{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1406","id":"T1406","name":"Obfuscated Files or Information","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"5dc7ad8ba0967f7f247fc2ad3ebbcedd3a99f85e929c08157b85258670a0a21e","description":"Adversaries may attempt to make a payload or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the device or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. \n \nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plaintext strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled.(Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB) ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406","external_id":"T1406"},{"source_name":"Microsoft MalLockerB","description":"D. Venkatesan. (2020, October 8). Sophisticated new Android malware marks the latest evolution of mobile ransomware . Retrieved October 29, 2020.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/10/08/sophisticated-new-android-malware-marks-the-latest-evolution-of-mobile-ransomware/"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html","external_id":"APP-21"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"mobile/T1406.001","id":"T1406.001","name":"Steganography","page":"techniques/mobile/T1406.001/"},{"key":"mobile/T1406.002","id":"T1406.002","name":"Software Packing","page":"techniques/mobile/T1406.002/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1406","id":"T1406","name":"Obfuscated Files or Information","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1406/","page":"detections/mobile/T1406/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0720","name":"Detection of Obfuscated Files or Information","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--7c507410-2dc7-4159-88ec-b2228547ae67","relationship_id":"relationship--6d0c1fb2-095f-4cd7-9594-0299823e3b0e","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1851","name":"Analytic 1851","guidance":"For Android, detect Obfuscated Files or Information by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate File Creation via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: open() with O_CREAT on path LIKE '/data/data/%/files/%' for binary or dex content by app_package NOT IN $LegitDynamicLoaders$]; Module Load via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: DexClassLoader() or dlopen() called with path argument matching file written in preceding $DecryptExecWindow$]; Network Connection Creation via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1851","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"LegitDynamicLoaders","description":"React Native, Unity, Xamarin runtime packages — legitimate apps that use dynamic code loading. Tightening: empty list (all dynamic loading flagged). Loosening: broad list reduces FP for game engines. Derive from MDM-approved app catalog."},{"field":"DecryptExecWindow","description":"Default 60s between file write and module load. Tightening: 10s — synchronous decrypt-load pattern."},{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"Per-app known CDN/update endpoints from 30-day network baseline. Derive by measurement."},{"field":"PostLoadWindow","description":"Default 120s between module load and novel network connection."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"mobile:ForensicArtifacts","channel":"Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: open() with O_CREAT on path LIKE '/data/data/%/files/%' for binary or dex content by app_package NOT IN $LegitDynamicLoaders$","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1851","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1851","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"mobile:DynamicAnalysis","channel":"Dynamic API/runtime trace: DexClassLoader() or dlopen() called with path argument matching file written in preceding $DecryptExecWindow$","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1851","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1851","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"android:EnterpriseNetworkLog","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1851","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1851","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]},{"id":"AN1852","name":"Analytic 1852","guidance":"For iOS, detect Obfuscated Files or Information by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Network Traffic Content via Enterprise Secure Web Gateway / Proxy [DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1852","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"Per-app declared CDN/update endpoints from 30-day baseline."},{"field":"AppBaselineDomains","description":"Full per-app network destination baseline, 30-day."},{"field":"ContentEntropyThreshold","description":"Default 7.0 bits Shannon entropy. Calibrate against known-good app responses."},{"field":"MinPayloadSize","description":"Default 1024 bytes — exclude trivial config responses."},{"field":"BehavioralForkWindow","description":"Default 120s between download and new destination first seen."