{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1558","id":"T1558","name":"Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"eaa31a09283d1b7c50bf6e0b616a7a6ed04cd1c3e24726ebd7a35c98149d005b","description":"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\n","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558","external_id":"T1558"},{"source_name":"CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection","description":"Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.","url":"https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018","description":"Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.","url":"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/"},{"source_name":"Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory","description":"French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.","url":"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"},{"source_name":"Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019","description":"Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.","url":"https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks"},{"source_name":"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"},{"source_name":"ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket","description":"Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.","url":"https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Klist","description":"Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist"},{"source_name":"ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder","description":"Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=227"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1558.001","id":"T1558.001","name":"Golden Ticket","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1558.002","id":"T1558.002","name":"Silver Ticket","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558.002/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1558.003","id":"T1558.003","name":"Kerberoasting","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558.003/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1558.004","id":"T1558.004","name":"AS-REP Roasting","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558.004/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1558.005","id":"T1558.005","name":"Ccache Files","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558.005/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0084","name":"Active Directory Credential Request","page":"telemetry/DC0084/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Directory authentication service requests, such as Kerberos ticket requests.","collection_focus":"Enable the relevant Account Logon subcategories on DCs, including Kerberos Authentication Service and Service Ticket Operations; preserve service/account, encryption and result.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"},{"name":"Active Directory domain controllers","scope":"Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.","source_id":"ad"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","service_principal","request_type","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0084","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"lab-user","service_principal":"cifs/lab-server.example.test","request_type":"service_ticket","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Access to file objects with user, process and access-right context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","access","actor","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Attributes of existing logon sessions and their association with accounts or hosts.","collection_focus":"Collect supported session inventory and correlate session IDs with authentication, logon and logoff events.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["session_id","account","host","session_type"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"One process opening or accessing another process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_process_id","target_process_id","granted_access","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1558","id":"T1558","name":"Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1558/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":5,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93","title":"Antivirus Password Dumper Detection","status":"stable","level":"critical","logsource":{"category":"antivirus"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/category/antivirus/av_password_dumper.yml","author":"Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"5a44727c-3b85-4713-8c44-4401d5499629","title":"Replay Attack Detected","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"service":"security","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/5a44727c-3b85-4713-8c44-4401d5499629.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_replay_attack_detected.yml","author":"frack113","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"9e099d99-44c2-42b6-a6d8-54c3545cab29","title":"HackTool - Mimikatz Kirbi File Creation","status":"test","level":"critical","logsource":{"category":"file_event","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/9e099d99-44c2-42b6-a6d8-54c3545cab29.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_mimikatz_files.yml","author":"Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74","title":"Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"network_connection","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml","author":"Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5","title":"Potential Unconstrained Delegation Discovery Via Get-ADComputer - ScriptBlock","status":"experimental","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"ps_script","definition":"Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enable"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_potential_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.yml","author":"frack113","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0522","name":"Detect Kerberos Ticket Theft or Forgery (T1558)","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--3638f523-dc38-4ff0-8682-d2027af5bd77","relationship_id":"relationship--d1276173-76de-43a0-be72-ef59ce90c44c","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1443","name":"Analytic 1443","guidance":"Detects anomalous Kerberos activity such as forged or stolen tickets by correlating malformed fields in logon events, RC4-encrypted TGTs, or TGS requests without corresponding TGT requests. Also detects suspicious processes accessing LSASS memory for ticket extraction.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1443","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"TicketLifetimeThreshold","description":"Threshold for Kerberos TGT lifetimes deviating from domain defaults."},{"field":"EncryptionTypes","description":"Monitor for downgraded encryption types (e.g., RC4) in Kerberos tickets."},{"field":"ProcessAllowlist","description":"List of expected processes accessing LSASS; deviations may be suspicious."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0088","component":"Logon Session Metadata","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4672, 4634","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1443","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1443","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0088/"},{"component_id":"DC0035","component":"Process Access","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=10","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1443","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1443","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0035/"}]},{"id":"AN1444","name":"Analytic 1444","guidance":"Detects suspicious access to SSSD secrets database and Kerberos key material indicating ticket theft or replay attempts. Correlates anomalous file access with unusual Kerberos service ticket requests.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1444","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"SecretsAccessThreshold","description":"Alert threshold for frequency of access to Kerberos secrets files."},{"field":"UnusualServiceAccounts","description":"Baseline accounts normally performing Kerberos requests; anomalies flagged."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Access to /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb or .secrets.mkey","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1444","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1444","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"},{"component_id":"DC0084","component":"Active Directory Credential Request","name":"linux:syslog","channel":"Unusual kinit or klist activity","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1444","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1444","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0084/"}]},{"id":"AN1445","name":"Analytic 1445","guidance":"Detects attempts to forge or replay Kerberos tickets by monitoring Unified Logs for anomalous kinit/klist activity and correlating unusual authentication sequences.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1445","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"TicketRequestPatterns","description":"Expected sequence of TGT followed by TGS requests; deviations may indicate forgery."},{"field":"TicketLifetime","description":"Expected ticket lifetimes; anomalies may indicate Golden or Silver Tickets."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0088","component":"Logon Session Metadata","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Unusual Kerberos TGS-REQ without TGT or anomalous ticket lifetime","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1445","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0522#AN1445","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0088/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0084","name":"Active Directory Credential Request","tag":"Active Directory Credential Request","page":"telemetry/DC0084/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","tag":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G1024","name":"Akira","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) have used scripts to dump Kerberos authentication credentials.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--5869cc87-316e-46ae-9f4f-fb6876b42d39","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024","description":"Nutland, J. and Szeliga, M. (2024, October 21). Akira ransomware continues to evolve. Retrieved December 10, 2024.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/akira-ransomware-continues-to-evolve/"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1015","name":"Active Directory Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1015","kind":"course-of-action","description":"For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.(Citation: STIG krbtgt reset)","relationship_id":"relationship--037b851b-7ced-4322-a57a-9f744f9a1e76","references":[{"source_name":"STIG krbtgt reset","description":"UCF. (n.d.). The password for the krbtgt account on a domain must be reset at least every 180 days. Retrieved November 5, 2020.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20240428080127/https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_server_2016/2019-12-12/finding/V-91779"}]},{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.\n\nLimit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--fbba8143-52be-4b81-8af7-94518799faaa","references":[{"source_name":"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"}]},{"id":"M1027","name":"Password Policies","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1027","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--cb2238b0-bd8e-4b21-b692-d1f362c102b4","references":[{"source_name":"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"}]},{"id":"M1041","name":"Encrypt Sensitive Information","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1041","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--5574a01e-efcc-49d6-8692-30c97c611397","references":[{"source_name":"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"}]},{"id":"M1043","name":"Credential Access Protection","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1043","kind":"course-of-action","description":"On Linux systems, protect resources with Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) by defining entry points, process types, and file labels.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) ","relationship_id":"relationship--1a1f2d06-9ea1-4ace-8d97-92bf4de60240","references":[{"source_name":"Brining MimiKatz to Unix","description":"Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.","url":"https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf"}]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.","relationship_id":"relationship--f1959153-4487-4604-a054-f2d7918c2067","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1550.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1550.003/","T1558":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1558/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1558","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0084","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"lab-user","service_principal":"cifs/lab-server.example.test","request_type":"service_ticket","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}}]}}