{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1547.001","id":"T1547.001","name":"Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"3d821d696bb5531b8789c97676e479050b85d635f341e786a1a7f5d352735966","description":"Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n\nRun keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)\n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp</code>.\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> run automatically for the currently logged-on user.\n\nBy default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001","external_id":"T1547.001"},{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016","description":"Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018","description":"Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Run Key","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys"},{"source_name":"Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018","description":"Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.","url":"https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/"},{"source_name":"TechNet Autoruns","description":"Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"}],"platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1547","id":"T1547","name":"Boot or Logon Autostart Execution","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["persistence","privilege-escalation"],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1547/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","some_candidates_require_elevation"],"telemetry_tags":["File Creation","File Modification","Process Creation","Service Metadata","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0041","name":"Service Metadata","tag":"Service Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0041/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1547/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":7,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Change-Point Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#25-change-point-anomaly"},{"title":"Novel-Category Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#85-novel-category-anomaly"},{"title":"Self-Baseline Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#7-self-baseline-anomaly"}]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":["Change-Point Anomaly","Novel-Category Anomaly","Self-Baseline Anomaly"],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":3,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Registry value changes or registry object renames.","collection_focus":"Use RegistryEvent 13 for value-set and 14 for rename; compare against intended policy and keep original type/value where available.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["registry_path","event_type","value_type","value"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1547.001","id":"T1547.001","name":"Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1547.001/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1547.001/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":31,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"318557a5-150c-4c8d-b70e-a9910e199857","title":"File Creation In Suspicious Directory By Msdt.EXE","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"file_event","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/318557a5-150c-4c8d-b70e-a9910e199857.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_msdt_susp_directories.yml","author":"Vadim Varganov, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"92fa78e7-4d39-45f1-91a3-8b23f3f1088d","title":"Potential Startup Shortcut Persistence Via PowerShell.EXE","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"file_event"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/92fa78e7-4d39-45f1-91a3-8b23f3f1088d.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_powershell_startup_shortcuts.yml","author":"Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75","title":"Startup Folder File Write","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"file_event"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_startup_folder_file_write.yml","author":"Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e","title":"Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"file_event"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_startup_folder_persistence.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"74a2b37d-fea4-41e0-9ac7-c9fbcf1f60cc","title":"WinRAR Creating Files in Startup Locations","status":"experimental","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"file_event","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/74a2b37d-fea4-41e0-9ac7-c9fbcf1f60cc.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_winrar_file_creation_in_startup_folder.yml","author":"Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0","title":"Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI","status":"experimental","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_autorun_registry_modified_via_wmic.yml","author":"Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"de587dce-915e-4218-aac4-835ca6af6f70","title":"Potential Persistence Attempt Via Run Keys Using Reg.EXE","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/de587dce-915e-4218-aac4-835ca6af6f70.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_add_run_key.yml","author":"Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"24357373-078f-44ed-9ac4-6d334a668a11","title":"Direct Autorun Keys Modification","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/24357373-078f-44ed-9ac4-6d334a668a11.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_direct_asep_registry_keys_modification.yml","author":"Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"c2c76b77-32be-4d1f-82c9-7e544bdfe0eb","title":"Potential Suspicious Activity Using SeCEdit","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/c2c76b77-32be-4d1f-82c9-7e544bdfe0eb.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_secedit_execution.yml","author":"Janantha Marasinghe","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818","title":"User Shell Folders Registry Modification via CommandLine","status":"experimental","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_user_shell_folders_registry_modification.yml","author":"Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"f663a6d9-9d1b-49b8-b2b1-0637914d199a","title":"Narrator's Feedback-Hub Persistence","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"registry_event","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/f663a6d9-9d1b-49b8-b2b1-0637914d199a.