{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1684.001","id":"T1684.001","name":"Impersonation","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1684/001","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"8a81fa9f468ac4894343552576a15292cbbd86b80619643593f0bb453681766e","description":"Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.\n\nIn many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657).\n\nAdversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as `payment`, `request`, or `urgent` to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary’s goal.  \n\nImpersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as [Gather Victim Identity Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589) and [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591) as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to substantiate their false identity.(Citation: Crowdstrike BEC)\n\nThere is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may Compromise Accounts targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.(Citation: VEC)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1684/001","external_id":"T1684.001"},{"source_name":"Crowdstrike BEC","description":"Bart Lenaerts-Bergmans. (2023, August 8). What is Business Email Compromise?. Retrieved April 15, 2026.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/threat-intelligence/business-email-compromise-bec/"},{"source_name":"VEC","description":"CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023.","url":"https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers."}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","saas"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1684","id":"T1684","name":"Social Engineering","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["stealth"],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","saas"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1684/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls"],"telemetry_tags":["Application Log Content","Command Execution","File Access","File Creation","File Modification","Logon Session Creation","Network Connection Creation","Process Creation","User Account Authentication"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","tag":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","tag":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1684/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"guidance_only","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Creation of a logon session with account and logon-type context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","logon_id","logon_type","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1684.001","id":"T1684.001","name":"Impersonation","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","saas"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1684/001","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1684.001/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1684.001/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0286","name":"Detection Strategy for Impersonation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--1e08be7e-451c-4b10-9e65-b6dbf8d54b38","relationship_id":"relationship--1760c251-517e-46a9-b97a-325a97d1a3d1","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0792","name":"Analytic 0792","guidance":"Monitor for anomalous email activity originating from Windows-hosted applications (e.g., Outlook) where the sending account name or display name does not match the underlying SMTP address. Detect abnormal volume of outbound messages containing sensitive keywords (e.g., 'payment', 'wire transfer') or anomalous login locations for accounts associated with email sending activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0792","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"KeywordList","description":"Adjust impersonation detection keywords based on local business risk terms (e.g., 'ACH', 'Invoice')."},{"field":"GeoLocationBaseline","description":"Define trusted geographic regions for normal user email activity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0067","component":"Logon Session Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4624, 4648","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0792","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0792","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0067/"},{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"m365:unified","channel":"SendOnBehalf/SendAs: Emails sent where the sending identity mismatches account ownership","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0792","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0792","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]},{"id":"AN0793","name":"Analytic 0793","guidance":"Monitor mail server logs (Postfix, Sendmail, Exim) for anomalous From headers mismatching authenticated SMTP identities. Detect abnormal relay attempts, spoofed envelope-from values, or large-scale outbound campaigns targeting internal users.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0793","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"KnownRelayHosts","description":"Filter trusted relays or automated notification systems from impersonation alerts."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve: Processes executing sendmail/postfix with forged headers","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0793","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0793","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"Application:Mail","channel":"Mismatch between authenticated username and From header in email","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0793","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0793","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]},{"id":"AN0794","name":"Analytic 0794","guidance":"Monitor Mail.app activity or unified logs for anomalous SMTP usage, including mismatches between display name and authenticated AppleID or Exchange credentials. Detect use of third-party mail utilities that attempt to send on behalf of corporate identities.