{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1398","id":"T1398","name":"Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"de0d41afcfcf2d602e13ec5d4347c86f2a79670004d1742d7af892f3287fe7d8","description":"Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts are part of the underlying operating system and are not accessible to the user unless the device has been rooted or jailbroken. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398","external_id":"T1398"},{"source_name":"Android-VerifiedBoot","description":"Android. (n.d.). Verified Boot. Retrieved December 21, 2016.","url":"https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html","external_id":"APP-26"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html","external_id":"APP-27"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0018","name":"Host Status","page":"telemetry/DC0018/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Host health and availability observations such as heartbeat, shutdown or degraded state.","collection_focus":"Collect agent heartbeat and OS health independently; record missed polls, last-seen time and monitor health.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","status","heartbeat_age_seconds","collector_healthy"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0018","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-host-1","status":"degraded","heartbeat_age_seconds":90,"collector_healthy":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1398","id":"T1398","name":"Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1398/","page":"detections/mobile/T1398/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0654","name":"Detection of Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--0677c510-fa4d-4a39-a14b-b91f9cde1e23","relationship_id":"relationship--70215e99-74e2-4a6a-999a-76507c20a82d","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1739","name":"Analytic 1739","guidance":"For Android, detect Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; Host Status via Android Enterprise DPC [DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported]; Network Traffic Flow via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1739","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"KnownInitPaths","description":"Known legitimate init paths: /data/adb/modules/<OEM-approved>/. Derive from device baseline inventory. Tightening: any new /data/adb/modules entry is anomalous on production fleet devices."},{"field":"AppBaselineDomains","description":"Per-device CDN baseline from 30-day measurement."},{"field":"PostRebootWindow","description":"Default 300s after MDM-recorded reboot event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1739","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1739","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0018","component":"Host Status","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1739","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1739","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0018/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"android:EnterpriseNetworkLog","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1739","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1739","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN1740","name":"Analytic 1740","guidance":"For iOS, detect Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Host Status via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1740","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"KnownAppDestinations","description":"Per-device CDN baseline from 30-day measurement."},{"field":"PostRebootWindow","description":"Default 300s after MDM-recorded reboot."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"mobile:ApplicationVetting","channel":"Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1740","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1740","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0018","component":"Host Status","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1740","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1740","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0018/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"iOS:NetworkExtension","channel":"NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1740","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0654#AN1740","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0018","name":"Host Status","tag":"Host Status","page":"telemetry/DC0018/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0285","name":"OldBoot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0285","kind":"malware","description":"[OldBoot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0285) uses escalated privileges to modify the init script on the device's boot partition to maintain persistence.(Citation: HackerNews-OldBoot)","relationship_id":"relationship--373f33be-9b40-44f5-bfd3-db2a9f5fa72c","references":[{"source_name":"HackerNews-OldBoot","description":"Sudhir K Bansal. (2014, January 28). First widely distributed Android bootkit Malware infects more than 350,000 Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.","url":"http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html"}]},{"id":"S1079","name":"BOULDSPY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1079","kind":"malware","description":"[BOULDSPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1079) can exfiltrate data when the user boots the app, or on device boot.(Citation: lookout_bouldspy_0423)","relationship_id":"relationship--f259b5a8-bf2f-48c9-ae1b-b20d53daf665","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_bouldspy_0423","description":"Kyle Schmittle, Alemdar Islamoglu, Paul Shunk, Justin Albrecht. (2023, April 27). Lookout Discovers Android Spyware Tied to Iranian Police Targeting Minorities: BouldSpy. Retrieved July 21, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/iranian-spyware-bouldspy"}]},{"id":"S1095","name":"AhRat","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095","kind":"malware","description":"[AhRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095) can register with the `BOOT_COMPLETED` broadcast to start when the device turns on.(Citation: welivesecurity_ahrat_0523)","relationship_id":"relationship--51bd38a1-465b-49c0-9218-5984f391a51c","references":[{"source_name":"welivesecurity_ahrat_0523","description":"Lukas Stefanko. (2023, May 23). Android app breaking bad: From legitimate screen recording to file exfiltration within a year. Retrieved December 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/05/23/android-app-breaking-bad-legitimate-screen-recording-file-exfiltration/"}]},{"id":"S1185","name":"LightSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185","kind":"malware","description":"[LightSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185) has established auto-start execution during the system boot process.(Citation: Threatfabric LightSpy 2024) ","relationship_id":"relationship--fed0de7b-509f-445d-90b9-4b507214298b","references":[{"source_name":"Threatfabric LightSpy 2024","description":"ThreatFabric. (2024, October 29). LightSpy: Implant for iOS. Retrieved January 30, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/lightspy-implant-for-ios"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1001","name":"Security Updates","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1001","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Security updates frequently contain fixes for vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to modify protected operating system files. ","relationship_id":"relationship--3c0b0763-78d2-4d6e-8e57-b4f27af7e414","references":[]},{"id":"M1002","name":"Attestation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1002","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Device attestation could detect devices with unauthorized or unsafe modifications. ","relationship_id":"relationship--92879f0e-d1db-4407-9cc6-c1dbcc47caea","references":[]},{"id":"M1003","name":"Lock Bootloader","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1003","kind":"course-of-action","description":"A locked bootloader could prevent unauthorized modifications to protected operating system files. ","relationship_id":"relationship--ce6c7f21-91a5-4d63-bd03-a6b57e025afe","references":[]},{"id":"M1004","name":"System Partition Integrity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1004","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Android and iOS include system partition integrity mechanisms that could detect unauthorized modifications. ","relationship_id":"relationship--82f12052-783e-40e4-8079-d9c030c310fd","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1398":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1398/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1398","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0018","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-host-1","status":"degraded","heartbeat_age_seconds":90,"collector_healthy":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}}]}}