{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1556.006","id":"T1556.006","name":"Multi-Factor Authentication","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"9c10c128b75b86c1bc29b39c7c8ecb1b94bb74befe26a5c158e2971b1ba6c7ab","description":"Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.\n\nOnce adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621), adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions)\n\nFor example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) \n\nDepending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006","external_id":"T1556.006"},{"source_name":"Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022","description":"Cyber Security Infrastructure Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved May 31, 2022.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a"},{"source_name":"Mandiant APT42","description":"Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromise. Retrieved September 16, 2022.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826"},{"source_name":"Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions","description":"Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Use Azure AD access reviews to manage users excluded from Conditional Access policies. Retrieved August 30, 2022.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/governance/conditional-access-exclusion"}],"platforms":["IaaS","Identity Provider","Linux","macOS","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","identity","onprem","saas"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1556","id":"T1556","name":"Modify Authentication Process","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["credential-access","defense-impairment","persistence"],"platforms":["IaaS","Identity Provider","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","identity","network-infrastructure","onprem","saas"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1556/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls","potential_disruption_requires_individual_review"],"telemetry_tags":["Cloud Service Modification","File Modification","Module Load","Process Access","Process Creation","User Account Modification","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0069","name":"Cloud Service Modification","tag":"Cloud Service Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0069/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0010","name":"User Account Modification","tag":"User Account Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0010/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1556/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":12,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":["SILENTTRINITY"],"tool_references":[{"id":"S0692","name":"SILENTTRINITY","page":"tools/S0692/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"]}],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0066","name":"Active Directory Object Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0066/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Modification of an Active Directory object attribute.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Directory Service Changes with appropriate object SACLs on lab DCs; retain 5136 attribute/value and correlation context.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"},{"name":"Active Directory domain controllers","scope":"Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.","source_id":"ad"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["object_dn","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0066","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"object_dn":"CN=LabUser,OU=Lab,DC=example,DC=test","attribute":"description","before":"Lab account","after":"Lab account reviewed"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0069","name":"Cloud Service Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0069/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Changes to a managed cloud service configuration.","collection_focus":"Collect the service-specific update API and resulting configuration state; record account/project, actor and changed settings.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","resource_id","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0069","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-audit-service","resource_id":"lab-service-1","attribute":"retention_days","before":7,"after":30}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0029","name":"Script Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0029/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Script content or script execution observations from an interpreter-aware sensor.","collection_focus":"Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Read recent Windows PowerShell script-block events","language":"powershell","source_id":"powershell","content":"Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{\n  LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'\n  Id = 4104\n} -MaxEvents 5","note":"Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions."},"required_fields":["engine","script_block_id","fragment","fragments_total","script_text"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0029","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"engine":"PowerShell","script_block_id":"lab-script-1","fragment":1,"fragments_total":1,"script_text":"Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Identity and SaaS","description":"Authentication attempts and outcomes for a user or workload account.","collection_focus":"Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","scope":"Interactive, non-interactive and workload sign-in contexts, subject to tenant features and access.","source_id":"entra"},{"name":"Cloud identity service audit","scope":"Issuer-side credential and administrative events where the service supports them.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Application audit instrumentation","scope":"Application-side use of identities and sessions; design fields without raw tokens.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.","Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.","Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","application","result","reason","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.","sources":[{"id":"entra","title":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins"},{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per identity and application: first-seen clients/resources, changes in authentication failures and session patterns, and unusual permission changes. Separate automation, travel, shared egress and identity-provider policy changes."},{"id":"DC0010","name":"User Account Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0010/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Modification of an account attribute, policy or enabled state.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit User Account Management and retain the changed attributes and target account; correlate approved administrative requests.