{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1550.003","id":"T1550.003","name":"Pass the Ticket","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"d370314b62c6efdfeae98b4b10a8c1ed20fa05111d0f27bca233ffa3769a275d","description":"Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nWhen preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nA [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nA [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)\n\nAdversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, \"overpassing the hash\" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003","external_id":"T1550.003"},{"source_name":"Campbell 2014","description":"Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf"},{"source_name":"GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket","description":"Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210515214027/https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"},{"source_name":"ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks","description":"Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=556"},{"source_name":"Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash","description":"Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.","url":"https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/"}],"platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1550","id":"T1550","name":"Use Alternate Authentication Material","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["lateral-movement"],"platforms":["Containers","IaaS","Identity Provider","Linux","Office Suite","SaaS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","identity","onprem","saas"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1550/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls"],"telemetry_tags":["Application Log Content","Logon Session Creation","Process Creation","User Account Authentication","User Account Metadata","Web Credential Usage"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","tag":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","tag":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0013","name":"User Account Metadata","tag":"User Account Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0013/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0007","name":"Web Credential Usage","tag":"Web Credential Usage","page":"telemetry/DC0007/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1550/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":4,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":7,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0084","name":"Active Directory Credential Request","page":"telemetry/DC0084/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Directory authentication service requests, such as Kerberos ticket requests.","collection_focus":"Enable the relevant Account Logon subcategories on DCs, including Kerberos Authentication Service and Service Ticket Operations; preserve service/account, encryption and result.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"},{"name":"Active Directory domain controllers","scope":"Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.","source_id":"ad"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","service_principal","request_type","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0084","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"lab-user","service_principal":"cifs/lab-server.example.test","request_type":"service_ticket","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Creation of a logon session with account and logon-type context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","logon_id","logon_type","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"One process opening or accessing another process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_process_id","target_process_id","granted_access","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Identity and SaaS","description":"Authentication attempts and outcomes for a user or workload account.","collection_focus":"Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","scope":"Interactive, non-interactive and workload sign-in contexts, subject to tenant features and access.","source_id":"entra"},{"name":"Cloud identity service audit","scope":"Issuer-side credential and administrative events where the service supports them.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Application audit instrumentation","scope":"Application-side use of identities and sessions; design fields without raw tokens.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.","Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.","Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","application","result","reason","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.","sources":[{"id":"entra","title":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins"},{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per identity and application: first-seen clients/resources, changes in authentication failures and session patterns, and unusual permission changes. Separate automation, travel, shared egress and identity-provider policy changes."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1550.003","id":"T1550.003","name":"Pass the Ticket","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1550.003/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1550.003/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":4,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74","title":"Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"network_connection","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml","author":"Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec","title":"HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"ps_script","definition":"Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_hktl_rubeus.yml","author":"Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"12827a56-61a4-476a-a9cb-f3068f191073","title":"HackTool - KrbRelayUp Execution","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/12827a56-61a4-476a-a9cb-f3068f191073.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_krbrelayup.yml","author":"Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18","title":"HackTool - Rubeus Execution","status":"stable","level":"critical","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_rubeus.yml","author":"Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0352","name":"Detection Strategy for T1550.003 - Pass the Ticket (Windows)","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0352","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--5f53739d-3a41-4f7e-a83d-219a0c64e7a1","relationship_id":"relationship--8c7004e4-8b41-436a-91e5-6b026eeaf062","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1000","name":"Analytic 1000","guidance":"Detects unauthorized Kerberos ticket injection by correlating service ticket (TGS - 4769) requests with absent corresponding account logons (4624) and prior Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT - 4768) activity. Highlights anomalous service ticket generation chains involving unexpected users, hosts, or times, and suspicious injection of tickets via mimikatz-like tooling into LSASS memory. Behavior also includes network lateral movement using Kerberos authentication absent expected interactive logon patterns.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0352#AN1000","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Defines the correlation window between TGT request (4768) and TGS request (4769)"},{"field":"HostContextScope","description":"Adjusts the host scoping for correlation of authentication chains and ticket injection"},{"field":"LSASSAccessAnomalyThreshold","description":"Allows tuning of alerts for ticket injection attempts via LSASS memory access"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4769","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1000","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0352#AN1000","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"},{"component_id":"DC0084","component":"Active Directory Credential Request","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4768","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1000","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0352#AN1000","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0084/"},{"component_id":"DC0067","component":"Logon Session Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4624, 4648","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1000","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0352#AN1000","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0067/"},{"component_id":"DC0035","component":"Process Access","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=10","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1000","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0352#AN1000","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0035/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1000","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0352#AN1000","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0084","name":"Active Directory Credential Request","tag":"Active Directory Credential