","url":"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/coordinated-kill-switch-lightspys-ios-destructive-plugin-bestuzhev-zhoye/"},{"source_name":"MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024","description":"Melikov, D. (2024, April 11). LightSpy Returns: Renewed Espionage Campaign Targets Southern Asia, Possibly India. Retrieved January 14, 2025.","url":"https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/04/lightspy-returns-renewed-espionage-campaign-targets-southern-asia-possibly-india"},{"source_name":"Threatfabric LightSpy 2024","description":"ThreatFabric. (2024, October 29). LightSpy: Implant for iOS. Retrieved January 30, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/lightspy-implant-for-ios"}]},{"id":"S1195","name":"SpyC23","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1195","kind":"malware","description":"[SpyC23](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1195) can download more malware to the victim device.(Citation: welivesecurity_apt-c-23)(Citation: checkpoint_hamas_android_malware)(Citation: SentinelLabs AridViper 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--5b4128cc-ae1b-4a1b-bc51-d4fdc507bc27","references":[{"source_name":"checkpoint_hamas_android_malware","description":"CheckPoint Research. (2020, February 16). Hamas Android Malware On IDF Soldiers-This is How it Happened. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20240226125457/https:/research.checkpoint.com/2020/hamas-android-malware-on-idf-soldiers-this-is-how-it-happened/"},{"source_name":"SentinelLabs AridViper 2023","description":"Delamotte, A. (2023, November 6). Arid Viper | APT’s Nest of SpyC23 Malware Continues to Target Android Devices. Retrieved December 2, 2024.","url":"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/arid-viper-apts-nest-of-spyc23-malware-continues-to-target-android-devices/"},{"source_name":"welivesecurity_apt-c-23","description":"Stefanko, L. (2020, September 30). APT‑C‑23 group evolves its Android spyware. Retrieved March 4, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20201123042131/www.welivesecurity.com/2020/09/30/aptc23-group-evolves-its-android-spyware/"}]},{"id":"S1216","name":"TriangleDB","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1216","kind":"malware","description":"[TriangleDB](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1216) has loaded additional modules stored in memory.(Citation: SecureList OpTriangulation 21Jun2023) ","relationship_id":"relationship--035bdf9a-dc4c-403a-b5c4-9b9b42675122","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList OpTriangulation 21Jun2023","description":"Kucherin, G., et al. (2023, June 21). Dissecting TriangleDB, a Triangulation spyware implant. Retrieved April 18, 2024.","url":"https://securelist.com/triangledb-triangulation-implant/110050/"}]},{"id":"S1225","name":"CherryBlos","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225","kind":"malware","description":"[CherryBlos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1225) has received configuration files from the C2 server.(Citation: TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023)  ","relationship_id":"relationship--f44f18d4-4595-4277-9d1e-dd5be6d07a80","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023","description":"Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 28). Related CherryBlos and FakeTrade Android Malware Involved in Scam Campaigns. Retrieved March 28, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/g/cherryblos-and-faketrade-android-malware-involved-in-scam-campai.html"}]},{"id":"S1231","name":"GodFather","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231","kind":"malware","description":"[GodFather](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231) has downloaded Google Play Store, Google Play services and Google Services Framework APK to a virtual folder.(Citation: ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025)  ","relationship_id":"relationship--b0d88891-f927-482e-980a-83d5512b1ae8","references":[{"source_name":"ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025","description":"Ortega, F. Pratapagiri, V. (2025, June 18). Your Mobile App, Their Playground: The Dark Side of Virtualization. Retrieved July 16, 2025.","url":"https://zimperium.com/blog/your-mobile-app-their-playground-the-dark-side-of-the-virtualization"}]},{"id":"S9005","name":"DocSwap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005","kind":"malware","description":"[DocSwap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005) has the ability to upload and download files via socket communication.(Citation: EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025)(Citation: S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--a3fbcfa8-941f-405a-bd71-a4e082be169f","references":[{"source_name":"EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025","description":"EnkiWhiteHat. (2025, December 16). Kimsuky Distributing Malicious Mobile App via QR Code. Retrieved January 8, 2026.","url":"https://www.enki.co.kr/en/media-center/blog/kimsuky-distributing-malicious-mobile-app-via-qr-code"},{"source_name":"S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025","description":"Kim, H., S2W TALON. (2025, March 13). Detailed Analysis of DocSwap Malware Disguised as Security Document Viewer. Retrieved January 12, 2026.","url":"https://medium.com/s2wblog/detailed-analysis-of-docswap-malware-disguised-as-security-document-viewer-218a728c36ff"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1544":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1544/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1544","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}}]}}