{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0895","id":"T0895","name":"Autorun Image","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0895","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"ef6f28ef22c88b1d4418a185f31f845d8730cd9df8cabc0635fedb79bbc5ba0e","description":"Adversaries may leverage AutoRun functionality or scripts to execute malicious code. Devices configured to enable AutoRun functionality or legacy operating systems may be susceptible to abuse of these features to run malicious code stored on various forms of removeable media (i.e., USB, Disk Images [.ISO]). Commonly, AutoRun or AutoPlay are disabled in many operating systems configurations to mitigate against this technique. If a device is configured to enable AutoRun or AutoPlay, adversaries may execute code on the device by mounting the removable media to the device, either through physical or virtual means. This may be especially relevant for virtual machine environments where disk images may be dynamically mapped to a guest system on a hypervisor.  \n\nAn example could include an adversary gaining access to a hypervisor through the management interface to modify a virtual machine’s hardware configuration. They could then deploy an iso image with a malicious AutoRun script to cause the virtual machine to automatically execute the code contained on the disk image. This would enable the execution of malicious code within a virtual machine without needing any prior remote access to that system.\n","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0895","external_id":"T0895"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0042","name":"Drive Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0042/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Appearance or creation of a drive/device mapping on a host.","collection_focus":"Collect OS device/mount events plus read-only volume inventory; distinguish physical attachment, partition creation and logical mapping.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["device_id","mount_point","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0042","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"lab-disk-2","mount_point":"/mnt/lab","action":"attach"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Access to file objects with user, process and access-right context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","access","actor","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0004","name":"Firmware Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0004/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Changes to firmware state or a firmware update observation on a device.","collection_focus":"Collect approved OEM firmware inventory/update audit and compare version or measured hashes against a known baseline. Use read-only vendor-supported interfaces.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","firmware_before","firmware_after","change_ticket"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0004","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-device-1","firmware_before":"1.0-lab","firmware_after":"1.1-lab","change_ticket":"LAB-42"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0895","id":"T0895","name":"Autorun Image","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0895","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0895/","page":"detections/ics/T0895/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0748","name":"Detection of Autorun Image","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--930b268b-abf0-485f-9854-60c1cfdd2d33","relationship_id":"relationship--a3447ec8-3224-4485-9324-cdc77231aaa5","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN2066","name":"Analytic 2066","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a field device loading a modified autorun image (boot read-only memory, bootloader firmware) detected by a discrepancy between the device's declared firmware hash and the authorized firmware inventory hash, with post-reboot device behavior diverging from expected (unexpected protocols active, unanticipated network connections). OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2066","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedICSSoftwareInventory","description":"Inventory of binaries legitimately authorized to be referenced by autorun/startup mechanisms on ICS hosts."},{"field":"AutorunModificationWindow","description":"Time window correlating removable media insertion with a subsequent autorun configuration change."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0004","component":"Firmware Modification","name":"assetinventory:FirmwareHash","channel":"device firmware hash does not match authorized firmware inventory following a reboot event","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN2066","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2066","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0004/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"NSM:Connections","channel":"device establishes new network connections or activates protocols not seen in pre-reboot baseline","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN2066","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2066","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]},{"id":"AN2112","name":"Analytic 2112","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies modification of udev rules or autofs configuration that triggers script execution on removable media mount, where the triggered script path is not in the authorized Industrial Control System (ICS) software inventory. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2112","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedICSSoftwareInventory","description":"Inventory of binaries legitimately authorized to be referenced by autorun/startup mechanisms on ICS hosts."},{"field":"AutorunModificationWindow","description":"Time window correlating removable media insertion with a subsequent autorun configuration change."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"auditd:SYSCALL+PATH","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL+PATH records: PATH record shows modification of udev/autofs configuration that references an executable or script outside the authorized ICS software inventory","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2112","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2112","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"}]},{"id":"AN2273","name":"Analytic 2273","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a registry write to Windows autorun keys or an AutoPlay/AutoRun configuration change referencing a binary path that is not part of the authorized Industrial Control System (ICS) software inventory, particularly in combination with removable media insertion. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2273","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedICSSoftwareInventory","description":"Inventory of binaries legitimately authorized to be referenced by autorun/startup mechanisms on ICS hosts."},{"field":"AutorunModificationWindow","description":"Time window correlating removable media insertion with a subsequent autorun configuration change."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"Windows Security Event ID 4663 (requires Object Access auditing and SACL on monitored paths): repeated ReadData/ListDirectory access across ICS data paths by an unapproved process/account","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2273","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2273","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"},{"component_id":"DC0042","component":"Drive Creation","name":"WinEventLog:System","channel":"EventCode=20001 correlated with autorun registry modification within autorun modification window","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2273","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0748#AN2273","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0042/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0042","name":"Drive Creation","tag":"Drive Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0042/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0004","name":"Firmware Modification","tag":"Firmware Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0004/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0928","name":"Operating System Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0928","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Configure operating systems to disable the autorun of any specific file types or drives.","relationship_id":"relationship--98567b03-7421-4761-8caa-cbea82d89fe3","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0895":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0895/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0895","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0042","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"device_id":"lab-disk-2","mount_point":"/mnt/lab","action":"attach"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0004","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-device-1","firmware_before":"1.0-lab","firmware_after":"1.1-lab","change_ticket":"LAB-42"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}}]}}