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1852","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1852","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"webproxy:applog","channel":"DNS/HTTP(S) inspection or proxy transaction metadata where enterprise decryption/inspection is deployed","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1852","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1852","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"iOS:NetworkExtension","channel":"NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1852","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0720#AN1852","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","page":"tools/S0408/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","page":"tools/S0408/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0286","name":"OBAD","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0286","kind":"malware","description":"[OBAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0286) contains encrypted code along with an obfuscated decryption routine to make it difficult to analyze.(Citation: TrendMicro-Obad)","relationship_id":"relationship--b67f04d9-1cbd-49b4-9ec3-a33a41ac42ab","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro-Obad","description":"Veo Zhang. (2013, June 13). Cybercriminals Improve Android Malware Stealth Routines with OBAD. Retrieved December 9, 2016.","url":"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/"}]},{"id":"S0293","name":"BrainTest","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0293","kind":"malware","description":"[BrainTest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0293) stores a secondary Android app package (APK) in its assets directory in encrypted form, and decrypts the payload at runtime.(Citation: Lookout-BrainTest)","relationship_id":"relationship--78cc0d6d-6347-45a4-a18c-ca76150aa7a9","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-BrainTest","description":"Chris Dehghanpoor. (2016, January 6). Brain Test re-emerges: 13 apps found in Google Play  Read more: Brain Test re-emerges: 13 apps found in Google Play. Retrieved December 21, 2016.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/01/06/brain-test-re-emerges/"}]},{"id":"S0312","name":"WireLurker","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0312","kind":"malware","description":"[WireLurker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0312) obfuscates its payload through complex code structure, multiple component versions, file hiding, code obfuscation and customized encryption to thwart anti-reversing.(Citation: PaloAlto-WireLurker)","relationship_id":"relationship--b3bb33bf-9034-4d5c-8ea0-31d3bbd12b6b","references":[{"source_name":"PaloAlto-WireLurker","description":"Claud Xiao. (2014, November 5). WireLurker: A New Era in OS X and iOS Malware. Retrieved January 24, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2014/11/wirelurker-new-era-os-x-ios-malware/"}]},{"id":"S0318","name":"XLoader for Android","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0318","kind":"malware","description":"[XLoader for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0318) loads an encrypted DEX code payload.(Citation: TrendMicro-XLoader)","relationship_id":"relationship--a5b72279-f99e-4f03-8669-04322b40ee6b","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro-XLoader","description":"Lorin Wu. (2018, April 19). XLoader Android Spyware and Banking Trojan Distributed via DNS Spoofing. Retrieved July 6, 2018.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/xloader-android-spyware-and-banking-trojan-distributed-via-dns-spoofing/"}]},{"id":"S0323","name":"Charger","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0323","kind":"malware","description":"[Charger](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0323) encodes strings into binary arrays to make it difficult to inspect them. It also loads code from encrypted resources dynamically and includes meaningless commands that mask the actual commands passing through.(Citation: CheckPoint-Charger)","relationship_id":"relationship--bee6407a-1f05-4f91-b6e7-a8f8b58fa421","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint-Charger","description":"Oren Koriat and Andrey Polkovnichenko. (2017, January 24). Charger Malware Calls and Raises the Risk on Google Play. Retrieved January 24, 2017.","url":"http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/01/24/charger-malware/"}]},{"id":"S0399","name":"Pallas","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0399","kind":"malware","description":"[Pallas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0399) stores domain information and URL paths as hardcoded AES-encrypted, base64-encoded strings.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--32958f57-ad9b-4fe1-abf3-6f92df895014","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018","description":"Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0406","name":"Gustuff","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0406","kind":"malware","description":"[Gustuff](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0406) obfuscated command information using a custom base85-based encoding.