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0794","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"TrustedMailClients","description":"Allowlist known third-party clients used for legitimate email activity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Mail.app or third-party clients sending messages with mismatched From headers","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0794","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0794","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]},{"id":"AN0795","name":"Analytic 0795","guidance":"Monitor SaaS mail platforms (Google Workspace, M365, Okta-integrated apps) for SendAs/SendOnBehalfOf operations where the delegated permissions are unusual or newly granted. Detect impersonation attempts where adversaries configure rules to auto-forward or auto-reply with impersonated content.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0795","platforms":["SaaS"],"tuning":[{"field":"DelegationBaseline","description":"Maintain baseline of normal SendAs/SendOnBehalf relationships to reduce false positives."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"gcp:workspaceaudit","channel":"SendAs: Outbound messages with alias identities that differ from primary account","platforms":["SaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN0795","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0795","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]},{"id":"AN0796","name":"Analytic 0796","guidance":"Monitor Office Suite applications (Outlook, Word mail merge, Excel macros) for abnormal automated message sending, especially when macros or scripts trigger email delivery. Detect patterns of impersonation language (urgent, payment, executive request) combined with anomalous execution of Office macros.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0796","platforms":["Office Suite"],"tuning":[{"field":"MacroExecutionThreshold","description":"Threshold for correlating macro execution with email sending activity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"m365:unified","channel":"SendOnBehalf/SendAs: Office Suite initiated messages using impersonated identities","platforms":["Office Suite"],"analytic_id":"AN0796","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0286#AN0796","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","tag":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S1131","name":"NPPSPY","page":"tools/S1131/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S1131","name":"NPPSPY","page":"tools/S1131/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S1131","name":"NPPSPY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1131","kind":"tool","description":"[NPPSPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1131) creates a network listener using the misspelled label <code>logincontroll</code> recorded to the Registry key <code>HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\NetworkProvider\\\\Order</code>.(Citation: Huntress NPPSPY 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--388ca51d-46e3-45bd-bf43-7ce4da109f8b","references":[{"source_name":"Huntress NPPSPY 2022","description":"Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved May 17, 2024.","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy"}]},{"id":"S9037","name":"RustyWater","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9037","kind":"malware","description":"[RustyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9037) has impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain `info@tmcell`.(Citation: CloudSEK_RustyWater_Jan2026)  ","relationship_id":"relationship--09bef668-b821-4228-adb3-35a4605ac3e9","references":[{"source_name":"CloudSEK_RustyWater_Jan2026","description":"Awasthi, P. (2026, January 8). Reborn in Rust: Muddy Water Evolves Tooling with RustyWater Implant. Retrieved March 19, 2026.","url":"https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/reborn-in-rust-muddywater-evolves-tooling-with-rustywater-implant"}]},{"id":"S9064","name":"TRUSTTRAP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9064","kind":"malware","description":"[TRUSTTRAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9064) has a function to prompt the user with a fake popup that impersonates the Microsoft Outlook login window.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--713877d8-6ace-4489-bb26-e9eabc793808","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025","description":"El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/analysis-of-unc1549-ttps-targeting-aerospace-defense"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[LAMEHUG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9035) has sent spearphishing emails impersonating Ukrainian government officials. (Citation: Cato LAMEHUG JUL 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--fd3ff9c1-b745-44b1-8a28-3fb4a12134c7","references":[{"source_name":"Cato LAMEHUG JUL 2025","description":"Simonovich, V. (2025, July 23). Cato CTRL™ Threat Research: Analyzing LAMEHUG – First Known LLM-Powered Malware with Links to APT28 (Fancy Bear) . Retrieved April 21, 2026.","url":"https://www.catonetworks.com/blog/cato-ctrl-threat-research-analyzing-lamehug/"}]},{"id":"G0069","name":"MuddyWater","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has used support@microsoftonlines[.]com to send phishing emails that masqueraded as security updates from Microsoft.(Citation: NaumaanProofpoint_GlobalClickFix_April2025) [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has also impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain info@tmcell.(Citation: CloudSEK_RustyWater_Jan2026) ","relationship_id":"relationship--8da03207-ceff-4791-ab21-730b0445fe6f","references":[{"source_name":"CloudSEK_RustyWater_Jan2026","description":"Awasthi, P. (2026, January 8). Reborn in Rust: Muddy Water Evolves Tooling with RustyWater Implant. Retrieved March 19, 2026.","url":"https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/reborn-in-rust-muddywater-evolves-tooling-with-rustywater-implant"},{"source_name":"NaumaanProofpoint_GlobalClickFix_April2025","description":"Naumaan, S., et al. (2025, April 17). Around the World in 90 Days: State-Sponsored Actors Try ClickFix . Retrieved January 21, 2026.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/around-world-90-days-state-sponsored-actors-try-clickfix"}]},{"id":"G0082","name":"APT38","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has impersonated recruiters and venture capitalists to lure victims into connecting to malicious skills assessments or online business meetings.