{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1584.004","id":"T1584.004","name":"Server","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"b6dfce01e5ef6e1d94cdeeee2f782f90895a9f4f2be1e606261769550d2c89f9","description":"Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022) Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.\n\nAdversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or email servers to support [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) operations.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004","external_id":"T1584.004"},{"source_name":"TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022","description":"Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/a/earth-lusca-employs-sophisticated-infrastructure-varied-tools-and-techniques/technical-brief-delving-deep-an-analysis-of-earth-lusca-operations.pdf"},{"source_name":"Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021","description":"Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.","url":"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"},{"source_name":"Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020","description":"Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation/"},{"source_name":"ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020","description":"ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved September 17, 2026.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20221130114004/https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"}],"platforms":["PRE"],"environments":["external-services"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1584","id":"T1584","name":"Compromise Infrastructure","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["resource-development"],"platforms":["PRE"],"environments":["external-services"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1584/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Active DNS","Domain Registration","Passive DNS","Response Content","Response Metadata"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0103","name":"Active DNS","tag":"Active DNS","page":"telemetry/DC0103/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0101","name":"Domain Registration","tag":"Domain Registration","page":"telemetry/DC0101/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0096","name":"Passive DNS","tag":"Passive DNS","page":"telemetry/DC0096/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0104","name":"Response Content","tag":"Response Content","page":"telemetry/DC0104/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0106","name":"Response Metadata","tag":"Response Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0106/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1584/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":3,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0104","name":"Response Content","page":"telemetry/DC0104/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Content returned by a queried service, such as an HTTP response body or banner.","collection_focus":"Capture responses only from authorized lab services or approved datasets; retain request context, response hash and a sanitized bounded excerpt.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","response_excerpt","content_type","body_truncated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0104","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"https://lab.example.test/health","response_excerpt":"LAB_OK","content_type":"text/plain","body_truncated":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0106","name":"Response Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0106/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Metadata about an Internet-facing resource inferred from authorized scan responses, such as open ports, services and reported versions.","collection_focus":"Preserve target, observation time, scan method and response evidence; distinguish inferred service identity from an authenticated software inventory.","providers":[{"name":"Nmap XML reports","scope":"Structured port/service observations from a separately authorized scan or existing report.","source_id":"nmap"},{"name":"Zeek protocol observations","scope":"Passive corroboration for visible service responses; not equivalent to active scan coverage.","source_id":"zeek"}],"configuration":["Use an existing authorized scan report or an explicitly approved isolated target set. Record tool/version, scan options, time window and scope.","Preserve native XML and normalized host/port/protocol/service fields. Disable XML external-entity resolution in downstream parsers.","Keep inferred service names/versions and their confidence separate from authenticated inventory; retain response evidence when available."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["target","port","transport","service","version","observation_source"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0106","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"target":"192.0.2.20","port":443,"transport":"tcp","service":"https","version":"not_identified","observation_source":"authorized_lab_scan"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A reported open port or banner is not a proven vulnerability. Filtered/no-response states can reflect routing or policy. The website performs no scans.","sources":[{"id":"nmap","title":"Nmap XML output specification","url":"https://nmap.org/book/output-formats-xml-output.html"},{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1584.004","id":"T1584.004","name":"Server","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["PRE"],"environments":["external-services"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1584.004/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1584.004/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0874","name":"Detection of Server","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0874","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--6bf8b26d-aa2d-4a8f-a1e4-c9cc4aef318d","relationship_id":"relationship--01da542d-e185-4495-b40b-fc9b4068a834","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN2006","name":"Analytic 2006","guidance":"Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0874#AN2006","platforms":["PRE"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0104","component":"Response Content","name":"Internet Scan","channel":"None","platforms":["PRE"],"analytic_id":"AN2006","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0874#AN2006","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0104/"},{"component_id":"DC0106","component":"Response Metadata","name":"Internet Scan","channel":"None","platforms":["PRE"],"analytic_id":"AN2006","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0874#AN2006","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0106/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0104","name":"Response Content","tag":"Response Content","page":"telemetry/DC0104/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0106","name":"Response Metadata","tag":"Response Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0106/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1584","id":"T1584","name":"Compromise Infrastructure","page":"detections/enterprise/T1584/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G0010","name":"Turla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) has used compromised servers as infrastructure.