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_narrator_feedback_persistance.yml","author":"Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"9c5037d1-c568-49b3-88c7-9846a5bdc2be","title":"Suspicious Run Key from Download","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"registry_event","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/9c5037d1-c568-49b3-88c7-9846a5bdc2be.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_download_run_key.yml","author":"Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poude (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"9df5f547-c86a-433e-b533-f2794357e242","title":"Classes Autorun Keys Modification","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"registry_set","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/9df5f547-c86a-433e-b533-f2794357e242.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_classes.yml","author":"Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"f59c3faf-50f3-464b-9f4c-1b67ab512d99","title":"Common Autorun Keys 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(2022, March 23). Mustang Panda’s Hodur: Old tricks, new Korplug variant. Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/23/mustang-panda-hodur-old-tricks-new-korplug-variant/"},{"source_name":"CIRCL PlugX March 2013","description":"Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"http://circl.lu/assets/files/tr-12/tr-12-circl-plugx-analysis-v1.pdf"},{"source_name":"DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024","description":"DOJ. (2024, December 20). Mag. No. 24-mj-1387 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AN APPLICATION  FOR A NINTH SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT- IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH AND  SEIZURE OF COMPUTERS IN THE  UNITED STATES INFECTED WITH  PLUGX MALWARE . Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/media/1384136/dl"},{"source_name":"EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugX","description":"EclecticIQ Threat Research Team. (2023, February 2). Mustang Panda APT Group Uses European Commission-Themed Lure to Deliver PlugX Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://blog.eclecticiq.com/mustang-panda-apt-group-uses-european-commission-themed-lure-to-deliver-plugx-malware"},{"source_name":"PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017","description":"PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.","url":"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-uk-operation-cloud-hopper-technical-annex-april-2017.pdf"},{"source_name":"Sophos Mustang Panda PLUGX","description":"Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, September 8). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets Government Officials. Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-president-targets-government-officials"},{"source_name":"Lastline PlugX Analysis","description":"Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015.","url":"https://lastline3.rssing.com/chan-29044929/all_p1.html#c29044929a2"}]},{"id":"S0015","name":"Ixeshe","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0015","kind":"malware","description":"[Ixeshe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0015) can achieve persistence by adding itself to the <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> Registry key.(Citation: Trend Micro IXESHE 2012)","relationship_id":"relationship--4ad60c58-2665-4c4b-a9e8-5cd0042e45bb","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro IXESHE 2012","description":"Sancho, D., et al. (2012, May 22). IXESHE An APT Campaign. Retrieved June 7, 2019.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0018","name":"Sykipot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018","kind":"malware","description":"[Sykipot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.(Citation: Blasco 2013)","relationship_id":"relationship--c1421d39-cb5d-4bac-a931-9c641066c0fd","references":[{"source_name":"Blasco 2013","description":"Blasco, J. (2013, March 21). New Sykipot developments &#91;Blog&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments"}]},{"id":"S0028","name":"SHIPSHAPE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0028","kind":"malware","description":"[SHIPSHAPE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0028) achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.(Citation: FireEye APT30)","relationship_id":"relationship--093215eb-4edb-4c55-bb5f-b8ca2de7962c","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT30","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0030","name":"Carbanak","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030","kind":"malware","description":"[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--9c12e724-5f3e-4209-961e-481ec22a5ab6","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye CARBANAK June 2017","description":"Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html"}]},{"id":"S0031","name":"BACKSPACE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0031","kind":"malware","description":"[BACKSPACE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0031) achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.(Citation: FireEye APT30)","relationship_id":"relationship--80aab758-d3fc-4380-b114-e552bdace832","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT30","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0032","name":"gh0st RAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032","kind":"malware","description":"[gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) has added a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)(Citation: Gh0stRAT ATT March 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--ab2b2cd2-9f20-4497-a6d3-ef1698809779","references":[{"source_name":"Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018","description":"Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/"},{"source_name":"Gh0stRAT ATT March 2019","description":"Quinn, J. (2019, March 25). The odd case of a Gh0stRAT variant. Retrieved July 15, 2020.","url":"https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/the-odd-case-of-a-gh0strat-variant"}]},{"id":"S0034","name":"NETEAGLE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0034","kind":"malware","description":"The \"SCOUT\" variant of [NETEAGLE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0034) achieves persistence by adding itself to the <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> Registry key.(Citation: FireEye APT30)","relationship_id":"relationship--617fe29d-ac48-4cd0-ae8c-19cf7cfdbedd","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT30","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0035","name":"SPACESHIP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0035","kind":"malware","description":"[SPACESHIP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0035) achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.