{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1574.013","id":"T1574.013","name":"KernelCallbackTable","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"fab45d27202b4f61e18e0518ae55e1bf90141ddc1ec7a3f60f889da911b3648b","description":"Adversaries may abuse the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once <code>user32.dll</code> is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)\n\nAn adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.\n\nA pointer to the memory address of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., <code>fnCOPYDATA</code>) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code>). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)\n\nThe tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013","external_id":"T1574.013"},{"source_name":"FinFisher exposed ","description":"Microsoft Defender Security Research Team. (2018, March 1). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved January 27, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/"},{"source_name":"NtQueryInformationProcess","description":"Microsoft. (2021, November 23). NtQueryInformationProcess function (winternl.h). Retrieved February 4, 2022.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess"},{"source_name":"Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable","description":"odzhan. (2019, May 25). Windows Process Injection: KernelCallbackTable used by FinFisher / FinSpy. Retrieved February 4, 2022.","url":"https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/"},{"source_name":"Lazarus APT January 2022","description":"Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/"}],"platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1574","id":"T1574","name":"Hijack Execution Flow","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["execution","stealth"],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1574/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["File Creation","File Modification","Module Load","Process Creation","Service Metadata","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0041","name":"Service Metadata","tag":"Service Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0041/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1574/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":5,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"One process opening or accessing another process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_process_id","target_process_id","granted_access","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1574.013","id":"T1574.013","name":"KernelCallbackTable","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1574.013/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1574.013/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0577","name":"Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow through the KernelCallbackTable on Windows.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0577","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--7ee8426e-2b65-44ed-b6d4-3800b92adf2e","relationship_id":"relationship--328731d0-4303-4abe-86de-e5d93d6d8623","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1593","name":"Analytic 1593","guidance":"Unexpected modification of the KernelCallbackTable in a process’s PEB followed by invocation of modified callback functions (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) through Windows messages. Defender observes suspicious API call chains such as NtQueryInformationProcess → WriteProcessMemory → abnormal GUI callback execution, often correlating to anomalous process behavior such as network activity or code injection.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0577#AN1593","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"MonitoredProcesses","description":"GUI applications (e.g., explorer.exe, notepad.exe) where KernelCallbackTable abuse is more likely."},{"field":"CallbackFunctions","description":"Specific callback functions (e.g., fnCOPYDATA, fnDWORD) expected to remain stable."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation interval between WriteProcessMemory calls and execution of modified callback functions."},{"field":"AccessMaskThresholds","description":"Access rights values that should be flagged when targeting GUI processes."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0035","component":"Process Access","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=10","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1593","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0577#AN1593","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0035/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1593","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0577#AN1593","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process","channel":"WriteProcessMemory: WriteProcessMemory targeting regions containing KernelCallbackTable addresses","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1593","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0577#AN1593","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1574","id":"T1574","name":"Hijack Execution Flow","page":"detections/enterprise/T1574/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0182","name":"FinFisher","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182","kind":"malware","description":"[FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182) has used the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack the execution flow of a process by replacing the <code>__fnDWORD</code> function with the address of a created [Asynchronous Procedure Call](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004) stub routine.(Citation: FinFisher exposed )","relationship_id":"relationship--fa5b5933-f9e3-4bbb-b734-f1c5984ded97","references":[{"source_name":"FinFisher exposed ","description":"Microsoft Defender Security Research Team. (2018, March 1). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved January 27, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0032","name":"Lazarus Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has abused the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack process control flow and execute shellcode.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)","relationship_id":"relationship--c0337d13-da6a-4e2b-91a4-a389c6b4ee28","references":[{"source_name":"Lazarus APT January 2022","description":"Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/"},{"source_name":"Qualys LolZarus","description":"Pradhan, A. (2022, February 8). LolZarus: Lazarus Group Incorporating Lolbins into Campaigns. Retrieved March 22, 2022.","url":"https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/02/08/lolzarus-lazarus-group-incorporating-lolbins-into-campaigns"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1040","name":"Behavior Prevention on Endpoint","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1040","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of behaviors related to process injection/memory tampering based on common sequences of indicators (ex: execution of specific API functions).","relationship_id":"relationship--868d0bb7-fb2a-42d8-8a8a-5772d8a10eea","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1620":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1620/","T1055":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1055/","T1106":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1106/","T1574.013":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1574.013/","T1055.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1055.004/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1574.013","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
