{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1461","id":"T1461","name":"Lockscreen Bypass","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"2852f52258c91fadf2ef44a9e954b9ab19b1e9785d5ff0a158597b49190e5b5a","description":"An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device’s lockscreen. Several methods exist to accomplish this, including:\n\n* Biometric spoofing: If biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device’s biometric authentication mechanism. Both iOS and Android partly mitigate this attack by requiring the device’s passcode rather than biometrics to unlock the device after every device restart, and after a set or random amount of time.(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID)\n* Unlock code bypass: An adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (“shoulder surfing”) the device owner’s use of the lockscreen passcode. Mobile OS vendors partly mitigate this by implementing incremental backoff timers after a set number of failed unlock attempts, as well as a configurable full device wipe after several failed unlock attempts.\n* Vulnerability exploit: Techniques have been periodically demonstrated that exploit mobile devices to bypass the lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device or OS vendor once disclosed.(Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass)(Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass)\n","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461","external_id":"T1461"},{"source_name":"Wired-AndroidBypass","description":"Andy Greenberg. (2015, September 15). Hack Brief: Emergency Number Hack Bypasses Android Lock Screens. Retrieved December 23, 2016.","url":"https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/"},{"source_name":"Kaspersky-iOSBypass","description":"Chris Brook. (2016, November 17). iOS 10 Passcode Bypass Can Access Photos, Contacts. Retrieved December 23, 2016.","url":"https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/"},{"source_name":"TheSun-FaceID","description":"Sean Keach. (2018, February 15). Brit mates BREAK Apple’s face unlock and vow to never buy iPhone again. Retrieved September 18, 2018.","url":"https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/"},{"source_name":"SRLabs-Fingerprint","description":"SRLabs. (n.d.). Fingerprints are not fit for secure device unlocking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.","url":"https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Application state and lifecycle observations such as foreground/background transitions.","collection_focus":"Instrument the owned app lifecycle and corroborate permitted service snapshots; distinguish app events from inferred gateway activity.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","state_before","state_after","source"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0115","name":"Protected Configuration","page":"telemetry/DC0115/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"State or changes affecting security-sensitive device configuration.","collection_focus":"Use approved device-management/research-build interfaces to snapshot the specific protected setting; document privileges and unsupported fields.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["device_id","setting","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0115","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"usb_debugging_enabled","before":false,"after":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1461","id":"T1461","name":"Lockscreen Bypass","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1461/","page":"detections/mobile/T1461/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0645","name":"Detection of Lockscreen Bypass","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--338779e6-0413-43e3-bfc8-71064a27ebeb","relationship_id":"relationship--9e77cf7d-41f2-41da-8bc3-491083a11d80","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1723","name":"Analytic 1723","guidance":"For Android, detect Lockscreen Bypass by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; Application State via Android Enterprise / EMM [Managed package inventory/status and package metadata]; Protected Configuration via Android Enterprise DPC [DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645#AN1723","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthPolicyAllowList","description":"MDM-managed authentication policy changes only. Any lock policy weakening outside MDM-authorized change is anomalous. Derive from MDM policy management logs."},{"field":"ElevationAllowList","description":"Approved accessibility and Device Admin apps that may interact with lockscreen for legitimate purposes (enterprise kiosk). Derive from MDM catalog."},{"field":"LockBypassWindow","description":"Default 10s between lock state and anomalous app activity. Lock-bypass is near-instantaneous."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1723","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645#AN1723","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"android:EMM","channel":"Managed package inventory/status and package metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1723","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645#AN1723","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0115","component":"Protected Configuration","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1723","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645#AN1723","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0115/"}]},{"id":"AN1724","name":"Analytic 1724","guidance":"For iOS, detect Lockscreen Bypass from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application State via Apple MDM [InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList]; Protected Configuration via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645#AN1724","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthPolicyAllowList","description":"MDM-managed authentication policy changes only. Any lock policy weakening outside MDM-authorized change is anomalous. Derive from MDM policy management logs."