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"},{"name":"Active Directory domain controllers","scope":"Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.","source_id":"ad"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["target_account","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0010","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"target_account":"lab-temp","attribute":"enabled","before":false,"after":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1556.006","id":"T1556.006","name":"Multi-Factor Authentication","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["IaaS","Identity Provider","Linux","macOS","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","identity","onprem","saas"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1556.006/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1556.006/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":3,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":7,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"28eea407-28d7-4e42-b0be-575d5ba60b2c","title":"Azure AD Only Single Factor Authentication Required","status":"test","level":"low","logsource":{"product":"azure","service":"signinlogs"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/28eea407-28d7-4e42-b0be-575d5ba60b2c.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/azure/signin_logs/azure_ad_only_single_factor_auth_required.yml","author":"MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"60de9b57-dc4d-48b9-a6a0-b39e0469f876","title":"Disabling Multi Factor Authentication","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"service":"audit","product":"m365"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/60de9b57-dc4d-48b9-a6a0-b39e0469f876.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/cloud/m365/audit/microsoft365_disabling_mfa.yml","author":"Splunk Threat Research Team (original rule), Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t (sigma rule)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"50e068d7-1e6b-4054-87e5-0a592c40c7e0","title":"Okta MFA Reset or Deactivated","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"okta","service":"okta"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/50e068d7-1e6b-4054-87e5-0a592c40c7e0.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/identity/okta/okta_mfa_reset_or_deactivated.yml","author":"Austin Songer @austinsonger","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0190","name":"Detect MFA Modification or Disabling Across Platforms","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--eccad822-4f5b-4337-8c8b-825cf617f853","relationship_id":"relationship--0cf350af-0fc3-4584-9e84-0af50eb17eca","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0543","name":"Analytic 0543","guidance":"Detects registry and Group Policy modifications that disable or weaken MFA, suspicious PowerShell usage modifying MFA-related attributes, and anomalous login sessions succeeding without expected MFA challenge.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0543","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"WatchedAttributes","description":"List of AD attributes or policy fields tied to MFA enforcement that may vary by organization."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window between MFA policy changes and anomalous login behavior."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0066","component":"Active Directory Object Modification","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4739","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0543","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0543","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0066/"},{"component_id":"DC0029","component":"Script Execution","name":"WinEventLog:PowerShell","channel":"Set-ADUser or Set-ADAuthenticationPolicy with MFA attributes disabled","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0543","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0543","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0029/"}]},{"id":"AN0544","name":"Analytic 0544","guidance":"Detects conditional access policy changes, exclusion of accounts from MFA enforcement, or registration of new MFA factors by non-admin or anomalous users.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0544","platforms":["Identity Provider"],"tuning":[{"field":"PrivilegedRoles","description":"Roles permitted to modify MFA settings in IdP; helps tune detection of unauthorized changes."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"azure:signinlogs","channel":"Modify Conditional Access Policy","platforms":["Identity Provider"],"analytic_id":"AN0544","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0544","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"},{"component_id":"DC0010","component":"User Account Modification","name":"m365:unified","channel":"User excluded from MFA or MFA method registered","platforms":["Identity Provider"],"analytic_id":"AN0544","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0544","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0010/"}]},{"id":"AN0545","name":"Analytic 0545","guidance":"Detects API calls to cloud secrets/MFA configurations where MFA enforcement policies are disabled or bypassed.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0545","platforms":["IaaS"],"tuning":[{"field":"MonitoredServices","description":"Specific cloud services or IAM policies relevant to MFA enforcement."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0069","component":"Cloud Service Modification","name":"AWS:CloudTrail","channel":"UpdateIdentityPolicy or DisableMFA","platforms":["IaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN0545","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0545","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0069/"}]},{"id":"AN0546","name":"Analytic 0546","guidance":"Detects PAM module modifications or removal of MFA hooks in /etc/pam.d/ configurations, correlated with successful authentications lacking MFA prompts.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0546","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"MFAHooks","description":"Paths to organization-specific PAM modules enforcing MFA."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"open/write to /etc/pam.d/*","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0546","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0546","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"},{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"NSM:Connections","channel":"Successful login without expected MFA challenge","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0546","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0546","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"}]},{"id":"AN0547","name":"Analytic 0547","guidance":"Detects modifications to authorization plugins responsible for MFA enforcement and correlates with suspicious login sessions missing MFA prompts.