{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1557.002","id":"T1557.002","name":"ARP Cache Poisoning","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"5a25bf4e6f9f7f5427f90ee2e1e8afd8bb0822494eb55e16e1bfa57dd8ee57bc","description":"Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nThe ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.\n\nAn adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.\n\nThe ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAdversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)\n","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002","external_id":"T1557.002"},{"source_name":"Cylance Cleaver","description":"Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"RFC826 ARP","description":"Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.","url":"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826"},{"source_name":"Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003","description":"Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.","url":"https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411"}],"platforms":["Linux","Windows","macOS"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1557","id":"T1557","name":"Adversary-in-the-Middle","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["collection","credential-access"],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1557/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Application Log Content","File Modification","Network Connection Creation","Network Traffic Content","Network Traffic Flow","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1557/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":9,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["evilginx2","NPPSPY"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S9003","name":"evilginx2","page":"tools/S9003/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]},{"id":"S1131","name":"NPPSPY","page":"tools/S1131/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1557.002","id":"T1557.002","name":"ARP Cache Poisoning","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","Windows","macOS"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1557.002/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1557.002/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0387","name":"Detect ARP Cache Poisoning Across Linux, Windows, and macOS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--99758bfb-f638-43aa-a233-d27646452116","relationship_id":"relationship--9b5ab78c-06dd-4baf-bca6-bee938523de1","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1091","name":"Analytic 1091","guidance":"Detects anomalous ARP traffic or cache modifications on Windows endpoints that indicate ARP poisoning. Behavioral focus is on multiple IP addresses resolving to a single MAC, or unsolicited ARP replies from unauthorized devices.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1091","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"TrustedGatewayMAC","description":"Expected MAC address for default gateways; deviations may indicate poisoning."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation interval for repeated unsolicited ARP replies."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1091","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1091","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"ARP cache modification attempts observed through event tracing or security baselines","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1091","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1091","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN1092","name":"Analytic 1092","guidance":"Detects suspicious gratuitous ARP responses or inconsistent IP-to-MAC mappings using auditd and packet capture. Behavioral focus is on unsolicited replies overriding legitimate ARP ownership.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1092","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"AllowedARPUpdates","description":"Expected legitimate IP-to-MAC updates for servers or virtual routers."},{"field":"AlertThreshold","description":"Number of anomalous ARP packets per second before triggering detection."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"setsockopt, ioctl modifying ARP entries","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1092","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1092","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Gratuitous ARP replies with mismatched IP-MAC binding","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1092","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1092","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN1093","name":"Analytic 1093","guidance":"Detects anomalous ARP cache changes and unsolicited ARP broadcasts using unified logs and packet capture. Behavioral detection includes multiple IP addresses mapped to the same MAC address and repeated gratuitous ARP traffic.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1093","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"GatewayMACBaseline","description":"Known MAC addresses for gateways or DHCP servers; used to detect spoofed ARP entries."},{"field":"CorrelationDepth","description":"How many ARP inconsistencies to tolerate before escalating detection."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"ARP table updates inconsistent with expected gateway or DHCP lease assignments","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1093","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1093","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Excessive gratuitous ARP replies on local subnet","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1093","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0387#AN1093","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1557","id":"T1557","name":"Adversary-in-the-Middle","page":"detections/enterprise/T1557/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G0003","name":"Cleaver","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Cleaver](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003) has used custom tools to facilitate ARP cache poisoning.(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)","relationship_id":"relationship--1e03e6e0-8b7b-4e93-a955-245561085aae","references":[{"source_name":"Cylance Cleaver","description":"Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1014","name":"LuminousMoth","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) has used ARP spoofing to redirect a compromised machine to an actor-controlled website.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--5cd6e7fd-b6c6-4796-91d5-6cf4ab724adf","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021","description":"Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/labs/luminousmoth-plugx-file-exfiltration-and-persistence-revisited"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1017","name":"User Training","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Train users to be suspicious about certificate errors. Adversaries may use their own certificates in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic. Certificate errors may arise when the application’s certificate does not match the one expected by the host.","relationship_id":"relationship--59c65423-347b-4a09-a24d-c228faaa5119","references":[]},{"id":"M1031","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.","relationship_id":"relationship--55e36f24-f7dd-4966-b39f-88349b86fff3","references":[]},{"id":"M1035","name":"Limit Access to Resource Over Network","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1035","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Create static ARP entries for networked devices. Implementing static ARP entries may be infeasible for large networks.","relationship_id":"relationship--c44ff9d1-8718-49d7-9054-f7c89a221c93","references":[]},{"id":"M1037","name":"Filter Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Consider enabling DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection on switches to create mappings between IP addresses requested via DHCP and ARP tables and tie the values to a port on the switch that may block bogus traffic.(Citation: Cisco ARP Poisoning Mitigation 2016)(Citation: Juniper DAI 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--cea07509-b84d-4b25-b9e8-758a8e66b3f1","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco ARP Poisoning Mitigation 2016","description":"King, J., Lauerman, K. (2016, January 22). ARP Poisoning (Man-in-the-Middle) Attack and Mitigation Technique. Retrieved October 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/switches/catalyst-6500-series-switches/white_paper_c11_603839.html"},{"source_name":"Juniper DAI 2020","description":"Juniper. (2020, September 23). Understanding and Using Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI). Retrieved October 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/task/configuration/understanding-and-using-dai.html"}]},{"id":"M1041","name":"Encrypt Sensitive Information","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1041","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS.","relationship_id":"relationship--07bc8502-7a60-4d19-b1e1-f4fb081ed50d","references":[]},{"id":"M1042","name":"Disable or Remove Feature or Program","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1042","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Consider disabling updating the ARP cache on gratuitous ARP replies.","relationship_id":"relationship--8fe9affe-bf8d-4392-882d-d3e737eb5c43","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1040":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1040/","T1565.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1565.002/","T1557.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1557.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1557.002","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}}]}}
