{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0845","id":"T0845","name":"Program Upload","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"d12e38cc1b9cffacca2337a38de0ef8983518c740638befe2c3f4f18ac3b9490","description":"Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845","external_id":"T0845"}],"platforms":["Embedded"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0845","id":"T0845","name":"Program Upload","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0845/","page":"detections/ics/T0845/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0761","name":"Detection of Program Upload","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0761","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--6f921aa8-deb3-4286-8101-26a7cbe80c0e","relationship_id":"relationship--476fdcf2-0b39-4ddc-9744-ef54d3b9efb8","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1893","name":"Analytic 1893","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol session reading back the user program from a field device to a source not in the approved engineering workstation list, where the session byte count is consistent with a substantial portion of the device's program memory. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0761#AN1893","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"BackupWindowSchedule","description":"Scheduled periods during which routine backup uploads are expected."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to perform program uploads from field devices."},{"field":"ProgramUploadSizeThreshold","description":"Minimum byte count for a session to be considered a substantial program readback."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Content","channel":"S7comm Upload Block / Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) Read Program session from source not in engineering workstation list with bytes_recv exceeding program upload size threshold","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1893","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0761#AN1893","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"engineeringworkstation:ApplicationLog","channel":"Engineering application audit/session log: controller program upload initiated outside approved backup/change window and without documented backup purpose","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1893","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0761#AN1893","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S1009","name":"Triton","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009","kind":"malware","description":"[Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) calls the SafeAppendProgramMod to transfer its payloads to the Tricon. Part of this call includes preforming a program upload. (Citation: MDudek-ICS)","relationship_id":"relationship--a946c9b1-5b89-44c9-b617-3412ffda34b9","references":[{"source_name":"MDudek-ICS","description":"MDudek-ICS   TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN Retrieved. 2019/11/03 ","url":"https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library"}]},{"id":"S1045","name":"INCONTROLLER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1045","kind":"malware","description":"[INCONTROLLER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1045)  can use the CODESYS protocol to upload programs from Schneider PLCs.(Citation: Wylie-22)(Citation: Brubaker-Incontroller) \n\n[INCONTROLLER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1045)  can obtain existing program logic from Omron PLCs by using either the program upload or backup functions available through the HTTP server.(Citation: Wylie-22) ","relationship_id":"relationship--b346eec8-de90-407c-b665-387086bb4553","references":[{"source_name":"Wylie-22","description":"Jimmy Wylie. (2022, August). Analyzing PIPEDREAM: Challenges in Testing an ICS Attack Toolkit. Defcon 30.","url":"https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Jimmy%20Wylie%20-%20Analyzing%20PIPEDREAM%20Challenges%20in%20testing%20an%20ICS%20attack%20toolkit.pdf"},{"source_name":"Brubaker-Incontroller","description":"Nathan Brubaker, Keith Lunden, Ken Proska, Muhammad Umair, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Corey Hildebrandt, Rob Caldwell. (2022, April 13). INCONTROLLER: New State-Sponsored Cyber Attack Tools Target Multiple Industrial Control Systems. Retrieved September 28, 2022.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/incontroller-state-sponsored-ics-tool"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G1027","name":"CyberAv3ngers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"During the [2026 Iranian Water Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0065), [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027) used the program upload feature to exfiltrate project files from victim PLCs. (Citation: CISA-AA26-097A)","relationship_id":"relationship--acc06595-994a-469b-972e-c71ab3298dde","references":[{"source_name":"CISA-AA26-097A","description":"Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, July 22). Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0800","name":"Authorization Enforcement","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800","kind":"course-of-action","description":"All field controllers should restrict program uploads to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--5ae1cf3a-2603-4bf9-ace3-5b1ee5d8d757","references":[]},{"id":"M0801","name":"Access Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--5ca1d677-b41f-4f1e-b86b-f5637a418829","references":[]},{"id":"M0802","name":"Communication Authenticity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--0df0cb6d-0067-48b2-a33e-495415713ab7","references":[]},{"id":"M0804","name":"Human User Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804","kind":"course-of-action","description":"All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support [Account Use Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936), [Password Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927), and [User Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918).","relationship_id":"relationship--f45c2df8-30e7-45d0-8067-7b2870767574","references":[]},{"id":"M0807","name":"Network Allowlists","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. (Citation: Department of Homeland Security September 2016)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--c0efb24a-2329-401a-bba6-817f2867bb3f","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security September 2016","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2016, September Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0813","name":"Software Process and Device Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--06c663f8-fcf1-47eb-ab79-284e93eafa6b","references":[]},{"id":"M0930","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. (Citation: Department of Homeland Security September 2016)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--671043a9-337f-411a-9ca9-3112e897ab09","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security September 2016","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2016, September Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0937","name":"Filter Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program upload activity to prevent unauthorized access to device configurations.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--baf4bd30-4213-43c3-b70c-54418e734caf","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0845":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0845/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0845","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}}]}}