{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1560","id":"T1560","name":"Archive Collected Data","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"a3d640f59d4e2d8de7f7da5ffb98aa88a680edf67a060ee8c24342e24210d21a","description":"An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.\n\nBoth compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560","external_id":"T1560"},{"source_name":"DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018","description":"Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/07/13/gru.indictment.pdf"},{"source_name":"Wikipedia File Header Signatures","description":"Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1560.001","id":"T1560.001","name":"Archive via Utility","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1560.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1560.002","id":"T1560.002","name":"Archive via Library","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1560.002/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1560.003","id":"T1560.003","name":"Archive via Custom Method","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1560.003/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1560","id":"T1560","name":"Archive Collected Data","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1560/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1560/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":2,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"418a3163-3247-4b7b-9933-dcfcb7c52ea9","title":"Compressed File Creation Via Tar.EXE","status":"test","level":"low","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/418a3163-3247-4b7b-9933-dcfcb7c52ea9.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tar_compression.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), AdmU3","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"bf361876-6620-407a-812f-bfe11e51e924","title":"Compressed File Extraction Via Tar.EXE","status":"test","level":"low","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/bf361876-6620-407a-812f-bfe11e51e924.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tar_extraction.yml","author":"AdmU3","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0526","name":"Detect Archiving and Encryption of Collected Data (T1560)","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--043bc738-1f07-4d28-9f5c-1b1f81525e7c","relationship_id":"relationship--162725e0-fc79-42ea-95a3-436b1f772d5b","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1458","name":"Analytic 1458","guidance":"Detects adversarial archiving of files prior to exfiltration by correlating execution of compression/encryption utilities (e.g., makecab.exe, rar.exe, 7z.exe, powershell Compress-Archive) with subsequent creation of large compressed or encrypted files. Identifies abnormal process lineage involving crypt32.dll usage, command-line arguments invoking compression switches, and file write operations to temporary or staging directories.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1458","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ArchiveExtensions","description":"List of file extensions treated as suspicious when created outside of expected paths."},{"field":"ProcessAllowlist","description":"Known business processes permitted to use compression/encryption utilities."},{"field":"FileSizeThresholdMB","description":"Minimum file size for flagging archive creation to reduce noise from benign small compressions."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4688","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1458","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1458","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1458","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1458","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1458","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1458","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"}]},{"id":"AN1459","name":"Analytic 1459","guidance":"Detects adversarial archiving activity through invocation of utilities like tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl used in non-administrative or unusual contexts. Correlates command execution patterns with file creation of compressed/encrypted outputs in staging directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp).","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1459","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ArchiveCommands","description":"List of archiving/encryption utilities considered sensitive in the monitored environment."},{"field":"SuspiciousDirectories","description":"Paths where archive creation is suspicious (e.g., /tmp, user home directories)."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Temporal window to correlate command execution with file creation events."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve: Execution of tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl with output redirection","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1459","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1459","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"auditd:FILE","channel":"create: Creation of files ending in .tar, .gz, .bz2, .zip in /tmp or /var/tmp","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1459","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1459","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"}]},{"id":"AN1460","name":"Analytic 1460","guidance":"Detects use of macOS-native archiving or encryption tools (zip, ditto, hdiutil) for staging collected data. Identifies unexpected invocation of archive utilities by Office apps, browsers, or background daemons. Correlates file creation of .zip/.dmg containers with process lineage anomalies.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1460","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AllowedArchiveUtilities","description":"Business-approved applications (e.g., Time Machine, backup agents) that generate archives."},{"field":"UserContext","description":"Threshold for flagging archive creation under privileged or service accounts."},{"field":"PayloadEntropyThreshold","description":"Entropy threshold for detecting encrypted archives versus standard compressed files."