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--0b1aae4b-4dcd-41b6-a708-1441e5a24070","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Gustuff Apr 2019","description":"Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9).  Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html"}]},{"id":"S0407","name":"Monokle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407","kind":"malware","description":"[Monokle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0407) uses XOR to obfuscate its second stage binary.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle)","relationship_id":"relationship--12098dee-27b3-4d0b-a15a-6b5955ba8879","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-Monokle","description":"Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408","kind":"tool","description":"[FlexiSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408) encrypts its configuration file using AES.(Citation: FortiGuard-FlexiSpy)","relationship_id":"relationship--a28a53e9-7a42-4f81-bced-0efbc3128cbd","references":[{"source_name":"FortiGuard-FlexiSpy","description":"K. Lu. (n.d.). Deep Technical Analysis of the Spyware FlexiSpy for Android. Retrieved September 10, 2019.","url":"https://d3gpjj9d20n0p3.cloudfront.net/fortiguard/research/Dig%20Deep%20into%20FlexiSpy%20for%20Android%28white%20paper%29_KaiLu.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0411","name":"Rotexy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0411","kind":"malware","description":"Starting in 2017, the [Rotexy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0411) DEX file was packed with garbage strings and/or operations.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--a8dd6ed7-910d-4bae-a2a8-19f3f32c915c","references":[{"source_name":"securelist rotexy 2018","description":"T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22).  The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/"}]},{"id":"S0420","name":"Dvmap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0420","kind":"malware","description":"[Dvmap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0420) decrypts executables from archive files stored in the `assets` directory of the installation binary.(Citation: SecureList DVMap June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--d886f368-a38b-4cb3-906f-9b284f58b369","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList DVMap June 2017","description":"R. Unuchek. (2017, June 8). Dvmap: the first Android malware with code injection. Retrieved December 10, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/dvmap-the-first-android-malware-with-code-injection/78648/"}]},{"id":"S0421","name":"GolfSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0421","kind":"malware","description":"[GolfSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0421) encodes its configurations using a customized algorithm.(Citation: Trend Micro Bouncing Golf 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--60db521a-ae2d-4a9a-8c6d-47a5528f1ecb","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Bouncing Golf 2019","description":"E. Xu, G. Guo. (2019, June 28).  Mobile Cyberespionage Campaign ‘Bouncing Golf’ Affects Middle East. Retrieved January 27, 2020.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/mobile-cyberespionage-campaign-bouncing-golf-affects-middle-east/"}]},{"id":"S0423","name":"Ginp","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0423","kind":"malware","description":"[Ginp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0423) obfuscates its payload, code, and strings.(Citation: ThreatFabric Ginp)","relationship_id":"relationship--f88cbb0c-ca34-4a87-82fa-e0e567ee8d57","references":[{"source_name":"ThreatFabric Ginp","description":"ThreatFabric. (2019, November). Ginp - A malware patchwork borrowing from Anubis. Retrieved April 8, 2020.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/ginp_a_malware_patchwork_borrowing_from_anubis.html"}]},{"id":"S0427","name":"TrickMo","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0427","kind":"malware","description":"[TrickMo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0427) contains obfuscated function, class, and variable names, and encrypts its shared preferences using Java’s `PBEWithMD5AndDES` algorithm.(Citation: SecurityIntelligence TrickMo)","relationship_id":"relationship--fd5b3d4b-5d56-4d66-8b57-f858bc139901","references":[{"source_name":"SecurityIntelligence TrickMo","description":"P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/trickbot-pushing-a-2fa-bypass-app-to-bank-customers-in-germany/"}]},{"id":"S0432","name":"Bread","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0432","kind":"malware","description":"[Bread](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0432) uses various tricks to obfuscate its strings including standard and custom encryption, programmatically building strings at runtime, and splitting unencrypted strings with repeated delimiters to break up keywords. [Bread](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0432) has also abused Java and JavaScript features to obfuscate code. [Bread](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0432) payloads have hidden code in native libraries and encrypted JAR files in the data section of an ELF file. [Bread](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0432) has stored DEX payloads as base64-encoded strings in the Android manifest and internal Java classes.