{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1602","id":"T1602","name":"Data from Configuration Repository","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"4129f9021f958cfa165b9ade7a936eb43148d0d47f68afd0485a191da63d75a1","description":"Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.\n\nAdversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602","external_id":"T1602"},{"source_name":"Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities","description":"Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3"},{"source_name":"US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017","description":"US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A"},{"source_name":"US-CERT-TA18-106A","description":"US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"}],"platforms":["Network Devices"],"environments":["network-infrastructure"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1602.001","id":"T1602.001","name":"SNMP (MIB Dump)","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1602.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1602.002","id":"T1602.002","name":"Network Device Configuration Dump","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1602.002/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1602","id":"T1602","name":"Data from Configuration Repository","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Network Devices"],"environments":["network-infrastructure"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1602/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1602/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0592","name":"Detection Strategy for Data from Configuration Repository on Network Devices","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0592","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--ff993025-1f12-486f-936f-6cc563050278","relationship_id":"relationship--68a7cda8-b2cd-4cc1-97d2-39be28357fe5","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1630","name":"Analytic 1630","guidance":"Defenders may observe adversary attempts to extract configuration data from management repositories by monitoring for anomalous SNMP queries, API calls, or protocol requests (e.g., NETCONF, RESTCONF) that enumerate system configuration. Suspicious sequences include repeated queries from untrusted IPs, abnormal query types requesting sensitive configuration data, or repository access occurring outside of normal administrative maintenance windows. Abnormal authentication attempts, sudden enumeration of device inventory, or bulk data transfer of configuration files may also be observed.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0592#AN1630","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedAdminIPs","description":"Expected IP ranges or hosts permitted to query configuration repositories; deviations may indicate compromise."},{"field":"NormalAccessTimeWindow","description":"Time periods when configuration queries normally occur; anomalies outside these windows may be suspicious."},{"field":"QueryVolumeThreshold","description":"Number of queries allowed within a given period before an anomaly is triggered."},{"field":"ProtocolUsageBaseline","description":"Expected usage of SNMP, NETCONF, or RESTCONF; deviations from baseline patterns may indicate misuse."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Unexpected or unauthorized inbound connections to SNMP, NETCONF, or RESTCONF services","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1630","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0592#AN1630","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"networkdevice:syslog","channel":"Authentication failures or unusual community string usage in SNMP queries","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1630","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0592#AN1630","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1030","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1030","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Segregate SNMP traffic on a separate management network.(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--a538a888-c4a1-49a7-b343-eb85ab6d665f","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017","description":"US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A"}]},{"id":"M1031","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Configure intrusion prevention devices to detect SNMP queries and commands from unauthorized sources.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)","relationship_id":"relationship--c217ea78-f411-4dd1-a019-8aa3e366df23","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT-TA18-106A","description":"US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"}]},{"id":"M1037","name":"Filter Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Apply extended ACLs to block unauthorized protocols outside the trusted network.(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--a78cac98-60e1-406a-8486-fcaf04a644e3","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017","description":"US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A"}]},{"id":"M1041","name":"Encrypt Sensitive Information","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1041","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Configure SNMPv3 to use the highest level of security (authPriv) available.(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--cee1cfd6-0906-4b52-a8b4-d0d585632b81","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017","description":"US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A"}]},{"id":"M1051","name":"Update Software","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1051","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Keep system images and software updated and migrate to SNMPv3.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","relationship_id":"relationship--44930e59-94ae-40ff-bf9e-da00553620af","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks","description":"Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.","url":"https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"}]},{"id":"M1054","name":"Software Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1054","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Allowlist MIB objects and implement SNMP views.(Citation: Cisco Securing SNMP)","relationship_id":"relationship--872ba9c6-8e0d-48af-864b-de83b906baf1","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco Securing SNMP","description":"Cisco. (2006, May 10). Securing Simple Network Management Protocol. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ip/simple-network-management-protocol-snmp/20370-snmpsecurity-20370.html"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1602":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1602/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1602","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}}]}}