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Execution of zip, ditto, hdiutil, or openssl by non-terminal parent processes","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1460","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1460","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Creation of .zip or .dmg files in user-accessible or temporary directories","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1460","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0526#AN1460","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0521","name":"BloodHound","page":"tools/S0521/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0363","name":"Empire","page":"tools/S0363/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0445","name":"ShimRatReporter","page":"tools/S0445/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0521","name":"BloodHound","page":"tools/S0521/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0363","name":"Empire","page":"tools/S0363/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0445","name":"ShimRatReporter","page":"tools/S0445/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0010","name":"Lurid","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0010","kind":"malware","description":"[Lurid](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0010) can compress data before sending it.(Citation: Villeneuve 2011)","relationship_id":"relationship--982d9af7-45bb-4cc0-9819-aaadb3304783","references":[{"source_name":"Villeneuve 2011","description":"Villeneuve, N., Sancho, D. (2011). THE “LURID” DOWNLOADER. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0045","name":"ADVSTORESHELL","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045","kind":"malware","description":"[ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045) encrypts with the 3DES algorithm and a hardcoded key prior to exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)","relationship_id":"relationship--2a8f0313-4059-42b9-b487-6c8f860588c0","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Sednit Part 2","description":"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0091","name":"Epic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0091","kind":"malware","description":"[Epic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0091) encrypts collected data using a public key framework before sending it over the C2 channel.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla) Some variants encrypt the collected data with AES and encode it with base64 before transmitting it to the C2 server.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Aug 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--9076865a-8215-4536-bb31-60ab7fa20af6","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Turla","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.","url":"https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/"},{"source_name":"Kaspersky Turla Aug 2014","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2014, August 06). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroboros. Retrieved November 7, 2018.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08080105/KL_Epic_Turla_Technical_Appendix_20140806.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0093","name":"Backdoor.Oldrea","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093","kind":"malware","description":"[Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) writes collected data to a temporary file in an encrypted form before exfiltration to a C2 server.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)","relationship_id":"relationship--a1dc7c15-bd44-43b3-a32b-8e4ea9856758","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Dragonfly","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.","url":"https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments"}]},{"id":"S0113","name":"Prikormka","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113","kind":"malware","description":"After collecting documents from removable media, [Prikormka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113) compresses the collected files, and encrypts it with Blowfish.(Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)","relationship_id":"relationship--fada6223-ba24-4c26-aa89-3998f07604f9","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Operation Groundbait","description":"Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0187","name":"Daserf","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0187","kind":"malware","description":"[Daserf](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0187) hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives.(Citation: Symantec Tick Apr 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--df6c39fa-9d95-45ee-911b-0ca2fc167086","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Tick Apr 2016","description":"DiMaggio, J. (2016, April 28). Tick cyberespionage group zeros in on Japan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/tick-cyberespionage-group-zeros-japan"}]},{"id":"S0198","name":"NETWIRE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198","kind":"malware","description":"[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) has the ability to compress archived screenshots.(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--8a2be44e-6a93-479f-ade9-7d49a1eb692a","references":[{"source_name":"Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020","description":"Lambert, T. (2020, January 29). Intro to Netwire. Retrieved January 7, 2021.","url":"https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/"}]},{"id":"S0249","name":"Gold Dragon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249","kind":"malware","description":"[Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) encrypts data using Base64 before being sent to the command and control server.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)","relationship_id":"relationship--7ee9b1ad-7f7b-4ae7-8cf4-8ab97b6a74b8","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Gold Dragon","description":"Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. 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Sednit: What’s going on with Zebrocy?. Retrieved February 12, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/20/sednit-whats-going-zebrocy/"},{"source_name":"CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020","description":"CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303B). Retrieved December 9, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303b"}]},{"id":"S0253","name":"RunningRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253","kind":"malware","description":"[RunningRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253) contains code to compress files.