{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0832","id":"T0832","name":"Manipulation of View","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"1b7ada1d0970ac5e88a1ff8dcd6a5365a89989cdc461e776dc5f7f80aeb18c37","description":"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) \n\nOperators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832","external_id":"T0832"},{"source_name":"Corero","description":"Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf"},{"source_name":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee","description":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee SANS Industrial Control System (ICS) Security; The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved 2024/11/25","url":"https://icscsi.org/library/Documents/White_Papers/SANS%20-%20ICS%20Cyber%20Kill%20Chain.pdf"},{"source_name":"Tyson Macaulay","description":"Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04  The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04  RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false"}],"platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"proposed-hmi-and-historian-value-comparison","name":"HMI and historian value comparison","page":"telemetry/proposed-hmi-and-historian-value-comparison/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Comparison of operator-display values with independently obtained historian records.","collection_focus":"Align source timestamps, engineering units and quality flags; account for display rounding and historian deadbands.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["tag","hmi_value","historian_value","unit","time_skew_ms"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-hmi-and-historian-value-comparison","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","hmi_value":42,"historian_value":42.1,"unit":"percent","time_skew_ms":100}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."},{"id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","name":"Independent physical process measurements","page":"telemetry/proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"A separate physical measurement used to check values reported by the control system.","collection_focus":"Use an independently powered/read sensor approved for the fixture; document calibration and independence assumptions.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["tag","independent_value","reported_value","unit"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","independent_value":42.2,"reported_value":42,"unit":"percent"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0832","id":"T0832","name":"Manipulation of View","domain":"ics","platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0832/","page":"detections/ics/T0832/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0785","name":"Detection of Manipulation of View","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0785","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--47c6f72c-1f2f-4ea8-94d0-08202b7d5bdb","relationship_id":"relationship--26bb65a5-a5c4-4a6a-9bdb-982abf425b49","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1917","name":"Analytic 1917","guidance":"No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0785#AN1917","platforms":["None"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"proposed-hmi-and-historian-value-comparison","name":"HMI and historian value comparison","tag":"Proposed: HMI and historian value comparison","page":"telemetry/proposed-hmi-and-historian-value-comparison/","kind":"proposed_input"},{"id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","name":"Independent physical process measurements","tag":"Proposed: Independent physical process measurements","page":"telemetry/proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements/","kind":"proposed_input"}],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0603","name":"Stuxnet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603","kind":"malware","description":"[Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) manipulates the view of operators replaying process input and manipulating the I/O image to evade detection and inhibit protection functions. (Citation: Langer Stuxnet) (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011)","relationship_id":"relationship--e257913e-40ba-4a05-ba97-0c3175c966b5","references":[{"source_name":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011","description":"Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/security-response-w32-stuxnet-dossier-11-en"},{"source_name":"Langer Stuxnet","description":"Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved December 7, 2020.","url":"https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604)'s OPC module can brute force values and will send out a 0x01 status which for the target systems equates to a Primary Variable Out of Limits misdirecting operators from understanding protective relay status. (Citation: Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--ca3c4d4b-cf53-4489-904f-8a220e421aeb","references":[{"source_name":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017","description":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0802","name":"Communication Authenticity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).\n","relationship_id":"relationship--41adaf0b-b7ae-4bdb-9a5b-567fd0911d7a","references":[]},{"id":"M0810","name":"Out-of-Band Communications Channel","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--58cb4cb5-4b0f-4ce0-b3f9-5deb9de31c52","references":[]},{"id":"M0953","name":"Data Backup","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.  Maintain and exercise incident response plans  (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--c64f2ed2-f7a7-4333-b0d3-d687ffb7ad6b","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security October 2009","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0832":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0832/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0832","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-hmi-and-historian-value-comparison","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","hmi_value":42,"historian_value":42.1,"unit":"percent","time_skew_ms":100}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","independent_value":42.2,"reported_value":42,"unit":"percent"}}]}}