{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T1701.005","id":"T1701.005","name":"Python","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1701/005","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"e9b2cfc2da317b5e591c68110ae41ca3c49eba5f63191f1db0c12886a900bb7b","description":"Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)\n\nPython comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Within industrial control system environments, Python libraries have been developed to implement multiple ICS protocols to establish communications with field devices. Adversaries can use these libraries or develop their own to execute commands on workstation, control server assets or send remote command messages to manipulate the industrial process through exisiting ICS protocols. \n\n","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1701/005","external_id":"T1701.005"},{"source_name":"Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020","description":"Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-31-leverages-covid-19-vaccine-theme-and-abuses-legitimate-online"}],"platforms":[],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"ics/T1701","id":"T1701","name":"Command and Scripting Interpreter","domain":"ics","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["execution"],"platforms":[],"environments":["ics-ot"],"page":"techniques/ics/T1701/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","ot_fixture_and_process_safety_review"],"telemetry_tags":["Command Execution","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/ics/T1701/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"guidance_only","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T1701.005","id":"T1701.005","name":"Python","domain":"ics","platforms":[],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1701/005","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T1701.005/","page":"detections/ics/T1701.005/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0933","name":"Behavioral Detection of Python Execution in ICS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0933","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--045550b2-8bb3-43ee-92fc-214f955fabdc","relationship_id":"relationship--e0bdfd25-c995-416e-9140-3520390da809","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN2094","name":"Analytic 2094","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies python.exe/py.exe or packaged Python runtimes launched from unexpected parents or locations, by unauthorized identities, or followed by communications to protected OT assets, system modification, or child interpreters. Alert only when the interpreter is not part of the asset's approved software/automation baseline or its execution context violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/user rule, and require OT-relevant corroboration such as access to engineering files, ICS software/API use, communications with protected OT assets, configuration change, or another suspicious follow-on behavior. Suppress documented vendor software, engineering workflows, diagnostics, backup, patching, and approved maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0933#AN2094","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedPythonInstallations","description":"Approved interpreter paths/hashes and embedded vendor runtimes"},{"field":"ScriptPath","description":"Approved automation repositories versus temp/user-writable paths"},{"field":"ParentProcess","description":"Expected vendor/engineering parents"},{"field":"UserContext","description":"Authorized automation/service accounts"},{"field":"ApprovedDestinations","description":"OT and external destinations Python may legitimately access"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1; Python interpreter/script execution and lineage","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2094","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0933#AN2094","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3; Python-originated connection to OT or external destination","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2094","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0933#AN2094","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]},{"id":"AN2095","name":"Analytic 2095","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies python/python3 execution by unexpected users/services, from unapproved script paths, or from cron/systemd contexts not associated with documented automation, particularly when followed by OT communications, sensitive file access, persistence, or child-shell activity. Alert only when the interpreter/shell is not expected for the asset role or user/service context, or when its parent, path, arguments, remote-session source, or follow-on behavior violates the approved OT baseline. Suppress approved engineering scripts, vendor support, diagnostics, backup, patching, and maintenance windows.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0933#AN2095","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedPythonInstallations","description":"Expected interpreter paths and vendor-embedded Python"},{"field":"ScriptDir","description":"Approved automation paths versus /tmp, /var/tmp, hidden/user paths"},{"field":"ScheduledContext","description":"Approved cron/systemd jobs"},{"field":"UserContext","description":"Expected service/engineering accounts"},{"field":"ApprovedDestinations","description":"Expected OT/external communications"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve for python/python3 and script path/arguments","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2095","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0933#AN2095","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"linux:osquery","channel":"socket_events for Python-originated connections, where deployed","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2095","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0933#AN2095","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1009","name":"Triton","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009","kind":"malware","description":"[Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) communicates with Triconex controllers using a custom component framework written entirely in Python. The modules that implement the TriStation communication protocol and other supporting components are found in a separate file -- library.zip -- the main script that employs this functionality is compiled into a standalone py2exe Windows executable -- trilog.exe  which includes a Python environment.(Citation: DHS CISA February 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--0ff9310f-6e24-4ad4-b704-8562f7b1b981","references":[{"source_name":"DHS CISA February 2019","description":"DHS CISA 2019, February 27 MAR-17-352-01 HatManSafety System Targeted Malware (Update B) Retrieved. 2019/03/08 ","url":"https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0938","name":"Execution Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Restrict Python execution to approved interpreters, scripts, libraries, accounts, and paths. On engineering systems where Python is required, use positive allowlisting rather than disabling the interpreter.","relationship_id":"relationship--d99e23f0-16ae-4391-a3e4-a38181114a22","references":[]},{"id":"M0947","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Inventory and audit Python interpreters, packages, virtual environments, execution paths, and ICS protocol libraries on assets where Python is authorized. Alert on new interpreters or packages outside approved engineering baselines.","relationship_id":"relationship--2049ea95-0a5e-4b85-87c6-a8307d4cf738","references":[]},{"id":"M0950","name":"Exploit Protection","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0950","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Apply exploit-protection controls to Python-capable Windows/Linux ICS overlap assets where supported, particularly when Python is embedded in engineering or vendor applications.","relationship_id":"relationship--90de74d1-598a-4372-9d7a-ed2c872b4c42","references":[]},{"id":"M1061","name":"Limit Software/Package Installation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1061","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Prevent unauthorized installation of Python interpreters and packages on ICS assets.","relationship_id":"relationship--f3b158ac-205e-483c-9b18-c4725ce24411","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1701.005":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T1701.005/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T1701.005","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}