(Citation: Microsoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--6cc7ee03-da28-4445-acd3-ce787b0ae61e","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft CYBERWARCON NOV 2024","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, November 22). Microsoft shares latest intelligence on North Korean and Chinese threat actors at CYBERWARCON. Retrieved September 30, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/11/22/microsoft-shares-latest-intelligence-on-north-korean-and-chinese-threat-actors-at-cyberwarcon/"}]},{"id":"G0090","name":"WIRTE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has used utilized look-alike domains and graphics of trusted security solution providers to entice victims to click on phishing links.(Citation: Check Point Wirte NOV 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--c3827f83-e909-4911-87ca-af039b369480","references":[{"source_name":"Check Point Wirte NOV 2024","description":"Check Point. (2024, November 12). Hamas-affiliated Threat Actor WIRTE Continues its Middle East Operations and Moves to Disruptive Activity. Retrieved April 20, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/hamas-affiliated-threat-actor-expands-to-disruptive-activity/"}]},{"id":"G0094","name":"Kimsuky","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has also impersonated legitimate people, such as a foreign advisor, an embassy employee, and a think tank employee.(Citation: FBI_KimsukyQR_Jan2026) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has also purported to be a Japanese diplomat to communicate with the victims.(Citation: NaumaanProofpoint_GlobalClickFix_April2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--21f3796d-3dd7-4b43-bd80-ec75ef3edfef","references":[{"source_name":"FBI_KimsukyQR_Jan2026","description":"FBI. (2026, January 8). FBI Flash AC-000001-MW North Korean Kimsuky Actors Leverage Malicious QR  Codes in Spearphishing Campaigns Targeting U.S. Entities. Retrieved April 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260108.pdf"},{"source_name":"NaumaanProofpoint_GlobalClickFix_April2025","description":"Naumaan, S., et al. (2025, April 17). Around the World in 90 Days: State-Sponsored Actors Try ClickFix . Retrieved January 21, 2026.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/around-world-90-days-state-sponsored-actors-try-clickfix"}]},{"id":"G0096","name":"APT41","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) impersonated an employee at a video game developer company to send phishing emails.(Citation: apt41_mandiant)","relationship_id":"relationship--ce372e4d-0174-4561-be4b-0d986c6d71bf","references":[{"source_name":"apt41_mandiant","description":"Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0099","name":"APT-C-36","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT-C-36](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0099) has impersonated banks including Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, and BBVA as well as government institutions such as Colombia’s National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General.(Citation: Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024)(Citation: LevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025)(Citation: Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025)(Citation: Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--45263d4b-48de-4c14-a90b-2de28daad829","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky BlindEagle AUG 2024","description":"Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky. (2024, August 19). BlindEagle flying high in Latin America. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://securelist.com/blindeagle-apt/113414/"},{"source_name":"Recorded Future TAG-144 AUG 2025","description":"Insikt Group. (2025, August 26). TAG-144’s Persistent Grip on South American Organizations. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2025/cta-2025-0826.pdf"},{"source_name":"LevelBlue Blind Eagle Proton66 JUN 2025","description":"Melnyk, S. (2025, June 27). Tracing Blind Eagle to Proton66. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/tracing-blind-eagle-to-proton66/"},{"source_name":"Zscaler BlindEagle DEC 2025","description":"Pellegrino, G. (2025, December 16). BlindEagle Targets Colombian Government Agency with Caminho and DCRAT. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/blindeagle-targets-colombian-government-agency-caminho-and-dcrat"}]},{"id":"G1004","name":"LAPSUS$","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1004","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[LAPSUS$](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1004) has called victims' help desk and impersonated legitimate users with previously gathered information in order to gain access to privileged accounts.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--ca441f47-97e7-4cc3-91af-a75d3aa45f72","references":[{"source_name":"MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022","description":"MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"}]},{"id":"G1015","name":"Scattered Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) utilized social engineering to compel IT help desk personnel to reset passwords and MFA tokens.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has also used Microsoft Teams to pose as internal IT support or help desk personnel.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--5d21c6ae-3b8b-4c3d-b71d-6d324ef80fa9","references":[{"source_name":"CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023","description":"CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a"},{"source_name":"Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025","description":"Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, May 6). Defending Against UNC3944: Cybercrime Hardening Guidance from the Frontlines. Retrieved October 13, 2025.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-proactive-hardening-recommendations"},{"source_name":"MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023","description":"Microsoft. (2023, October 25). Octo Tempest crosses boundaries to facilitate extortion, encryption, and destruction. Retrieved March 18, 2024.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/25/octo-tempest-crosses-boundaries-to-facilitate-extortion-encryption-and-destruction/"}]},{"id":"G1031","name":"Saint Bear","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) has impersonated government and related entities in both phishing activity and developing web sites with malicious links that mimic legitimate resources.