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)","relationship_id":"relationship--b997d866-0aef-4ba6-a812-cfa2fccb05af","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Gold Dragon","description":"Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. 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Retrieved September 21, 2018.","url":"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"}]},{"id":"S0331","name":"Agent Tesla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331","kind":"malware","description":"[Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331) can encrypt data with 3DES before sending it over to a C2 server.(Citation: Talos Agent Tesla Oct 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--c48ff628-9276-492f-a61c-73989785b292","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Agent Tesla Oct 2018","description":"Brumaghin, E., et al. (2018, October 15). Old dog, new tricks - Analysing new RTF-based campaign distributing Agent Tesla, Loki with PyREbox. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/10/old-dog-new-tricks-analysing-new-rtf_15.html"}]},{"id":"S0343","name":"Exaramel for Windows","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0343","kind":"malware","description":"[Exaramel for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0343) automatically encrypts files before sending them to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018) ","relationship_id":"relationship--1631a8e5-36e6-4468-9ed6-48df1138461c","references":[{"source_name":"ESET TeleBots Oct 2018","description":"Cherepanov, A., Lipovsky, R. (2018, October 11). New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya. Retrieved November 27, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/"}]},{"id":"S0356","name":"KONNI","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356","kind":"malware","description":"[KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has encrypted data and files prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--823fc0fa-1648-40ed-87a3-eec3138eb3dd","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021","description":"Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, August 23). New variant of Konni malware used in campaign targetting Russia. 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Retrieved June 24, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0409","name":"Machete","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409","kind":"malware","description":"[Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) stores zipped files with profile data from installed web browsers.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) ","relationship_id":"relationship--c254bf89-3726-4c56-aae5-700c59427daf","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Machete July 2019","description":"ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0445","name":"ShimRatReporter","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0445","kind":"tool","description":"[ShimRatReporter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0445) used LZ compression to compress initial reconnaissance reports before sending to the C2.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--70af600c-ca7a-4ea3-8c03-3a166e2d88a7","references":[{"source_name":"FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang","description":"Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. 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Retrieved April 17, 2019.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets"}]},{"id":"S0456","name":"Aria-body","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456","kind":"malware","description":"[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) has used ZIP to compress data gathered on a compromised host.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--fa77baa1-a258-4059-aa84-6822fe023d70","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint Naikon May 2020","description":"CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/naikon-apt-cyber-espionage-reloaded/"}]},{"id":"S0487","name":"Kessel","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0487","kind":"malware","description":"[Kessel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0487) can RC4-encrypt credentials before sending to the C2.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--9433ea0e-0bae-44b6-b32b-5290356f057b","references":[{"source_name":"ESET ForSSHe December 2018","description":"Dumont, R., M.Léveillé, M., Porcher, H. (2018, December 1). THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORSSHE A landscape of OpenSSH backdoors. Retrieved July 16, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ESET-The_Dark_Side_of_the_ForSSHe.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0515","name":"WellMail","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0515","kind":"malware","description":"[WellMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0515) can archive files on the compromised host.(Citation: CISA WellMail July 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--423b6f97-96c5-47f3-aa9f-f27bf5cd1ba0","references":[{"source_name":"CISA WellMail July 2020","description":"CISA. (2020, July 16). MAR-10296782-3.v1 – WELLMAIL. 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Retrieved July 27, 2020.","url":"https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/pillowmint-fin7s-monkey-thief/"}]},{"id":"S0521","name":"BloodHound","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521","kind":"tool","description":"[BloodHound](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521) can compress data collected by its SharpHound ingestor into a ZIP file to be written to disk.(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound)(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--2762485e-c8a2-4bbe-b3d8-8b20ca70197b","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022","description":"Kenefick, I. et al. (2022, October 12). Black Basta Ransomware Gang Infiltrates Networks via QAKBOT, Brute Ratel, and Cobalt Strike. Retrieved February 6, 2023.