{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0852","id":"T0852","name":"Screen Capture","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0852","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"bf5a476e17e04f55a00cb3c7bd4f19f9404ed824c01da57b777411f07380487c","description":"Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: ICS-CERT October 2017) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0852","external_id":"T0852"},{"source_name":"ICS-CERT October 2017","description":"ICS-CERT 2017, October 21 Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2017/10/23 ","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0852","id":"T0852","name":"Screen Capture","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0852","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0852/","page":"detections/ics/T0852/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0751","name":"Detection of Screen Capture","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--3e884c49-75ca-449e-83cb-3517ee88e0f1","relationship_id":"relationship--22401c3f-f64f-4ee6-94ee-24fe108b595a","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1883","name":"Analytic 1883","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies execution of screenshot utilities (scrot, import, xwd) on an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux Human-Machine Interface (HMI), from a User Identifier (UID) that does not normally perform display operations. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751#AN1883","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedScreenCaptureTools","description":"Allowlist of remote support, training, or documentation tools legitimately authorized to perform screen capture."},{"field":"CaptureToFileWindow","description":"Time window correlating a screen capture API call with a subsequent image file write."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): execve of screenshot utility (scrot, import, xwd) on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Human-Machine Interface (HMI) by User Identifier (UID) not in approved operator UIDs","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1883","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751#AN1883","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]},{"id":"AN2250","name":"Analytic 2250","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests to an embedded Human-Machine Interface (HMI) panel's built-in web server capturing screen images, or Virtual Network Computing (VNC) connections to embedded HMI panels, from source Internet Protocol (IP) addresses not in the approved operator workstation list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751#AN2250","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedScreenCaptureTools","description":"Allowlist of remote support, training, or documentation tools legitimately authorized to perform screen capture."},{"field":"CaptureToFileWindow","description":"Time window correlating a screen capture API call with a subsequent image file write."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Content","channel":"Virtual Network Computing (VNC) connection or screen-capture Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request to embedded Human-Machine Interface (HMI) panel from source not in approved operator workstation list","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN2250","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751#AN2250","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN2274","name":"Analytic 2274","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a process invoking screen capture Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) targeting an Human-Machine Interface (HMI) or operator workstation window, where the calling process is not a recognized Industrial Control System (ICS) vendor application or approved remote support tool, immediately followed by an image file write. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751#AN2274","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedScreenCaptureTools","description":"Allowlist of remote support, training, or documentation tools legitimately authorized to perform screen capture."},{"field":"CaptureToFileWindow","description":"Time window correlating a screen capture API call with a subsequent image file write."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11 by same process within capture to file window of the Application Programming Interface (API) call","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2274","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751#AN2274","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7 of GDI32.dll/User32.dll by process not in authorized screen capture tools on Human-Machine Interface (HMI)-classified host","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2274","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0751#AN2274","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G0064","name":"APT33","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) utilize backdoors capable of capturing screenshots once installed on a system. (Citation: Jacqueline O'Leary et al. September 2017)(Citation: Junnosuke Yagi March 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--0beb0088-3bea-4612-b2d9-ff9988f829ae","references":[{"source_name":"Jacqueline O'Leary et al. September 2017","description":"Jacqueline O'Leary et al. 2017, September 20 Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware Retrieved. 2019/12/02 ","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html"},{"source_name":"Junnosuke Yagi March 2017","description":"Junnosuke Yagi 2017, March 07 Trojan.Stonedrill Retrieved. 2019/12/05 ","url":"https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2017-030708-4403-99"}]},{"id":"G1000","name":"ALLANITE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1000","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1000) has been identified to collect and distribute screenshots of ICS systems such as HMIs. (Citation: Dragos) (Citation: ICS-CERT October 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--5424e327-396f-4b07-94a3-408ffc915686","references":[{"source_name":"Dragos","description":"Dragos   Allanite Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ","url":"https://dragos.com/resource/allanite/"},{"source_name":"ICS-CERT October 2017","description":"ICS-CERT 2017, October 21 Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2017/10/23 ","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0816","name":"Mitigation Limited or Not Effective","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Preventing screen capture on a device may require disabling various system calls supported by the operating systems (e.g., Microsoft Windows.Graphics.Capture APIs), however, these may be needed for other critical applications.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--b5e52859-8dab-4e7e-af70-bb38c6993c98","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0852":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0852/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0852","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}}]}}