{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1430","id":"T1430","name":"Location Tracking","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"b41b1af705bea8e5adb82811a16b13c37c99989a562fa9fcea7e6af19819a425","description":"Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device. \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications holding the `ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION` or `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permissions provide access to the device’s physical location. On Android 10 and up, declaration of the `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` permission in an application’s manifest will allow applications to request location access even when the application is running in the background.(Citation: Android Request Location Permissions) Some adversaries have utilized integration of Baidu map services to retrieve geographical location once the location access permissions had been obtained.(Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox) \n\n \n\nOn iOS, applications must include the `NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription`, `NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription`, and/or `NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription` keys in their `Info.plist` file depending on the extent of requested access to location information.(Citation: Apple Requesting Authorization for Location Services) On iOS 8.0 and up, applications call `requestWhenInUseAuthorization()` to request access to location information when the application is in use or `requestAlwaysAuthorization()` to request access to location information regardless of whether the application is in use. With elevated privileges, an adversary may be able to access location data without explicit user consent with the `com.apple.locationd.preauthorized` entitlement key.(Citation: Google Project Zero Insomnia)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430","external_id":"T1430"},{"source_name":"Palo Alto HenBox","description":"A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/"},{"source_name":"Android Request Location Permissions","description":"Android Developers. (2022, March 24). Request Location Permissions. Retrieved April 1, 2022.","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/location/permissions"},{"source_name":"Apple Requesting Authorization for Location Services","description":"Apple Developers. (n.d.). Requesting Authorization for Location Services. Retrieved April 1, 2022.","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services"},{"source_name":"Google Project Zero Insomnia","description":"I. Beer. (2019, August 29). Implant Teardown. Retrieved June 2, 2020.","url":"https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teardown.html"},{"source_name":"PaloAlto-SpyDealer","description":"Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html","external_id":"APP-24"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"mobile/T1430.001","id":"T1430.001","name":"Remote Device Management Services","page":"techniques/mobile/T1430.001/"},{"key":"mobile/T1430.002","id":"T1430.002","name":"Impersonate SS7 Nodes","page":"techniques/mobile/T1430.002/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0112","name":"API Calls","page":"telemetry/DC0112/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Instrumented mobile API calls and results relevant to an application behavior.","collection_focus":"Instrument selected APIs in the owned test app or approved research build; log caller, API, sanitized argument class and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","api","result","thread"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0112","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","api":"android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera","result":"permission_denied","thread":"main"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0116","name":"Permissions Request","page":"telemetry/DC0116/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"A system prompt for an application permission, with request and response context where observable.","collection_focus":"Correlate own-app request/callback instrumentation with the consented test-device prompt. A request callback alone does not prove a prompt appeared (for example, a previously denied permission).","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","permission","action","prompt_observed","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0116","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","action":"permission_prompt","prompt_observed":true,"result":"denied"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1430","id":"T1430","name":"Location Tracking","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1430/","page":"detections/mobile/T1430/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0675","name":"Detection of Location Tracking","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--ac9d1b33-cfba-415e-aef2-c4c0b359ed5f","relationship_id":"relationship--1aa58b60-1a3d-4e97-918a-4553985488e8","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1776","name":"Analytic 1776","guidance":"For Android, detect Location Tracking by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: LocationManager.requestLocationUpdates() called with minTime < $LocationUpdateFreqThreshold$ by app NOT IN $LocationAllowList$]; Network Traffic Content via Enterprise Secure Web Gateway / Proxy [DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed]; Permissions Request via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1776","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"LocationAllowList","description":"Navigation, delivery, enterprise fleet management apps. Derive from MDM catalog."},{"field":"LocationUpdateFreqThreshold","description":"Default 60000ms (1 min) — below this = continuous surveillance vs occasional check-in."},{"field":"LocationCDNList","description":"Google Maps, Apple Maps, Mapbox, enterprise fleet CDN endpoints."