{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1558.004","id":"T1558.004","name":"AS-REP Roasting","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"de6c9b2c81c1e45a052810dedcf6bd19ef34cb947d8200dfece11160f0714395","description":"Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) \n\nPreauthentication offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002). When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014)\n\nFor each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) attacks similarly to [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003) and expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019) \n\nAn account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004","external_id":"T1558.004"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018","description":"Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.","url":"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/"},{"source_name":"Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017","description":"HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved September 23, 2024.","url":"https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/"},{"source_name":"Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019","description":"Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.","url":"https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"},{"source_name":"SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014","description":"Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides"},{"source_name":"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"},{"source_name":"Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017","description":"Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014","description":"Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.","url":"https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx"}],"platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1558","id":"T1558","name":"Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["credential-access"],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Active Directory Credential Request","File Access","Logon Session Metadata","Process Access"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0084","name":"Active Directory Credential Request","tag":"Active Directory Credential Request","page":"telemetry/DC0084/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","tag":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1558/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":5,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0084","name":"Active Directory Credential Request","page":"telemetry/DC0084/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Directory authentication service requests, such as Kerberos ticket requests.","collection_focus":"Enable the relevant Account Logon subcategories on DCs, including Kerberos Authentication Service and Service Ticket Operations; preserve service/account, encryption and result.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"},{"name":"Active Directory domain controllers","scope":"Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.","source_id":"ad"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","service_principal","request_type","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0084","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"lab-user","service_principal":"cifs/lab-server.example.test","request_type":"service_ticket","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1558.004","id":"T1558.004","name":"AS-REP Roasting","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1558.004/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1558.004/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0113","name":"Detect AS-REP Roasting Attempts (T1558.004)","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0113","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--d881e35b-5401-46c0-b966-8880c64681ab","relationship_id":"relationship--7be88280-2aa7-4661-9ee1-b9f74e58a49c","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0316","name":"Analytic 0316","guidance":"Detects AS-REP roasting attempts by monitoring for Kerberos AS-REQ/AS-REP authentication patterns where preauthentication is disabled (Event ID 4768 with Pre-Auth Type 0). Correlates these requests with subsequent service ticket activity (Event ID 4769) and anomalies such as requests using weak RC4 encryption (etype 0x17). Excessive enumeration of accounts with 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set in Active Directory is another key detection point.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0113#AN0316","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"PreAuthDisabledAccountsBaseline","description":"Baseline of accounts legitimately configured without Kerberos preauthentication; deviations may indicate adversary enumeration."},{"field":"TGTRequestThreshold","description":"Number of AS-REQ/AS-REP exchanges per account within a short timeframe; higher counts may indicate AS-REP roasting."},{"field":"AllowedEncryptionTypes","description":"Permitted Kerberos encryption algorithms; RC4 usage (etype 0x17) should be closely monitored."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window for linking AS-REQs, AS-REPs, and subsequent service ticket requests."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0084","component":"Active Directory Credential Request","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4768","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0316","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0113#AN0316","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0084/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0316","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0113#AN0316","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0084","name":"Active Directory Credential Request","tag":"Active Directory Credential Request","page":"telemetry/DC0084/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S1071","name":"Rubeus","page":"tools/S1071/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1558","id":"T1558","name":"Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets","page":"detections/enterprise/T1558/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S1071","name":"Rubeus","page":"tools/S1071/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S1071","name":"Rubeus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1071","kind":"tool","description":"[Rubeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1071) can reveal the credentials of accounts that have Kerberos pre-authentication disabled through AS-REP roasting.(Citation: GitHub Rubeus March 2023)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020) ","relationship_id":"relationship--865d4dac-1c58-46ed-8b86-58ec6c2633ec","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub Rubeus March 2023","description":"Harmj0y. (n.d.). Rubeus. Retrieved March 29, 2023.","url":"https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus"},{"source_name":"DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020","description":"The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.","url":"https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/05/ryuk-speed-run-2-hours-to-ransom/"},{"source_name":"DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020","description":"The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.","url":"https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1027","name":"Password Policies","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1027","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--6e751301-3697-4851-b55c-259976891406","references":[{"source_name":"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"}]},{"id":"M1041","name":"Encrypt Sensitive Information","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1041","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--b05e473b-ac33-42ce-b7c6-a2a8517def0d","references":[{"source_name":"AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"}]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Kerberos preauthentication is enabled by default. Older protocols might not support preauthentication therefore it is possible to have this setting disabled. Make sure that all accounts have preauthentication whenever possible and audit changes to setting. Windows tools such as PowerShell may be used to easily find which accounts have preauthentication disabled.  (Citation: Microsoft Preauthentication Jul 2012)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--3de2faf5-8019-4aad-a317-fb66554cd2c0","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Preauthentication Jul 2012","description":"Microsoft. (2012, July 18). Preauthentication. Retrieved August 24, 2020.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc961961(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN"},{"source_name":"Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019","description":"Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.","url":"https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"}]}],"candidates":[{"id":"615bd568-2859-41b5-9aed-61f6a88e48dd","name":"Rubeus asreproast","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":2,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.yaml","description":"Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast\nThis build targets .NET 4.5.  If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus\n","inputs":{"local_folder":{"description":"Local path of Rubeus executable","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads"},"local_executable":{"description":"name of the rubeus executable","type":"string","default":"rubeus.exe"},"out_file":{"description":"file where command results are stored","type":"string","default":"rubeus_output.txt"},"rubeus_url":{"description":"URL of Rubeus executable","type":"url","default":"https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"Computer must be domain joined\n"},{"description":"Rubeus must exist\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"c19b87270dba7a044af6ac67bc22202aaa47c840161644676de1462fcbb6aae3"},{"id":"8c385f88-4d47-4c9a-814d-93d9deec8c71","name":"WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":false,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.yaml","description":"PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus technique via function of WinPwn","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"402112f6f3f5ed2a48a89af2848c6e7772c1f283f385fef4086e5e178d1ce33a"},{"id":"d6139549-7b72-4e48-9ea1-324fc9bdf88a","name":"Get-DomainUser with PowerView","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":false,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.yaml","description":"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify domain users. Upon execution, progress and info about users within the domain being scanned will be displayed.\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"61bd740de72f7448e168d351bec9869c8eca28c72bca5b73428876c4255342cc"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1110.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1110.002/","T1558.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1558.003/","T1059.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1059.001/","T1078":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1078/","T1558.004":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1558.004/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1558.004","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0084","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"lab-user","service_principal":"cifs/lab-server.example.test","request_type":"service_ticket","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