(Citation: FireEye APT30)","relationship_id":"relationship--689c51b8-7e41-474e-abf6-ffdde0acc40b","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT30","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0036","name":"FLASHFLOOD","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0036","kind":"malware","description":"[FLASHFLOOD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0036) achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.(Citation: FireEye APT30)","relationship_id":"relationship--3ebad12d-fd33-4289-93dc-1f5af5e90b66","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT30","description":"FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/05/20081935/rpt-apt30.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0044","name":"JHUHUGIT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044","kind":"malware","description":"[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)","relationship_id":"relationship--5d0263d9-ddd3-4195-96ae-e340caef9e0e","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Sednit Part 1","description":"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 1: Approaching the Target. Retrieved November 8, 2016.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0045","name":"ADVSTORESHELL","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045","kind":"malware","description":"[ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045) achieves persistence by adding itself to the <code>HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> Registry key.(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)(Citation: Bitdefender APT28 Dec 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--284ffb1b-ad42-468e-9897-94c25024f0d4","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Sofacy","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.","url":"https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/"},{"source_name":"ESET Sednit Part 2","description":"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"},{"source_name":"Bitdefender APT28 Dec 2015","description":"Bitdefender. (2015, December). APT28 Under the Scope. Retrieved February 23, 2017.","url":"https://download.bitdefender.com/resources/media/materials/white-papers/en/Bitdefender_In-depth_analysis_of_APT28%E2%80%93The_Political_Cyber-Espionage.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0046","name":"CozyCar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046","kind":"malware","description":"One persistence mechanism used by [CozyCar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046) is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys: <br><code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code> <br><code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code> <br><code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code> <br><code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>(Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)","relationship_id":"relationship--327a64df-b405-453b-83d2-528d17e8df51","references":[{"source_name":"F-Secure CozyDuke","description":"F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.","url":"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke"}]},{"id":"S0053","name":"SeaDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053","kind":"malware","description":"[SeaDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053) is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.(Citation: Unit 42 SeaDuke 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--bcdbb8dc-87e5-4f29-8ff2-d660e53015cb","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 SeaDuke 2015","description":"Grunzweig, J.. (2015, July 14). Unit 42 Technical Analysis: Seaduke. Retrieved August 3, 2016.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/"}]},{"id":"S0058","name":"SslMM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0058","kind":"malware","description":"To establish persistence, [SslMM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0058) identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an “Office Start,” “Yahoo Talk,” “MSN Gaming Z0ne,” or “MSN Talk” shortcut.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--8904bd95-4844-4fe4-b6b6-47e4a4f8d85d","references":[{"source_name":"Baumgartner Naikon 2015","description":"Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0062","name":"DustySky","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062","kind":"malware","description":"[DustySky](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062) achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in <code>HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>.(Citation: DustySky)","relationship_id":"relationship--9a7ff784-436b-40c5-bfb0-25e02e1d9940","references":[{"source_name":"DustySky","description":"ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.","url":"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0070","name":"HTTPBrowser","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070","kind":"malware","description":"[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) has established persistence by setting the <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> key value for <code>wdm</code> to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry <code>HKEY_USERS\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run vpdn “%ALLUSERPROFILE%\\%APPDATA%\\vpdn\\VPDN_LU.exe”</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ZScaler Hacking Team)(Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis)","relationship_id":"relationship--259b878f-147e-443b-8360-aabc00cf6d73","references":[{"source_name":"ZScaler Hacking Team","description":"Desai, D.. (2015, August 14). Chinese cyber espionage APT group leveraging recently leaked Hacking Team exploits to target a Financial Services Firm. Retrieved January 26, 2016.","url":"http://research.zscaler.com/2015/08/chinese-cyber-espionage-apt-group.html"},{"source_name":"ThreatStream Evasion Analysis","description":"Shelmire, A.. (2015, July 6). Evasive Maneuvers. Retrieved January 22, 2016.","url":"https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop"}]},{"id":"S0074","name":"Sakula","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0074","kind":"malware","description":"Most [Sakula](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0074) samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key <code>SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code> in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.