{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1687","id":"T1687","name":"Exploitation for Defense Impairment","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1687","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"bde6d1c01d30b3c2ccc8ea3a6f386701def45f5fe2a074ce3c932b46b08a4d3f","description":"Adversaries may exploit vulnerabilities in security software, infrastructure, or defensive components to degrade, disable, or otherwise continue to impair their ability to prevent, detect, or respond to malicious activity. \n \nAdversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to directly interfere with defensive mechanisms. Exploitation occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in software, services, or the operating system to execute adversary-controlled code, often with the goal of weakening or disabling protections. \n\nVulnerabilities may exist in security tools such as antivirus, endpoint detection and response (EDR), firewalls, or other monitoring solutions. Adversaries may use prior reconnaissance or perform discovery activities (e.g., [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)) to identify defensive tools present in an environment and target them for exploitation. \n\nSuccessful exploitation may allow adversaries to terminate security processes, disable protections, bypass enforcement mechanisms, or reduce the effectiveness of defensive controls. In some cases, vulnerabilities in cloud-based or SaaS infrastructure may also be leveraged to bypass built-in security boundaries or disrupt visibility and enforcement across environments.(Citation: Salesforce zero-day in facebook phishing attack)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1687","external_id":"T1687"},{"source_name":"Salesforce zero-day in facebook phishing attack","description":"Bill Toulas. (2023, August 2). Hackers exploited Salesforce zero-day in Facebook phishing attack. Retrieved September 18, 2023.","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploited-salesforce-zero-day-in-facebook-phishing-attack/"}],"platforms":["IaaS","Linux","macOS","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","saas"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0090","name":"Cloud Service Disable","page":"telemetry/DC0090/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Disabling a cloud service or an enabled service capability.","collection_focus":"Collect service disable/stop-logging administrative actions and independent health/configuration checks; monitor the audit destination itself.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["resource_id","action","enabled_before","enabled_after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0090","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"resource_id":"lab-service-1","action":"disable","enabled_before":true,"enabled_after":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0079","name":"Driver Load","page":"telemetry/DC0079/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Loading of a driver into the running OS.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon DriverLoad (6) and retain image path, hash and signature result; distinguish load from file installation.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["driver_path","action","signature_status"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0079","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"driver_path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.sys","action":"load","signature_status":"lab_fixture_only"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0074","name":"Driver Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0074/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Driver inventory and properties such as path, version, signature and hash.","collection_focus":"Collect signed-driver inventory with hash algorithm and signer verification result; differentiate installed files from loaded drivers.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["driver_path","version","signed","loaded"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0074","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"driver_path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.sys","version":"1.0-lab","signed":false,"loaded":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0051","name":"Firewall Rule Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0051/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Changes to firewall rules and their matching/action criteria.","collection_focus":"Collect firewall policy audit plus before/after rule snapshots; identify local versus centrally managed policy and the responsible administrator.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["rule_id","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0051","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"rule_id":"lab-rule-1","attribute":"remote_address","before":"192.0.2.10","after":"192.0.2.11"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0073","name":"Instance Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0073/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Changes to a compute instance configuration.","collection_focus":"Collect compute update/modify APIs and before/after state, including attached role, network interfaces and launch parameters where exposed.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["instance_id","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0073","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"instance_id":"vm-lab-1","attribute":"instance_type","before":"small-lab","after":"medium-lab"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0034","name":"Process Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0034/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Point-in-time process properties such as owner, executable and start time.","collection_focus":"Collect read-only process inventory with PID plus start time/stable identity, command line and collection time; restrict access to potentially sensitive arguments.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image","owner_uid","started_at"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0034","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image":"/usr/bin/sleep","owner_uid":1000,"started_at":"2026-09-27T11:59:00Z"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0041","name":"Service Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0041/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Service configuration and current state at observation time.","collection_focus":"Inventory service name, executable, startup mode, owner and status using supported OS APIs; compare successive snapshots.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","executable","start_mode","state"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0041","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","start_mode":"manual","state":"stopped"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1687","id":"T1687","name":"Exploitation for Defense Impairment","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["IaaS","Linux","macOS","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","saas"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1687","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1687/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1687/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0900","name":"Detection of Defense Impairment","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--3a3820cd-260b-43d0-b5af-89b7ba81a044","relationship_id":"relationship--1a900a55-e489-4cc5-a1c6-ded0d0daae6a","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN2038","name":"Analytic 2038","guidance":"Detects suspicious interactions with security products followed by service crashes, unexpected restarts, driver unloads, telemetry gaps, or tamper-state changes. Correlates exploit precursor behavior with immediate degradation of defensive services and follow-on process execution.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2038","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"CrashCorrelationWindow","description":"Time between suspicious interaction and security service failure"},{"field":"ProtectedServiceList","description":"Security agents/services expected to remain stable"},{"field":"TelemetryGapThreshold","description":"Acceptable heartbeat silence duration"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0041","component":"Service Metadata","name":"WinEventLog:System","channel":"EventCode=7035","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2038","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2038","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0041/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2038","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2038","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0079","component":"Driver Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=6","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2038","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2038","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0079/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4688","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2038","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2038","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2039","name":"Analytic 2039","guidance":"Detects exploitation attempts against security daemons or kernel security modules followed by daemon termination, disabled logging, module unload, audit stoppage, or reduced endpoint telemetry. Correlates local execution or network input with control degradation.