},{"field":"ExfilWindow","description":"Default 300s."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0112","component":"API Calls","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: LocationManager.requestLocationUpdates() called with minTime < $LocationUpdateFreqThreshold$ by app NOT IN $LocationAllowList$","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1776","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1776","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0112/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1776","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1776","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0116","component":"Permissions Request","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1776","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1776","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0116/"}]},{"id":"AN1777","name":"Analytic 1777","guidance":"For iOS, detect Location Tracking by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1777","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"LocationAllowList","description":"Navigation, delivery, enterprise fleet app bundle IDs."},{"field":"LocationCDNList","description":"Apple Maps, Google Maps, Mapbox, enterprise fleet endpoints."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1777","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1777","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"iOS:NetworkExtension","channel":"NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1777","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1777","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0116","component":"Permissions Request","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1777","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0675#AN1777","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0116/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0112","name":"API Calls","tag":"API Calls","page":"telemetry/DC0112/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0116","name":"Permissions Request","tag":"Permissions Request","page":"telemetry/DC0116/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","page":"tools/S0408/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","page":"tools/S0408/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0182","name":"FinFisher","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182","kind":"malware","description":"[FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182) tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--b53d1c92-b71f-434e-aa4f-08b8db765248","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018","description":"Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0289","name":"Pegasus for iOS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289","kind":"malware","description":"[Pegasus for iOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289) update and sends the location of the phone.(Citation: Lookout-Pegasus)","relationship_id":"relationship--94040d2e-3f60-423c-8a93-a83b61cafe7d","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-Pegasus","description":"Lookout. (2016). Technical Analysis of Pegasus Spyware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-pegasus-technical-analysis.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0291","name":"PJApps","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0291","kind":"malware","description":"[PJApps](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0291) has the capability to collect and leak the victim's location.(Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)","relationship_id":"relationship--27247071-356b-4b5f-bc8f-6436a3fec095","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-EnterpriseApps","description":"Lookout. (2016, May 25). 5 active mobile threats spoofing enterprise apps. Retrieved December 19, 2016.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/"}]},{"id":"S0292","name":"AndroRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0292","kind":"malware","description":"[AndroRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0292) tracks the device location.(Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)","relationship_id":"relationship--fa1da6db-da32-45d2-98a8-6bbe153166da","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-EnterpriseApps","description":"Lookout. (2016, May 25). 5 active mobile threats spoofing enterprise apps. Retrieved December 19, 2016.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/"}]},{"id":"S0295","name":"RCSAndroid","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0295","kind":"malware","description":"[RCSAndroid](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0295) can record location.(Citation: TrendMicro-RCSAndroid)","relationship_id":"relationship--da4296d7-5fdb-45b6-9791-b023d634c08d","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro-RCSAndroid","description":"Veo Zhang. (2015, July 21). Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In. Retrieved December 22, 2016.","url":"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/"}]},{"id":"S0304","name":"Android/Chuli.A","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0304","kind":"malware","description":"[Android/Chuli.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0304) stole geo-location data.(Citation: Kaspersky-WUC)","relationship_id":"relationship--9c7c302a-d5ba-4fc9-a4e5-e865fd7fb708","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky-WUC","description":"Costin Raiu, Denis Maslennikov, Kurt Baumgartner. (2013, March 26). Android Trojan Found in Targeted Attack. Retrieved December 23, 2016.","url":"https://securelist.com/android-trojan-found-in-targeted-attack-58/35552/"}]},{"id":"S0305","name":"SpyNote RAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0305","kind":"malware","description":"[SpyNote RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0305) collects the device's location.