(Citation: Check Point-Joker)(Citation: Google Bread)","relationship_id":"relationship--29357289-362c-447c-b387-9a38b50d7296","references":[{"source_name":"Google Bread","description":"A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020.","url":"https://security.googleblog.com/2020/01/pha-family-highlights-bread-and-friends.html"},{"source_name":"Check Point-Joker","description":"Hazum, A., Melnykov, B., Wernik, I.. (2020, July 9). New Joker variant hits Google Play with an old trick. Retrieved July 20, 2020.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/new-joker-variant-hits-google-play-with-an-old-trick/"}]},{"id":"S0463","name":"INSOMNIA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0463","kind":"malware","description":"[INSOMNIA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0463) obfuscates various pieces of information within the application.(Citation: Volexity Insomnia) ","relationship_id":"relationship--2e59d381-eac6-41c6-a5e6-f9617c10259e","references":[{"source_name":"Volexity Insomnia","description":"A. Case, D. Lassalle, M. Meltzer, S. Koessel, et al.. (2020, April 21). Evil Eye Threat Actor Resurfaces with iOS Exploit and Updated Implant. Retrieved June 2, 2020.","url":"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/04/21/evil-eye-threat-actor-resurfaces-with-ios-exploit-and-updated-implant/"}]},{"id":"S0478","name":"EventBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0478","kind":"malware","description":"[EventBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0478) dynamically loads its malicious functionality at runtime from an RC4-encrypted TTF file. [EventBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0478) also utilizes ProGuard to obfuscate the generated APK file.(Citation: Cybereason EventBot)","relationship_id":"relationship--bed52256-e5d2-4f15-8c4c-27f709e10c6c","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason EventBot","description":"D. Frank, L. Rochberger, Y. Rimmer, A. Dahan. (2020, April 30). EventBot: A New Mobile Banking Trojan is Born. Retrieved June 26, 2020.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/eventbot-a-new-mobile-banking-trojan-is-born"}]},{"id":"S0480","name":"Cerberus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0480","kind":"malware","description":"[Cerberus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0480) uses standard payload and string obfuscation techniques.(Citation: Threat Fabric Cerberus)","relationship_id":"relationship--386b0a9f-9951-4717-8bce-30c8fbe05050","references":[{"source_name":"Threat Fabric Cerberus","description":"Threat Fabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved June 26, 2020.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html"}]},{"id":"S0485","name":"Mandrake","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485","kind":"malware","description":"[Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) obfuscates its hardcoded C2 URLs.(Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)","relationship_id":"relationship--8f2ff9c5-249d-4a9a-bdc6-0cef887eaefc","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Mandrake","description":"R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/329/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-Mandrake-creat4464-en-EN-interactive.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0489","name":"WolfRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0489","kind":"malware","description":"[WolfRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0489)’s code is obfuscated.(Citation: Talos-WolfRAT)","relationship_id":"relationship--91de92af-fe1d-469e-8c36-1a9f4b621a27","references":[{"source_name":"Talos-WolfRAT","description":"W. Mercer, P. Rascagneres, V. Ventura. (2020, May 19).  The wolf is back... . Retrieved July 20, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/05/the-wolf-is-back.html"}]},{"id":"S0494","name":"Zen","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0494","kind":"malware","description":"[Zen](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0494) base64 encodes one of the strings it searches for.(Citation: Google Security Zen)","relationship_id":"relationship--97417113-1840-4e00-98d3-bb222e1a1f60","references":[{"source_name":"Google Security Zen","description":"Siewierski, L. (2019, January 11). PHA Family Highlights: Zen and its cousins . Retrieved July 27, 2020.","url":"https://security.googleblog.com/2019/01/pha-family-highlights-zen-and-its.html"}]},{"id":"S0509","name":"FakeSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0509","kind":"malware","description":"[FakeSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0509) stores its malicious code in encrypted asset files that are decrypted at runtime. Newer versions of [FakeSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0509) encrypt the C2 address.