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html"},{"source_name":"GitHub Bloodhound","description":"Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.","url":"https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound"}]},{"id":"S0567","name":"Dtrack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567","kind":"malware","description":"[Dtrack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0567) packs collected data into a password protected archive.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)","relationship_id":"relationship--d80207ae-0b3c-4f5f-ac89-9caa8c2c9beb","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Dtrack","description":"Konstantin Zykov. (2019, September 23). Hello! My name is Dtrack. Retrieved January 20, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/"}]},{"id":"S0586","name":"TAINTEDSCRIBE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586","kind":"malware","description":"[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) has used <code>FileReadZipSend</code> to compress a file and send to C2.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1  TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--1f066ba6-31e2-48d1-a7ac-27a20879287b","references":[{"source_name":"CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1  TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020","description":"USG. (2020, May 12). MAR-10288834-2.v1 – North Korean Trojan: TAINTEDSCRIBE. Retrieved March 5, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133b"}]},{"id":"S0622","name":"AppleSeed","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622","kind":"malware","description":"[AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) has compressed collected data before exfiltration.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)","relationship_id":"relationship--985066fb-7fbb-4147-a69d-b33d45cd3e7f","references":[{"source_name":"KISA Operation Muzabi","description":"KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220328121326/https://boho.or.kr/filedownload.do?attach_file_seq=2695&attach_file_id=EpF2695.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0657","name":"BLUELIGHT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0657","kind":"malware","description":"[BLUELIGHT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0657) can zip files before exfiltration.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--a4361a93-3ce2-4c35-a5d8-9a4fae2dc822","references":[{"source_name":"Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021","description":"Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.","url":"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/"}]},{"id":"S0658","name":"XCSSET","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658","kind":"malware","description":"[XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) will compress entire <code>~/Desktop</code> folders excluding all <code>.git</code> folders, but only if the total data size is under 200MB.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--7bbd6131-24cd-437e-8057-02f84b357cbe","references":[{"source_name":"trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020","description":"Mac Threat Response, Mobile Research Team. (2020, August 13). The XCSSET Malware: Inserts Malicious Code Into Xcode Projects, Performs UXSS Backdoor Planting in Safari, and Leverages Two Zero-day Exploits. Retrieved October 5, 2021.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/XCSSET_Technical_Brief.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0667","name":"Chrommme","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667","kind":"malware","description":"[Chrommme](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667) can encrypt and store on disk collected data before exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--02174a5c-9cda-4ddc-9952-1ff1b956d31e","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Gelsemium June 2021","description":"Dupuy, T. and Faou, M. (2021, June). Gelsemium. Retrieved November 30, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eset_gelsemium.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0681","name":"Lizar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0681","kind":"malware","description":"[Lizar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0681) has encrypted data before sending it to the server.(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--ff9e8d81-dc74-4494-a4aa-54f8039f9ad7","references":[{"source_name":"BiZone Lizar May 2021","description":"BI.ZONE Cyber Threats Research Team. (2021, May 13). From pentest to APT attack: cybercriminal group FIN7 disguises its malware as an ethical hacker’s toolkit. Retrieved February 2, 2022.","url":"https://bi-zone.medium.com/from-pentest-to-apt-attack-cybercriminal-group-fin7-disguises-its-malware-as-an-ethical-hackers-c23c9a75e319"}]},{"id":"S1012","name":"PowerLess","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1012","kind":"malware","description":"[PowerLess](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1012) can encrypt browser database files prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason PowerLess February 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--8b16a324-45f2-4e90-8c30-39229b352fb7","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason PowerLess February 2022","description":"Cybereason Nocturnus. (2022, February 1). PowerLess Trojan: Iranian APT Phosphorus Adds New PowerShell Backdoor for Espionage. Retrieved June 1, 2022.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/powerless-trojan-iranian-apt-phosphorus-adds-new-powershell-backdoor-for-espionage"}]},{"id":"S1039","name":"Bumblebee","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039","kind":"malware","description":"[Bumblebee](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1039) can compress data stolen from the Registry and volume shadow copies prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--3df9c843-4833-45f9-a1ae-f7231d8410c4","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022","description":"Cybereason. (2022, August 17). Bumblebee Loader – The High Road to Enterprise Domain Control. Retrieved August 29, 2022.