{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0815","id":"T0815","name":"Denial of View","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0815","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"e1e7de406327c0fdaf1aae5c5ef55ac1f89fba29323d5b8c1d76832cbdffa38a","description":"Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) \n\nAn adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0815","external_id":"T0815"},{"source_name":"Corero","description":"Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf"},{"source_name":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee","description":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee SANS Industrial Control System (ICS) Security; The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved 2024/11/25","url":"https://icscsi.org/library/Documents/White_Papers/SANS%20-%20ICS%20Cyber%20Kill%20Chain.pdf"},{"source_name":"Tyson Macaulay","description":"Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04  The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04  RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false"}],"platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","name":"HMI communication health","page":"telemetry/proposed-hmi-communication-health/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"HMI-to-controller/historian connection and update status.","collection_focus":"Export supported HMI connection diagnostics and distinguish display freeze, stale data and transport failure.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["hmi","controller","connected","last_update_age_seconds"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"hmi":"lab-hmi-1","controller":"lab-controller-1","connected":true,"last_update_age_seconds":2}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."},{"id":"proposed-historian-data-freshness","name":"Historian data freshness","page":"telemetry/proposed-historian-data-freshness/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Age and continuity of process measurements in the historian.","collection_focus":"Calculate age from source timestamps, not only database ingestion time; define expected sample interval and quality rules.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["tag","sample_age_seconds","expected_interval_seconds","quality"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-historian-data-freshness","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","sample_age_seconds":30,"expected_interval_seconds":1,"quality":"stale"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0815","id":"T0815","name":"Denial of View","domain":"ics","platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0815","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0815/","page":"detections/ics/T0815/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0769","name":"Detection of Denial of View","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0769","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--13412b71-b94e-4aef-912a-44853f8bff05","relationship_id":"relationship--408b2389-3280-46c6-8c94-2579b47b2340","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1901","name":"Analytic 1901","guidance":"No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0769#AN1901","platforms":["None"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","name":"HMI communication health","tag":"Proposed: HMI communication health","page":"telemetry/proposed-hmi-communication-health/","kind":"proposed_input"},{"id":"proposed-historian-data-freshness","name":"Historian data freshness","tag":"Proposed: Historian data freshness","page":"telemetry/proposed-historian-data-freshness/","kind":"proposed_input"}],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is able to block serial COM channels temporarily causing a denial of view. (Citation: Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--a04169ed-c16b-466b-80ef-22a11067f475","references":[{"source_name":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017","description":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0810","name":"Out-of-Band Communications Channel","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage  (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013). Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--18ef2d69-d11a-4d31-a803-da989c4073f7","references":[{"source_name":"National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013","description":"National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0811","name":"Redundancy of Service","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. (Citation: M. Rentschler and H. Heine)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--e852e64c-b5e0-4e7f-a189-bbc7aa7932c7","references":[{"source_name":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine","description":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine   The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877"}]},{"id":"M0953","name":"Data Backup","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.  Maintain and exercise incident response plans  (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--c2fe42b4-6750-4b51-86b7-6c37fbfdef2d","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security October 2009","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0815":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0815/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0815","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"hmi":"lab-hmi-1","controller":"lab-controller-1","connected":true,"last_update_age_seconds":2}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-historian-data-freshness","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","sample_age_seconds":30,"expected_interval_seconds":1,"quality":"stale"}}]}}