{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1587.003","id":"T1587.003","name":"Digital Certificates","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"127ad97a7b2d106c6572cc5800f779e671912574768708270572e5ee2dac0629","description":"Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).(Citation: Spice Works Digital Certificates)\n\nAdversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).\n\nAfter creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003","external_id":"T1587.003"},{"source_name":"Spice Works Digital Certificates","description":"Chiradeep BasuMallick. (2022, December 9). Who controls trust on the internet? Why digital certificates matter more than ever now?. Retrieved August 27, 2026.","url":"https://www.spiceworks.com/security/digital-certificate/"}],"platforms":["PRE"],"environments":["external-services"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1587","id":"T1587","name":"Develop Capabilities","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["resource-development"],"platforms":["PRE"],"environments":["external-services"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1587/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Malware Content","Malware Metadata","Response Content"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0011","name":"Malware Content","tag":"Malware Content","page":"telemetry/DC0011/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0003","name":"Malware Metadata","tag":"Malware Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0003/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0104","name":"Response Content","tag":"Response Content","page":"telemetry/DC0104/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1587/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":3,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0104","name":"Response Content","page":"telemetry/DC0104/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Content returned by a queried service, such as an HTTP response body or banner.","collection_focus":"Capture responses only from authorized lab services or approved datasets; retain request context, response hash and a sanitized bounded excerpt.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","response_excerpt","content_type","body_truncated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0104","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"https://lab.example.test/health","response_excerpt":"LAB_OK","content_type":"text/plain","body_truncated":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1587.003","id":"T1587.003","name":"Digital Certificates","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["PRE"],"environments":["external-services"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1587.003/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1587.003/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0844","name":"Detection of Digital Certificates","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0844","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--2e8be762-9987-4f19-997d-2f7c7540b8e1","relationship_id":"relationship--ef33ab11-69aa-46b8-a0a7-f54a0386daff","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1976","name":"Analytic 1976","guidance":"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.\nDetection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as Web Protocols , Asymmetric Cryptography , and/or Install Root Certificate .","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0844#AN1976","platforms":["PRE"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0104","component":"Response Content","name":"Internet Scan","channel":"None","platforms":["PRE"],"analytic_id":"AN1976","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0844#AN1976","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0104/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0104","name":"Response Content","tag":"Response Content","page":"telemetry/DC0104/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1587","id":"T1587","name":"Develop Capabilities","page":"detections/enterprise/T1587/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G0016","name":"APT29","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) has created self-signed digital certificates to enable mutual TLS authentication for malware.(Citation: PWC WellMess July 2020)(Citation: PWC WellMess C2 August 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--3bd4bd69-b1f6-426a-a63f-b8107eb57f8e","references":[{"source_name":"PWC WellMess July 2020","description":"PWC. (2020, July 16). How WellMess malware has been used to target COVID-19 vaccines. Retrieved September 24, 2020.","url":"https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-services/insights/cleaning-up-after-wellmess.html"},{"source_name":"PWC WellMess C2 August 2020","description":"PWC. (2020, August 17). WellMess malware: analysis of its Command and Control (C2) server. Retrieved September 29, 2020.","url":"https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-services/insights/wellmess-analysis-command-control.html"}]},{"id":"G0047","name":"Gamaredon Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) has used the same TLS certificate across its infrastructure.(Citation: Huntio_GamaredonFlux_Apr2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--a7c7a560-9ad7-4c8e-b147-00d8a4c06fe2","references":[{"source_name":"Huntio_GamaredonFlux_Apr2025","description":"Hunt.io. (2025, April 8). State-Sponsored Tactics: How Gamaredon and ShadowPad Operate and Rotate Their Infrastructure. Retrieved July 23, 2025.","url":"https://hunt.io/blog/state-sponsored-activity-gamaredon-shadowpad"}]},{"id":"G0056","name":"PROMETHIUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) has created self-signed digital certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--66e5238f-c1f7-4094-8c2e-e8e41a4c12f3","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Promethium June 2020","description":"Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html"}]},{"id":"G1053","name":"Storm-0501","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1053","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Storm-0501](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1053) has utilized their own self-signed TLS certificate “Microsoft IT TLS CA 5” with their infrastructure.(Citation: Google Mandiant Storm-0501 Sabbath Ransomware November 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--e612293a-23f1-457e-b92c-43c84f57389a","references":[{"source_name":"Google Mandiant Storm-0501 Sabbath Ransomware November 2021","description":"Tyler McLellan, Brandan Schondorfer. (2021, November 29). Kitten.gif: Meet the Sabbath Ransomware Affiliate Program, Again. Retrieved October 19, 2025.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/sabbath-ransomware-affiliate/"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1056","name":"Pre-compromise","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1056","kind":"course-of-action","description":"This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.","relationship_id":"relationship--5761f7ba-920b-491b-a010-d12645dedf0b","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1573.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1573.002/","T1071.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1071.001/","T1557":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1557/","T1553.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1553.004/","T1608.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1608.003/","T1587.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1587.003/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1587.003","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0104","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"https://lab.example.test/health","response_excerpt":"LAB_OK","content_type":"text/plain","body_truncated":false}}]}}