(Citation: Zscaler-SpyNote)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f7e7c29-43f0-4aff-ae83-dfff331915ef","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler-SpyNote","description":"Shivang Desai. (2017, January 23). SpyNote RAT posing as Netflix app. Retrieved January 26, 2017.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/spynote-rat-posing-netflix-app"}]},{"id":"S0309","name":"Adups","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0309","kind":"malware","description":"[Adups](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0309) transmitted location information.(Citation: NYTimes-BackDoor)","relationship_id":"relationship--8ed14c81-0b30-4bfc-8552-439aa0e920c3","references":[{"source_name":"NYTimes-BackDoor","description":"Matt Apuzzo and Michael S. Schmidt. (2016, November 15). Secret Back Door in Some U.S. Phones Sent Data to China, Analysts Say. Retrieved February 6, 2017.","url":"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html"}]},{"id":"S0314","name":"X-Agent for Android","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314","kind":"malware","description":"[X-Agent for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314) was believed to have been used to obtain locational data of Ukrainian artillery forces.(Citation: CrowdStrike-Android)","relationship_id":"relationship--9e66ec3b-cdd6-461c-bd84-e75316818e15","references":[{"source_name":"CrowdStrike-Android","description":"CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team. (2016). Use of Fancy Bear Android Malware in Tracking of Ukrainian FIeld Artillery Units. Retrieved February 6, 2017.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0323","name":"Charger","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0323","kind":"malware","description":"[Charger](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0323) checks the local settings of the device and does not run its malicious logic if the device is located in Ukraine, Russia, or Belarus.(Citation: CheckPoint-Charger)","relationship_id":"relationship--85c7e956-3ce5-4495-b52e-385ae2ee4f9b","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint-Charger","description":"Oren Koriat and Andrey Polkovnichenko. (2017, January 24). Charger Malware Calls and Raises the Risk on Google Play. Retrieved January 24, 2017.","url":"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/01/24/charger-malware/"}]},{"id":"S0324","name":"SpyDealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0324","kind":"malware","description":"[SpyDealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0324) harvests location data from victims.(Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)","relationship_id":"relationship--be136fd1-6949-4de6-be37-6d76f8def41a","references":[{"source_name":"PaloAlto-SpyDealer","description":"Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/"}]},{"id":"S0327","name":"Skygofree","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0327","kind":"malware","description":"[Skygofree](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0327) can track the device's location.(Citation: Kaspersky-Skygofree)","relationship_id":"relationship--3c3c957e-7a23-4801-9f6a-ba599ad727d7","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky-Skygofree","description":"Nikita Buchka and Alexey Firsh. (2018, January 16). Skygofree: Following in the footsteps of HackingTeam. Retrieved September 24, 2018.","url":"https://securelist.com/skygofree-following-in-the-footsteps-of-hackingteam/83603/"}]},{"id":"S0328","name":"Stealth Mango","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0328","kind":"malware","description":"[Stealth Mango](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0328) can perform GPS location tracking as well as capturing coordinates as when an SMS message or call is received.(Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)","relationship_id":"relationship--f7c5c344-4310-4e2a-a5aa-133f3d132fff","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-StealthMango","description":"Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-stealth-mango-srr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0329","name":"Tangelo","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329","kind":"malware","description":"[Tangelo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329) contains functionality to gather GPS coordinates.(Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)","relationship_id":"relationship--7accde36-cb29-43c6-8c66-6486efd867a8","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-StealthMango","description":"Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-stealth-mango-srr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0399","name":"Pallas","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0399","kind":"malware","description":"[Pallas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0399) tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--a8ac5084-5631-4670-8ac6-6fbe7bdb0a84","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018","description":"Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0405","name":"Exodus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0405","kind":"malware","description":"[Exodus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0405) Two can extract the GPS coordinates of the device.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--d22d309b-ab00-4f17-b6bf-7706f499cc5e","references":[{"source_name":"SWB Exodus March 2019","description":"Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200314194610/https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html"}]},{"id":"S0407","name":"Monokle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407","kind":"malware","description":"[Monokle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407) can track the device's location.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle)","relationship_id":"relationship--c6241ba3-e0f9-48a7-9ed7-a5544a090081","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-Monokle","description":"Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408","kind":"tool","description":" [FlexiSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408) can track the device's location.