(Citation: Cybereason FakeSpy)","relationship_id":"relationship--7696b512-ba2f-4310-86e1-7c528529fc5e","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason FakeSpy","description":"O. Almkias. (2020, July 1). FakeSpy Masquerades as Postal Service Apps Around the World. Retrieved September 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/fakespy-masquerades-as-postal-service-apps-around-the-world"}]},{"id":"S0524","name":"AndroidOS/MalLocker.B","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0524","kind":"malware","description":"[AndroidOS/MalLocker.B](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0524) has employed both name mangling and meaningless variable names in source. [AndroidOS/MalLocker.B](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0524) has stored encrypted payload code in the Assets directory, coupled with a custom decryption routine that assembles a .dex file by passing data through Android Intent objects. (Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB)","relationship_id":"relationship--23cac1d7-27ca-4c78-bfa0-2d6023d21798","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft MalLockerB","description":"D. Venkatesan. (2020, October 8). Sophisticated new Android malware marks the latest evolution of mobile ransomware . Retrieved October 29, 2020.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/10/08/sophisticated-new-android-malware-marks-the-latest-evolution-of-mobile-ransomware/"}]},{"id":"S0525","name":"Android/AdDisplay.Ashas","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0525","kind":"malware","description":"[Android/AdDisplay.Ashas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0525) has hidden the C2 server address using base-64 encoding. (Citation: WeLiveSecurity AdDisplayAshas)","relationship_id":"relationship--a042d55c-b31e-41c1-9cd0-66070ec9a11d","references":[{"source_name":"WeLiveSecurity AdDisplayAshas","description":"L. Stefanko. (2019, October 24). Tracking down the developer of Android adware affecting millions of users. Retrieved October 29, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/24/tracking-down-developer-android-adware/"}]},{"id":"S0529","name":"CarbonSteal","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529","kind":"malware","description":"[CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) has used incorrect file extensions and encryption to hide most of its assets, including secondary APKs, configuration files, and JAR or DEX files.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--d7aa436a-e66d-4217-be66-4414703dec07","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0536","name":"GPlayed","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0536","kind":"malware","description":"[GPlayed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0536) has base64-encoded the exfiltrated data, replacing some of the base64 characters to further obfuscate the data.(Citation: Talos GPlayed)","relationship_id":"relationship--a299e0a6-cada-4629-a6c6-ed73dc4422aa","references":[{"source_name":"Talos GPlayed","description":"V. Ventura. (2018, October 11).  GPlayed Trojan - .Net playing with Google Market . Retrieved November 24, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/10/gplayedtrojan.html"}]},{"id":"S0539","name":"Red Alert 2.0","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0539","kind":"malware","description":"[Red Alert 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0539) has stored data embedded in the strings.xml resource file.(Citation: Sophos Red Alert 2.0)","relationship_id":"relationship--bb006be2-7d2c-4bb3-ab48-7c95e0ab8106","references":[{"source_name":"Sophos Red Alert 2.0","description":"J. Chandraiah. (2018, July 23). Red Alert 2.0: Android Trojan targets security-seekers. Retrieved December 14, 2020.","url":"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2018/07/23/red-alert-2-0-android-trojan-targets-security-seekers/"}]},{"id":"S0540","name":"Asacub","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0540","kind":"malware","description":"[Asacub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0540) has stored encrypted strings in the APK file.(Citation: Securelist Asacub)","relationship_id":"relationship--42f8d024-64a7-4bbf-8c05-2b0c7e667396","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Asacub","description":"T. Shishkova. (2018, August 28).  The rise of mobile banker Asacub. Retrieved December 14, 2020.","url":"https://securelist.com/the-rise-of-mobile-banker-asacub/87591/"}]},{"id":"S0544","name":"HenBox","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544","kind":"malware","description":"[HenBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0544) has obfuscated components using XOR, ZIP with a single-byte key or ZIP/Zlib compression wrapped with RC4 encryption.