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-bumblebee-loader-the-high-road-to-enterprise-domain-control"}]},{"id":"S1101","name":"LoFiSe","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1101","kind":"malware","description":"[LoFiSe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1101) can collect files into password-protected ZIP-archives for exfiltration.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--255eb82c-19d3-43bd-a13c-e7c54413bfd6","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023","description":"Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024.","url":"https://securelist.com/toddycat-keep-calm-and-check-logs/110696/"}]},{"id":"S1140","name":"Spica","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1140","kind":"malware","description":"[Spica](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1140) can archive collected documents for exfiltration.(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--60fd7b53-b65a-49d3-ba1c-40beb74e8088","references":[{"source_name":"Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024","description":"Shields, W. (2024, January 18). Russian threat group COLDRIVER expands its targeting of Western officials to include the use of malware. Retrieved June 13, 2024.","url":"https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/google-tag-coldriver-russian-phishing-malware/"}]},{"id":"S1148","name":"Raccoon Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148","kind":"malware","description":"[Raccoon Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148) archives collected system information in a text f ile, `System info.txt`, prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Sekoia Raccoon2 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--88d26308-c00d-4394-8074-7d80d3deeea5","references":[{"source_name":"Sekoia Raccoon2 2022","description":"Pierre Le Bourhis, Quentin Bourgue, & Sekoia TDR. (2022, June 29). Raccoon Stealer v2 - Part 2: In-depth analysis. Retrieved August 1, 2024.","url":"https://blog.sekoia.io/raccoon-stealer-v2-part-2-in-depth-analysis/"}]},{"id":"S1196","name":"Troll Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1196","kind":"malware","description":"[Troll Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1196) compresses stolen data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: S2W Troll Stealer 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--630e90a1-6600-4017-8fdc-c13222b59ee4","references":[{"source_name":"S2W Troll Stealer 2024","description":"Jiho Kim & Sebin Lee, S2W. (2024, February 7). Kimsuky disguised as a Korean company signed with a valid certificate to distribute Troll Stealer (English ver.). Retrieved January 17, 2025.","url":"https://medium.com/s2wblog/kimsuky-disguised-as-a-korean-company-signed-with-a-valid-certificate-to-distribute-troll-stealer-cfa5d54314e2"}]},{"id":"S1206","name":"JumbledPath","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1206","kind":"malware","description":"[JumbledPath](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1206) can compress and encrypt exfiltrated packet captures from targeted devices.(Citation: Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--99e5781a-104c-49a7-b0b0-9f00b804f536","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025","description":"Cisco Talos. (2025, February 20). Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon. Retrieved February 24, 2025.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/salt-typhoon-analysis/"}]},{"id":"S9032","name":"MuddyViper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9032","kind":"malware","description":"[MuddyViper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9032) has archived collected web browser data into a file named CacheDump.zip.(Citation: ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025)       ","relationship_id":"relationship--4ef8c5fb-1c73-4847-9aa0-0d83eec44993","references":[{"source_name":"ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025","description":"ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/"}]},{"id":"S9036","name":"LP-Notes","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9036","kind":"malware","description":"[LP-Notes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9036) has encrypted collected credentials using AES-CBC from the CNG API and the key ED15C8344B45DAED1E0578F8BC1A32411812C61F4CB45D89B107287DE0E09FFC\nand the initialization vector 91A4E6F6D51DAEE773A8F00279792578.(Citation: ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--6eb19d8a-2a57-4089-9cd2-ae9023a1a337","references":[{"source_name":"ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025","description":"ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/"}]},{"id":"S9043","name":"Mini Shai-Hulud","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9043","kind":"malware","description":"[Mini Shai-Hulud](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9043) has compressed collected credentials to reduce transmission size and to make string content harder to detect in memory forensics captures.(Citation: Hunt.io TeamPCP Toolkit MAY 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--43b6c74f-57ee-4cf8-acf8-97cbaa85db38","references":[{"source_name":"Hunt.io TeamPCP Toolkit MAY 2026","description":"Hunt.io. (2026, May 14). How TeamPCP's Python Toolkit Survives a C2 Takedown: FIRESCALE, GitHub, and the Victim's Own Account. Retrieved July 16, 2026.","url":"https://hunt.io/blog/teampcp-python-toolkit-firescale-github-c2-takedown"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0001","name":"Axiom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) has compressed and encrypted data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)","relationship_id":"relationship--2202d670-a6f3-42eb-ae1b-1ae615c3b620","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta-Axiom","description":"Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230115144216/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0004","name":"Ke3chang","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"The [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) group has been known to compress data before exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--ab7eb363-c775-4065-a80d-1b324f22d0b8","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014","description":"Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs"}]},{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--63ee7d80-372e-4841-87a4-825cb5dd7058","references":[{"source_name":"DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018","description":"Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/07/13/gru.indictment.