(Citation: CyberMerchants-FlexiSpy)","relationship_id":"relationship--e03b0eb5-32c6-4867-9235-77fe32192983","references":[{"source_name":"CyberMerchants-FlexiSpy","description":"Actis B. (2017, April 22). FlexSpy Application Analysis. Retrieved September 4, 2019.","url":"http://www.cybermerchantsofdeath.com/blog/2017/04/22/FlexiSpy.html"}]},{"id":"S0418","name":"ViceLeaker","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0418","kind":"malware","description":"[ViceLeaker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0418) can collect location information, including GPS coordinates.(Citation: SecureList - ViceLeaker 2019)(Citation: Bitdefender - Triout 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--a1023a75-31cc-420a-9c59-b440f7fb27e6","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList - ViceLeaker 2019","description":"GReAT. (2019, June 26).  ViceLeaker Operation: mobile espionage targeting Middle East. Retrieved November 21, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/fanning-the-flames-viceleaker-operation/90877/"},{"source_name":"Bitdefender - Triout 2018","description":"L. Arsene, C. Ochinca. (2018, August 20). Triout – Spyware Framework for Android with Extensive Surveillance Capabilities. Retrieved January 21, 2020.","url":"https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/08/triout-spyware-framework-for-android-with-extensive-surveillance-capabilities/"}]},{"id":"S0421","name":"GolfSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0421","kind":"malware","description":"[GolfSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0421) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Trend Micro Bouncing Golf 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--5088a10e-03d2-4643-8df8-b7b601c2cc24","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Bouncing Golf 2019","description":"E. Xu, G. Guo. (2019, June 28).  Mobile Cyberespionage Campaign ‘Bouncing Golf’ Affects Middle East. Retrieved January 27, 2020.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/mobile-cyberespionage-campaign-bouncing-golf-affects-middle-east/"}]},{"id":"S0422","name":"Anubis","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0422","kind":"malware","description":"[Anubis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0422) can retrieve the device’s GPS location.(Citation: Cofense Anubis)","relationship_id":"relationship--806a9338-be20-4eef-aa54-067633ac0e58","references":[{"source_name":"Cofense Anubis","description":"M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved September 25, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20231222134431/https://cofense.com/blog/infostealer-keylogger-ransomware-one-anubis-targets-250-android-applications/"}]},{"id":"S0425","name":"Corona Updates","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0425","kind":"malware","description":"[Corona Updates](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0425) can track the device’s location.(Citation: TrendMicro Coronavirus Updates)","relationship_id":"relationship--4b8d027d-5da2-4a01-ad31-b6644a5cda61","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro Coronavirus Updates","description":"T. Bao, J. Lu. (2020, April 14).  Coronavirus Update App Leads to Project Spy Android and iOS Spyware. Retrieved April 24, 2020.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/coronavirus-update-app-leads-to-project-spy-android-and-ios-spyware/"}]},{"id":"S0463","name":"INSOMNIA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0463","kind":"malware","description":"[INSOMNIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0463) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Google Project Zero Insomnia)","relationship_id":"relationship--0ef4845d-994e-4f0d-9eed-7cf600fc03b4","references":[{"source_name":"Google Project Zero Insomnia","description":"I. Beer. (2019, August 29). Implant Teardown. Retrieved June 2, 2020.","url":"https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teardown.html"}]},{"id":"S0480","name":"Cerberus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0480","kind":"malware","description":"[Cerberus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0480) can collect the device’s location.(Citation: Threat Fabric Cerberus)","relationship_id":"relationship--70fa8498-6117-4e15-ae3c-f53d63996826","references":[{"source_name":"Threat Fabric Cerberus","description":"Threat Fabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved June 26, 2020.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html"}]},{"id":"S0485","name":"Mandrake","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485","kind":"malware","description":"[Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) can collect the device’s location.(Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)","relationship_id":"relationship--ba5fc090-d420-4006-9dc0-57b75260b5f6","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Mandrake","description":"R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/329/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-Mandrake-creat4464-en-EN-interactive.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0505","name":"Desert Scorpion","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505","kind":"malware","description":"[Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Lookout Desert Scorpion)","relationship_id":"relationship--98b14660-79e1-4244-99c2-3dedd84eb68d","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Desert Scorpion","description":"A. Blaich, M. Flossman. (2018, April 16). Lookout finds new surveillanceware in Google Play with ties to known threat actor targeting the Middle East. Retrieved September 11, 2020.