{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0885","id":"T0885","name":"Commonly Used Port","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"8aa3c8082c60c4462fcf61b2dda8291705d512387bd4b3260674fdcca7e4bcb0","description":"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. \n \n * TCP:80 (HTTP) \n * TCP:443 (HTTPS) \n * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) \n * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) \n * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) \n * TCP:23 (TELNET) \n * UDP:161 (SNMP) \n * TCP:502 (MODBUS) \n * TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) \n * TCP:20000 (DNP3) \n * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885","external_id":"T0885"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0885","id":"T0885","name":"Commonly Used Port","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0885/","page":"detections/ics/T0885/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0736","name":"Detection of Commonly Used Port","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--33dd1c37-1702-4de2-9712-fcc640e4b681","relationship_id":"relationship--1d637465-fa54-4962-aa2d-cb0d04dfec0a","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1869","name":"Analytic 1869","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) host or server establishing outbound connections on a commonly-allowed port (e.g., 443, 80, 8080, 53, etc.) to a destination not in the approved vendor/business domain list, where that host's documented network role does not require external connectivity. Documented real-world use: Sandworm's 2015 Ukraine power grid attack used port 443 for Command and Control (C2) communications. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity. SNI and certificate attributes are TLS/session metadata; do not treat them as decrypted payload content. Encrypted application content requires a separate inspection point.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN1869","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedVendorDomains","description":"Allowlist of legitimate vendor domains for software updates, licensing, or remote support."},{"field":"NoExternalConnectivityRoleList","description":"Inventory of ICS hosts whose documented function never requires outbound internet connectivity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"netflow:ipfix","channel":"IPFIX/NetFlow flow record (src/dst IP, src/dst port, protocol, packets/bytes/time): egress flow on port 443/80/8080/53 from Industrial Control Systems (ICS) host in no-external-connectivity role list to destination not in approved vendor domains","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1869","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN1869","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"zeek:ssl","channel":"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Server Name Indication (SNI) or certificate issuer does not match approved vendor domains or recognized Content Delivery Network (CDN) serving vendor content","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1869","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN1869","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN2129","name":"Analytic 2129","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux service process initiating an outbound connection on a commonly-used port to a destination not in the approved vendor domain list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN2129","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedVendorDomains","description":"Allowlist of legitimate vendor domains for software updates, licensing, or remote support."},{"field":"NoExternalConnectivityRoleList","description":"Inventory of ICS hosts whose documented function never requires outbound internet connectivity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): connect() syscall on port (e.g., 80, 443, 8080, etc.) to destination not in approved vendor domains, from Industrial Control Systems (ICS) service process","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2129","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN2129","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]},{"id":"AN2221","name":"Analytic 2221","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an embedded field device initiating outbound connections on a commonly-used port to a destination outside the device's documented operational communication profile, which for most embedded Industrial Control System (ICS) devices normally should not include arbitrary outbound internet connectivity under the approved communications architecture. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN2221","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedVendorDomains","description":"Allowlist of legitimate vendor domains for software updates, licensing, or remote support."},{"field":"NoExternalConnectivityRoleList","description":"Inventory of ICS hosts whose documented function never requires outbound internet connectivity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"NSM:Connections","channel":"embedded device_ip initiates outbound connection on port 443/80/8080 to destination outside documented operational profile","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN2221","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN2221","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN2271","name":"Analytic 2271","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) vendor process making outbound connections on commonly-allowed port (e.g., 80, 443, 8080, etc.) to a destination not in the approved vendor domain list, from a host whose documented role does not require external connectivity. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the asset's documented role does not permit the connection and the destination/proxy/service is outside the approved communications profile, with process/service identity used as corroboration where available. Suppress approved vendor support, update repositories, remote operations, failover paths, and documented temporary connectivity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN2271","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedVendorDomains","description":"Allowlist of legitimate vendor domains for software updates, licensing, or remote support."},{"field":"NoExternalConnectivityRoleList","description":"Inventory of ICS hosts whose documented function never requires outbound internet connectivity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3 on port 80/443/8080 from process not matching Industrial Control Systems (ICS) vendor update process allowlist","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2271","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0736#AN2271","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0603","name":"Stuxnet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603","kind":"malware","description":"[Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) attempts to contact command and control servers on port 80 to send basic information about the computer it has compromised. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011)","relationship_id":"relationship--bcece7ce-91b5-40b3-b87a-25cab3600e5c","references":[{"source_name":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011","description":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/security-response-w32-stuxnet-dossier-11-en"}]},{"id":"S1009","name":"Triton","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009","kind":"malware","description":"[Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) uses TriStations default UDP port, 1502, to communicate with devices.(Citation: MDudek-ICS)","relationship_id":"relationship--8b2d82aa-75fc-4d6d-bb4b-9f600bd211fd","references":[{"source_name":"MDudek-ICS","description":"MDudek-ICS   TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN Retrieved. 2019/11/03 ","url":"https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library"}]},{"id":"S1165","name":"FrostyGoop","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1165","kind":"malware","description":"[FrostyGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1165) communicates using the Modbus protocol over the standard port of TCP 502.(Citation: Dragos FROSTYGOOP 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--69d19946-72fb-40ce-90fb-0757df8353b5","references":[{"source_name":"Dragos FROSTYGOOP 2024","description":"Mark Graham, Carolyn Ahlers, Kyle O'Meara; Dragos. (2024, July). Impact of FrostyGoop ICS Malware on Connected OT Systems. Retrieved November 20, 2024.","url":"https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/Reports/Dragos-FrostyGoop-ICS-Malware-Intel-Brief-0724_r2.pdf"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G1027","name":"CyberAv3ngers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"During the [2026 Iranian Water Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0065), [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027) were observed using secure shell ports TCP/22 and common industrial ports (TCP/44818, TCP&UDP/2222, TCP/102, and TCP/502). (Citation: CISA-AA26-097A)","relationship_id":"relationship--cf125e14-158c-4bd2-9d86-61f349704c99","references":[{"source_name":"CISA-AA26-097A","description":"Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, July 22). Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0804","name":"Human User Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804","kind":"course-of-action","description":"All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support [Account Use Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936), [Password Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927), and [User Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918).","relationship_id":"relationship--0a5d2136-e1f5-4a54-be64-a558f918bf0d","references":[]},{"id":"M0930","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Configure internal and external firewalls to block traffic using common ports that associate to network protocols that may be unnecessary for that particular network segment.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--bde941c6-2ca0-4f94-9336-027e7eee15a1","references":[]},{"id":"M0931","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--7dedeb73-ef90-4282-a635-cc37326773af","references":[{"source_name":"University of Birmingham C2","description":"Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved September 3, 2026.","url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.1136"}]},{"id":"M0942","name":"Disable or Remove Feature or Program","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--ca64a927-f050-41b3-80d3-93d22cdef26a","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0885":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0885/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0885","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}}]}}