{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1612","id":"T1612","name":"Build Image on Host","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"c800e5d3d38c3b7f03f70a00904088a735c25ef5e18b92dcc19eeccda110e430","description":"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image)\n\nAn adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612","external_id":"T1612"},{"source_name":"Aqua Build Images on Hosts","description":"Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.","url":"https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host"},{"source_name":"Docker Build Image","description":"Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.","url":"https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild"},{"source_name":"Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021","description":"Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved October 7, 2026.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220106180157/https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf"}],"platforms":["Containers"],"environments":["containers"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0015","name":"Image Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0015/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Creation or registration of a virtual-machine image in a cloud environment.","collection_focus":"Collect VM image create/register APIs from the cloud control plane; retain source instance/disk, image ID and final state. Container image events are a separate concept.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["image_id","source_instance","action","state"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0015","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"image_id":"image-lab-1","source_instance":"vm-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1612","id":"T1612","name":"Build Image on Host","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Containers"],"environments":["containers"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1612/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1612/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0459","name":"Detection Strategy for Build Image on Host","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0459","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--62b445ed-7d9d-4c1a-8d4e-6c742ec1b0e2","relationship_id":"relationship--33529d4a-1eac-4346-86e0-10fd834d8811","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1261","name":"Analytic 1261","guidance":"Detection of container image build activity directly on the host using Docker or Kubernetes APIs. Defenders may observe Docker build requests, anomalous Dockerfile instructions (such as downloading code from unknown IPs), or creation of new images followed by immediate deployment. This behavior chain typically consists of an unexpected image creation event correlated with outbound network communication to non-standard or untrusted destinations.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0459#AN1261","platforms":["Containers"],"tuning":[{"field":"RegistryAllowList","description":"Defines trusted registries for image pulls/builds. Builds referencing unapproved registries may indicate adversary behavior."},{"field":"NewImageThreshold","description":"Threshold for number of new custom images created in a given time window. Exceeding this threshold may indicate malicious builds."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Defines correlation window (e.g., 5m) between suspicious build activity and subsequent network traffic anomalies."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0015","component":"Image Creation","name":"docker:daemon","channel":"docker build or POST /build API request","platforms":["Containers"],"analytic_id":"AN1261","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0459#AN1261","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0015/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"outbound connections from host during or immediately after image build","platforms":["Containers"],"analytic_id":"AN1261","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0459#AN1261","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0015","name":"Image Creation","tag":"Image Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0015/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.(Citation: Kubernetes Hardening Guide)","relationship_id":"relationship--52ded6c4-f6f1-4c9a-8973-4378a91193d5","references":[{"source_name":"Kubernetes Hardening Guide","description":"National Security Agency, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March). Kubernetes Hardening Guide. Retrieved April 1, 2022.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2022/Aug/29/2003066362/-1/-1/0/CTR_KUBERNETES_HARDENING_GUIDANCE_1.2_20220829.PDF"}]},{"id":"M1030","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1030","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls.","relationship_id":"relationship--57db6603-303e-4749-8a92-2e4021aee764","references":[]},{"id":"M1035","name":"Limit Access to Resource Over Network","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1035","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Limit communications with the container service to local Unix sockets or remote access via SSH. Require secure port access to communicate with the APIs over TLS by disabling unauthenticated access to the Docker API on port 2375. Instead, communicate with the Docker API over TLS on port 2376.(Citation: Docker Daemon Socket Protect)","relationship_id":"relationship--1720444b-e442-423e-ba6f-48079ad8b04e","references":[{"source_name":"Docker Daemon Socket Protect","description":"Docker. (n.d.). Protect the Docker Daemon Socket. Retrieved March 29, 2021.","url":"https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/protect-access/"}]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Audit images deployed within the environment to ensure they do not contain any malicious components.","relationship_id":"relationship--bc02a307-04c7-4b8e-ab91-bf8ca261420e","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"2db30061-589d-409b-b125-7b473944f9b3","name":"Build Image On Host","platforms":["containers"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":2,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1612/T1612.yaml","description":"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize Deploy Container using that custom image.","inputs":{},"dependencies":[{"description":"Verify docker is installed."},{"description":"Verify docker service is running."}],"source_definition_sha256":"8816832155379511ed82019f0e3ca159940d4bf26f66e30930a789c8de341419"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1610":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1610/","T1612":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1612/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1612","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0015","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"image_id":"image-lab-1","source_instance":"vm-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}}]}}