{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0863","id":"T0863","name":"User Execution","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"58f53b4d5af3aa6000660ba24105e01de89e4b7f49a55772add6b87ac03c2fc3","description":"Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. \n\nAdversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) \n\nA Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution. (Citation: CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863","external_id":"T0863"},{"source_name":"Booz Allen Hamilton","description":"Booz Allen Hamilton. (2016). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved December 18, 2024.","url":"https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf"},{"source_name":"Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014","description":"Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01 ","url":"https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"},{"source_name":"CISA AA21-201A Pipeline Intrusion July 2021","description":"Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0863","id":"T0863","name":"User Execution","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0863/","page":"detections/ics/T0863/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0791","name":"Detection of User Execution","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--eabde43f-1872-499d-9642-85a6959c4d28","relationship_id":"relationship--1992737e-0df0-43c6-8a43-85bf3802e470","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1923","name":"Analytic 1923","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a user-invoked action on an Industrial Control System (ICS) workstation immediately followed by a process execution chain inconsistent with normal ICS operations -- the user-driven trigger plus the resulting anomalous execution chain together distinguish this from generic malware execution. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the account/device/session violates the approved identity + source host/jump path/zone policy and is corroborated by access to a protected OT asset, execution, configuration change, or another security-relevant follow-on event. Suppress approved shift activity, vendor support, break-glass use, commissioning, and documented remote-access windows.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791#AN1923","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedDestinations","description":"Allowlist of network destinations consistent with legitimate document/link content."},{"field":"ExpectedDocumentViewerChildren","description":"Documented normal child processes for legitimate document viewers/handlers."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1 chain originating from user-invoked file open or link click action, spawning processes not in expected document viewer children","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1923","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791#AN1923","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3 from resulting process to destinations not in approved destinations list","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1923","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791#AN1923","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]},{"id":"AN2150","name":"Analytic 2150","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a user-facing application on an ICS Linux workstation spawning a child process outside the expected application-child baseline. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the account/device/session violates the approved identity + source host/jump path/zone policy and is corroborated by access to a protected OT asset, execution, configuration change, or another security-relevant follow-on event. Suppress approved shift activity, vendor support, break-glass use, commissioning, and documented remote-access windows.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791#AN2150","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedDestinations","description":"Allowlist of network destinations consistent with legitimate document/link content."},{"field":"ExpectedDocumentViewerChildren","description":"Documented normal child processes for legitimate document viewers/handlers."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): syscall=execve; document/viewer process launches a child process outside the expected viewer-child baseline","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2150","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791#AN2150","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2220","name":"Analytic 2220","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) embedded device executing a sequence of operations inconsistent with its programmed logic, correlating temporally with an operator interaction on an engineering terminal connected to the device. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the account/device/session violates the approved identity + source host/jump path/zone policy and is corroborated by access to a protected OT asset, execution, configuration change, or another security-relevant follow-on event. Suppress approved shift activity, vendor support, break-glass use, commissioning, and documented remote-access windows.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791#AN2220","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedDestinations","description":"Allowlist of network destinations consistent with legitimate document/link content."},{"field":"ExpectedDocumentViewerChildren","description":"Documented normal child processes for legitimate document viewers/handlers."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"otndr:BehaviorAlert","channel":"device Input/Output (I/O) state change inconsistent with programmed logic correlating temporally with operator terminal interaction","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN2220","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0791#AN2220","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0093","name":"Backdoor.Oldrea","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093","kind":"malware","description":"Execution of [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) relies on a user opening a trojanized installer attached to an email. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) (Citation: Kyle Wilhoit)","relationship_id":"relationship--5bb313a8-8407-4ec1-a4b0-683ded7f3302","references":[{"source_name":"Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014","description":"Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01 ","url":"https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"},{"source_name":"Kyle Wilhoit","description":"Kyle Wilhoit Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01  ICS Malware: Havex and Black Energy Retrieved. 2019/10/22 ","url":"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eywmb7UDODY&feature=youtu.be&t=939"}]},{"id":"S0496","name":"REvil","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496","kind":"malware","description":"[REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) initially executes when the user clicks on a JavaScript file included in the phishing emails .zip attachment. (Citation: Tom Fakterman August 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--1fd4cf4e-a26c-4fe5-a7fd-f49b8aea8437","references":[{"source_name":"Tom Fakterman August 2019","description":"Tom Fakterman 2019, August 05 Sodinokibi: The Crown Prince of Ransomware Retrieved. 2021/04/12 ","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/the-sodinokibi-ransomware-attack"}]},{"id":"S0603","name":"Stuxnet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603","kind":"malware","description":"[Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) infects DLL's associated with the WinCC Simatic manager which are responsible for opening project files. If a user opens an uninfected project file using a compromised manager, the file will be infected with Stuxnet code. If an infected project is opened with the Simatic manager, the modified data file will trigger a search for the `xyz.dll` file. If the `xyz.dll` file is not found in any of the specified locations, the malicious DLL will be loaded and executed by the manager. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011)","relationship_id":"relationship--8a06c15b-b7e5-4374-9265-8d9020e126cd","references":[{"source_name":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011","description":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/security-response-w32-stuxnet-dossier-11-en"}]},{"id":"S0606","name":"Bad Rabbit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606","kind":"malware","description":"[Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is disguised as an Adobe Flash installer. When the file is opened it starts locking the infected computer. (Citation: Orkhan Mamedov, Fedor Sinitsyn, Anton Ivanov October 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--edf73653-b2d7-422f-b433-b6a428ff12d4","references":[{"source_name":"Orkhan Mamedov, Fedor Sinitsyn, Anton Ivanov October 2017","description":"Orkhan Mamedov, Fedor Sinitsyn, Anton Ivanov 2017, October 27 Bad Rabbit Ransomware Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ","url":"https://securelist.com/bad-rabbit-ransomware/82851/"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0917","name":"User Training","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--71c9db9c-6f0c-4e33-a20a-dcd5b791a49a","references":[]},{"id":"M0921","name":"Restrict Web-Based Content","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0921","kind":"course-of-action","description":"If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--1aa02c37-973e-46bd-ab45-609463e514e9","references":[]},{"id":"M0931","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931","kind":"course-of-action","description":"If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--b1d993d5-9e7e-4043-a651-07c7b5ad5a6b","references":[]},{"id":"M0938","name":"Execution Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Application control may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--07f4d65d-4572-450f-8cb2-908fee97bd67","references":[]},{"id":"M0945","name":"Code Signing","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Prevent the use of unsigned executables, such as installers and scripts.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--e09e253c-fd28-49ae-988e-1f80d769e8b8","references":[]},{"id":"M0949","name":"Antivirus/Antimalware","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure anti-virus solution can detect malicious files that allow user execution (e.g., Microsoft Office Macros, program installers).\n","relationship_id":"relationship--d3c94120-e6b5-4bd2-88f0-9c73f76b0104","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0863":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0863/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0863","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}