{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0873","id":"T0873","name":"Project File Infection","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"30955722ce233b289fdc6d485188c21a81867aab3898fea47362df80add10811","description":"Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function.(Citation: Beckhoff) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0104) and [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0110) techniques.(Citation: PLCdev) \n\nAdversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals.(Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing.(Citation: PLCdev)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873","external_id":"T0873"},{"source_name":"Beckhoff","description":"Beckhoff   TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files Retrieved. 2019/11/21 ","url":"https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3_sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id="},{"source_name":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011","description":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/security-response-w32-stuxnet-dossier-11-en"},{"source_name":"PLCdev","description":"PLCdev Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22  Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook Retrieved. 2019/11/21 ","url":"http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373"}],"platforms":["Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"ics/T0873.001","id":"T0873.001","name":"Siemens Project File Format","page":"techniques/ics/T0873.001/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Access to file objects with user, process and access-right context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","access","actor","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"File attributes such as path, size, timestamps, ownership and cryptographic hash.","collection_focus":"Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","size_bytes","sha256","owner_uid"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0873","id":"T0873","name":"Project File Infection","domain":"ics","platforms":["Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0873/","page":"detections/ics/T0873/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0766","name":"Detection of Project File Infection","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0766","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--09754c36-7be2-4536-aad2-a6c3568ba0e5","relationship_id":"relationship--8d392c6e-1368-4c6f-a189-aaf4c6355e55","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1898","name":"Analytic 1898","guidance":"Configured Windows object-access monitoring identifies a write to an Industrial Control System (ICS) engineering project file by a process that is not the recognized vendor engineering software, or by the vendor engineering software immediately after loading a project file from an untrusted source. Documented mechanism in Havex (trojanized vendor software/installers distributed via compromised vendor websites). OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance. Collection requirement: use Windows Security Event ID 4663 with Object Access auditing and SACLs on approved project repositories; Sysmon FileCreate events can corroborate writes/overwrites but do not report generic file-open/read activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0766#AN1898","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedProjectRepository","description":"Documented, trusted source location(s) for project files."},{"field":"AuthorizedEngineeringTools","description":"Allowlist of vendor engineering software processes authorized to modify project files."},{"field":"ProjectFileExtensions","description":"File extensions used by ICS engineering project files for in-use vendor platforms."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"Windows Security Event ID 4663 (requires Object Access auditing/SACL): engineering process reads/opens project file from unapproved repository/removable-media/network-share path","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1898","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0766#AN1898","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"},{"component_id":"DC0059","component":"File Metadata","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational Event ID 11 FileCreate/overwrite or Event ID 2 FileCreateTime, as applicable: Engineering tool process opens project file from path not in approved project repository (removable media, email attachment cache, untrusted network share)","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1898","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0766#AN1898","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0059/"}]},{"id":"AN2116","name":"Analytic 2116","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a write to Industrial Control System (ICS) project file paths on a Linux engineering station from a User Identifier (UID) not associated with the ICS engineering tool, or from the tool after loading a file from a removable media or network path not in the approved software distribution list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0766#AN2116","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedProjectRepository","description":"Documented, trusted source location(s) for project files."},{"field":"AuthorizedEngineeringTools","description":"Allowlist of vendor engineering software processes authorized to modify project files."},{"field":"ProjectFileExtensions","description":"File extensions used by ICS engineering project files for in-use vendor platforms."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0059","component":"File Metadata","name":"auditd:SYSCALL+PATH","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL+PATH records: write to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) project file path by uid not in authorized engineering User Identifiers (UIDs) or from path not in approved project sources","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2116","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0766#AN2116","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0059/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","tag":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0922","name":"Restrict File and Directory Permissions","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure permissions restrict project file access to only engineer and technician user groups and accounts.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--42ab7d24-8286-4a7a-8cd7-02e54a80e13f","references":[]},{"id":"M0941","name":"Encrypt Sensitive Information","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941","kind":"course-of-action","description":"When at rest, project files should be encrypted to prevent unauthorized changes.(Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--c78f497f-01c3-4efb-aa74-92b700b9c02b","references":[{"source_name":"National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013","description":"National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0945","name":"Code Signing","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Allow for code signing of any project files stored at rest to prevent unauthorized tampering. Ensure the signing keys are not easily accessible on the same system.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--f9c29dd4-1c5e-4f7e-b60a-862319a6d0a0","references":[]},{"id":"M0947","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Review the integrity of project files to verify they have not been modified by adversary behavior. Verify a cryptographic hash for the file with a known trusted version, or look for other indicators of modification (e.g., timestamps).\n","relationship_id":"relationship--f9aa3364-a1eb-4776-ae03-c39b250545a0","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0873":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0873/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0873","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}}]}}