{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1564.012","id":"T1564.012","name":"File/Path Exclusions","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"659393d344cc4df34bf3ea742a7479549cf2d1fb33ec187e4994b6c89f0cac3f","description":"Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.(Citation: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than  tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685)), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) and other [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007)/[Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012","external_id":"T1564.012"},{"source_name":"Microsoft File Folder Exclusions","description":"Microsoft. (2024, February 27). Contextual file and folder exclusions. Retrieved March 29, 2024.","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-contextual-file-folder-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1564","id":"T1564","name":"Hide Artifacts","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["stealth"],"platforms":["ESXi","Linux","macOS","Office Suite","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","virtualization"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1564/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","some_candidates_require_elevation"],"telemetry_tags":["Application Log Content","Command Execution","File Creation","File Metadata","Process Creation","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","tag":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1564/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":10,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["Remcos"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S0332","name":"Remcos","page":"tools/S0332/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":5,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Access to file objects with user, process and access-right context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","access","actor","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"File attributes such as path, size, timestamps, ownership and cryptographic hash.","collection_focus":"Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","size_bytes","sha256","owner_uid"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1564.012","id":"T1564.012","name":"File/Path Exclusions","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1564.012/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1564.012/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0051","name":"Detection Strategy for File/Path Exclusions","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--f9175415-59ba-497c-b96f-639e01f4cf4e","relationship_id":"relationship--34cc64f1-eeb5-49cd-8077-5986c332fe06","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0139","name":"Analytic 0139","guidance":"Creation or modification of files in directories known to be excluded from AV scanning (e.g., C:\\Windows\\Temp, Exchange server directories, or default AV exclusions). Defender perspective: correlate file creation with execution behavior or anomalous parent processes writing to excluded paths.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0139","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ExcludedPaths","description":"List of directories excluded from scanning in the environment (customizable per organization)."},{"field":"ProcessAllowlist","description":"Legitimate processes typically writing to excluded paths to minimize false positives."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0139","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0139","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0139","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0139","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"}]},{"id":"AN0140","name":"Analytic 0140","guidance":"Adversaries writing or moving payloads into directories configured as AV/EDR exclusion paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/lib, or custom directories from auditd exclusion rules). Defender perspective: detect file creation in paths matching known exclusions correlated with unusual parent processes.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0140","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ExcludedDirectories","description":"System- or security-tool-configured exclusion directories where files should rarely change."},{"field":"CorrelationWindow","description":"Time window to correlate file creation in excluded paths with execution or network activity."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"open or creat syscalls targeting excluded paths","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0140","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0140","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0059","component":"File Metadata","name":"auditd:PATH","channel":"file path matches exclusion directories","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0140","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0140","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0059/"}]},{"id":"AN0141","name":"Analytic 0141","guidance":"Suspicious file creation or modification in directories ignored by XProtect or AV exclusions (e.g., ~/Library, temporary cache directories). Defender perspective: monitor file events in ignored paths with correlation to execution or persistence activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0141","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AVExclusionPaths","description":"Paths ignored by AV/XProtect that should be monitored for abnormal writes."},{"field":"ProcessContext","description":"Expected user or application context writing to excluded directories."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"file creation in AV exclusion directories","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0141","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0141","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"process writes or modifies files in excluded paths","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0141","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0051#AN0141","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","tag":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1564","id":"T1564","name":"Hide Artifacts","page":"detections/enterprise/T1564/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S9051","name":"The Gentlemen Ransomware","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051","kind":"malware","description":"[The Gentlemen Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051) has modified anti-virus settings to add its own executable to the exclusion list of the endpoint detection solution using the PowerShell command `Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess <malware path> -force`.