(Citation: Dell Sakula)","relationship_id":"relationship--384c75e4-04e7-4ff8-9da6-0c8a03cb7a61","references":[{"source_name":"Dell Sakula","description":"Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.","url":"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/"}]},{"id":"S0080","name":"Mivast","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0080","kind":"malware","description":"[Mivast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0080) creates the following Registry entry: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Micromedia</code>.(Citation: Symantec Backdoor.Mivast)","relationship_id":"relationship--5ab3897a-4f37-4b59-99ca-f39605cb1a35","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Backdoor.Mivast","description":"Stama, D.. (2015, February 6). Backdoor.Mivast. Retrieved February 15, 2016.","url":"http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-020623-0740-99&tabid=2"}]},{"id":"S0081","name":"Elise","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081","kind":"malware","description":"If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of [Elise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081) establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\svchost : %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Network\\svchost.exe</code>. Other variants have set the following Registry keys for persistence: <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\imejp : [self]</code> and <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\IAStorD</code>.(Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--f696324d-7fb4-44ca-82dd-3385b55fbb80","references":[{"source_name":"Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018","description":"Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165226/https://www.accenture.com/t20180127T003755Z_w_/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-46/Accenture-Security-Dragonfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf"},{"source_name":"Lotus Blossom Jun 2015","description":"Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.","url":"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"}]},{"id":"S0082","name":"Emissary","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0082","kind":"malware","description":"Variants of [Emissary](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0082) have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Emissary Trojan Feb 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--0040fdbd-ec7e-49b3-b715-c8c91e08666b","references":[{"source_name":"Emissary Trojan Feb 2016","description":"Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/"}]},{"id":"S0085","name":"S-Type","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0085","kind":"malware","description":"[S-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0085) may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key <code>HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}</code>.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)","relationship_id":"relationship--d067b113-4584-419f-860b-d3184f734350","references":[{"source_name":"Cylance Dust Storm","description":"Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.","url":"https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0087","name":"Hi-Zor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0087","kind":"malware","description":"[Hi-Zor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0087) creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Fidelis INOCNATION)","relationship_id":"relationship--4f08676f-51c1-4cb5-94a7-08922e4886c6","references":[{"source_name":"Fidelis INOCNATION","description":"Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2015, December 16). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1020: Dissecting the Malware Involved in the INOCNATION Campaign. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://fidelissecurity.com/resource/report/fidelis-threat-advisory-1020-dissecting-the-malware-involved-in-the-inocnation-campaign/"}]},{"id":"S0088","name":"Kasidet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0088","kind":"malware","description":"[Kasidet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0088) creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Zscaler Kasidet)(Citation: Microsoft Kasidet)","relationship_id":"relationship--828afc32-9874-40aa-b752-315c7623ffee","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler Kasidet","description":"Yadav, A., et al. (2016, January 29). Malicious Office files dropping Kasidet and Dridex. Retrieved March 24, 2016.","url":"http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Kasidet","description":"Manuel, J. and Plantado, R.. (2015, August 9). Win32/Kasidet. Retrieved March 24, 2016.","url":"http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2FKasidet"}]},{"id":"S0089","name":"BlackEnergy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089","kind":"malware","description":"The [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--cd2a7854-1339-4f40-8ba1-be032dc5249e","references":[{"source_name":"F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014","description":"F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.","url":"https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0090","name":"Rover","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090","kind":"malware","description":"[Rover](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090) persists by creating a Registry entry in <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code>.(Citation: Palo Alto Rover)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f5d3626-1dc2-4ebe-ba37-3f86ab0df9ec","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Rover","description":"Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"}]},{"id":"S0093","name":"Backdoor.Oldrea","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093","kind":"malware","description":"[Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--087721ee-6643-4453-8a76-8768ced7e506","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Dragonfly","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.","url":"https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments"},{"source_name":"Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021","description":"Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.","url":"https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0094","name":"Trojan.Karagany","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094","kind":"malware","description":"[Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--57e1f6b0-7fbd-49b4-8f5d-876b759437ac","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Dragonfly","description":"Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.","url":"https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments"},{"source_name":"Secureworks Karagany July 2019","description":"Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector"}]},{"id":"S0113","name":"Prikormka","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113","kind":"malware","description":"[Prikormka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113) adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.(Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)","relationship_id":"relationship--c5fa4766-4468-4afd-9b5f-5ce4f443729d","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Operation Groundbait","description":"Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0115","name":"Crimson","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115","kind":"malware","description":"[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) can add Registry run keys for persistence.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--3216e004-d8fe-4475-a107-8c3ad92f0fd8","references":[{"source_name":"Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016","description":"Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"},{"source_name":"Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020","description":"Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/"}]},{"id":"S0124","name":"Pisloader","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124","kind":"malware","description":"[Pisloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0124) establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.(Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)","relationship_id":"relationship--02a629d3-b970-43e8-a11b-79f35107a4c0","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto DNS Requests","description":"Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved August 17, 2016.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/"}]},{"id":"S0127","name":"BBSRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127","kind":"malware","description":"[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\ssonsvr.exe</code>.","relationship_id":"relationship--4af1ec66-5007-49df-8a10-df2c8ed7edc8","references":[]},{"id":"S0128","name":"BADNEWS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128","kind":"malware","description":"[BADNEWS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128) installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)","relationship_id":"relationship--8c359d18-06fc-4db1-9b58-6e85fa563066","references":[{"source_name":"Forcepoint Monsoon","description":"Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.","url":"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0131","name":"TINYTYPHON","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0131","kind":"malware","description":"[TINYTYPHON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0131) installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)","relationship_id":"relationship--753f9861-f0b8-4467-ac5e-4457bd350095","references":[{"source_name":"Forcepoint Monsoon","description":"Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.","url":"https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0136","name":"USBStealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136","kind":"malware","description":"[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name \"USB Disk Security.\"(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--5b686a7c-4fcd-44c2-9f57-1d88d6633ef4","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014","description":"Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.","url":"http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/"}]},{"id":"S0137","name":"CORESHELL","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0137","kind":"malware","description":"[CORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0137) has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19)","relationship_id":"relationship--dcc2c503-25dc-47bb-b9cb-35ce27e73cd2","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft SIR Vol 19","description":"Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.","url":"http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_English.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0139","name":"PowerDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0139","kind":"malware","description":"[PowerDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0139) achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.(Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--f0b00a47-9d63-4d05-b771-022a21a4ed06","references":[{"source_name":"Volexity PowerDuke November 2016","description":"Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.","url":"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"}]},{"id":"S0141","name":"Winnti for Windows","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141","kind":"malware","description":"[Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) can add a service named <code>wind0ws</code> to the Registry to achieve persistence after reboot.(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--5bd58ef1-ad36-47ac-91e5-4e7df618dd87","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta Winnti April 2015","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150412223949/http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0144","name":"ChChes","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0144","kind":"malware","description":"[ChChes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0144) establishes persistence by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--2e44b66a-0f81-4f60-94aa-c450556bc243","references":[{"source_name":"PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017","description":"PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.","url":"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-uk-operation-cloud-hopper-technical-annex-april-2017.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0145","name":"POWERSOURCE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145","kind":"malware","description":"[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--afa1f53f-abd9-4e57-b4e1-4e161dd34e9b","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017","description":"Brumaghin, E. and Grady, C.. (2017, March 2). Covert Channels and Poor Decisions: The Tale of DNSMessenger. Retrieved March 8, 2017.","url":"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html"}]},{"id":"S0147","name":"Pteranodon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147","kind":"malware","description":"[Pteranodon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147) copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--44908b0a-993a-4339-b30f-f0f1a64c0753","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017","description":"Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"}]},{"id":"S0148","name":"RTM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148","kind":"malware","description":"[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) tries to add a Registry Run key under the name \"Windows Update\" to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--37dd9a3c-dd52-4541-be7c-b490d026305c","references":[{"source_name":"ESET RTM Feb 2017","description":"Faou, M. and Boutin, J. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0152","name":"EvilGrab","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0152","kind":"malware","description":"[EvilGrab](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0152) adds a Registry Run key for ctfmon.exe to establish persistence.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--cd1e409b-e981-4c83-a9ea-86705a45f92c","references":[{"source_name":"PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017","description":"PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.","url":"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-uk-operation-cloud-hopper-technical-annex-april-2017.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0153","name":"RedLeaves","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0153","kind":"malware","description":"[RedLeaves](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0153) attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--ed2f811d-3258-4489-abe1-57dac4bdbbf8","references":[{"source_name":"Accenture Hogfish April 2018","description":"Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.","url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20220810112638/https:/www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Z_w_/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf"},{"source_name":"PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017","description":"PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.","url":"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-uk-operation-cloud-hopper-technical-annex-april-2017.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0159","name":"SNUGRIDE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0159","kind":"malware","description":"[SNUGRIDE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0159) establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--c75cc595-79d7-4a77-9647-d2323aad93d0","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT10 April 2017","description":"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"}]},{"id":"S0167","name":"Matryoshka","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167","kind":"malware","description":"[Matryoshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.(Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)(Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--4696a49d-caa1-4746-b106-45faf327270b","references":[{"source_name":"ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017","description":"ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017.","url":"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf"},{"source_name":"CopyKittens Nov 2015","description":"Minerva Labs LTD and ClearSky Cyber Security. (2015, November 23). CopyKittens Attack Group. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/1903456/Whitepapers/CopyKittens.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0168","name":"Gazer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0168","kind":"malware","description":"[Gazer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0168) can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--2fb450c6-e236-4b81-b5ac-a9d4be0cf167","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Gazer Aug 2017","description":"ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"},{"source_name":"Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.","url":"https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/"}]},{"id":"S0170","name":"Helminth","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170","kind":"malware","description":"[Helminth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170) establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--2a7cd52f-46e5-4a18-bdf6-4c38edfcb97c","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto OilRig May 2016","description":"Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.","url":"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S0172","name":"Reaver","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172","kind":"malware","description":"[Reaver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0172) creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--3dcf441c-b987-4c6a-93e7-e24ae1e16475","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017","description":"Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/"}]},{"id":"S0178","name":"Truvasys","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0178","kind":"malware","description":"[Truvasys](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0178) adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--55df3b40-b130-4313-9064-6b0fc56564d0","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017","description":"Microsoft. (2017, September 15). Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha. Retrieved November 30, 2017.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha"}]},{"id":"S0182","name":"FinFisher","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182","kind":"malware","description":"[FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182) establishes persistence by creating the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Run</code>.(Citation: FinFisher Citation)(Citation: Microsoft FinFisher March 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f60b67a-c6a5-4855-991e-00ec6fe5f9ac","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft FinFisher March 2018","description":"Allievi, A.,Flori, E. (2018, March 01). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018.","url":"https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/"},{"source_name":"FinFisher Citation","description":"FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20171222050934/http://www.finfisher.com/FinFisher/index.html"}]},{"id":"S0186","name":"DownPaper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0186","kind":"malware","description":"[DownPaper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0186) uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.(Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--82826722-4278-438e-a8d0-5bd9fd117b2b","references":[{"source_name":"ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017","description":"ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.","url":"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0192","name":"Pupy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192","kind":"tool","description":"[Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key <code>SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run</code> for persistence.(Citation: GitHub Pupy)","relationship_id":"relationship--d38177b0-03c0-4c59-afa6-eea94a372daa","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub Pupy","description":"Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.","url":"https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy"}]},{"id":"S0194","name":"PowerSploit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194","kind":"tool","description":"[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194)'s <code>New-UserPersistenceOption</code> Persistence argument can be used to establish via the <code>HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> Registry key.(Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012)(Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)","relationship_id":"relationship--7b06929c-1b23-4efc-9fc1-64552d5fbdb2","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub PowerSploit May 2012","description":"PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.","url":"https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit"},{"source_name":"PowerSploit Documentation","description":"PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.","url":"http://powersploit.readthedocs.io"}]},{"id":"S0196","name":"PUNCHBUGGY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196","kind":"malware","description":"[PUNCHBUGGY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196) has been observed using a Registry Run key.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)(Citation: Morphisec ShellTea June 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--559c0d59-16a7-4c1c-801d-6c8c32ffc5ce","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016","description":"Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy:  New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.","url":"https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html"},{"source_name":"Morphisec ShellTea June 2019","description":"Gorelik, M.. (2019, June 10). SECURITY ALERT: FIN8 IS BACK IN BUSINESS, TARGETING THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY. Retrieved June 13, 2019.","url":"http://blog.morphisec.com/security-alert-fin8-is-back"}]},{"id":"S0198","name":"NETWIRE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198","kind":"malware","description":"[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.(Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015)(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint NETWIRE December 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--06eb051c-74d0-4bbd-8cdf-1018b3c2e748","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Netwire Mar 2015","description":"McAfee. (2015, March 2). Netwire RAT Behind Recent Targeted Attacks. Retrieved February 15, 2018.","url":"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/netwire-rat-behind-recent-targeted-attacks/"},{"source_name":"Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020","description":"Lambert, T. (2020, January 29). Intro to Netwire. Retrieved January 7, 2021.","url":"https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/"},{"source_name":"Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020","description":"Duncan, B. (2020, April 3). GuLoader: Malspam Campaign Installing NetWire RAT. Retrieved January 7, 2021.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/"},{"source_name":"Proofpoint NETWIRE December 2020","description":"Proofpoint. (2020, December 2). Geofenced NetWire Campaigns. Retrieved January 7, 2021.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/geofenced-netwire-campaigns"}]},{"id":"S0199","name":"TURNEDUP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0199","kind":"malware","description":"[TURNEDUP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0199) is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.(Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--f2d1bf8c-6541-40af-8c84-48c7570fb50b","references":[{"source_name":"CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018","description":"Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.","url":"https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/"}]},{"id":"S0204","name":"Briba","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0204","kind":"malware","description":"[Briba](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0204) creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.(Citation: Symantec Briba May 2012)","relationship_id":"relationship--7ae71a39-4f64-4d64-ad3f-885ae7a5c613","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Briba May 2012","description":"Ladley, F. (2012, May 15). Backdoor.Briba. Retrieved February 21, 2018.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-2843-99"}]},{"id":"S0207","name":"Vasport","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0207","kind":"malware","description":"[Vasport](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0207) copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.(Citation: Symantec Vasport May 2012)","relationship_id":"relationship--498c599b-99ed-477d-afe8-2a6714506934","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Vasport May 2012","description":"Zhou, R. (2012, May 15). Backdoor.Vasport. Retrieved February 22, 2018.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-5938-99"}]},{"id":"S0226","name":"Smoke Loader","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0226","kind":"malware","description":"[Smoke Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0226) adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.(Citation: Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--51cc7dff-7fb4-41bc-a67d-39598f14f1d8","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016","description":"Hasherezade. (2016, September 12). Smoke Loader – downloader with a smokescreen still alive. Retrieved March 20, 2018.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/"}]},{"id":"S0228","name":"NanHaiShu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0228","kind":"malware","description":"[NanHaiShu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0228) modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.