{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0826","id":"T0826","name":"Loss of Availability","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0826","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"9966bf335657da50d1a4357b939ba08b242ae86835c2d6a9e18b927bf3d5f997","description":"Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) \n\nAdversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases.\n\nIn the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0826","external_id":"T0826"},{"source_name":"Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021","description":"Colonial Pipeline Company 2021, May Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ","url":"https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption"},{"source_name":"Corero","description":"Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf"},{"source_name":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee","description":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee SANS Industrial Control System (ICS) Security; The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved 2024/11/25","url":"https://icscsi.org/library/Documents/White_Papers/SANS%20-%20ICS%20Cyber%20Kill%20Chain.pdf"},{"source_name":"Tyson Macaulay","description":"Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04  The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04  RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false"}],"platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"proposed-asset-availability-monitoring","name":"Asset availability monitoring","page":"telemetry/proposed-asset-availability-monitoring/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Read-only heartbeat or availability observations for an operational asset.","collection_focus":"Define expected heartbeat interval and monitor independence; track missed polls without equating them to an attack.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","reachable","last_seen_age_seconds"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-asset-availability-monitoring","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-controller-1","reachable":false,"last_seen_age_seconds":60}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."},{"id":"proposed-production-service-health","name":"Production service health","page":"telemetry/proposed-production-service-health/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Health and dependency status of services supporting a production process.","collection_focus":"Collect service health from approved monitoring interfaces and process-owner records; distinguish collector failure from service failure.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","status","latency_ms","monitor_healthy"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-production-service-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-historian","status":"degraded","latency_ms":250,"monitor_healthy":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0826","id":"T0826","name":"Loss of Availability","domain":"ics","platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0826","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0826/","page":"detections/ics/T0826/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0729","name":"Detection of Loss of Availability","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0729","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--d9469edc-7e55-41bc-8b17-a8db9fc6302e","relationship_id":"relationship--ad2ed5dc-d683-4b0e-b1e2-50b2e61ffd11","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1862","name":"Analytic 1862","guidance":"No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0729#AN1862","platforms":["None"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"proposed-asset-availability-monitoring","name":"Asset availability monitoring","tag":"Proposed: Asset availability monitoring","page":"telemetry/proposed-asset-availability-monitoring/","kind":"proposed_input"},{"id":"proposed-production-service-health","name":"Production service health","tag":"Proposed: Production service health","page":"telemetry/proposed-production-service-health/","kind":"proposed_input"}],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0608","name":"Conficker","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608","kind":"malware","description":"A [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) infection at a nuclear power plant forced the facility to temporarily shutdown. (Citation: Catalin Cimpanu April 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--990f944f-190d-456d-b194-f5ecb17a0868","references":[{"source_name":"Catalin Cimpanu April 2016","description":"Catalin Cimpanu 2016, April 26 Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary Retrieved. 2019/10/14 ","url":"https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G1027","name":"CyberAv3ngers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"During the [2026 Iranian Water Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0065), [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027) degraded operations across at least seven states that resulted in reported incidents, pressure loss and flooding.(Citation: Tenable Minnesota Water Utilities)","relationship_id":"relationship--89923285-812d-4a09-8536-bf41943e8229","references":[{"source_name":"Tenable Minnesota Water Utilities","description":"Research Special Operations. (2026, July 28). Coordinated \"cyberattack\" on U.S. water utilities: What you need to know. Retrieved September 26, 2026.","url":"https://www.tenable.com/blog/coordinated-cyberattack-on-minnesota-water-utilities-what-you-need-to-know"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0810","name":"Out-of-Band Communications Channel","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage  (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013). Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--52c7176b-431d-44a6-8c03-7c15a8cf6ce1","references":[{"source_name":"National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013","description":"National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0811","name":"Redundancy of Service","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system is compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. (Citation: M. Rentschler and H. Heine)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--afb0b60e-e604-4b96-abb9-57fdce4e5108","references":[{"source_name":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine","description":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine   The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877"}]},{"id":"M0953","name":"Data Backup","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.  Maintain and exercise incident response plans  (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--b8d6e550-18fe-49ad-9964-7802bbe0cb58","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security October 2009","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0826":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0826/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0826","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-asset-availability-monitoring","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-controller-1","reachable":false,"last_seen_age_seconds":60}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-production-service-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-historian","status":"degraded","latency_ms":250,"monitor_healthy":true}}]}}