{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0867","id":"T0867","name":"Lateral Tool Transfer","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0867","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"04cc55b32bf1911d82af1d21ea26f5df40b4356a573f8236d119d3e105a2ef19","description":"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.(Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares.(Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK)\n\nIn control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0867","external_id":"T0867"},{"source_name":"Enterprise ATT&CK","description":"Enterprise ATT&CK Enterprise ATT&CK   Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27  Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0102","name":"Network Share Access","page":"telemetry/DC0102/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Access to a network share or an object through that share.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit File Share / Detailed File Share on the lab file server; correlate share checks with file-system access and requesting host/account.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["share","relative_path","access","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0102","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"share":"\\\\lab-server\\demo","relative_path":"demo.txt","access":"read","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0867","id":"T0867","name":"Lateral Tool Transfer","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0867","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0867/","page":"detections/ics/T0867/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0745","name":"Detection of Lateral Tool Transfer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--62587e44-0623-4b14-bd45-126430eaed4a","relationship_id":"relationship--c563bfb5-173f-4a96-812b-2aad8057f09f","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1878","name":"Analytic 1878","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a file written to an Industrial Control System (ICS) host from a remote network share, where the file has an executable or script extension, immediately followed by execution of that file from the same path. Documented in the PIPEDREAM toolkit's modular design, where components transfer files to compromised Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and engineering workstations. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN1878","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedFileSources","description":"Allowlist of network shares/hosts authorized to write executable or script files to ICS Windows assets."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to perform file transfers to field devices."},{"field":"SuspiciousFilePatterns","description":"Filename/extension patterns inconsistent with the device's normal configuration exchange profile."},{"field":"ToolTransferWindow","description":"Time window after file creation within which execution is considered directly connected to the transfer event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0102","component":"Network Share Access","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"Windows Security Event ID 5140/5145: EventCode=5145 for file write to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) host, source not in authorized file sources","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1878","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN1878","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0102/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11 with executable/script extension from remote-sourced write operation","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1878","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN1878","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1 of the newly-created file within tool transfer window of its creation","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1878","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN1878","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2135","name":"Analytic 2135","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies execution on an ICS Linux asset of an executable or script from a path commonly used for inbound file transfer or staging, by a UID outside the approved deployment/administration baseline. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN2135","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedFileSources","description":"Allowlist of network shares/hosts authorized to write executable or script files to ICS Windows assets."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to perform file transfers to field devices."},{"field":"SuspiciousFilePatterns","description":"Filename/extension patterns inconsistent with the device's normal configuration exchange profile."},{"field":"ToolTransferWindow","description":"Time window after file creation within which execution is considered directly connected to the transfer event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL+PATH","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL+PATH records: file transfer (scp, sftp, rsync, etc.) placing executable on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Linux asset, followed by execve of the transferred file within tool transfer window","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2135","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN2135","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"}]},{"id":"AN2229","name":"Analytic 2229","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol file-transfer service placing a file on a field device from a source not in the approved engineering workstation list, where the transferred filename pattern matches firmware images or executable payloads inconsistent with the device's normal data exchange profile. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN2229","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedFileSources","description":"Allowlist of network shares/hosts authorized to write executable or script files to ICS Windows assets."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to perform file transfers to field devices."},{"field":"SuspiciousFilePatterns","description":"Filename/extension patterns inconsistent with the device's normal configuration exchange profile."},{"field":"ToolTransferWindow","description":"Time window after file creation within which execution is considered directly connected to the transfer event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"otids:ProtocolDecoder","channel":"Decoded DNP3/IEC 61850 file-transfer transaction: source/destination and file/object identifier where exposed; correlate with approved engineering source and change window","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN2229","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0745#AN2229","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0102","name":"Network Share Access","tag":"Network Share Access","page":"telemetry/DC0102/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0366","name":"WannaCry","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366","kind":"malware","description":"[WannaCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366) can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--d50a3d89-c8fa-4c5d-813e-f4495d892d1a","references":[{"source_name":"Joe Slowik April 2019","description":"Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ","url":"https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/"}]},{"id":"S0368","name":"NotPetya","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368","kind":"malware","description":"[NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--6258c355-677c-452d-b1fc-27767232437b","references":[{"source_name":"Joe Slowik April 2019","description":"Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ","url":"https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/"}]},{"id":"S0603","name":"Stuxnet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603","kind":"malware","description":"[Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) sends an SQL statement that creates a table and inserts a binary value into the table. The binary value is a hex string representation of the main Stuxnet DLL as an executable file (formed using resource 210) and an updated configuration data block. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011)","relationship_id":"relationship--327916f7-fe5d-4858-adeb-f72f74c60c25","references":[{"source_name":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011","description":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/security-response-w32-stuxnet-dossier-11-en"}]},{"id":"S0606","name":"Bad Rabbit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606","kind":"malware","description":"[Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--ffc5bbce-8d9c-4276-9dc6-efed5c01af8b","references":[{"source_name":"Joe Slowik April 2019","description":"Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ","url":"https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/"}]},{"id":"S1045","name":"INCONTROLLER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1045","kind":"malware","description":"[INCONTROLLER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1045) can use a Telnet session to load a malware implant on Omron PLCs.(Citation: CISA-AA22-103A)(Citation: Wylie-22) ","relationship_id":"relationship--868db512-b897-4a54-ae56-ac78f6c93a14","references":[{"source_name":"CISA-AA22-103A","description":"DHS/CISA. (2022, May 25). Alert (AA22-103A) APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices. Retrieved September 28, 2022.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-103a"},{"source_name":"Wylie-22","description":"Jimmy Wylie. (2022, August). Analyzing PIPEDREAM: Challenges in Testing an ICS Attack Toolkit. Defcon 30.","url":"https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Jimmy%20Wylie%20-%20Analyzing%20PIPEDREAM%20Challenges%20in%20testing%20an%20ICS%20attack%20toolkit.pdf"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0931","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--c69eab3c-861c-45f5-8858-a595fcc7e6f6","references":[{"source_name":"University of Birmingham C2","description":"Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved September 3, 2026.","url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.1136"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0867":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0867/","T1570":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1570/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0867","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0102","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"share":"\\\\lab-server\\demo","relative_path":"demo.txt","access":"read","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}