(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox)","relationship_id":"relationship--5b37d94a-64a3-432a-b340-1c9a4f553d02","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto HenBox","description":"A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/"}]},{"id":"S0545","name":"TERRACOTTA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0545","kind":"malware","description":"[TERRACOTTA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0545) has stored encoded strings.(Citation: WhiteOps TERRACOTTA)","relationship_id":"relationship--07dd3318-2965-4085-be64-a8e956c7b8da","references":[{"source_name":"WhiteOps TERRACOTTA","description":"Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020.","url":"https://www.whiteops.com/blog/terracotta-android-malware-a-technical-study"}]},{"id":"S0549","name":"SilkBean","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0549","kind":"malware","description":"[SilkBean](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0549) has hidden malicious functionality in a second stage file and has encrypted C2 server information.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--24a7379e-a994-411b-b17c-add6c6c6fc07","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0550","name":"DoubleAgent","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0550","kind":"malware","description":"[DoubleAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0550) has used an AES encrypted file in the assets folder with an unsuspecting name (e.g. ‘GoogleMusic.png’) for holding configuration and C2 information.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--ca486783-9413-4f39-8d2f-3adcb3e79127","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0555","name":"CHEMISTGAMES","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0555","kind":"malware","description":"[CHEMISTGAMES](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0555) has encrypted its DEX payload.(Citation: CYBERWARCON CHEMISTGAMES)","relationship_id":"relationship--694857ba-92e8-462e-8900-a9f6fdcf495d","references":[{"source_name":"CYBERWARCON CHEMISTGAMES","description":"B. Leonard, N. Mehta. (2019, November 21). The Secret Life of Sandworms. Retrieved December 31, 2020.","url":"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoNSbm1aX_w"}]},{"id":"S1054","name":"Drinik","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1054","kind":"malware","description":"[Drinik](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1054) has used custom encryption to hide strings, potentially to evade antivirus products.(Citation: cyble_drinik_1022)","relationship_id":"relationship--8e6b9c1e-5e28-4519-95c3-6b4a836661de","references":[{"source_name":"cyble_drinik_1022","description":"Cyble. (2022, October 27). Drinik Malware Returns With Advanced Capabilities Targeting Indian Taxpayers. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20221114031945/https://blog.cyble.com/2022/10/27/drinik-malware-returns-with-advanced-capabilities-targeting-indian-taxpayers/"}]},{"id":"S1055","name":"SharkBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055","kind":"malware","description":"[SharkBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055) can use a Domain Generation Algorithm to decode the C2 server location.(Citation: nccgroup_sharkbot_0322) ","relationship_id":"relationship--a6bb6c55-3b33-4cd4-981b-055551edc4c2","references":[{"source_name":"nccgroup_sharkbot_0322","description":"RIFT: Research and Intelligence Fusion Team. (2022, March 3). SharkBot: a “new” generation Android banking Trojan being distributed on Google Play Store. Retrieved January 18, 2023.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/03/03/sharkbot-a-new-generation-android-banking-trojan-being-distributed-on-google-play-store/"}]},{"id":"S1056","name":"TianySpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1056","kind":"malware","description":"[TianySpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1056) has encrypted C2 details, email addresses, and passwords.(Citation: trendmicro_tianyspy_0122) ","relationship_id":"relationship--38cb6365-40ba-47c6-a5e4-1a9be665f951","references":[{"source_name":"trendmicro_tianyspy_0122","description":"Trend Micro. (2022, January 25). TianySpy Malware Uses Smishing Disguised as Message From Telco. Retrieved January 11, 2023.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/a/tianyspy-malware-uses-smishing-disguised-as-message-from-telco.html"}]},{"id":"S1061","name":"AbstractEmu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061","kind":"malware","description":"[AbstractEmu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061) has encoded files, such as exploit binaries, to potentially use during and after the rooting process.