{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0816","id":"T0816","name":"Device Restart/Shutdown","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"8edcecbd5fbe32ec14005f54669e98d40eeebc1d4ea675d79b54bef8ea23a385","description":"Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands.\n\nUnexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states.\n\nA device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816","external_id":"T0816"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0108","name":"Device Alarm","page":"telemetry/DC0108/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Device-generated alarms about equipment or controller state.","collection_focus":"Subscribe to supported device alarm/audit channels; retain code, severity, source asset and acknowledgement/clear times.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","alarm_code","severity","active"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0108","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-controller-1","alarm_code":"LAB_COMM_LOSS","severity":"warning","active":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0816","id":"T0816","name":"Device Restart/Shutdown","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0816/","page":"detections/ics/T0816/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0801","name":"Detection of Device Restart/Shutdown","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--194cb4dd-81ca-4e64-94e2-911fab1219f9","relationship_id":"relationship--b720b42c-5eba-4164-9c3d-8b4eabde4716","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1933","name":"Analytic 1933","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol restart/reset command directed at a field device from a source not in the approved engineering workstation list, particularly where multiple devices receive restart commands within a short window. Documented precedent: Industroyer exploited CVE-2015-5374 via a crafted 18-byte User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet to port 50000 on Siemens SIPROTEC relays. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN1933","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"BulkRestartTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which multiple device restarts are considered a coordinated event."},{"field":"ChangeControlWindow","description":"Scheduled maintenance periods during which restarts are authorized."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to issue device restart commands."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0108","component":"Device Alarm","name":"operationaldb:AlarmEvent","channel":"more than one device generates restart/offline alarm within bulk restart time window without open maintenance ticket","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1933","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN1933","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0108/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Content","channel":"restart/reset service from source not in engineering workstation list outside change control window","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1933","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN1933","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"NSM:Content","channel":"non-standard or malformed packet to device-specific diagnostic port immediately preceding a device-offline alarm","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1933","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN1933","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN2157","name":"Analytic 2157","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux engineering tool issuing device restart commands outside a scheduled maintenance window, from a User Identifier (UID) not in the approved engineer list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN2157","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"BulkRestartTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which multiple device restarts are considered a coordinated event."},{"field":"ChangeControlWindow","description":"Scheduled maintenance periods during which restarts are authorized."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to issue device restart commands."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): syscall=execve; device restart/shutdown command invoked outside the approved change-control window by an unauthorized UID","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2157","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN2157","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2187","name":"Analytic 2187","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) SET commands to power Management Information Base (MIB) restart Object Identifiers (OIDs) or Command Line Interface (CLI) reload commands from a source not in the approved Network Management System (NMS) Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN2187","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"BulkRestartTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which multiple device restarts are considered a coordinated event."},{"field":"ChangeControlWindow","description":"Scheduled maintenance periods during which restarts are authorized."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to issue device restart commands."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"networkdevice:snmp","channel":"Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) SET to power Management Information Base (MIB) restart Object Identifier (OID) or Command Line Interface (CLI) reload command from source not in approved Network Management System (NMS) Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) subnet","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN2187","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN2187","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]},{"id":"AN2260","name":"Analytic 2260","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) vendor engineering software initiating a device restart command from a Windows host outside a scheduled maintenance window. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN2260","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"BulkRestartTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which multiple device restarts are considered a coordinated event."},{"field":"ChangeControlWindow","description":"Scheduled maintenance periods during which restarts are authorized."},{"field":"EngineeringWorkstationList","description":"IP allowlist of workstations authorized to issue device restart commands."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"engineeringworkstation:ApplicationLog","channel":"device restart command initiated outside change control window by account not in approved engineer list","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2260","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0801#AN2260","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0108","name":"Device Alarm","tag":"Device Alarm","page":"telemetry/DC0108/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"The [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) SIPROTEC DoS module exploits the CVE-2015-5374 vulnerability in order to render a Siemens SIPROTEC device unresponsive. While the vulnerability does not directly cause the restart or shutdown of the device, the device must be restarted manually before it can resume operations. (Citation: Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--87c8ab74-576d-4962-b641-0762d374d1e8","references":[{"source_name":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017","description":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0800","name":"Authorization Enforcement","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800","kind":"course-of-action","description":"All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--6b5fd6d8-ef70-4896-b1a4-7b6c29c3a0d4","references":[]},{"id":"M0801","name":"Access Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801","kind":"course-of-action","description":"All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherently provide strong authentication and authorization functions.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--e8af0b34-4a67-4966-a34a-c4d1b346ea15","references":[]},{"id":"M0802","name":"Communication Authenticity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).\n","relationship_id":"relationship--491455dc-f7c8-4e12-811b-b8c5c041b4c3","references":[]},{"id":"M0804","name":"Human User Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804","kind":"course-of-action","description":"All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support [Account Use Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936), [Password Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927), and [User Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918).","relationship_id":"relationship--3a6cd53d-0d4e-4cf8-8edf-f9ebde4faac4","references":[]},{"id":"M0807","name":"Network Allowlists","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. (Citation: Department of Homeland Security September 2016)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--00e6c22b-9275-4039-b6d4-2ac0680325d6","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security September 2016","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2016, September Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0813","name":"Software Process and Device Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--f862418a-e7b4-4783-8949-7145f3dee665","references":[]},{"id":"M0930","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. (Citation: Department of Homeland Security September 2016)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--45ee1822-71e4-4d92-976d-306561b70555","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security September 2016","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2016, September Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0937","name":"Filter Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Application denylists can be used to block automation protocol functions used to initiate device shutdowns or restarts, such as DNP3's 0x0D function code, or vulnerabilities that can be used to trigger device shutdowns (e.g., CVE-2014-9195, CVE-2015-5374).\n","relationship_id":"relationship--ca768c2a-0f14-471c-90a5-bce649e88d51","references":[]},{"id":"M0942","name":"Disable or Remove Feature or Program","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure remote commands that enable device shutdown are disabled if they are not necessary. Examples include DNP3's 0x0D function code or unnecessary device management functions.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--8ca2fe75-9bb3-4af5-8fee-accd33d6d2ec","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0816":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0816/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0816","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0108","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-controller-1","alarm_code":"LAB_COMM_LOSS","severity":"warning","active":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}