{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1516","id":"T1516","name":"Input Injection","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"0e81aabd5ddc9467ff02c1936161ec22aa52947375b1c8adc7c802bec35ee2cd","description":"A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs.\n\n[Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) can be achieved using any of the following methods:\n\n* Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money from a user's PayPal account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)\n* Injecting global actions, such as `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK` (programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019)\n* Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.(Citation: bitwarden autofill logins)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516","external_id":"T1516"},{"source_name":"bitwarden autofill logins","description":"Bitwarden. (n.d.).  Auto-fill logins on Android . Retrieved September 15, 2019.","url":"https://help.bitwarden.com/article/auto-fill-android/"},{"source_name":"android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa","description":"Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/"},{"source_name":"Talos Gustuff Apr 2019","description":"Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9).  Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html"}],"platforms":["Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Application state and lifecycle observations such as foreground/background transitions.","collection_focus":"Instrument the owned app lifecycle and corroborate permitted service snapshots; distinguish app events from inferred gateway activity.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","state_before","state_after","source"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1516","id":"T1516","name":"Input Injection","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1516/","page":"detections/mobile/T1516/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0612","name":"Detection of Input Injection","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0612","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--12a7802a-b0c2-4823-b03d-e59b2c4bc4de","relationship_id":"relationship--45b2b93c-86fb-412c-b2e1-d4d267715bd5","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1666","name":"Analytic 1666","guidance":"For Android, detect Input Injection from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application State via Android Enterprise / EMM [Managed package inventory/status and package metadata]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: Accessibility-enabled app NOT IN $AccessibilityAllowList$ invokes performAction() click, global action (GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK/HOME/RECENTS), or insertText() on a UI element belonging to a different foregrounded app — cross-app UI action is the]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0612#AN1666","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"AccessibilityAllowList","description":"Approved assistive technology apps with legitimate UI automation need. Minimal list. Derive from MDM catalog accessibility policy."},{"field":"InjectionInteractionThreshold","description":"Default 5s. UI actions occurring >5s after last detected user touch without expected foreground transition are injection-driven. Tightening: 2s."},{"field":"TargetAppList","description":"Banking, enterprise SSO, authentication, payment app packages. Injections against these raise confidence from Medium to High."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"android:EMM","channel":"Managed package inventory/status and package metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1666","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0612#AN1666","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: Accessibility-enabled app NOT IN $AccessibilityAllowList$ invokes performAction() click, global action (GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK/HOME/RECENTS), or insertText() on a UI element belonging to a different foregrounded app — cross-app UI action is the","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1666","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0612#AN1666","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","tag":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0403","name":"Riltok","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0403","kind":"malware","description":"[Riltok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0403) injects input to set itself as the default SMS handler by clicking the appropriate places on the screen. It can also close or minimize targeted antivirus applications and the device security settings screen.(Citation: Kaspersky Riltok June 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--e9607e4f-5743-4bbb-b7d4-5554d66c8be7","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Riltok June 2019","description":"Tatyana Shishkova. (2019, June 25). Riltok mobile Trojan: A banker with global reach. Retrieved August 7, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/mobile-banker-riltok/91374/"}]},{"id":"S0406","name":"Gustuff","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0406","kind":"malware","description":"[Gustuff](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0406) injects the global action `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK` to mimic pressing the back button to close the application if a call to an open antivirus application is detected.