(Citation: lookout_abstractemu_1021)","relationship_id":"relationship--09d08f16-9e4d-4279-9a8c-bdda7afdb37d","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_abstractemu_1021","description":"P Shunk, K Balaam. (2021, October 28). Rooting Malware Makes a Comeback: Lookout Discovers Global Campaign. Retrieved February 6, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-global-rooting-malware-campaign"}]},{"id":"S1067","name":"FluBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1067","kind":"malware","description":"[FluBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1067) can obfuscated class, string, and method names in newer malware versions.(Citation: proofpoint_flubot_0421)","relationship_id":"relationship--57e441f8-6799-4d1b-8e2a-13d8ac1c8e78","references":[{"source_name":"proofpoint_flubot_0421","description":"Crista Giering, F. Naves, Andrew Conway, Adam McNeil . (2021, April 27). FluBot Android Malware Spreading Rapidly Through Europe, May Hit U.S. Soon. Retrieved February 28, 2023.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/flubot-android-malware-spreading-rapidly-through-europe-may-hit-us-soon"}]},{"id":"S1094","name":"BRATA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094","kind":"malware","description":"[BRATA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1094) has employed code obfuscation and encryption of configuration files.(Citation: cleafy_brata_0122)(Citation: mcafee_brata_0421)","relationship_id":"relationship--5fb59cf9-9af5-4dd5-9878-dda2ba228ae5","references":[{"source_name":"cleafy_brata_0122","description":"Federico Valentini, Francesco Lubatti. (2022, January 24). How BRATA is monitoring your bank account. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/how-brata-is-monitoring-your-bank-account"},{"source_name":"mcafee_brata_0421","description":"Fernando Ruiz. (2021, April 12). BRATA Keeps Sneaking into Google Play, Now Targeting USA and Spain. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/brata-keeps-sneaking-into-google-play-now-targeting-usa-and-spain/"}]},{"id":"S1095","name":"AhRat","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095","kind":"malware","description":"[AhRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095) can use an encryption key received from its C2 to encrypt and decrypt configuration files and exfiltrated data.(Citation: welivesecurity_ahrat_0523)","relationship_id":"relationship--597579b4-7e2f-4843-8cd3-f9143eca34f2","references":[{"source_name":"welivesecurity_ahrat_0523","description":"Lukas Stefanko. (2023, May 23). Android app breaking bad: From legitimate screen recording to file exfiltration within a year. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/05/23/android-app-breaking-bad-legitimate-screen-recording-file-exfiltration/"}]},{"id":"S1185","name":"LightSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185","kind":"malware","description":"Using an XOR-chain algorithm, [LightSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185) decrypts an embedded configuration blob containing URLs for jailbreak components and next-stage payloads. It also decrypts modules in memory and on disk using AES-ECB with the hardcoded key `3e2717e8b3873b29`.(Citation: Threatfabric LightSpy 2023)(Citation: MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024)(Citation: Threatfabric LightSpy 2024)(Citation: LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025) Additionally, [LightSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185)’s plugins have been encrypted during transmission.(Citation: LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--3c4ea7a5-251c-4d10-a724-f4a247f44637","references":[{"source_name":"LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025","description":"Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy's iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025.","url":"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/coordinated-kill-switch-lightspys-ios-destructive-plugin-bestuzhev-zhoye/"},{"source_name":"MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024","description":"Melikov, D. (2024, April 11). LightSpy Returns: Renewed Espionage Campaign Targets Southern Asia, Possibly India. Retrieved January 14, 2025.","url":"https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/04/lightspy-returns-renewed-espionage-campaign-targets-southern-asia-possibly-india"},{"source_name":"Threatfabric LightSpy 2023","description":"ThreatFabric. (2023, October 2). LightSpy mAPT Mobile Payment System Attack. Retrieved January 17, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/lightspy-mapt-mobile-payment-system-attack"},{"source_name":"Threatfabric LightSpy 2024","description":"ThreatFabric. (2024, October 29). LightSpy: Implant for iOS. Retrieved January 30, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/lightspy-implant-for-ios"}]},{"id":"S1195","name":"SpyC23","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1195","kind":"malware","description":"[SpyC23](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1195) has used obfuscation techniques to hide its hardcoded C2 address.