{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1686.002","id":"T1686.002","name":"Network Device Firewall","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1686/002","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"5b7885e7ccb63edec91b7e4178d4ca885dd375ba8053ab9b571d258e2b13f86b","description":"Adversaries may disable network device-based firewall mechanisms entirely or add, delete, or modify particular rules in order to bypass controls limiting network usage.  \n\nAdversaries may obtain access to devices such as routers, switches, or other perimeter/network devices and change access control lists (ACLs), security zones, or policy rules to permit otherwise blocked traffic. For example, adversaries may add new network firewall rules to allow access to all internal network subnets without restrictions. Allowing access to internal network subsets may enable unrestricted inbound/outbound connectivity or open paths for command and control and lateral movement.\n\nAdversaries may obtain access to network device management interfaces via [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or by exploiting vulnerabilities. In some cases, threat actors may target firewalls and other network infrastructure that are exposed to the internet by leveraging weaknesses in public-facing applications ([Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).(Citation: CVE-2024-55591 Detail)\n\nAdversaries may also modify host networking configurations that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as adjusting interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1686/002","external_id":"T1686.002"},{"source_name":"CVE-2024-55591 Detail","description":"NIST NVD. (2025, January 22). Retrieved September 22, 2025.","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55591"}],"platforms":["Network Devices"],"environments":["network-infrastructure"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1686","id":"T1686","name":"Disable or Modify System Firewall","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["defense-impairment"],"platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1686/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","some_candidates_require_elevation","potential_disruption_requires_individual_review"],"telemetry_tags":["Command Execution","Firewall Rule Modification","Process Creation","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0051","name":"Firewall Rule Modification","tag":"Firewall Rule Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0051/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1686/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":7,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["netsh"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S0108","name":"netsh","page":"tools/S0108/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":25,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0051","name":"Firewall Rule Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0051/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Changes to firewall rules and their matching/action criteria.","collection_focus":"Collect firewall policy audit plus before/after rule snapshots; identify local versus centrally managed policy and the responsible administrator.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["rule_id","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0051","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"rule_id":"lab-rule-1","attribute":"remote_address","before":"192.0.2.10","after":"192.0.2.11"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Creation of a logon session with account and logon-type context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","logon_id","logon_type","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1686.002","id":"T1686.002","name":"Network Device Firewall","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Network Devices"],"environments":["network-infrastructure"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1686/002","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1686.002/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1686.002/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0306","name":"Detection of Unauthorized Network Firewall Rule Modification","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0306","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--3a114d11-0850-4c33-b828-359e59b15250","relationship_id":"relationship--81ca2e61-d39f-4a2d-810c-e9d5e953ca86","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0855","name":"Analytic 0855","guidance":"Defender observes configuration changes on firewall/network appliance involving rule creation, modification, or deletion from abnormal management IPs or non-console channels (e.g., remote CLI, API). These are often correlated with a spike in previously blocked outbound traffic, unexpected allow-all rules, or bulk rule deletions. Behavior often follows unauthorized login, privilege escalation, or API abuse.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0306#AN0855","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"TrustedAdminIPs","description":"Allowlisted IPs/subnets where administrative access is expected (e.g., jump box, VPN mgmt)"},{"field":"ConfigChangeWindow","description":"Expected maintenance window (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC) to filter benign changes"},{"field":"RuleScopeThreshold","description":"Number of rules affected or port ranges modified to determine severity"},{"field":"NewUserPrivilegeThreshold","description":"Flag new users making changes without observed privilege elevation path"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0051","component":"Firewall Rule Modification","name":"networkdevice:Firewall","channel":"update_rule: Access control or NAT rule modified or disabled outside maintenance window","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN0855","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0306#AN0855","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0051/"},{"component_id":"DC0067","component":"Logon Session Creation","name":"networkdevice:Firewall","channel":"Login from untrusted IP, or new admin account accessing firewall console/API","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN0855","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0306#AN0855","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0067/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"networkdevice:Firewall","channel":"Audit trail or CLI/API access indicating commands like no access-list, delete rule-set, clear config","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN0855","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0306#AN0855","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Outbound traffic spike through formerly blocked ports/subnets following config change","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN0855","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0306#AN0855","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0051","name":"Firewall Rule Modification","tag":"Firewall Rule Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0051/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","tag":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1686","id":"T1686","name":"Disable or Modify System Firewall","page":"detections/enterprise/T1686/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0531","name":"Grandoreiro","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531","kind":"malware","description":"[Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) can block the Deibold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia security tool at the firewall level. (Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--c1b233f3-87f7-43e8-8185-0c6aa0e1b959","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Grandoreiro April 2020","description":"ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/"}]},{"id":"S0687","name":"Cyclops Blink","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687","kind":"malware","description":"[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) can modify the Linux iptables firewall to enable C2 communication on network devices via a stored list of port numbers.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--c329aee6-3e4d-42c1-baef-bdb011d6f90c","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022","description":"Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html"},{"source_name":"NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022","description":"NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022.","url":"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0082","name":"APT38","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443. (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) ","relationship_id":"relationship--9420db13-b21f-4a52-b650-fe9b6b790c4a","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020","description":"DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-239a"}]},{"id":"G1045","name":"Salt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Salt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045) has modified the network firewalls access control lists to add IP addresses to bypass security policies and maintain access.(Citation: CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025)      ","relationship_id":"relationship--0b5cb8e1-14e9-4064-9276-632f8ee96230","references":[{"source_name":"CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025","description":"CISA. (2025, September 3). Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System. Retrieved September 22, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or modifying firewall settings.","relationship_id":"relationship--455d3c85-713f-44e4-816b-3825be78df8b","references":[]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Routinely check account role permissions to ensure only expected users and roles have permission to modify system firewalls.","relationship_id":"relationship--28888941-36e8-43b7-ac44-14d25fa17484","references":[]},{"id":"M1051","name":"Update Software","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1051","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure the network firewall is up to date with security patches.","relationship_id":"relationship--126e0d75-d772-4af2-a47f-e92ccd8140b4","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1078":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1078/","T1190":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1190/","T1686.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1686.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1686.002","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0051","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"rule_id":"lab-rule-1","attribute":"remote_address","before":"192.0.2.10","after":"192.0.2.11"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}}]}}
