{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1685.003","id":"T1685.003","name":"Modify or Spoof Tool UI","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/003","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"a19039d7a8db97f904d3cee7d7811a85018c55d8d3be9711d259729a76f79cc7","description":"Adversaries may spoof or manipulate security tool user interfaces (UIs) to falsely indicate tools are functioning normally and delay detection and response. \n\nAdversaries may present misleading or falsified security tool interfaces (UIs) that display normal or healthy status indicators, even when underlying security tools have been disabled, degraded, or otherwise tampered with. Security tools typically provide visibility into system health, alerting, and operational status; by misrepresenting this information, adversaries can undermine defender trust in these signals and obscure the true security posture of the system. \n\nThis behavior is often used in conjunction with efforts to disable or modify tools, where adversaries first impair the functionality of defenses (e.g., EDR, logging agents) and then replace or mimic their interfaces to conceal the loss of visibility. By maintaining the appearance of normal operations, such as showing active protection, successful updates, or absence of threats, adversaries can delay investigation and response, enabling continued malicious activity. \n\nFor example, adversaries may display a fake Windows Security interface or system tray icon indicating a “protected” or “healthy” state after disabling Windows Defender or related services.(Citation: BlackBasta)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/003","external_id":"T1685.003"},{"source_name":"BlackBasta","description":"Antonio Cocomazzi and Antonio Pirozzi. (2022, November 3). Black Basta Ransomware | Attacks Deploy Custom EDR Evasion Tools Tied to FIN7 Threat Actor. Retrieved March 14, 2023.","url":"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1685","id":"T1685","name":"Disable or Modify Tools","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["defense-impairment"],"platforms":["Containers","ESXi","IaaS","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","network-infrastructure","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1685/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls","some_candidates_require_elevation","potential_disruption_requires_individual_review"],"telemetry_tags":["Cloud Service Modification","Command Execution","Host Status","Process Creation","Process Termination","Service Creation","Service Metadata","Service Modification","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0069","name":"Cloud Service Modification","tag":"Cloud Service Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0069/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0018","name":"Host Status","tag":"Host Status","page":"telemetry/DC0018/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0033","name":"Process Termination","tag":"Process Termination","page":"telemetry/DC0033/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","tag":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0041","name":"Service Metadata","tag":"Service Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0041/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0065","name":"Service Modification","tag":"Service Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0065/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1685/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":156,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":7,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["Brute Ratel C4","Cobalt Strike","DCRAT","Donut","Imminent Monitor","SILENTTRINITY"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S1063","name":"Brute Ratel C4","page":"tools/S1063/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0154","name":"Cobalt Strike","page":"tools/S0154/","kind":"selected_framework","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S9017","name":"DCRAT","page":"tools/S9017/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0695","name":"Donut","page":"tools/S0695/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0434","name":"Imminent Monitor","page":"tools/S0434/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S0692","name":"SILENTTRINITY","page":"tools/S0692/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":77,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0018","name":"Host Status","page":"telemetry/DC0018/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Host health and availability observations such as heartbeat, shutdown or degraded state.","collection_focus":"Collect agent heartbeat and OS health independently; record missed polls, last-seen time and monitor health.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","status","heartbeat_age_seconds","collector_healthy"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0018","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-host-1","status":"degraded","heartbeat_age_seconds":90,"collector_healthy":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Installation or registration of a service.","collection_focus":"Collect service-install auditing through Audit Security System Extension where supported, plus Service Control Manager/System logs and the new service configuration.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","executable","actor"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0060","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","action":"install","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","actor":"lab-admin"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1685.003","id":"T1685.003","name":"Modify or Spoof Tool UI","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/003","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1685.003/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1685.003/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0311","name":"Detection for Spoofing Tool UI across OS Platforms","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--fecfb9f9-645e-4e09-ba21-05bc60722688","relationship_id":"relationship--58dc2b98-c557-4a65-9f7f-624c9f838288","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0868","name":"Analytic 0868","guidance":"Detection of inconsistencies between reported sensor health and actual process/service state. For example, Windows Defender tray icon/UI showing healthy status while corresponding Defender services (WinDefend, MsMpEng) are stopped or disabled. Correlates process creation events with missing or terminated security processes and spoofed health events.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0868","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ServiceNameList","description":"Monitored list of critical security service names; environment-specific."},{"field":"FakeUIProcessPatterns","description":"Patterns of filenames or paths mimicking Windows Security GUI elements."