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--cacc0b72-9d73-4381-90e9-545ba908722c","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Gustuff Apr 2019","description":"Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9).  Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html"}]},{"id":"S0423","name":"Ginp","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0423","kind":"malware","description":" [Ginp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0423) can inject input to make itself the default SMS handler.(Citation: ThreatFabric Ginp) ","relationship_id":"relationship--43a62244-29f1-4f7f-bc9f-9b7b8e488b38","references":[{"source_name":"ThreatFabric Ginp","description":"ThreatFabric. (2019, November). Ginp - A malware patchwork borrowing from Anubis. Retrieved April 8, 2020.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/ginp_a_malware_patchwork_borrowing_from_anubis.html"}]},{"id":"S0427","name":"TrickMo","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0427","kind":"malware","description":"[TrickMo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0427) can inject input to set itself as the default SMS handler, and to automatically click through pop-ups without giving the user any time to react.(Citation: SecurityIntelligence TrickMo)","relationship_id":"relationship--740ea19e-d248-44e5-a0e5-3e9420df9dc8","references":[{"source_name":"SecurityIntelligence TrickMo","description":"P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/trickbot-pushing-a-2fa-bypass-app-to-bank-customers-in-germany/"}]},{"id":"S0479","name":"DEFENSOR ID","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0479","kind":"malware","description":"[DEFENSOR ID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0479) can abuse the accessibility service to perform actions on behalf of the user, including launching attacker-specified applications to steal data.(Citation: ESET DEFENSOR ID)","relationship_id":"relationship--1577a79c-5f70-41cc-95bd-2407cfd1acbd","references":[{"source_name":"ESET DEFENSOR ID","description":"L. Stefanko. (2020, May 22). Insidious Android malware gives up all malicious features but one to gain stealth. Retrieved June 26, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/22/insidious-android-malware-gives-up-all-malicious-features-but-one-gain-stealth/"}]},{"id":"S0480","name":"Cerberus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0480","kind":"malware","description":"[Cerberus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0480) can inject input to grant itself additional permissions without user interaction and to prevent application removal.(Citation: Threat Fabric Cerberus)(Citation: CheckPoint Cerberus)","relationship_id":"relationship--f776a4da-0fa6-414c-a705-e9e8b419e056","references":[{"source_name":"Threat Fabric Cerberus","description":"Threat Fabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved June 26, 2020.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html"},{"source_name":"CheckPoint Cerberus","description":"A. Hazum, B. Melnykov, C. Efrati, D. Golubenko, I. Wernik, L. Kuperman, O. Mana. (2020, April 29). First seen in the wild – Malware uses Corporate MDM as attack vector. Retrieved June 26, 2020.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/mobile-as-attack-vector-using-mdm/"}]},{"id":"S0485","name":"Mandrake","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485","kind":"malware","description":"[Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) abuses the accessibility service to prevent removing administrator permissions, accessibility permissions, and to set itself as the default SMS handler.(Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)","relationship_id":"relationship--af55d12a-5f58-4135-90d0-f465a66f7a3f","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Mandrake","description":"R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/329/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-Mandrake-creat4464-en-EN-interactive.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0494","name":"Zen","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0494","kind":"malware","description":"[Zen](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0494) can simulate user clicks on ads and system prompts to create new Google accounts.(Citation: Google Security Zen)","relationship_id":"relationship--afe9e326-01f7-4296-a11b-09cfffd80120","references":[{"source_name":"Google Security Zen","description":"Siewierski, L. (2019, January 11). PHA Family Highlights: Zen and its cousins . Retrieved July 27, 2020.","url":"https://security.googleblog.com/2019/01/pha-family-highlights-zen-and-its.html"}]},{"id":"S0545","name":"TERRACOTTA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0545","kind":"malware","description":"[TERRACOTTA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0545) can inject clicks to launch applications, share posts on social media, and interact with WebViews to perform fraudulent actions.