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)","relationship_id":"relationship--61035d89-bac7-4267-829f-a898eeb41f11","references":[{"source_name":"Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/"}]},{"id":"G1033","name":"Star Blizzard","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) has registered impersonation email accounts to spoof experts in a particular field or individuals and organizations affiliated with the intended target.(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--006e52ca-80ac-458a-943e-0595f570fe73","references":[{"source_name":"CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023","description":"CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-341a"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, August 15). Disrupting SEABORGIUM’s ongoing phishing operations. Retrieved June 13, 2024.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/08/15/disrupting-seaborgiums-ongoing-phishing-operations/"},{"source_name":"Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024","description":"Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.","url":"https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/google-tag-coldriver-russian-phishing-malware/"}]},{"id":"G1044","name":"APT42","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1044","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT42](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1044) has impersonated legitimate people in phishing emails to gain credentials.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms)(Citation: TAG APT42) ","relationship_id":"relationship--6fc6386b-9e04-4f20-aae6-a18ae3025391","references":[{"source_name":"TAG APT42","description":"Google Threat Analysis Group. (2024, August 14). Iranian backed group steps up phishing campaigns against Israel, U.S.. Retrieved October 9, 2024.","url":"https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/iranian-backed-group-steps-up-phishing-campaigns-against-israel-us/"},{"source_name":"Mandiant APT42-charms","description":"Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromises. Retrieved October 9, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt42-crooked-charms-cons-and-compromises.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1046","name":"Storm-1811","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1046","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Storm-1811](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1046) impersonates help desk and IT support personnel for phishing and social engineering purposes during initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Microsoft Storm-1811 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--8b3cbcdd-bbe0-4e98-bef6-c81b1549f625","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Storm-1811 2024","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 15). Threat actors misusing Quick Assist in social engineering attacks leading to ransomware. Retrieved March 14, 2025.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/15/threat-actors-misusing-quick-assist-in-social-engineering-attacks-leading-to-ransomware/"}]},{"id":"G1052","name":"Contagious Interview","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Contagious Interview](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052) had impersonated HR hiring personnel through social media, job board notifications, and conducted interviews with victims in order to entice them to download malware disguised as legitimate applications or malicious scripts from code repositories.(Citation: Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025)(Citation: Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025)(Citation: Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025)(Citation: SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview October 2024)(Citation: Securonix Contagious Interview DEVPOPPER April 2024)(Citation: SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview FamousChollima October 2024)(Citation: PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023)(Citation: PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--93746e56-c2da-4186-acad-3a212537d764","references":[{"source_name":"Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025","description":"Aleksandar Milenkoski, Sreekar Madabushi, Kenneth Kinion. (2025, September 4). Contagious Interview | North Korean Threat Actors Reveal Plans and Ops by Abusing Cyber Intel Platforms. Retrieved October 20, 2025.","url":"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/contagious-interview-threat-actors-scout-cyber-intel-platforms-reveal-plans-and-ops/"},{"source_name":"Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025","description":"Efstratios Lontzetidis. (2025, January 16). Lazarus APT: Techniques for Hunting Contagious Interview. Retrieved October 20, 2025.","url":"https://www.validin.com/blog/inoculating_contagious_interview_with_validin/"},{"source_name":"Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025","description":"Kirill Boychenko. (2025, June 25). Another Wave: North Korean Contagious Interview Campaign Drops 35 New Malicious npm Packages. Retrieved October 19, 2025.","url":"https://socket.dev/blog/north-korean-contagious-interview-campaign-drops-35-new-malicious-npm-packages"},{"source_name":"SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview October 2024","description":"Ryan Sherstobitoff. (2024, October 29). Inside a North Korean Phishing Operation Targeting DevOps Employees. Retrieved October 20, 2025.","url":"https://securityscorecard.com/blog/inside-a-north-korean-phishing-operation-targeting-devops-employees/"},{"source_name":"Securonix Contagious Interview DEVPOPPER April 2024","description":"Securonix Threat Research, D.Iuzvyk, T. Peck, O.Kolesnikov. (2024, April 24). Analysis of DEV#POPPER: New Attack Campaign Targeting Software Developers Likely Associated With North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 20, 2025.","url":"https://www.securonix.com/blog/analysis-of-devpopper-new-attack-campaign-targeting-software-developers-likely-associated-with-north-korean-threat-actors/"},{"source_name":"SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview FamousChollima October 2024","description":"Steve Cobb. (2024, October 29). The Job Offer That Wasn’t: How We Stopped an Espionage Plot. Retrieved October 20, 2025.","url":"https://securityscorecard.com/blog/the-job-offer-that-wasnt-how-we-stopped-an-espionage-plot/"},{"source_name":"PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023","description":"Unit 42. (2023, November 21). Hacking Employers and Seeking Employment: Two Job-Related Campaigns Bear Hallmarks of North Korean Threat Actors. Retrieved October 17, 2025.