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0060","component":"Service Creation","name":"WinEventLog:System","channel":"EventCode=7036","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0868","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0868","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0060/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0868","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0868","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN0869","name":"Analytic 0869","guidance":"Monitoring for discrepancies between system daemon/service state and reported health messages (e.g., syslog shows AV/IDS daemon stopped, but spoofed messages claim it is still running). Detects userland processes impersonating AV/IDS command-line outputs or modifying log forwarding configurations.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0869","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"SecurityDaemonList","description":"Names of AV/IDS/EDR daemons monitored in Linux environments."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve: Execution of binaries/scripts presenting false health messages for security daemons","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0869","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0869","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0018","component":"Host Status","name":"linux:syslog","channel":"Service stop or disable messages for security tools not reflected in SIEM alerts","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0869","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0869","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0018/"}]},{"id":"AN0870","name":"Analytic 0870","guidance":"Detection of fake or spoofed macOS Security & Privacy GUIs showing healthy status after XProtect, Gatekeeper, or AV processes are disabled. Correlates user-space UI process creation with terminated or missing security daemons.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0870","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"TrustedDaemonList","description":"Monitored list of macOS security daemons such as XProtect, Gatekeeper, or third-party AV."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Execution of processes mimicking Apple Security & Privacy GUIs","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0870","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0870","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0018","component":"Host Status","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Termination or disabling of XProtect, Gatekeeper, or third-party AV daemons","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0870","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0311#AN0870","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0018/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0018","name":"Host Status","tag":"Host Status","page":"telemetry/DC0018/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","tag":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1685","id":"T1685","name":"Disable or Modify Tools","page":"detections/enterprise/T1685/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S9014","name":"PHASEJAM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9014","kind":"malware","description":"[PHASEJAM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9014) has prevented legitimate Ivanti Connect Secure system upgrades by intercepting the upgrade command and rendering fake HTML upgrade progress bar through a function called `processUpgradeDisplay()` which allowed the compromised device to remain under the control of the adversary.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--af446864-1b82-4ea7-86af-16b983ce9005","references":[{"source_name":"Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025","description":"John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-zero-day"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0082","name":"APT38","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has displayed a fake “system update complete” dialog to the user following successful deployment of malicious payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Sapphire Sleet APR 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--41b83cc1-2c0b-461f-b9ec-3e7f51420780","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Sapphire Sleet APR 2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 16). Dissecting Sapphire Sleet’s macOS intrusion from lure to compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/04/16/dissecting-sapphire-sleets-macos-intrusion-from-lure-to-compromise/"}]},{"id":"G1059","name":"NIMBUS MANTICORE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1059","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[NIMBUS MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1059) has prompted victims with fake warnings and error messages to appear as legitimate failures to reduce user suspicion.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026)(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025)(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024)         ","relationship_id":"relationship--13db5e06-ca37-4cdc-81a0-972ede455234","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025","description":"Check Point. (2025, September 22). Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe. Retrieved September 24, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/"},{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026","description":"Check Point. (2026, May 22). Fast and Furious – Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict. Retrieved September 23, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/"},{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024","description":"Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, February 27). When Cats Fly: Suspected Iranian Threat Actor UNC1549 Targets Israeli and Middle East Aerospace and Defense Sectors. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1038","name":"Execution Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1038","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use application controls to mitigate installation and use of payloads that may be utilized to spoof security alerting.","relationship_id":"relationship--fe03f972-e88a-4eca-bb43-5f7a8ac4a9ad","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1685.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1685.003/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1685.003","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0018","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-host-1","status":"degraded","heartbeat_age_seconds":90,"collector_healthy":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0060","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","action":"install","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","actor":"lab-admin"}}]}}