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/desert-scorpion-google-play"}]},{"id":"S0506","name":"ViperRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0506","kind":"malware","description":"[ViperRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0506) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Lookout ViperRAT)","relationship_id":"relationship--7c6207c7-d738-4a17-8380-595c86574b64","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout ViperRAT","description":"M. Flossman. (2017, February 16). ViperRAT: The mobile APT targeting the Israeli Defense Force that should be on your radar. Retrieved September 11, 2020.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/viperrat-mobile-apt"}]},{"id":"S0507","name":"eSurv","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0507","kind":"malware","description":"[eSurv](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0507) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Lookout eSurv)","relationship_id":"relationship--72a88d43-4144-444e-8f71-ac0d19ae3710","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout eSurv","description":"A. Bauer. (2019, April 8). Lookout discovers phishing sites distributing new iOS and Android surveillanceware. Retrieved September 11, 2020.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/esurv-research"}]},{"id":"S0529","name":"CarbonSteal","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529","kind":"malware","description":"[CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) can access the device’s location and track the device over time.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--a09f8daa-aa02-45f1-8dac-9bea355c9415","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0535","name":"Golden Cup","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0535","kind":"malware","description":"[Golden Cup](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0535) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Symantec GoldenCup)","relationship_id":"relationship--89565753-23c4-422d-a9ba-39f4101cd819","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec GoldenCup","description":"R. Iarchy, E. Rynkowski. (2018, July 5). GoldenCup: New Cyber Threat Targeting World Cup Fans. Retrieved October 29, 2020.","url":"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/expert-perspectives/goldencup-new-cyber-threat-targeting-world-cup-fans"}]},{"id":"S0536","name":"GPlayed","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0536","kind":"malware","description":"[GPlayed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0536) can request the device’s location.(Citation: Talos GPlayed)","relationship_id":"relationship--ea2ad242-4365-4868-8beb-4a634f3ba6b7","references":[{"source_name":"Talos GPlayed","description":"V. Ventura. (2018, October 11).  GPlayed Trojan - .Net playing with Google Market . Retrieved November 24, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/10/gplayedtrojan.html"}]},{"id":"S0544","name":"HenBox","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544","kind":"malware","description":"[HenBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox)","relationship_id":"relationship--cdb9788e-7d16-482e-92b6-cbde0b3de357","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto HenBox","description":"A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/"}]},{"id":"S0549","name":"SilkBean","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0549","kind":"malware","description":"[SilkBean](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0549) has access to the device’s location.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--d0c039cb-c815-4d9c-a100-a45f923bc65b","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0551","name":"GoldenEagle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0551","kind":"malware","description":"[GoldenEagle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0551) has tracked location.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--5c7508ae-5d05-49fd-a489-b944d3b45dd0","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0555","name":"CHEMISTGAMES","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0555","kind":"malware","description":"[CHEMISTGAMES](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0555) has collected the device’s location.(Citation: CYBERWARCON CHEMISTGAMES)","relationship_id":"relationship--44b63426-1ea7-456e-907b-0856e3eab0c3","references":[{"source_name":"CYBERWARCON CHEMISTGAMES","description":"B. Leonard, N. Mehta. (2019, November 21). The Secret Life of Sandworms. Retrieved December 31, 2020.","url":"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoNSbm1aX_w"}]},{"id":"S0558","name":"Tiktok Pro","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0558","kind":"malware","description":"[Tiktok Pro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0558) can track the device’s location.(Citation: Zscaler TikTok Spyware)","relationship_id":"relationship--22f3d28b-ba0c-4aa3-99b4-60790ba9c7b6","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler TikTok Spyware","description":"S. Desai. (2020, September 8). TikTok Spyware. Retrieved January 5, 2021.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/tiktok-spyware"}]},{"id":"S0577","name":"FrozenCell","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577","kind":"malware","description":"[FrozenCell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577) has used an online cell tower geolocation service to track targets.(Citation: Lookout FrozenCell)","relationship_id":"relationship--0d2d9c6e-6ac8-4cda-bfa4-cedf26a1760a","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout FrozenCell","description":"Michael Flossman. (2017, October 5). FrozenCell: Multi-platform surveillance campaign against Palestinians. Retrieved November 11, 2020.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/frozencell-mobile-threat"}]},{"id":"S0655","name":"BusyGasper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655","kind":"malware","description":"[BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) can collect the device’s location information based on cellular network or GPS coordinates.