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/two-campaigns-by-north-korea-bad-actors-target-job-hunters/"},{"source_name":"PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024","description":"Unit42. (2024, October 9). Contagious Interview: DPRK Threat Actors Lure Tech Industry Job Seekers to Install New Variants of BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret Malware. Retrieved October 17, 2025.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/north-korean-threat-actors-lure-tech-job-seekers-as-fake-recruiters/"}]},{"id":"G1054","name":"MirrorFace","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) has sent targeted emails purporting to be from a Japanese political party’s PR department.(Citation: ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--5b8730a2-45ea-4811-aabd-a764cc0261a9","references":[{"source_name":"ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022","description":"Breitenbacher, D. (2022, December 14). Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities. Retrieved April 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/12/14/unmasking-mirrorface-operation-liberalface-targeting-japanese-political-entities/"}]},{"id":"G1055","name":"VOID MANTICORE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has impersonated individuals familiar to the victim and technical support associated with social messaging services.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--492f94b3-6076-40ee-87be-6b26880a6dce","references":[{"source_name":"FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026","description":"FBI. (2026, March 20). FBI Flash: FLASH-20260320-001:Government of Iran Cyber Actors Deploy Telegram C2 to  Push Malware to Identified Targets. Retrieved April 20, 2026.","url":"https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260320.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1056","name":"TeamPCP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[TeamPCP](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056) impersonated legitimate maintainers to push imposter commits to the Aquasecurity Trivy scanner GitHub repository.(Citation: Wiz Trivy Compromise MAR 2026)(Citation: Aqua Security Blog Trivy Compromise APR 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--64228637-0b64-45f6-b2e9-9601679576e1","references":[{"source_name":"Aqua Security Blog Trivy Compromise APR 2026","description":"Aqua Team. (2026, April 1). Update: Ongoing Investigation and Continued Remediation. Retrieved July 1, 2026.","url":"https://www.aquasec.com/blog/trivy-supply-chain-attack-what-you-need-to-know"},{"source_name":"Wiz Trivy Compromise MAR 2026","description":"McCarthy, R. (2026, March 20). Trivy Compromised: Everything You Need to Know about the Latest Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved July 1, 2026.","url":"https://www.wiz.io/blog/trivy-compromised-teampcp-supply-chain-attack"}]},{"id":"G1059","name":"NIMBUS MANTICORE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1059","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[NIMBUS MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1059) has impersonated legitimate companies with fake career opportunities.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026)(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025)(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024)(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549TTPsTools_Nov2025)    ","relationship_id":"relationship--6fe65298-7e59-4d1d-851a-d6cb38e78795","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025","description":"Check Point. (2025, September 22). Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe. Retrieved September 24, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/"},{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026","description":"Check Point. (2026, May 22). Fast and Furious – Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict. Retrieved September 23, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/"},{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549TTPsTools_Nov2025","description":"El-Banna, M., et al. (2025, November 17). Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/analysis-of-unc1549-ttps-targeting-aerospace-defense"},{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024","description":"Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, February 27). When Cats Fly: Suspected Iranian Threat Actor UNC1549 Targets Israeli and Middle East Aerospace and Defense Sectors. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1017","name":"User Training","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Train users to be aware of impersonation tricks and how to counter them, for example confirming incoming requests through an independent platform like a phone call or in-person, to reduce risk.","relationship_id":"relationship--74a8ec0f-20d4-4175-bfc3-517d57956eff","references":[]},{"id":"M1019","name":"Threat Intelligence Program","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1019","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Threat intelligence helps defenders and users be aware of and defend against common lures and active campaigns that have been used for impersonation.","relationship_id":"relationship--9fbfdfe8-abe8-4c09-9d34-f0825b061cfa","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1598":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1598/","T1566":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1566/","T1534":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1534/","T1657":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1657/","T1589":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1589/","T1591":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1591/","T1583.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1583.001/","T1684.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1684.001/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1684.001","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}}]}}