(Citation: welivesecurity_apt-c-23)","relationship_id":"relationship--76336d14-0dcb-4fc4-8423-9996dca9a9f2","references":[{"source_name":"welivesecurity_apt-c-23","description":"Stefanko, L. (2020, September 30). APT‑C‑23 group evolves its Android spyware. Retrieved March 4, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20201123042131/www.welivesecurity.com/2020/09/30/aptc23-group-evolves-its-android-spyware/"}]},{"id":"S1214","name":"Android/SpyAgent","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1214","kind":"malware","description":"[Android/SpyAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1214) has used the Tencent packer to hide its malicious payload.(Citation: McAfee MoqHao 2019) ","relationship_id":"relationship--f524f2d9-cdf7-403b-af0f-96c1c60b32a8","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee MoqHao 2019","description":"Pak, C. (2019, August 7). MoqHao Related Android Spyware Targeting Japan and Korea Found on Google Play. Retrieved November 13, 2024.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/moqhao-related-android-spyware-targeting-japan-and-korea-found-on-google-play/"}]},{"id":"S1231","name":"GodFather","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231","kind":"malware","description":"[GodFather](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1231) has obfuscated its Android manifest file with irrelevant permissions and manifest strings.(Citation: ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--d7bd4131-a95e-4f6a-a9ce-113079f1dbec","references":[{"source_name":"ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025","description":"Ortega, F. Pratapagiri, V. (2025, June 18). Your Mobile App, Their Playground: The Dark Side of Virtualization. Retrieved July 16, 2025.","url":"https://zimperium.com/blog/your-mobile-app-their-playground-the-dark-side-of-the-virtualization"}]},{"id":"S9004","name":"Crocodilus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9004","kind":"malware","description":"[Crocodilus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9004) has used XOR to encode its payload.(Citation: ThreatFabric_Crocodilus_June2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--04d9e597-f25b-40cf-bdb6-d552255acc78","references":[{"source_name":"ThreatFabric_Crocodilus_June2025","description":"ThreatFabric. (2025, June 3). Crocodilus Mobile Malware: Evolving Fast, Going Global. Retrieved November 24, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/crocodilus-mobile-malware-evolving-fast-going-global"}]},{"id":"S9005","name":"DocSwap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005","kind":"malware","description":"[DocSwap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9005) has used an obfuscated APK file and Base64-encoded URLs and files.(Citation: EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025)(Citation: S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--033e6e76-2274-4c1f-9a88-a3206836867e","references":[{"source_name":"EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025","description":"EnkiWhiteHat. (2025, December 16). Kimsuky Distributing Malicious Mobile App via QR Code. Retrieved January 8, 2026.","url":"https://www.enki.co.kr/en/media-center/blog/kimsuky-distributing-malicious-mobile-app-via-qr-code"},{"source_name":"S2W_DocSwap_Mar2025","description":"Kim, H., S2W TALON. (2025, March 13). Detailed Analysis of DocSwap Malware Disguised as Security Document Viewer. Retrieved January 12, 2026.","url":"https://medium.com/s2wblog/detailed-analysis-of-docswap-malware-disguised-as-security-document-viewer-218a728c36ff"}]},{"id":"S9040","name":"NGate","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9040","kind":"malware","description":"[NGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9040) has decrypted ASCII-hex data from the `assets/___` resource, which resulted in a config file that has the host IP address, port, `sharedToken`, and more.(Citation: CERTPL_NGate_Nov2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--d7c99131-c898-451c-811a-80505205d1f1","references":[{"source_name":"CERTPL_NGate_Nov2025","description":"Ratajczak, K. (2025, November 3). Analysis of NGate malware campaign (NFC relay). Retrieved November 10, 2025.","url":"https://cert.pl/en/posts/2025/11/analiza-ngate/"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0112","name":"Windshift","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112) has encrypted application strings using AES in ECB mode and Blowfish, and stored strings encoded in hex during Operation BULL. Further, in Operation BULL, encryption keys were stored within the application’s launcher icon file.(Citation: BlackBerry Bahamut)","relationship_id":"relationship--cc4ae06f-0258-4fe9-b63a-334d283e766d","references":[{"source_name":"BlackBerry Bahamut","description":"The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.","url":"https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/pdfviewer?file=/content/dam/blackberry-com/asset/enterprise/pdf/direct/report-spark-bahamut.pdf"}]}],"mitigations":[],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1406":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1406/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1406","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}}]}}