{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1553","id":"T1553","name":"Subvert Trust Controls","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"79b50a1817f8e0475f1d0982229ad0b775c31407877271d92fffaaa6dbed418d","description":"Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553","external_id":"T1553"},{"source_name":"SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017","description":"Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.","url":"https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf"},{"source_name":"Securelist Digital Certificates","description":"Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.","url":"https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/"},{"source_name":"Symantec Digital Certificates","description":"Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.","url":"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1553.001","id":"T1553.001","name":"Gatekeeper Bypass","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1553.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1553.002","id":"T1553.002","name":"Code Signing","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1553.002/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1553.003","id":"T1553.003","name":"SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1553.003/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1553.004","id":"T1553.004","name":"Install Root Certificate","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1553.004/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1553.005","id":"T1553.005","name":"Mark-of-the-Web Bypass","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1553.005/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1553.006","id":"T1553.006","name":"Code Signing Policy Modification","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1553.006/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"File attributes such as path, size, timestamps, ownership and cryptographic hash.","collection_focus":"Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","size_bytes","sha256","owner_uid"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Registry value changes or registry object renames.","collection_focus":"Use RegistryEvent 13 for value-set and 14 for rename; compare against intended policy and keep original type/value where available.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["registry_path","event_type","value_type","value"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1553","id":"T1553","name":"Subvert Trust Controls","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1553/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1553/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":2,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4","title":"Suspicious Execution via macOS Script Editor","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"macos"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_susp_execution_macos_script_editor.yml","author":"Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"30d07da2-83ab-45d8-ae75-ec7c0edcaffc","title":"Renamed BOINC Client Execution","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/30d07da2-83ab-45d8-ae75-ec7c0edcaffc.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_boinc.yml","author":"Matt Anderson (Huntress)","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0452","name":"Detect Subversion of Trust Controls via Certificate, Registry, and Attribute Manipulation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--73cde34a-247f-4ebc-87a5-ab6a9c400f40","relationship_id":"relationship--9e91959a-a90f-4523-8ad3-8b713a919656","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1246","name":"Analytic 1246","guidance":"Detection correlates abnormal installation or modification of root or code-signing certificates, creation/modification of suspicious registry keys for trust providers, and unusual module loads from non-standard locations. Identifies unsigned or improperly signed executables bypassing trust prompts, combined with persistence artifacts.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1246","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"TrustedPublisherList","description":"Baseline list of approved certificate authorities that should not change frequently"},{"field":"FilePathAllowList","description":"Exclusions for legitimate enterprise-signed binaries stored in unusual directories"},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window for registry + file + process activity"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0063","component":"Windows Registry Key Modification","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4657","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1246","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1246","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0063/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1246","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1246","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1246","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1246","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN1247","name":"Analytic 1247","guidance":"Detection monitors extended attribute manipulation (xattr) to strip quarantine or trust metadata, anomalous installation of root certificates in /etc/ssl or /usr/local/share/ca-certificates, and unauthorized modification of system trust stores. Correlates with unexpected process execution involving package managers or custom certificate utilities.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1247","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"CertificatePathList","description":"Paths to monitor for changes depending on distro-specific trust locations"},{"field":"RegexPatterns","description":"Regex patterns for suspicious use of xattr or openssl parameters"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0059","component":"File Metadata","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"chmod, chown, setxattr, or file writes to /etc/ssl/* or /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/*","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1247","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1247","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0059/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"auditd:EXECVE","channel":"Process execution of update-ca-certificates or openssl with suspicious arguments","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN1247","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1247","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]},{"id":"AN1248","name":"Analytic 1248","guidance":"Detection monitors modification of code signing attributes, Gatekeeper/quarantine flags, and insertion of new trust certificates via security add-trusted-cert. Identifies adversary use of xattr to strip quarantine flags from downloaded binaries. Correlates with abnormal module loads bypassing SIP protections.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1248","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"QuarantineBypassAllowList","description":"List of enterprise apps where quarantine flag removal is expected"},{"field":"CertificateAuthorityList","description":"Baseline trusted root and intermediate CAs for comparison"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0059","component":"File Metadata","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"New certificate trust settings added by unexpected process","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1248","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1248","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0059/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"xattr -d com.apple.quarantine or similar removal commands","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1248","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1248","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"macos:osquery","channel":"Unsigned or ad-hoc signed process executions in user contexts","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1248","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0452#AN1248","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","tag":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S9008","name":"Shai-Hulud","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9008","kind":"malware","description":"[Shai-Hulud](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9008) has suppressed victim NPM warnings using `process[“exit’](0x0);` which results in having all errors exit with code 0.(Citation: Socket Shai-Hulud November 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--99bed0a8-e2af-40ef-bcf4-45792749f15f","references":[{"source_name":"Socket Shai-Hulud November 2025","description":"Socket Research Team. (2025, November 24). Shai Hulud Strikes Again (v2). Retrieved April 9, 2026.","url":"https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-v2"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0001","name":"Axiom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) has used digital certificates to deliver malware.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)","relationship_id":"relationship--64aa92d9-abdb-494c-8646-8548aa7c25a5","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta-Axiom","description":"Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20230115144216/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1024","name":"Restrict Registry Permissions","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1024","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.","relationship_id":"relationship--a152969e-2530-4cb7-acdf-f93b138116d0","references":[]},{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.","relationship_id":"relationship--764f3883-da8b-421d-96ed-e14878bcc72e","references":[]},{"id":"M1028","name":"Operating System Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1028","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Windows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the <code>Flags</code> value of <code>HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\ProtectedRoots</code> can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--1c0ec3cf-8942-4d47-b1ac-dfdaca31bac0","references":[{"source_name":"SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017","description":"Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.","url":"https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec"}]},{"id":"M1038","name":"Execution Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1038","kind":"course-of-action","description":"System settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store (or other legitimate repositories) which can help mitigate some of these issues. Also enable application control solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious content.","relationship_id":"relationship--15b9b22e-7896-4219-8ec9-59b099644a6f","references":[]},{"id":"M1054","name":"Software Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1054","kind":"course-of-action","description":"HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)","relationship_id":"relationship--d9c08e10-909d-46d0-aa15-b99d1487be62","references":[{"source_name":"Wikipedia HPKP","description":"Wikipedia. (2017, February 28). HTTP Public Key Pinning. Retrieved March 31, 2017.","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1222":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1222/","T1112":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1112/","T1553":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1553/","T1557":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1557/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1553","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}}]}}