},{"field":"ElevationAllowList","description":"Approved accessibility and Device Admin apps that may interact with lockscreen for legitimate purposes (enterprise kiosk). Derive from MDM catalog."},{"field":"LockBypassWindow","description":"Default 10s between lock state and anomalous app activity. Lock-bypass is near-instantaneous."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1724","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645#AN1724","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0115","component":"Protected Configuration","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1724","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0645#AN1724","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0115/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","tag":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0115","name":"Protected Configuration","tag":"Protected Configuration","page":"telemetry/DC0115/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1083","name":"Chameleon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083","kind":"malware","description":"[Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has the ability to bypass the biometric prompt for unlocking an infected device, forcing the victim to use PIN authentication. To do so, [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) will first check specified conditions, then will use the AccessibilityEvent action to transition from biometric authentication to PIN authentication.(Citation: ThreatFabric_Chameleon_Dec2023) ","relationship_id":"relationship--b14a1e23-e1ce-46ec-b4f2-414a13a8b6a7","references":[{"source_name":"ThreatFabric_Chameleon_Dec2023","description":"ThreatFabric. (2023, December 21). Android Banking Trojan Chameleon can now bypass any Biometric Authentication. Retrieved July 7, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/android-banking-trojan-chameleon-is-back-in-action"}]},{"id":"S1092","name":"Escobar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1092","kind":"malware","description":"[Escobar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1092) can request the `DISABLE_KEYGUARD` permission to disable the device lock screen password.(Citation: Bleeipng Computer Escobar)","relationship_id":"relationship--48cd0af5-9ad1-44b3-beeb-d576974dadee","references":[{"source_name":"Bleeipng Computer Escobar","description":"B. Toulas. (2022, March 12). Android malware Escobar steals your Google Authenticator MFA codes. Retrieved September 28, 2023.","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-malware-escobar-steals-your-google-authenticator-mfa-codes/"}]},{"id":"S1094","name":"BRATA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094","kind":"malware","description":"[BRATA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094) can request the user unlock the device, or remotely unlock the device.(Citation: securelist_brata_0819)","relationship_id":"relationship--4159bc09-ddf3-4d88-9bf0-853ace9c8151","references":[{"source_name":"securelist_brata_0819","description":"Securelist. (2019, August 29). Fully equipped Spying Android RAT from Brazil: BRATA. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://securelist.com/spying-android-rat-from-brazil-brata/92775/"}]},{"id":"S9006","name":"VajraSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006","kind":"malware","description":"[VajraSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006) has requested for `android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD` to disable the device lock screen password.(Citation: K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022) ","relationship_id":"relationship--7e5a6195-11f7-4862-845c-78a9c4fea3fc","references":[{"source_name":"K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022","description":"Dhanalakshmi. (2022, April 19).  VajraSpy – An Android RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2025.","url":"https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/vajraspy-an-android-rat/"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1001","name":"Security Updates","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1001","kind":"course-of-action","description":"OS security updates typically contain exploit patches when disclosed.","relationship_id":"relationship--cc81b56c-cf73-4307-b950-e80246985195","references":[]},{"id":"M1012","name":"Enterprise Policy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1012","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Enterprises can provision policies to mobile devices that require a minimum complexity (length, character requirements, etc.) for the device passcode, and cause the device to wipe all data if an incorrect passcode is entered too many times. Both policies would mitigate brute-force, guessing, or shoulder surfing of the device passcode. Enterprises can also provision policies to disable biometric authentication, however, biometric authentication can help make using a longer, more complex passcode more practical because it does not need to be entered as frequently. ","relationship_id":"relationship--73d78f2c-dd3b-469c-a622-e2e89cb521d3","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1461":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1461/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1461","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0115","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"android-lab-1","setting":"usb_debugging_enabled","before":false,"after":true}}]}}