{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1474","id":"T1474","name":"Supply Chain Compromise","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"58ba3ead75ca14ae1d7313855a1b6aa5d968573db2eeb0f9cf0ae70d1c564c94","description":"Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images\n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.  Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency, specifically with the widespread usage of third-party advertising libraries.(Citation: Grace-Advertisement)(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474","external_id":"T1474"},{"source_name":"Grace-Advertisement","description":"M. Grace et al. (2012, April 16-18). Unsafe exposure analysis of mobile in-app advertisements. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2185448.2185464"},{"source_name":"NowSecure-RemoteCode","description":"Ryan Welton. (2015, June 15). A Pattern for Remote Code Execution using Arbitrary File Writes and MultiDex Applications. Retrieved December 22, 2016.","url":"https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html","external_id":"APP-6"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-0.html","external_id":"SPC-0"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-1.html","external_id":"SPC-1"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-2.html","external_id":"SPC-2"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-3.html","external_id":"SPC-3"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html","external_id":"SPC-4"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-5.html","external_id":"SPC-5"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-6.html","external_id":"SPC-6"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-7.html","external_id":"SPC-7"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-8.html","external_id":"SPC-8"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-9.html","external_id":"SPC-9"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-10.html","external_id":"SPC-10"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-11.html","external_id":"SPC-11"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-12.html","external_id":"SPC-12"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-13.html","external_id":"SPC-13"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-14.html","external_id":"SPC-14"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-15.html","external_id":"SPC-15"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-16.html","external_id":"SPC-16"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-17.html","external_id":"SPC-17"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-18.html","external_id":"SPC-18"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-19.html","external_id":"SPC-19"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-20.html","external_id":"SPC-20"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-21.html","external_id":"SPC-21"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"mobile/T1474.001","id":"T1474.001","name":"Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools","page":"techniques/mobile/T1474.001/"},{"key":"mobile/T1474.002","id":"T1474.002","name":"Compromise Hardware Supply Chain","page":"techniques/mobile/T1474.002/"},{"key":"mobile/T1474.003","id":"T1474.003","name":"Compromise Software Supply Chain","page":"techniques/mobile/T1474.003/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Application state and lifecycle observations such as foreground/background transitions.","collection_focus":"Instrument the owned app lifecycle and corroborate permitted service snapshots; distinguish app events from inferred gateway activity.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","state_before","state_after","source"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0115","name":"Protected Configuration","page":"telemetry/DC0115/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"State or changes affecting security-sensitive device configuration.","collection_focus":"Use approved device-management/research-build interfaces to snapshot the specific protected setting; document privileges and unsupported fields.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["device_id","setting","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0115","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"usb_debugging_enabled","before":false,"after":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1474","id":"T1474","name":"Supply Chain Compromise","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1474/","page":"detections/mobile/T1474/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0628","name":"Detection of Supply Chain Compromise","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--8d518627-1df4-4bf8-b1fb-0828fb9f6d31","relationship_id":"relationship--68267f97-b22e-4cd5-a417-0771a1741a32","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1697","name":"Analytic 1697","guidance":"For Android, detect Supply Chain Compromise by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; Application State via Android Enterprise / EMM [Managed package inventory/status and package metadata]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: Known application begins first-seen or expanded use of content providers, account services, accessibility, or network destinations not in $AppBehaviorBaseline$ post-update]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1697","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"AppNetworkBaseline","description":"30-day per-app network destination baseline anchored to prior version. Updated on each planned release. Derive by measurement. Tightening: strict domain allowlist per version."},{"field":"AppBehaviorBaseline","description":"Per-app permission and API call baseline from prior version. Derive from MDM telemetry on known-good version. Any new API category post-update is anomalous."},{"field":"PostInstallWindow","description":"Default 86400s (24hr) behavioral observation window post-install/update. Tightening: 3600s — catches immediate post-install C2."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1697","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1697","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"android:EMM","channel":"Managed package inventory/status and package metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1697","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1697","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: Known application begins first-seen or expanded use of content providers, account services, accessibility, or network destinations not in $AppBehaviorBaseline$ post-update","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1697","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1697","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"},{"component_id":"DC0115","component":"Protected Configuration","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1697","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1697","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0115/"}]},{"id":"AN1698","name":"Analytic 1698","guidance":"For iOS, detect Supply Chain Compromise from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Application State via Apple MDM [InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: Known app begins first-seen use of protected framework categories (location, microphone, contacts) or background task patterns post-update]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1698","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AppNetworkBaseline","description":"30-day per-app network destination baseline anchored to prior version. Updated on each planned release. Derive by measurement. Tightening: strict domain allowlist per version."},{"field":"AppBehaviorBaseline","description":"Per-app permission and API call baseline from prior version. Derive from MDM telemetry on known-good version. Any new API category post-update is anomalous."},{"field":"PostInstallWindow","description":"Default 86400s (24hr) behavioral observation window post-install/update. Tightening: 3600s — catches immediate post-install C2."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1698","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1698","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1698","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1698","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: Known app begins first-seen use of protected framework categories (location, microphone, contacts) or background task patterns post-update","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1698","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1698","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"},{"component_id":"DC0115","component":"Protected Configuration","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1698","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0628#AN1698","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0115/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","tag":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0115","name":"Protected Configuration","tag":"Protected Configuration","page":"telemetry/DC0115/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1001","name":"Security Updates","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1001","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Security updates may contain patches for devices that were compromised at the supply chain level.","relationship_id":"relationship--535d2425-21aa-4fe5-ae6d-5b677f459020","references":[]},{"id":"M1013","name":"Application Developer Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application.","relationship_id":"relationship--557e6d99-d7d8-4e2f-bc01-66b0754de089","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1474":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1474/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1474","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0115","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"usb_debugging_enabled","before":false,"after":true}}]}}