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0547","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"WatchedPluginPaths","description":"Paths to organization-deployed MFA authorization plugins."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0061","component":"File Modification","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Modification of /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0547","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0547","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0061/"},{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"Login success without MFA step","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0547","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0547","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"}]},{"id":"AN0548","name":"Analytic 0548","guidance":"Detects suspicious MFA method changes, such as registration of weaker factors (e.g., SMS), or removal of MFA requirements for specific accounts or groups.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0548","platforms":["SaaS"],"tuning":[{"field":"AcceptedFactors","description":"Configured MFA factors allowed in SaaS environment; tuned to organizational policies."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0010","component":"User Account Modification","name":"saas:zoom","channel":"DisableMFA or RegisterNewFactor","platforms":["SaaS"],"analytic_id":"AN0548","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0548","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0010/"}]},{"id":"AN0549","name":"Analytic 0549","guidance":"Detects MFA bypass attempts by modifying tenant-wide authentication policies or excluding high-value accounts from MFA enforcement.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0549","platforms":["Office Suite"],"tuning":[{"field":"MonitoredPolicies","description":"Specific tenant or suite policies tied to MFA enforcement."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"m365:unified","channel":"Set-CsOnlineUser or UpdateAuthPolicy","platforms":["Office Suite"],"analytic_id":"AN0549","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0190#AN0549","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0066","name":"Active Directory Object Modification","tag":"Active Directory Object Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0066/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0069","name":"Cloud Service Modification","tag":"Cloud Service Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0069/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0029","name":"Script Execution","tag":"Script Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0029/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","tag":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0010","name":"User Account Modification","tag":"User Account Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0010/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0677","name":"AADInternals","page":"tools/S0677/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1556","id":"T1556","name":"Modify Authentication Process","page":"detections/enterprise/T1556/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0677","name":"AADInternals","page":"tools/S0677/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0677","name":"AADInternals","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677","kind":"tool","description":"The [AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) `Set-AADIntUserMFA` command can be used to disable MFA for a specified user.","relationship_id":"relationship--d5e008e5-28ff-4f0a-8e09-ab637c733646","references":[]},{"id":"S1104","name":"SLOWPULSE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1104","kind":"malware","description":"[SLOWPULSE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1104) can insert malicious logic to bypass RADIUS and ACE two factor authentication (2FA) flows if a designated attacker-supplied password is provided.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--7fd19007-dd72-448f-b174-35d258b9c373","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021","description":"Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G1015","name":"Scattered Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"After compromising user accounts, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) registers their own MFA tokens.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--55e1a1e9-689f-4242-8316-d59c309849d6","references":[{"source_name":"CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023","description":"CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the secure enrollment and deactivation of MFA for user accounts.","relationship_id":"relationship--21aa8534-0280-4109-8dfb-6adbc2310dd8","references":[]},{"id":"M1032","name":"Multi-factor Authentication","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1032","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that MFA and MFA policies and requirements are properly implemented for existing and deactivated or dormant accounts and devices. If possible, consider configuring MFA solutions to \"fail closed\" rather than grant access in case of serious errors.","relationship_id":"relationship--eb985609-6a5f-4e44-9bae-bfbc1e93d978","references":[]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Review MFA actions alongside authentication logs to ensure that MFA-based logins are functioning as intended. Review user accounts to ensure that all accounts have MFA enabled.(Citation: Mandiant Cloudy Logs 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--90d0d818-4a80-459c-9d57-ca9221eae57b","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Cloudy Logs 2023","description":"Pany, D. & Hanley, C. (2023, May 3). Cloudy with a Chance of Bad Logs: Cloud Platform Log Configurations to Consider in Investigations. Retrieved October 16, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/cloud-bad-log-configurations"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1621":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1621/","T1556.006":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1556.006/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1556.006","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0066","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"object_dn":"CN=LabUser,OU=Lab,DC=example,DC=test","attribute":"description","before":"Lab account","after":"Lab account reviewed"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0069","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-audit-service","resource_id":"lab-service-1","attribute":"retention_days","before":7,"after":30}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0029","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"engine":"PowerShell","script_block_id":"lab-script-1","fragment":1,"fragments_total":1,"script_text":"Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0010","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"target_account":"lab-temp","attribute":"enabled","before":false,"after":true}}]}}