(Citation: MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026)(Citation: TrendAI_TheGentlemen_Sept2025)(Citation: CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026)(Citation: CarveyODonnellWelchHuntress_TheGentlemen_May2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--75aae509-b369-49b7-b6e1-ffbbb16fb67c","references":[{"source_name":"CarveyODonnellWelchHuntress_TheGentlemen_May2026","description":"Carvey, H., O'Donnell-Welch, L. (2026, May 21). The Gentlemen (Ransomware) in Disguise: Defense Evasion and other TTPs. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-gentlemen-ransomware-defense-evasion-ttps"},{"source_name":"CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026","description":"Check Point Research. (2026, April 20). DFIR Report – The Gentlemen & SystemBC: A Sneak Peek Behind the Proxy. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/dfir-report-the-gentlemen/"},{"source_name":"MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, May 28). The Gentlemen ransomware: Dissecting a self-propagating Go encryptor . Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/28/the-gentlemen-ransomware-dissecting-a-self-propagating-go-encryptor/"},{"source_name":"TrendAI_TheGentlemen_Sept2025","description":"Santos, J., et al. (2025, September 9). Unmasking The Gentlemen Ransomware: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Revealed . Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.trendaisecurity.com/en-us/resources-insights/trendai-security-blog/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0010","name":"Turla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) has placed [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) install files into directories that are excluded from scanning.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--73d8a610-1fe1-40bc-82ba-52129d8c4979","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024","description":"Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/"}]},{"id":"G0082","name":"APT38","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has added Microsoft Defender exclusions to include `C:\\Windows\\System32` to suppress detection of dropped tooling.(Citation: MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--fa98aa65-385f-448a-bd60-0ab736d9b66f","references":[{"source_name":"MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, June 17). From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet. Retrieved September 30, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/postinstall-payload-inside-mastra-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1013","name":"Application Developer Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Application developers should consider limiting the requirements for custom or otherwise difficult to manage file/folder exclusions. Where possible, install applications to trusted system folder paths that are already protected by restricted file and directory permissions.","relationship_id":"relationship--7acdcde3-1065-4393-ae6b-80ac95b2607d","references":[]},{"id":"M1049","name":"Antivirus/Antimalware","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1049","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Review and audit file/folder exclusions, and limit scope of exclusions to only what is required where possible.(Citation: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions)","relationship_id":"relationship--3d24da0a-7124-4043-881b-da19436c007c","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft File Folder Exclusions","description":"Microsoft. (2024, February 27). Contextual file and folder exclusions. Retrieved March 29, 2024.","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-contextual-file-folder-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus"}]}],"candidates":[{"id":"0303c07b-545e-4c0b-89f4-aea84a7a8d8e","name":"Stage and execute a payload from a Windows Defender excluded path","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":2,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1564.012/T1564.012.yaml","description":"Writes an executable payload into a directory that is excluded from Microsoft Defender scanning\nand executes it from that location. Rather than modifying tool settings to create a new\nexclusion, adversaries may place file-based payloads in existing default or otherwise\nwell-known exclusions so that the artifact is never scanned.\n\nA copy of a benign signed binary (calc.exe) is used as the payload so that no malicious content\nis written to disk.\n\nUpon successful execution, the payload is copied into the excluded directory and launched from\nthere.\n","inputs":{"excluded_path":{"description":"Directory that is present in the Defender exclusion list, used to stage the payload.\n","type":"path","default":"C:\\Temp\\ARTExclusionTest"},"payload_source":{"description":"Benign binary copied into the excluded directory to act as the staged payload.","type":"path","default":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"},"payload_name":{"description":"File name given to the staged payload inside the excluded directory.","type":"string","default":"art-staged-payload.exe"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"An excluded directory (#{excluded_path}) must exist and be present in the Defender\nexclusion list. Adding a Defender exclusion requires administrative privileges and fails\nwhen Tamper Protection is enabled.\n"},{"description":"The payload source (#{payload_source}) must exist on disk.\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"cd1abfc68f06920ae608e3900ac2d63d1a6078e0125074f97604464b9fd99aa8"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1685":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1685/","T1518.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1518.001/","T1564.012":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1564.012/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1564.012","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