(Citation: WhiteOps TERRACOTTA)","relationship_id":"relationship--4761145d-34ac-4b45-a0d6-a09b1907a196","references":[{"source_name":"WhiteOps TERRACOTTA","description":"Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020.","url":"https://www.whiteops.com/blog/terracotta-android-malware-a-technical-study"}]},{"id":"S1055","name":"SharkBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055","kind":"malware","description":"[SharkBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055) can use input injection via Accessibility Services to simulate user touch inputs, prevent applications from opening, change device settings, and bypass MFA protections.(Citation: nccgroup_sharkbot_0322)","relationship_id":"relationship--5dc4eaca-ff82-412a-a8dd-168de1857d8c","references":[{"source_name":"nccgroup_sharkbot_0322","description":"RIFT: Research and Intelligence Fusion Team. (2022, March 3). SharkBot: a “new” generation Android banking Trojan being distributed on Google Play Store. Retrieved January 18, 2023.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/03/03/sharkbot-a-new-generation-android-banking-trojan-being-distributed-on-google-play-store/"}]},{"id":"S1062","name":"S.O.V.A.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062","kind":"malware","description":"[S.O.V.A.](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062) can programmatically tap the screen or swipe.(Citation: cleafy_sova_1122)","relationship_id":"relationship--0b1f2735-97d9-4f4a-9967-9fa1464bb651","references":[{"source_name":"cleafy_sova_1122","description":"Francesco Lubatti, Federico Valentini. (2022, November 8). SOVA malware is back and is evolving rapidly. Retrieved March 30, 2023.","url":"https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/sova-malware-is-back-and-is-evolving-rapidly"}]},{"id":"S1094","name":"BRATA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094","kind":"malware","description":"[BRATA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094) can insert a given string of text into a data field. [BRATA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094) can abuse the Accessibility Service to interact with other installed applications and inject screen taps to grant permissions.(Citation: securelist_brata_0819)(Citation: mcafee_brata_0421)","relationship_id":"relationship--a4e72b4f-7ee4-4ee3-82c9-acc3aedb1f2d","references":[{"source_name":"mcafee_brata_0421","description":"Fernando Ruiz. (2021, April 12). BRATA Keeps Sneaking into Google Play, Now Targeting USA and Spain. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/brata-keeps-sneaking-into-google-play-now-targeting-usa-and-spain/"},{"source_name":"securelist_brata_0819","description":"Securelist. (2019, August 29). Fully equipped Spying Android RAT from Brazil: BRATA. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://securelist.com/spying-android-rat-from-brazil-brata/92775/"}]},{"id":"S1231","name":"GodFather","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231","kind":"malware","description":"[GodFather](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231) has abused the Accessibility Service to mimic victims’ actions and to redirect victims to its StubActivity when the victims attempt to use the original, legitimate banking application.(Citation: ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--c0121974-44ba-425d-9445-2d6598a5bc66","references":[{"source_name":"ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025","description":"Ortega, F. Pratapagiri, V. (2025, June 18). Your Mobile App, Their Playground: The Dark Side of Virtualization. Retrieved July 16, 2025.","url":"https://zimperium.com/blog/your-mobile-app-their-playground-the-dark-side-of-the-virtualization"}]},{"id":"S9004","name":"Crocodilus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9004","kind":"malware","description":"[Crocodilus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9004) has the ability to perform clicks, swipes (left, right, up and down) on the screen and actions such as “Back,” “Home,” and “Menu.”(Citation: ThreatFabric_Crocodilus_March2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--a67a9c6f-318a-4ca5-aa6a-1d6d88b5d523","references":[{"source_name":"ThreatFabric_Crocodilus_March2025","description":"ThreatFabric. (2025, March 28). Exposing Crocodilus: New Device Takeover Malware Targeting Android Devices. Retrieved November 24, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exposing-crocodilus-new-device-takeover-malware-targeting-android-devices"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1011","name":"User Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Users should be warned against granting access to accessibility features, and to carefully scrutinize applications that request this dangerous permission.","relationship_id":"relationship--17558571-7352-470b-b728-0511fb3f699d","references":[]},{"id":"M1012","name":"Enterprise Policy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1012","kind":"course-of-action","description":"An EMM/MDM can use the Android `DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices` method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features.","relationship_id":"relationship--3dff770d-9627-4647-b945-7f24a97b2273","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1516":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1516/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1516","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}}]}}