(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020)(Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--65eac98e-82b8-4592-a121-bea99f80dc87","references":[{"source_name":"Accenture HyperStack October 2020","description":"Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20201101015247/https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity"},{"source_name":"Talos TinyTurla September 2021","description":"Cisco Talos. (2021, September 21). TinyTurla - Turla deploys new malware to keep a secret backdoor on victim machines. Retrieved December 2, 2021.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html"},{"source_name":"Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020","description":"Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved September 16, 2024.","url":"https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/turla-apt-infrastructure"}]},{"id":"G0023","name":"APT16","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0023","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT16](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0023) has compromised otherwise legitimate sites as staging servers for second-stage payloads.(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)","relationship_id":"relationship--82bfe762-9468-458e-801a-13387a271521","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2","description":"Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20151226205946/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"}]},{"id":"G0032","name":"Lazarus Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--0dcce53a-3ac1-4528-8c34-f85569638740","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021","description":"Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/"}]},{"id":"G0034","name":"Sandworm Team","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) compromised legitimate Linux servers running the EXIM mail transfer agent for use in subsequent campaigns.(Citation: NSA Sandworm 2020)(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--adc994b3-b5cb-4005-882f-a5116d6e40d5","references":[{"source_name":"Leonard TAG 2023","description":"Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia’s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.","url":"https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/ukraine-remains-russias-biggest-cyber-focus-in-2023/"},{"source_name":"NSA Sandworm 2020","description":"National Security Agency. (2020, March 28). Sandworm Actors Exploiting Vulnerability In EXIM Mail Transfer Agent. Retrieved March 1, 2024.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/28/2002306626/-1/-1/0/CSA%20Sandworm%20Actors%20Exploiting%20Vulnerability%20in%20Exim%20Transfer%20Agent%2020200528.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0035","name":"Dragonfly","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has compromised legitimate websites to host C2 and malware modules.(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--20aaed95-65ce-4a0f-9e25-4a4156889a84","references":[{"source_name":"Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021","description":"Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.","url":"https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0065","name":"Leviathan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has used compromised legitimate websites as command and control nodes for operations.(Citation: CISA Leviathan 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--8191e3f4-df01-42c0-925b-0038772afb17","references":[{"source_name":"CISA Leviathan 2024","description":"CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-190a"}]},{"id":"G0119","name":"Indrik Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) has served fake updates via legitimate websites that have been compromised.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--f7d3d7fc-e25f-4b1f-b7ea-7c19adb300bd","references":[{"source_name":"Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018","description":"Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/"}]},{"id":"G1006","name":"Earth Lusca","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Earth Lusca](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1006) has used compromised web servers as part of their operational infrastructure.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--ff6f4b5b-1b5f-4f8f-9307-345a3c278151","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022","description":"Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/a/earth-lusca-employs-sophisticated-infrastructure-varied-tools-and-techniques/technical-brief-delving-deep-an-analysis-of-earth-lusca-operations.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1017","name":"Volt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) has used compromised Paessler Router Traffic Grapher (PRTG) servers from other organizations for C2.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023)(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--12948e09-2774-4b91-b9d1-018b41f7f923","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024","description":"CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf"},{"source_name":"Secureworks BRONZE SILHOUETTE May 2023","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2023, May 24). Chinese Cyberespionage Group BRONZE SILHOUETTE Targets U.S. Government and Defense Organizations. Retrieved July 27, 2023.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230601025540/https://www.secureworks.com/blog/chinese-cyberespionage-group-bronze-silhouette-targets-us-government-and-defense-organizations"}]},{"id":"G1034","name":"Daggerfly","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Daggerfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1034) compromised web servers hosting updates for software as part of a supply chain intrusion.(Citation: ESET EvasivePanda 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--c75e753a-881a-40db-99d2-f7a7b2183606","references":[{"source_name":"ESET EvasivePanda 2024","description":"Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/evasive-panda-leverages-monlam-festival-target-tibetans/"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1056","name":"Pre-compromise","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1056","kind":"course-of-action","description":"This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.","relationship_id":"relationship--19264fec-8c72-470f-9a7f-6c135718fde7","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1583.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1583.004/","T1583.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1583.003/","T1189":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1189/","T1566":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1566/","T1584.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1584.004/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1584.004","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0104","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"https://lab.example.test/health","response_excerpt":"LAB_OK","content_type":"text/plain","body_truncated":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0106","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"target":"192.0.2.20","port":443,"transport":"tcp","service":"https","version":"not_identified","observation_source":"authorized_lab_scan"}}]}}
