{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1578.001","id":"T1578.001","name":"Create Snapshot","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"6f390ad70a277c61cbafc73f4a7646622d3fbe0de33636b779e42a29d7ba7947","description":"An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.\n\nAn adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001","external_id":"T1578.001"},{"source_name":"Mandiant M-Trends 2020","description":"Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"}],"platforms":["IaaS"],"environments":["cloud"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1578","id":"T1578","name":"Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["defense-impairment"],"platforms":["IaaS"],"environments":["cloud"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1578/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls","potential_disruption_requires_individual_review"],"telemetry_tags":["Cloud Service Metadata","Instance Start","Instance Stop","Snapshot Creation","Snapshot Deletion","Snapshot Modification","Volume Creation","Volume Deletion","Volume Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0070","name":"Cloud Service Metadata","tag":"Cloud Service Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0070/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0080","name":"Instance Start","tag":"Instance Start","page":"telemetry/DC0080/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0089","name":"Instance Stop","tag":"Instance Stop","page":"telemetry/DC0089/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0057","name":"Snapshot Creation","tag":"Snapshot Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0057/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0049","name":"Snapshot Deletion","tag":"Snapshot Deletion","page":"telemetry/DC0049/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0058","name":"Snapshot Modification","tag":"Snapshot Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0058/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0097","name":"Volume Creation","tag":"Volume Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0097/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0098","name":"Volume Deletion","tag":"Volume Deletion","page":"telemetry/DC0098/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0092","name":"Volume Modification","tag":"Volume Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0092/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1578/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":1,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0057","name":"Snapshot Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0057/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Creation of a snapshot or recovery-point artifact.","collection_focus":"Collect snapshot-create APIs and subsequent state; link snapshot to source volume/instance and requesting principal.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["snapshot_id","source_volume","action","state"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0057","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"snapshot_id":"snap-lab-1","source_volume":"vol-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0062","name":"Snapshot Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0062/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Snapshot inventory including age, owner, source resource and permissions.","collection_focus":"Collect authorized describe/list metadata with observation time and resource IDs; preserve original provider fields.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["snapshot_id","owner","source_volume","state"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0062","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"snapshot_id":"snap-lab-1","owner":"lab-account","source_volume":"vol-lab-1","state":"completed"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1578.001","id":"T1578.001","name":"Create Snapshot","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["IaaS"],"environments":["cloud"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1578.001/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1578.001/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0423","name":"Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Snapshot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0423","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--160f132d-626e-412a-ae16-df265670c196","relationship_id":"relationship--2e8e1e84-69c7-4302-abb9-3ae279f485c7","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1187","name":"Analytic 1187","guidance":"Detection focuses on correlating snapshot creation events with subsequent instance creation and mounting activities. From a defender perspective, suspicious sequences include snapshot creation by unexpected or newly created IAM users, snapshots created from sensitive volumes without preceding change-control activity, or snapshots immediately followed by mounting to unauthorized instances. Cross-referencing with user behavior, IP geolocation, and automation context helps distinguish benign backup operations from adversary-driven snapshot exploitation.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0423#AN1187","platforms":["IaaS"],"tuning":[{"field":"UserContext","description":"IAM user, service account, or role performing snapshot creation. Tuned to allowlist known backup automation services."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Frequency of snapshot creation in a defined period. Adjusted for environments with frequent automated backups."},{"field":"GeoLocation","description":"Unusual regions or IPs from which snapshot creation API calls originate. Helps identify cross-region snapshot abuse."},{"field":"VolumeSensitivity","description":"Tagging or classification of volumes being snapshotted. Tuned to prioritize alerts when sensitive volumes are copied."