{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0880","id":"T0880","name":"Loss of Safety","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"29cb7d6b2af43cb62958f32309acc9b442d34982f86020709787a9630bfe82de","description":"Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. \n\nMany unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. \n\nAdversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880","external_id":"T0880"}],"platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"proposed-safety-system-diagnostics","name":"Safety-system diagnostics","page":"telemetry/proposed-safety-system-diagnostics/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Safety-controller or safety-system diagnostic status and event records.","collection_focus":"Use vendor-supported read-only exports with process-safety approval. Never initiate trips, bypasses or unsafe state changes just to test a detection.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","diagnostic_status","bypass_active"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-safety-system-diagnostics","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-safety-1","diagnostic_status":"healthy","bypass_active":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."},{"id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","name":"Independent physical process measurements","page":"telemetry/proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"A separate physical measurement used to check values reported by the control system.","collection_focus":"Use an independently powered/read sensor approved for the fixture; document calibration and independence assumptions.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["tag","independent_value","reported_value","unit"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","independent_value":42.2,"reported_value":42,"unit":"percent"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0880","id":"T0880","name":"Loss of Safety","domain":"ics","platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0880/","page":"detections/ics/T0880/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0779","name":"Detection of Loss of Safety","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0779","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--fb0931d5-8eb9-4db2-a2a4-447c32b29bd4","relationship_id":"relationship--b2823439-efbd-4f91-9a7f-753d40004bc8","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1911","name":"Analytic 1911","guidance":"No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0779#AN1911","platforms":["None"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"proposed-safety-system-diagnostics","name":"Safety-system diagnostics","tag":"Proposed: Safety-system diagnostics","page":"telemetry/proposed-safety-system-diagnostics/","kind":"proposed_input"},{"id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","name":"Independent physical process measurements","tag":"Proposed: Independent physical process measurements","page":"telemetry/proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements/","kind":"proposed_input"}],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1009","name":"Triton","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009","kind":"malware","description":"[Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) has the capability to reprogram the SIS logic to allow unsafe conditions to persist or reprogram the SIS to allow an unsafe state  while using the DCS to create an unsafe state or hazard. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--d8354850-bd4c-4bd9-a585-b107f5f1398f","references":[{"source_name":"Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017","description":"Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer 2017, December 14 Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework TRITON and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure Retrieved. 2018/01/12 ","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G1027","name":"CyberAv3ngers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"During the [2026 Iranian Water Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0065), [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027) manipulated critical shutdown and alarm logic, which would allow the system to enter unsafe process states without proper notification or protections.(Citation: CISA-AA26-097A)","relationship_id":"relationship--9058043b-50b6-48de-b34b-5fb254fe471b","references":[{"source_name":"CISA-AA26-097A","description":"Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, July 22). Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0805","name":"Mechanical Protection Layers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0805","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples include interlocks, rupture disks, release valves, etc. (Citation: A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004) \n","relationship_id":"relationship--242b5a0d-e4e8-4ceb-a975-cf8efd64e981","references":[{"source_name":"A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004","description":"A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004 APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY  IEC 61511 Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://www.icheme.org/media/9906/xviii-paper-23.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0812","name":"Safety Instrumented Systems","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0812","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that all SIS are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--0ffdee1a-1e83-4506-aba2-38c55812abb3","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0880":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0880/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0880","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-safety-system-diagnostics","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-safety-1","diagnostic_status":"healthy","bypass_active":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","independent_value":42.2,"reported_value":42,"unit":"percent"}}]}}