{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0813","id":"T0813","name":"Denial of Control","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0813","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"7ee79db176a3bf851c22348188a17246ffa15f0748dc1fc474e6372ec0833f41","description":"Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay)\n\nIn the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters. (Citation: Mark Loveless April 2017)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0813","external_id":"T0813"},{"source_name":"Corero","description":"Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf"},{"source_name":"Mark Loveless April 2017","description":"Mark Loveless 2017, April 11 THE DALLAS COUNTY SIREN HACK Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ","url":"https://duo.com/decipher/the-dallas-county-siren-hack"},{"source_name":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee","description":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee SANS Industrial Control System (ICS) Security; The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved 2024/11/25","url":"https://icscsi.org/library/Documents/White_Papers/SANS%20-%20ICS%20Cyber%20Kill%20Chain.pdf"},{"source_name":"Tyson Macaulay","description":"Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04  The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04  RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false"}],"platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"proposed-control-command-acknowledgements","name":"Control-command acknowledgements","page":"telemetry/proposed-control-command-acknowledgements/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Responses acknowledging a command sent to a control-system endpoint.","collection_focus":"Collect command/acknowledgement pairs with sequence ID, status and timestamps; compare against measured physical response.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["command_id","asset_id","acknowledged","physical_effect_verified"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-control-command-acknowledgements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"command_id":"lab-cmd-1","asset_id":"lab-controller-1","acknowledged":true,"physical_effect_verified":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."},{"id":"proposed-controller-communication-health","name":"Controller communication health","page":"telemetry/proposed-controller-communication-health/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"Controller link/communication diagnostics and freshness indicators.","collection_focus":"Export supported communication counters or heartbeat diagnostics through approved read-only interfaces.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","link_state","timeouts_last_minute"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-controller-communication-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-controller-1","link_state":"up","timeouts_last_minute":2}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0813","id":"T0813","name":"Denial of Control","domain":"ics","platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0813","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0813/","page":"detections/ics/T0813/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0786","name":"Detection of Denial of Control","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0786","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--1bae319f-03d8-49c9-8bb8-e4f27bb69a11","relationship_id":"relationship--d99a28f4-6536-4d73-9241-497cda9a8878","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1918","name":"Analytic 1918","guidance":"No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0786#AN1918","platforms":["None"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"proposed-control-command-acknowledgements","name":"Control-command acknowledgements","tag":"Proposed: Control-command acknowledgements","page":"telemetry/proposed-control-command-acknowledgements/","kind":"proposed_input"},{"id":"proposed-controller-communication-health","name":"Controller communication health","tag":"Proposed: Controller communication health","page":"telemetry/proposed-controller-communication-health/","kind":"proposed_input"}],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is able to block serial COM channels temporarily causing a denial of control. (Citation: Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--9902691c-aaf2-48a1-b1ca-cd6f652ae1c6","references":[{"source_name":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017","description":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0810","name":"Out-of-Band Communications Channel","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage  (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013). Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--2089201c-c1c6-4d92-a737-a6499e26ee7f","references":[{"source_name":"National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013","description":"National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0811","name":"Redundancy of Service","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. (Citation: M. Rentschler and H. Heine)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--99ec0a8e-4a4f-427c-89db-163e4b206021","references":[{"source_name":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine","description":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine   The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877"}]},{"id":"M0953","name":"Data Backup","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.  Maintain and exercise incident response plans (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--44c857cf-7a4e-405a-87ca-7f6d79000589","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security October 2009","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0813":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0813/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0813","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-control-command-acknowledgements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"command_id":"lab-cmd-1","asset_id":"lab-controller-1","acknowledged":true,"physical_effect_verified":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-controller-communication-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-controller-1","link_state":"up","timeouts_last_minute":2}}]}}