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0032","name":"Lazarus Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--552ac18c-4fac-4cb0-aefc-811a10e1c320","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster Loaders","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165631/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Loaders-Installers-and-Uninstallers-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster RATs","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220608001455/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-RAT-and-Staging-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018","description":"Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/lazarus-resurfaces-targets-global-banks-bitcoin-users/"}]},{"id":"G0035","name":"Dragonfly","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltration.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)","relationship_id":"relationship--0082e86b-a7b7-496b-af03-88785b6c8fbb","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT TA18-074A","description":"US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"}]},{"id":"G0037","name":"FIN6","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"Following data collection, [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--98229d5a-fce3-442e-91cf-7ec7b7994248","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN6 April 2016","description":"FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190807112824/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0040","name":"Patchwork","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) encrypted the collected files' path with AES and then encoded them with base64.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--03b18e87-f5f2-4d12-b5b3-2e1ba131b091","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017","description":"Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0045","name":"menuPass","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) has encrypted files and information before exfiltration.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--d844fdcc-a0d1-46b4-a4dc-f56063ef9584","references":[{"source_name":"DOJ APT10 Dec 2018","description":"United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019.","url":"https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion"},{"source_name":"District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018","description":"US District Court Southern District of New York. (2018, December 17). United States v. Zhu Hua Indictment. Retrieved December 17, 2020.","url":"https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1122671/download"}]},{"id":"G0050","name":"APT32","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050)'s backdoor has used LZMA compression and RC4 encryption before exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--7723037f-0b2e-447b-811a-d18a109570bb","references":[{"source_name":"ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019","description":"Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/20/fake-or-fake-keeping-up-with-oceanlotus-decoys/"}]},{"id":"G0065","name":"Leviathan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has archived victim's data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--e37d3456-b3a0-4502-b502-a505f383cb4c","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021","description":"CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a"}]},{"id":"G1003","name":"Ember Bear","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has compressed collected data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--2e3dd466-e330-4d59-9c23-59f1f697d60d","references":[{"source_name":"CISA GRU29155 2024","description":"US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/aa24-249a-russian-military-cyber-actors-target-us-and-global-critical-infrastructure.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1014","name":"LuminousMoth","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--9e8e158e-31a9-406e-8b58-68ef645b0cc8","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021","description":"Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/labs/luminousmoth-plugx-file-exfiltration-and-persistence-revisited"}]},{"id":"G1043","name":"BlackByte","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1043","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[BlackByte](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1043) compressed data collected from victim environments prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Picus BlackByte 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--4ad19c3f-54c6-4bc6-a6fc-95ffb6fe75be","references":[{"source_name":"Picus BlackByte 2022","description":"Huseyin Can Yuceel. (2022, February 21). TTPs used by BlackByte Ransomware Targeting Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved December 16, 2024.","url":"https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/ttps-used-by-blackbyte-ransomware-targeting-critical-infrastructure"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"System scans can be performed to identify unauthorized archival utilities.","relationship_id":"relationship--9e0cc38c-17a0-4320-b9b4-dc8458a9bb79","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"41410c60-614d-4b9d-b66e-b0192dd9c597","name":"Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1560/T1560.yaml","description":"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration.\nWhen the test completes you should find the files from the $env:USERPROFILE directory compressed in a file called T1560-data-ps.zip in the $env:USERPROFILE directory \n","inputs":{"input_file":{"description":"Path that should be compressed into our output file","type":"path","default":"$env:USERPROFILE"},"output_file":{"description":"Path where resulting compressed data should be placed","type":"path","default":"$env:USERPROFILE\\T1560-data-ps.zip"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"3035ef586f1801cdece575f4e096b6e59e41ce16ca38d54d82be9224110cb9ce"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1560":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1560/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1560","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}