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2039","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ProtectedProcessNames","description":"Names of EDR, audit, AV, firewall daemons"},{"field":"ModuleUnloadAllowlist","description":"Approved maintenance unload operations"},{"field":"HealthGapThreshold","description":"Expected telemetry heartbeat tolerance"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"auditd:EXECVE","channel":"execve, kill, ptrace, insmod, rmmod targeting security processes","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2039","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2039","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0041","component":"Service Metadata","name":"auditd:DAEMON","channel":"auditd stopped, config changed, logging suspended","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2039","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2039","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0041/"}]},{"id":"AN2042","name":"Analytic 2042","guidance":"Detects exploitation or abuse of SaaS security workflows resulting in disabled alerts, reduced retention, bypassed enforcement, role escalation, or tokenized persistence that weakens monitoring. Correlates unusual admin/API activity with visibility reduction.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2042","platforms":["SaaS"],"tuning":[{"field":"PrivilegedActorAllowlist","description":"Approved admins allowed to change controls"},{"field":"RetentionChangeThreshold","description":"Minimum acceptable logging retention"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"saas:okta","channel":"policy.rule.update;system.log.disable;admin.role.assign","platforms":["SaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN2042","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2042","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"},{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"m365:unified","channel":"Set-AdminAuditLogConfig;New-ApplicationAccessPolicy;ConsentToApplication","platforms":["SaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN2042","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2042","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]},{"id":"AN2040","name":"Analytic 2040","guidance":"Detects crafted activity resulting in crashes or impairment of endpoint security extensions, network filters, launch daemons, or telemetry agents. Correlates process activity, system extension state changes, and telemetry interruption.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2040","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"ExtensionList","description":"Protected security system extensions"},{"field":"CrashBurstThreshold","description":"Multiple failures in short interval"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0034","component":"Process Metadata","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Crash or abnormal termination of security agent or system extension host","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN2040","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2040","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0034/"},{"component_id":"DC0074","component":"Driver Metadata","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Extension disabled, unloaded, failed to start","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN2040","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2040","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0074/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Traffic spike preceding control crash","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN2040","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2040","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN2041","name":"Analytic 2041","guidance":"Detects exploitation of cloud-native security boundaries or management components followed by disabled logging, detached agents, changed security groups, policy bypass, or telemetry suppression. Correlates suspicious API activity with reduced control coverage.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2041","platforms":["IaaS"],"tuning":[{"field":"CriticalTrailList","description":"Audit trails that must remain enabled"},{"field":"ControlChangeWindow","description":"Time after suspicious API sequence to inspect coverage loss"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0090","component":"Cloud Service Disable","name":"AWS:CloudTrail","channel":"StopLogging, DeleteTrail, or DisableSecurityService","platforms":["IaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN2041","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2041","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0090/"},{"component_id":"DC0073","component":"Instance Modification","name":"AWS:CloudTrail","channel":"ModifyInstanceAttribute","platforms":["IaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN2041","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2041","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0073/"},{"component_id":"DC0051","component":"Firewall Rule Modification","name":"AWS:CloudTrail","channel":"AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress","platforms":["IaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN2041","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0900#AN2041","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0051/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0090","name":"Cloud Service Disable","tag":"Cloud Service Disable","page":"telemetry/DC0090/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0079","name":"Driver Load","tag":"Driver Load","page":"telemetry/DC0079/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0074","name":"Driver Metadata","tag":"Driver Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0074/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0051","name":"Firewall Rule Modification","tag":"Firewall Rule Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0051/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0073","name":"Instance Modification","tag":"Instance Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0073/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0034","name":"Process Metadata","tag":"Process Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0034/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0041","name":"Service Metadata","tag":"Service Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0041/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1518":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1518/","T1687":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1687/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1687","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0090","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"resource_id":"lab-service-1","action":"disable","enabled_before":true,"enabled_after":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0079","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"driver_path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.sys","action":"load","signature_status":"lab_fixture_only"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0074","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"driver_path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.sys","version":"1.0-lab","signed":false,"loaded":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0051","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"rule_id":"lab-rule-1","attribute":"remote_address","before":"192.0.2.10","after":"192.0.2.11"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0073","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"instance_id":"vm-lab-1","attribute":"instance_type","before":"small-lab","after":"medium-lab"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0034","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image":"/usr/bin/sleep","owner_uid":1000,"started_at":"2026-09-27T11:59:00Z"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0041","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","start_mode":"manual","state":"stopped"}}]}}