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)","relationship_id":"relationship--b45cf5e0-7427-4d5c-be2c-22f5231493d1","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList BusyGasper","description":"Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/busygasper-the-unfriendly-spy/87627/"}]},{"id":"S1061","name":"AbstractEmu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061","kind":"malware","description":"[AbstractEmu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061) can access a device's location.(Citation: lookout_abstractemu_1021)","relationship_id":"relationship--c7f876d4-99f2-41ac-993c-57a3f2b4e0eb","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_abstractemu_1021","description":"P Shunk, K Balaam. (2021, October 28). Rooting Malware Makes a Comeback: Lookout Discovers Global Campaign. Retrieved February 6, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-global-rooting-malware-campaign"}]},{"id":"S1069","name":"TangleBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1069","kind":"malware","description":"[TangleBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1069) can request location permissions.(Citation: cloudmark_tanglebot_0921)","relationship_id":"relationship--276bfd69-33cc-4665-8aa7-72bed65d01f9","references":[{"source_name":"cloudmark_tanglebot_0921","description":"Felipe Naves, Andrew Conway, W. Stuart Jones, Adam McNeil . (2021, September 23). TangleBot: New Advanced SMS Malware Targets Mobile Users Across U.S. and Canada with COVID-19 Lures. Retrieved February 28, 2023.","url":"https://www.cloudmark.com/en/blog/malware/tanglebot-new-advanced-sms-malware-targets-mobile-users-across-us-and-canada-covid-19"}]},{"id":"S1077","name":"Hornbill","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077","kind":"malware","description":"[Hornbill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077) can access a device’s location and check if GPS is enabled. [Hornbill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077) has logic to only log location changes greater than 70 meters.(Citation: lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221)","relationship_id":"relationship--6ad4f199-99fe-4366-87be-7a462f6c89b0","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221","description":"Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-novel-confucius-apt-android-spyware-linked-to-india-pakistan-conflict"}]},{"id":"S1079","name":"BOULDSPY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1079","kind":"malware","description":"[BOULDSPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1079) can get a device’s location using GPS or network.(Citation: lookout_bouldspy_0423)","relationship_id":"relationship--fadd27ec-56ac-4834-af40-76c9e8764eb9","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_bouldspy_0423","description":"Kyle Schmittle, Alemdar Islamoglu, Paul Shunk, Justin Albrecht. (2023, April 27). Lookout Discovers Android Spyware Tied to Iranian Police Targeting Minorities: BouldSpy. Retrieved July 21, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/iranian-spyware-bouldspy"}]},{"id":"S1080","name":"Fakecalls","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1080","kind":"malware","description":"[Fakecalls](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1080) can access a device’s location.(Citation: kaspersky_fakecalls_0422)","relationship_id":"relationship--502fc83c-ce03-4ce7-a202-095bbe0b492b","references":[{"source_name":"kaspersky_fakecalls_0422","description":"Igor Golovin. (2022, April 11). Fakecalls: a talking Trojan. Retrieved July 21, 2023.","url":"https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/fakecalls-banking-trojan/44072/"}]},{"id":"S1082","name":"Sunbird","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1082","kind":"malware","description":"[Sunbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1082) can access a device’s location.(Citation: lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221)","relationship_id":"relationship--7825f4b1-75ca-4377-b8f6-0dda9311d889","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221","description":"Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-novel-confucius-apt-android-spyware-linked-to-india-pakistan-conflict"}]},{"id":"S1083","name":"Chameleon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083","kind":"malware","description":"[Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has gathered device location data.(Citation: cyble_chameleon_0423)","relationship_id":"relationship--3c6776b9-258c-460c-b4b4-ea1a1453e5c5","references":[{"source_name":"cyble_chameleon_0423","description":"Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs. (2023, April 13). Banking Trojan targeting mobile users in Australia and Poland. Retrieved August 16, 2023.","url":"https://cyble.com/blog/chameleon-a-new-android-malware-spotted-in-the-wild/"}]},{"id":"S1092","name":"Escobar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1092","kind":"malware","description":"[Escobar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1092) can request coarse and fine location permissions to track the device.(Citation: Bleeipng Computer Escobar)","relationship_id":"relationship--50d8e788-d405-45e8-b6b7-0f02f353cc97","references":[{"source_name":"Bleeipng Computer Escobar","description":"B. Toulas. (2022, March 12). Android malware Escobar steals your Google Authenticator MFA codes. Retrieved September 28, 2023.","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-malware-escobar-steals-your-google-authenticator-mfa-codes/"}]},{"id":"S1093","name":"FlyTrap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1093","kind":"malware","description":"[FlyTrap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1093) can collect device geolocation data.