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0057","component":"Snapshot Creation","name":"AWS:CloudTrail","channel":"CreateSnapshot","platforms":["IaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN1187","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0423#AN1187","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0057/"},{"component_id":"DC0062","component":"Snapshot Metadata","name":"AWS:CloudTrail","channel":"DescribeSnapshots","platforms":["IaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN1187","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0423#AN1187","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0062/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0057","name":"Snapshot Creation","tag":"Snapshot Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0057/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0062","name":"Snapshot Metadata","tag":"Snapshot Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0062/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S1091","name":"Pacu","page":"tools/S1091/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1578","id":"T1578","name":"Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure","page":"detections/enterprise/T1578/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S1091","name":"Pacu","page":"tools/S1091/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S1091","name":"Pacu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1091","kind":"tool","description":"[Pacu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1091) can create snapshots of EBS volumes and RDS instances.(Citation: GitHub Pacu)","relationship_id":"relationship--eba5e32f-2817-4833-8d65-3ccb2d9d367c","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub Pacu","description":"Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.","url":"https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Limit permissions for creating snapshots or backups in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--9ce9ab1f-b4fa-41e7-8302-11c30f918001","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant M-Trends 2020","description":"Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"}]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to create snapshots and backups.","relationship_id":"relationship--6f8f4546-9e1c-42c9-b76f-863e51d6cb2a","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"89e69b4b-3458-4ec6-b819-b3008debc1bc","name":"Azure - Create Snapshot from Managed Disk","platforms":["iaas:azure"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":3,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml","description":"Creates a snapshot of a managed disk in Azure using the Azure CLI.\nSimulates adversary snapshotting behavior for persistence or data duplication.\n","inputs":{"azure_resource_group":{"description":"The Azure resource group where the disk is located.","type":"string","default":"myResourceGroup"},"azure_disk_name":{"description":"The Azure disk name.","type":"string","default":"myDiskName"},"azure_snapshot_name":{"description":"The Azure snapshot name.","type":"string","default":"mySnapshotName"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"Azure CLI must be installed."},{"description":"Azure CLI must be authenticated."},{"description":"Azure disk must exist."}],"source_definition_sha256":"7acfccb702f66b79918028f1ab98f56a93f9001976add3f979ca57b6d398a238"},{"id":"a3c09662-85bb-4ea8-b15b-6dc8a844e236","name":"AWS - Create Snapshot from EBS Volume","platforms":["iaas:aws"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":3,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml","description":"Creates an EBS snapshot in AWS using the AWS CLI.\nThis simulates an adversary duplicating volume data via snapshots for persistence or exfiltration.\n","inputs":{"aws_region":{"description":"AWS region where the volume is located.","type":"string","default":"us-east-1"},"aws_volume_id":{"description":"The AWS EBS Volume ID to create a snapshot from.","type":"string","default":"vol-0123456789abcdef0"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"AWS CLI must be installed."},{"description":"AWS CLI must be authenticated."},{"description":"EBS volume must exist."}],"source_definition_sha256":"064dcc4b186d6cff95b4488a1b25cfa7de2ac02eb77abbac8d9d97f8a5272a85"},{"id":"e6fbc036-91e7-4ad3-b9cb-f7210f40dd5d","name":"GCP - Create Snapshot from Persistent Disk","platforms":["iaas:gcp"],"method":"automated","executor":"sh","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":3,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml","description":"Creates a snapshot of a persistent disk in GCP using the gcloud CLI.\nEmulates adversary behavior to gain access to volume data or replicate environment state.\n","inputs":{"gcp_disk_name":{"description":"The Google Cloud disk name.","type":"string","default":"myDiskName"},"gcp_zone":{"description":"The Google Cloud zone where the disk is located.","type":"string","default":"us-central1-a"},"gcp_snapshot_name":{"description":"The Google Cloud snapshot name.","type":"string","default":"mySnapshotName"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"gcloud CLI must be installed."},{"description":"gcloud CLI must be authenticated."},{"description":"GCP disk must exist."}],"source_definition_sha256":"491d5f0f8330c803e7d9d25559bef5155c5718f326dc566e859dce05dcc05eab"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1578.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1578.004/","T1578.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1578.002/","T1578.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1578.001/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1578.001","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0057","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"snapshot_id":"snap-lab-1","source_volume":"vol-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0062","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"snapshot_id":"snap-lab-1","owner":"lab-account","source_volume":"vol-lab-1","state":"completed"}}]}}
