{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1601.001","id":"T1601.001","name":"Patch System Image","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"4a2301d5096097dead2b88f4785b7bccea42e50e79f1049bf492590da8a64bbe","description":"Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file.  Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.\n\nTo change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection.  The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image.\n\nTo change the operating system in memory, the adversary typically can use one of two methods. In the first, the adversary would make use of native debug commands in the original, unaltered running operating system that allow them to directly modify the relevant memory addresses containing the running operating system.  This method typically requires administrative level access to the device.\n\nIn the second method for changing the operating system in memory, the adversary would make use of the boot loader. The boot loader is the first piece of software that loads when the device starts that, in turn, will launch the operating system.  Adversaries may use malicious code previously implanted in the boot loader, such as through the [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) method, to directly manipulate running operating system code in memory.  This malicious code in the bootloader provides the capability of direct memory manipulation to the adversary, allowing them to patch the live operating system during runtime.\n\nBy modifying the instructions stored in the system image file, adversaries may either weaken existing defenses or provision new capabilities that the device did not have before. Examples of existing defenses that can be impeded include encryption, via [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600), authentication, via [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004), and perimeter defenses, via [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599).  Adding new capabilities for the adversary’s purpose include [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003), and [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001).\n\nAdversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to produce false output to mislead defenders.   When this method is used in conjunction with [Downgrade System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002), one example of a compromised system command may include changing the output of the command that shows the version of the currently running operating system.  By patching the operating system, the adversary can change this command to instead display the original, higher revision number that they replaced through the system downgrade. \n\nWhen the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005). \n\nWhen the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots.  However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve persistence. ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001","external_id":"T1601.001"},{"source_name":"Killing IOS diversity myth","description":"Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.","url":"https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf"},{"source_name":"Cisco IOS Forensics Developments","description":"Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020.","url":"https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf"},{"source_name":"Cisco IOS Shellcode","description":"George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved October 21, 2020.","url":"http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf"},{"source_name":"Juniper Netscreen of the Dead","description":"Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead. Retrieved October 20, 2020.","url":"https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf"},{"source_name":"Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits","description":"Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020.","url":"https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf"}],"platforms":["Network Devices"],"environments":["network-infrastructure"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1601","id":"T1601","name":"Modify System Image","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["defense-impairment"],"platforms":["Network Devices"],"environments":["network-infrastructure"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1601/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","potential_disruption_requires_individual_review"],"telemetry_tags":["Command Execution","File Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1601/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"guidance_only","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0004","name":"Firmware Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0004/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Changes to firmware state or a firmware update observation on a device.","collection_focus":"Collect approved OEM firmware inventory/update audit and compare version or measured hashes against a known baseline. Use read-only vendor-supported interfaces.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","firmware_before","firmware_after","change_ticket"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0004","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-device-1","firmware_before":"1.0-lab","firmware_after":"1.1-lab","change_ticket":"LAB-42"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1601.001","id":"T1601.001","name":"Patch System Image","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Network Devices"],"environments":["network-infrastructure"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1601.001/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1601.001/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0469","name":"Detection Strategy for Patch System Image on Network Devices","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0469","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--ca16d7e8-77f3-4d0c-88a3-31696224ed67","relationship_id":"relationship--ce9ce398-22ae-42da-93c4-591f51cd8d62","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1293","name":"Analytic 1293","guidance":"Defenders may observe adversary attempts to patch system images by monitoring for anomalous file transfers (TFTP, SCP, FTP) of image files, unauthorized CLI commands altering boot system variables, integrity check mismatches between running and baseline OS images, and runtime memory manipulation attempts. Suspicious sequences include uploading a new image, modifying boot parameters, and subsequent reload/reboot of the device. In-memory patching attempts may manifest as debug commands or boot loader manipulation inconsistent with normal administrative activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0469#AN1293","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedFirmwareVersions","description":"Whitelist of validated vendor OS versions; deviations may indicate tampering."},{"field":"AuthorizedAdminAccounts","description":"Trusted admin accounts permitted to update images; anomalies suggest compromise."},{"field":"ChecksumBaseline","description":"Baseline hash of approved images; used for detecting file tampering."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation period for detecting chained behaviors (file upload → boot config change → reboot)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"networkdevice:cli","channel":"Execution of privileged commands such as 'copy tftp flash', 'boot system', or 'debug memory'","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1293","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0469#AN1293","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"networkdevice:config","channel":"Configuration changes to startup image paths, boot loader parameters, or debug flags","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1293","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0469#AN1293","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"},{"component_id":"DC0004","component":"Firmware Modification","name":"firmware:runtime","channel":"Debug or memory access commands indicating attempts to alter OS instructions in memory","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN1293","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0469#AN1293","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0004/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0004","name":"Firmware Modification","tag":"Firmware Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0004/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0519","name":"SYNful Knock","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519","kind":"malware","description":"[SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is malware that is inserted into a network device by patching the operating system image.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)","relationship_id":"relationship--1fbc7b2a-1cdb-455b-bd5a-b0ff29efe800","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant - Synful Knock","description":"Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/synful-knock-acis/"},{"source_name":"Cisco Synful Knock Evolution","description":"Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles.  Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints.","relationship_id":"relationship--a4c24712-a5cf-4c44-91cd-057dc0a85e0f","references":[]},{"id":"M1027","name":"Password Policies","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1027","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies.  (Citation: NIST 800-63-3)","relationship_id":"relationship--fef0f7bc-5af4-4a5c-bd73-5892badf8707","references":[{"source_name":"NIST 800-63-3","description":"Temoshok, D., et al. (July 2025). SP 800-63-4, Digital Identity Guidelines. Retrieved July 29, 2026.","url":"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-4.pdf"}]},{"id":"M1032","name":"Multi-factor Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1032","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS.  Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS)","relationship_id":"relationship--f1d0e2ed-3d68-4606-8a1c-3a78f9b55afe","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS","description":"Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#39"}]},{"id":"M1043","name":"Credential Access Protection","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1043","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Some embedded network devices are capable of storing passwords for local accounts in either plain-text or encrypted formats.  Ensure that, where available, local passwords are always encrypted, per vendor recommendations. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Credentials Management)","relationship_id":"relationship--7349c449-f6cd-44cd-858d-93c29320d7f0","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Credentials Management","description":"Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Credentials Management. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#40"}]},{"id":"M1045","name":"Code Signing","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1045","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Many vendors provide digitally signed operating system images to validate the integrity of the software used on their platform.  Make use of this feature where possible in order to prevent and/or detect attempts by adversaries to compromise the system image. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Deploy Signed IOS)","relationship_id":"relationship--731ba292-7016-4ccf-a296-58ced0421a37","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Deploy Signed IOS","description":"Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Deploy Signed IOS. Retrieved October 21, 2020.","url":"https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#34"}]},{"id":"M1046","name":"Boot Integrity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1046","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Some vendors of embedded network devices provide cryptographic signing to ensure the integrity of operating system images at boot time.  Implement where available, following vendor guidelines. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot)","relationship_id":"relationship--42703ec8-4dd6-42a3-b2bb-f2a135f89863","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot","description":"Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.","url":"https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1542.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1542.004/","T1600":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1600/","T1556.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1556.004/","T1599":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1599/","T1056.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1056.001/","T1090.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1090.003/","T1205.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1205.001/","T1601.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1601.002/","T1542.005":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1542.005/","T1601.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1601.001/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1601.001","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0004","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-device-1","firmware_before":"1.0-lab","firmware_after":"1.1-lab","change_ticket":"LAB-42"}}]}}