(Citation: Trend Micro FlyTrap)","relationship_id":"relationship--907db911-b39c-4230-b6ad-a0ba5ef6926a","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro FlyTrap","description":"Trend Micro. (2021, August 17). FlyTrap Android Malware Is Taking Over Facebook Accounts — Protect Yourself With a Malware Scanner. Retrieved September 28, 2023.","url":"https://news.trendmicro.com/2021/08/17/flytrap-android-malware-is-taking-over-facebook-accounts-protect-yourself-with-a-malware-scanner/"}]},{"id":"S1094","name":"BRATA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094","kind":"malware","description":"[BRATA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094) can track the device's location.(Citation: cleafy_brata_0122)","relationship_id":"relationship--143833fb-8034-4e75-a030-d8e47f9bebef","references":[{"source_name":"cleafy_brata_0122","description":"Federico Valentini, Francesco Lubatti. (2022, January 24). How BRATA is monitoring your bank account. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/how-brata-is-monitoring-your-bank-account"}]},{"id":"S1095","name":"AhRat","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095","kind":"malware","description":"[AhRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095) can track the device’s location.(Citation: welivesecurity_ahrat_0523)","relationship_id":"relationship--56a0173f-68ec-48f6-88d8-ed1e7a2470ba","references":[{"source_name":"welivesecurity_ahrat_0523","description":"Lukas Stefanko. (2023, May 23). Android app breaking bad: From legitimate screen recording to file exfiltration within a year. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/05/23/android-app-breaking-bad-legitimate-screen-recording-file-exfiltration/"}]},{"id":"S1128","name":"HilalRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1128","kind":"malware","description":"[HilalRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1128) can access a device’s location.(Citation: Meta Adversarial Threat Report 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--93c16b23-305c-418d-9792-6e44525ed85a","references":[{"source_name":"Meta Adversarial Threat Report 2022","description":"Agranovich, D., et al. (2022, April). Adversarial Threat Report. Retrieved April 2, 2024.","url":"https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Meta-Quarterly-Adversarial-Threat-Report_Q1-2022.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1185","name":"LightSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185","kind":"malware","description":"[LightSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185) has accessed the device’s GPS location.(Citation: MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024)(Citation: Threatfabric LightSpy 2023)(Citation: Shoshin_Kaspersky LightSpy 2020)(Citation: LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--c052da1e-4a1e-48bb-9b8d-b68839d4347e","references":[{"source_name":"LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025","description":"Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy's iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025.","url":"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/coordinated-kill-switch-lightspys-ios-destructive-plugin-bestuzhev-zhoye/"},{"source_name":"MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024","description":"Melikov, D. (2024, April 11). LightSpy Returns: Renewed Espionage Campaign Targets Southern Asia, Possibly India. Retrieved January 14, 2025.","url":"https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/04/lightspy-returns-renewed-espionage-campaign-targets-southern-asia-possibly-india"},{"source_name":"Shoshin_Kaspersky LightSpy 2020","description":"Shoshin, P. (2020, March 27). LightSpy spyware targets iPhone users in Hong Kong. Retrieved February 12, 2025.","url":"https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/lightspy-watering-hole-attack/21301/"},{"source_name":"Threatfabric LightSpy 2023","description":"ThreatFabric. (2023, October 2). LightSpy mAPT Mobile Payment System Attack. Retrieved January 17, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/lightspy-mapt-mobile-payment-system-attack"}]},{"id":"S1195","name":"SpyC23","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1195","kind":"malware","description":"[SpyC23](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1195) can access the device's location.(Citation: SentinelLabs AridViper 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--5a55b7a2-52ab-4cf8-abc1-8ec4e42102cb","references":[{"source_name":"SentinelLabs AridViper 2023","description":"Delamotte, A. (2023, November 6). Arid Viper | APT’s Nest of SpyC23 Malware Continues to Target Android Devices. Retrieved December 2, 2024.","url":"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/arid-viper-apts-nest-of-spyc23-malware-continues-to-target-android-devices/"}]},{"id":"S1216","name":"TriangleDB","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1216","kind":"malware","description":"[TriangleDB](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1216) has monitored the device’s geolocation, which includes coordinates, altitude, bearing and speed.(Citation: SecureList OpTriangulation 21Jun2023) ","relationship_id":"relationship--41b7cdc1-0b0a-49da-b694-774c22e6cd27","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList OpTriangulation 21Jun2023","description":"Kucherin, G., et al. (2023, June 21). Dissecting TriangleDB, a Triangulation spyware implant. Retrieved April 18, 2024.","url":"https://securelist.com/triangledb-triangulation-implant/110050/"}]},{"id":"S1241","name":"RatMilad","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1241","kind":"malware","description":"[RatMilad](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1241) has collected the device’s last known location.(Citation: ZimperiumGupta_RatMilad_Oct2022) ","relationship_id":"relationship--8b9c56b9-0807-4ce7-ad81-428aaf0e925b","references":[{"source_name":"ZimperiumGupta_RatMilad_Oct2022","description":"Gupta, N. (2022, October 5). We Smell A RatMilad Android Spyware. Retrieved August 27, 2025.","url":"https://zimperium.com/blog/we-smell-a-ratmilad-mobile-spyware"}]},{"id":"S1243","name":"DCHSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243","kind":"malware","description":"[DCHSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243) has collected location data.