{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0846.001","id":"T0846.001","name":"Port Scan","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846/001","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"f766856500a84ad7ca619d5ba0602dc0220cc3b6e83ca464dfed4b773fce89a5","description":"Adversaries may perform a port scan on a system, device, or network to identify live hosts, enumerate open ports and running services, identify operating systems, and map out the network.(Citation: NIST SP 800-82r3) The results of a port scan may inform adversary [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0102), [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0109), and vulnerability exploitation decisions ([Exploitation for Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0820), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0890), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0866)). \n\nSome common tools for executing a port scan include `nmap`, `netcat`, and the Advanced Port Scanner.\n","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846/001","external_id":"T0846.001"},{"source_name":"NIST SP 800-82r3","description":"Keith Stouffer. (2023, September). Guide to Operational Technology  (OT) Security. Retrieved April 22, 2026.","url":"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r3.pdf"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"ics/T0846","id":"T0846","name":"Remote System Discovery","domain":"ics","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["discovery"],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"page":"techniques/ics/T0846/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","ot_fixture_and_process_safety_review"],"telemetry_tags":["Network Traffic Content","Network Traffic Flow","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/ics/T0846/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"guidance_only","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0846.001","id":"T0846.001","name":"Port Scan","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846/001","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0846.001/","page":"detections/ics/T0846.001/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0907","name":"Detection of Port Scan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--6bdde391-76eb-4bd7-9e19-e805ab98b7ac","relationship_id":"relationship--ba394cbc-461d-44cc-8fa5-92f11a5c8e6b","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN2050","name":"Analytic 2050","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies execution of port scanning utilities (nmap, masscan) with arguments targeting Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol port ranges on an ICS Windows host. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2050","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedSCADAServers","description":"IP allowlist of legitimate sources."},{"field":"PortScanTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which connections across multiple ports are considered a single scan event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1 of port scanning utility with arguments targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS) protocol port ranges","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2050","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2050","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2161","name":"Analytic 2161","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies execve of port scanning utilities on an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux asset with arguments targeting ICS protocol port ranges. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2161","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedSCADAServers","description":"IP allowlist of legitimate sources."},{"field":"PortScanTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which connections across multiple ports are considered a single scan event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): execve of nmap/masscan with arguments targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS) protocol port ranges","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2161","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2161","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2181","name":"Analytic 2181","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a host generating rapid, sequential Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection attempts across multiple destination ports on Industrial Control System (ICS) device Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, targeting ICS-specific protocol ports, from a source not in the approved control server inventory. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2181","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedSCADAServers","description":"IP allowlist of legitimate sources."},{"field":"PortScanTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which connections across multiple ports are considered a single scan event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"netflow:ipfix","channel":"IPFIX/NetFlow flow record (src/dst IP, src/dst port, protocol, packets/bytes/time): source generates short-lived flows to single dst across multiple Industrial Control Systems (ICS) protocol ports (502,102,44818,20000,4840) within port scan time window, source not in approved Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) servers","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN2181","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2181","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN2226","name":"Analytic 2226","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies rapid sequential Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol connection attempts to the same field device Internet Protocol (IP) address across different protocol ports from a single source not in the approved control server list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2226","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedSCADAServers","description":"IP allowlist of legitimate sources."},{"field":"PortScanTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which connections across multiple ports are considered a single scan event."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"NSM:Connections","channel":"rapid sequential connection attempts to same device Internet Protocol (IP) address across multiple Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol ports from source not in approved Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) servers","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN2226","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0907#AN2226","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"The [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) IEC 61850 payload component has the ability to discover relevant devices in the infected host's network subnet by attempting to connect on port 102.(Citation: Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--b217aaf1-0fe7-43cc-85ad-45b252651e2d","references":[{"source_name":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017","description":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1006","name":"PLC-Blaster","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1006","kind":"malware","description":"[PLC-Blaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1006) scans the network to find other Siemens S7 PLC devices to infect. It locates these devices by checking for a service listening on TCP port 102.(Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--b9b45f7a-742f-4b72-bdee-577ceb539499","references":[{"source_name":"Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016","description":"Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke 2016, March 31 Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc. Retrieved. 2017/09/19 ","url":"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1045","name":"INCONTROLLER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1045","kind":"malware","description":"[INCONTROLLER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1045) has the ability to perform scans for TCP port 4840 to identify devices running OPC UA servers.(Citation: Wylie-22)","relationship_id":"relationship--93489277-7107-4bad-a9d1-2013ef471905","references":[{"source_name":"Wylie-22","description":"Jimmy Wylie. (2022, August). Analyzing PIPEDREAM: Challenges in Testing an ICS Attack Toolkit. Defcon 30.","url":"https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Jimmy%20Wylie%20-%20Analyzing%20PIPEDREAM%20Challenges%20in%20testing%20an%20ICS%20attack%20toolkit.pdf"}]},{"id":"S9046","name":"IOControl","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9046","kind":"malware","description":"IOCONTROL has conducted port scans on a network.(Citation: Claroty-IOCONTROL)","relationship_id":"relationship--37b2e059-853e-423f-8504-a11b55f92160","references":[{"source_name":"Claroty-IOCONTROL","description":"Claroty Team82. (2024, December 10). Inside a New OT/IoT Cyberweapon: IOCONTROL. Retrieved September 2, 2026.","url":"https://claroty.com/team82/research/inside-a-new-ot-iot-cyber-weapon-iocontrol"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0814","name":"Static Network Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814","kind":"course-of-action","description":"ICS environments typically have more statically defined devices, therefore minimize the use of both IT discovery protocols (e.g., DHCP, LLDP) and discovery functions in automation protocols.(Citation: D. Parsons and D. Wylie September 2019)(Citation: Colin Gray) Examples of automation protocols with discovery capabilities include OPC UA Device Discovery(Citation: Josh Rinaldi April 2016), BACnet(Citation: Aditya K Sood July 2019), and Ethernet/IP.(Citation: Langner November 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f7a9b56-e3b4-4cc9-9ea7-32faebad74b6","references":[{"source_name":"Aditya K Sood July 2019","description":"Aditya K Sood 2019, July Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/"},{"source_name":"Colin Gray","description":"Colin Gray D. Parsons and D. Wylie 2019, September Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged  Discover and Defend Your Assets Retrieved. 2020/09/25  How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901"},{"source_name":"D. Parsons and D. Wylie September 2019","description":"D. Parsons and D. Wylie 2019, September Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged  Discover and Defend Your Assets Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/"},{"source_name":"Josh Rinaldi April 2016","description":"Josh Rinaldi 2016, April Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/"},{"source_name":"Langner November 2018","description":"Langner 2018, November Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/"}]},{"id":"M0930","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical systems and devices.","relationship_id":"relationship--49aebf0c-e231-4cbb-84a2-97c9a6d11654","references":[]},{"id":"M0931","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent port scans.","relationship_id":"relationship--73dbe470-0d10-493b-b0ae-241da7dc0b58","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0820":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0820/","T0890":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0890/","T0866":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0866/","T0846.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0846.001/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0846.001","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
