{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1569","id":"T1569","name":"System Services","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"9d28e3fbb58c54124e1ef328c42192d68e9cd00b6452668e8fc96da7b8bdc191","description":"Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569","external_id":"T1569"}],"platforms":["Windows","macOS","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1569.001","id":"T1569.001","name":"Launchctl","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1569.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1569.002","id":"T1569.002","name":"Service Execution","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1569.002/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1569.003","id":"T1569.003","name":"Systemctl","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1569.003/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Installation or registration of a service.","collection_focus":"Collect service-install auditing through Audit Security System Extension where supported, plus Service Control Manager/System logs and the new service configuration.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","executable","actor"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0060","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","action":"install","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","actor":"lab-admin"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Registry value changes or registry object renames.","collection_focus":"Use RegistryEvent 13 for value-set and 14 for rename; compare against intended policy and keep original type/value where available.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["registry_path","event_type","value_type","value"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1569","id":"T1569","name":"System Services","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows","macOS","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1569/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1569/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":1,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"730fc21b-eaff-474b-ad23-90fd265d4988","title":"Psexec Execution","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/730fc21b-eaff-474b-ad23-90fd265d4988.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psexec_execution.yml","author":"omkar72","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0279","name":"Detection Strategy for System Services across OS platforms.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--38364d2d-7b25-4f75-9679-eca4dd18b213","relationship_id":"relationship--20cd9b34-087b-42ab-9819-fe330c06c89d","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0778","name":"Analytic 0778","guidance":"Monitor for abnormal creation or modification of Windows services (e.g., via sc.exe, PowerShell, or API calls) that load non-standard executables. Correlate registry changes in service keys with service creation events and process execution to detect service abuse for persistence or execution.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0778","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ServiceAllowlist","description":"Known good services and installers that regularly modify or create services"},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Threshold for correlating service creation with unusual process execution"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0060","component":"Service Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4697","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0778","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0778","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0060/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0778","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0778","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0063","component":"Windows Registry Key Modification","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=13, 14","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0778","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0778","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0063/"}]},{"id":"AN0779","name":"Analytic 0779","guidance":"Detect unusual invocations of systemctl, service, or init scripts creating or modifying daemons. Monitor audit logs for execution of binaries from unexpected paths linked to service start/stop activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0779","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ServiceBinaryPaths","description":"Valid directories for service binaries to filter out benign changes"},{"field":"UserContext","description":"Expected accounts performing service management (e.g., root/admin)"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0779","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0779","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0060","component":"Service Creation","name":"linux:syslog","channel":"systemctl start/enable with uncommon binary paths","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0779","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0779","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0060/"},{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"write","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0779","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0779","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"}]},{"id":"AN0780","name":"Analytic 0780","guidance":"Monitor launchd service definitions and property list (.plist) modifications for non-standard executables. Detect unauthorized processes registered as launch daemons or agents.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0780","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"PlistAllowlist","description":"Known launch agents/daemons expected to be modified by updates or IT tools"},{"field":"PayloadEntropyThreshold","description":"Entropy level for detecting suspicious binary payloads in launchd services"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Unexpected processes registered with launchd","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0780","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0780","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Modification of LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons plist files","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0780","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0279#AN0780","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","tag":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G1045","name":"Salt Typhoon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Salt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045) has utilized SNMP daemon to execute commands to include SNMPwalk.(Citation: CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--3927b0e9-9318-43ec-a27a-b8948c6ccffb","references":[{"source_name":"CISA_AA25-239ASaltTyphoon_Sept2025","description":"CISA. (2025, September 3). Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System. Retrieved September 22, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons.","relationship_id":"relationship--64ebe849-d632-4af5-92b4-05e246b732c2","references":[]},{"id":"M1022","name":"Restrict File and Directory Permissions","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1022","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.","relationship_id":"relationship--ce16e7b4-b78e-4587-bf65-8a0c0c370cc4","references":[]},{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level.","relationship_id":"relationship--3ab372ea-c8be-4fb1-a9d3-4aa542e1f10f","references":[]},{"id":"M1040","name":"Behavior Prevention on Endpoint","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1040","kind":"course-of-action","description":"On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) from running. (Citation: win10_asr)","relationship_id":"relationship--bcfcbbdb-302d-4e63-ba65-7333dfdaec3a","references":[{"source_name":"win10_asr","description":"Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1543":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1543/","T1569":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1569/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1569","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0060","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","action":"install","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","actor":"lab-admin"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}}]}}