(Citation: Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--53c19d17-7109-4394-9c38-7a7514cddd0a","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025","description":"Albrecht, J., Islamoglu, A. (2025, July 21). Lookout Discovers Iranian APT MuddyWater Leveraging DCHSpy During Israel-Iran Conflict . Retrieved September 19, 2025.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/article/lookout-discovers-iranian-dchsy-surveillanceware"}]},{"id":"S9005","name":"DocSwap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005","kind":"malware","description":"[DocSwap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005) has the ability to collect location information and to start/stop location information from being sent to the C2 server.(Citation: EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025)(Citation: S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--b9920bae-9bcc-41ea-92c4-cdf40d9f3506","references":[{"source_name":"EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025","description":"EnkiWhiteHat. (2025, December 16). Kimsuky Distributing Malicious Mobile App via QR Code. Retrieved January 8, 2026.","url":"https://www.enki.co.kr/en/media-center/blog/kimsuky-distributing-malicious-mobile-app-via-qr-code"},{"source_name":"S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025","description":"Kim, H., S2W TALON. (2025, March 13). Detailed Analysis of DocSwap Malware Disguised as Security Document Viewer. Retrieved January 12, 2026.","url":"https://medium.com/s2wblog/detailed-analysis-of-docswap-malware-disguised-as-security-document-viewer-218a728c36ff"}]},{"id":"S9006","name":"VajraSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006","kind":"malware","description":"[VajraSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006) has exfiltrated the device’s location.(Citation: ESET_VajraSpy_Feb2024) [VajraSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006) has also requested for `android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` and `android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION` to obtain the device’s location.(Citation: K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022) ","relationship_id":"relationship--598005fe-a176-421e-8086-e9593fcfa40d","references":[{"source_name":"K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022","description":"Dhanalakshmi. (2022, April 19).  VajraSpy – An Android RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2025.","url":"https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/vajraspy-an-android-rat/"},{"source_name":"ESET_VajraSpy_Feb2024","description":"Stefanko, L. (2024, February 1). VajraSpy: A Patchwork of espionage apps. Retrieved October 27, 2025.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/vajraspy-patchwork-espionage-apps/"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0112","name":"Windshift","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112) has included location tracking capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.(Citation: BlackBerry Bahamut)","relationship_id":"relationship--b5590b50-0aaa-4f43-9b29-f17ee717b551","references":[{"source_name":"BlackBerry Bahamut","description":"The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.","url":"https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/pdfviewer?file=/content/dam/blackberry-com/asset/enterprise/pdf/direct/report-spark-bahamut.pdf"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1006","name":"Use Recent OS Version","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006","kind":"course-of-action","description":"On Android 11 and up, users are not prompted with the option to select “Allow all the time” and must navigate to the settings page to manually select this option. On iOS 14 and up, users can select whether to provide Precise Location for each installed application. ","relationship_id":"relationship--1b633efc-762f-47f9-96c3-d08ba92e0e3e","references":[]},{"id":"M1011","name":"User Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to location information. Users should also protect their account credentials and enable multi-factor authentication options when available. ","relationship_id":"relationship--9c284d41-21ef-4009-bb47-3ae09b08f38d","references":[]},{"id":"M1012","name":"Enterprise Policy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1012","kind":"course-of-action","description":"If devices are enrolled using Apple User Enrollment or using a profile owner enrollment mode for Android, device controls prevent the enterprise from accessing the device’s physical location. This is typically used for a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) deployment. ","relationship_id":"relationship--544e8fc3-c656-4081-9b4f-8a5d60926f47","references":[]},{"id":"M1014","name":"Interconnection Filtering","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1014","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Filtering requests by checking request origin information may provide some defense against spurious operators.(Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) ","relationship_id":"relationship--a98c127b-8da9-4ea5-980e-d154ea541ec9","references":[{"source_name":"CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport","description":"Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200330012714/https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1430":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1430/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1430","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0112","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","api":"android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera","result":"permission_denied","thread":"main"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0116","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","action":"permission_prompt","prompt_observed":true,"result":"denied"}}]}}