Request","page":"telemetry/DC0084/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","tag":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","tag":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0002","name":"Mimikatz","page":"tools/S0002/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0192","name":"Pupy","page":"tools/S0192/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S1071","name":"Rubeus","page":"tools/S1071/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["atomic_test"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1550","id":"T1550","name":"Use Alternate Authentication Material","page":"detections/enterprise/T1550/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0002","name":"Mimikatz","page":"tools/S0002/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0192","name":"Pupy","page":"tools/S0192/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S1071","name":"Rubeus","page":"tools/S1071/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["atomic_test"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0002","name":"Mimikatz","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002","kind":"tool","description":"[Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)’s <code>LSADUMP::DCSync</code> and <code>KERBEROS::PTT</code> modules implement the three steps required to extract the krbtgt account hash and create/use Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015)(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)","relationship_id":"relationship--76037b22-a3e4-40d3-bd56-699d1ea4e97e","references":[{"source_name":"AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640"},{"source_name":"Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide","description":"Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821"},{"source_name":"Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015","description":"Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150923020927/http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"},{"source_name":"NCSC Joint Report Public Tools","description":"The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.","url":"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools"}]},{"id":"S0053","name":"SeaDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053","kind":"malware","description":"Some [SeaDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053) samples have a module to use pass the ticket with Kerberos for authentication.(Citation: Symantec Seaduke 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--02a7ea5c-695c-4932-9160-6e0441789670","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Seaduke 2015","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2015, July 13). “Forkmeiamfamous”: Seaduke, latest weapon in the Duke armory. Retrieved July 22, 2015.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150717011546/http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory"}]},{"id":"S0192","name":"Pupy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192","kind":"tool","description":"[Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) can also perform pass-the-ticket.(Citation: GitHub Pupy)","relationship_id":"relationship--9f6c0951-1a78-4738-81ec-a11325a15352","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub Pupy","description":"Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.","url":"https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0016","name":"APT29","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)","relationship_id":"relationship--5de21fc4-c460-4da4-9dc4-2acdd54640a8","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant No Easy Breach","description":"Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/no-easy-breach-derby-con-2016/66447908"}]},{"id":"G0050","name":"APT32","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--c08684c8-8467-4b7f-a9ac-3330cf423261","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017","description":"Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.","url":"https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0060","name":"BRONZE BUTLER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060) has created forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets to maintain administrative access.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--eb91c7d8-2cfb-4d8b-905a-d146bc8178e2","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1015","name":"Active Directory Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1015","kind":"course-of-action","description":"To contain the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) For each domain, change the KRBTGT account password once, force replication, and then change the password a second time. Consider rotating the KRBTGT account password every 180 days.(Citation: STIG krbtgt reset)","relationship_id":"relationship--918a7d67-faea-4a41-9ed3-e3558fca73db","references":[{"source_name":"ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT","description":"Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=483"},{"source_name":"STIG krbtgt reset","description":"UCF. (n.d.). The password for the krbtgt account on a domain must be reset at least every 180 days. Retrieved November 5, 2020.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20240428080127/https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_server_2016/2019-12-12/finding/V-91779"}]},{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems.","relationship_id":"relationship--4ff3969a-4992-43c0-b4dc-02a21f5c9b2b","references":[]},{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)","relationship_id":"relationship--0347a294-8928-4d15-8df2-44452b40afe4","references":[{"source_name":"ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks","description":"Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.","url":"https://adsecurity.org/?p=556"}]},{"id":"M1027","name":"Password Policies","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1027","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords.","relationship_id":"relationship--214b91f3-a71f-45b2-b85a-b1510d947806","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"a2fc4ec5-12c6-4fb4-b661-961f23f359cb","name":"Rubeus Kerberos Pass The Ticket","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":2,"cleanup_defined":false,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1550.003/T1550.003.yaml","description":"Requesting a TGT on a remote system and retrieving it locally before requesting a service ticket with it. This is a Pass-The-Ticket attack because the TGT is obtained on the remote system, then used from a different machine (local).\nPsExec is used to execute commands on the remote system, and the \"C$\" admin share is used to retrieve the TGT, so the current user must have admin rights remotely and other PsExec prerequisites must be met.\n","inputs":{"target":{"description":"Remote system to request the TGT from","type":"string","default":"localhost"},"user_name":{"description":"username associated with the ticket (privileged account not required)","type":"string","default":"Administrator"},"password":{"description":"password for user_name","type":"string","default":"Password"},"domain":{"description":"domain","type":"string","default":"$Env:USERDOMAIN"},"rubeus_url":{"description":"URL of Rubeus executable","type":"url","default":"https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"Rubeus must exist on disk at \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\rubeus.exe\"\n"},{"description":"PsExec must exist on disk at \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\PsExec.exe\"\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"705c473cc1763f6b13cd35daa48227792d2d858fe94b8907c482fcca0e2861db"},{"id":"dbf38128-7ba7-4776-bedf-cc2eed432098","name":"Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":false,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1550.003/T1550.003.yaml","description":"Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos\n","inputs":{"ticket":{"description":"Ticket file name usually format of 'id-username\\@domain.kirbi' (e.g. can be dumped by \"sekurlsa::tickets /export\" module)","type":"string","default":null},"mimikatz_exe":{"description":"Path of the Mimikatz binary","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\bin\\x64\\mimikatz.exe"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"Mimikatz must exist on disk at specified location (#{mimikatz_exe})\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"1da60aec80c02d3d37eac3863d3c5b1a9342dcbb5b0292b0f0f7fc42a34e7c2e"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1078":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1078/","T1003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1003/","T1558.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1558.002/","T1558.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1558.001/","T1550.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1550.002/","T1550.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1550.003/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1550.003","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0084","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"lab-user","service_principal":"cifs/lab-server.example.test","request_type":"service_ticket","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}}]}}