(Citation: fsecure NanHaiShu July 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--cb69898b-b5e4-407a-964d-a13149accdd7","references":[{"source_name":"fsecure NanHaiShu July 2016","description":"F-Secure Labs. (2016, July). NANHAISHU RATing the South China Sea. Retrieved July 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0235","name":"CrossRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0235","kind":"malware","description":"[CrossRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0235) uses run keys for persistence on Windows.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--8023d964-9013-4f3d-962e-569b799a2991","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018","description":"Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0244","name":"Comnie","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0244","kind":"malware","description":"[Comnie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0244) achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.(Citation: Palo Alto Comnie)","relationship_id":"relationship--d490bb02-7dfc-4808-8109-29a3871f830a","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Comnie","description":"Grunzweig, J. (2018, January 31). Comnie Continues to Target Organizations in East Asia. Retrieved June 7, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-comnie-continues-target-organizations-east-asia/"}]},{"id":"S0247","name":"NavRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0247","kind":"malware","description":"[NavRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0247) creates a Registry key to ensure a file gets executed upon reboot in order to establish persistence.(Citation: Talos NavRAT May 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--b28c7fbf-05c6-4be2-9f17-3dcc722cee7c","references":[{"source_name":"Talos NavRAT May 2018","description":"Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, May 31). NavRAT Uses US-North Korea Summit As Decoy For Attacks In South Korea. Retrieved June 11, 2018.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/navrat.html"}]},{"id":"S0249","name":"Gold Dragon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249","kind":"malware","description":"[Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) establishes persistence in the Startup folder.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)","relationship_id":"relationship--750ca5b8-6142-46c0-9c40-f04dc9036bb9","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Gold Dragon","description":"Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. Retrieved June 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/"}]},{"id":"S0250","name":"Koadic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250","kind":"tool","description":"[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has added persistence to the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` Registry key.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--969e4342-1635-4e0f-8855-47be84cddccf","references":[{"source_name":"MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021","description":"Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20211003035156/https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0251","name":"Zebrocy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251","kind":"malware","description":"[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)(Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--8839b4ad-24cb-4ad3-a407-947f75591973","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018","description":"ESET. (2018, November 20). Sednit: What’s going on with Zebrocy?. Retrieved February 12, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/11/20/sednit-whats-going-zebrocy/"},{"source_name":"ESET Zebrocy May 2019","description":"ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/"},{"source_name":"Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018","description":"Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.","url":"https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50"}]},{"id":"S0253","name":"RunningRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253","kind":"malware","description":"[RunningRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253) adds itself to the Registry key <code>Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> to establish persistence upon reboot.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)","relationship_id":"relationship--7d1d4ffd-7c60-4a83-bcfa-66413bbe7212","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Gold Dragon","description":"Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. Retrieved June 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/gold-dragon-widens-olympics-malware-attacks-gains-permanent-presence-on-victims-systems/"}]},{"id":"S0254","name":"PLAINTEE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0254","kind":"malware","description":"[PLAINTEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0254) gains persistence by adding the Registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--baca2e38-a6fa-430e-a829-7afc5537e45f","references":[{"source_name":"Rancor Unit42 June 2018","description":"Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/"}]},{"id":"S0256","name":"Mosquito","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0256","kind":"malware","description":"[Mosquito](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0256) establishes persistence under the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Run auto_update</code>.(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--e73d4586-569d-4f32-9468-95777d65770a","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018","description":"ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0259","name":"InnaputRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259","kind":"malware","description":"Some [InnaputRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259) variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key <code>HKU\\<SID>\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run:%appdata%\\NeutralApp\\NeutralApp.exe</code>.(Citation: ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--bc7382dc-b2d0-4bd3-9e7d-f49cf17e7fc1","references":[{"source_name":"ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018","description":"ASERT Team. (2018, April 04). Innaput Actors Utilize Remote Access Trojan Since 2016, Presumably Targeting Victim Files. Retrieved July 9, 2018.","url":"https://asert.arbornetworks.com/innaput-actors-utilize-remote-access-trojan-since-2016-presumably-targeting-victim-files/"}]},{"id":"S0260","name":"InvisiMole","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260","kind":"malware","description":"[InvisiMole](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260) can place a lnk file in the Startup Folder to achieve persistence.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--3434121e-a4d6-43a7-b905-78c52f5a12bd","references":[{"source_name":"ESET InvisiMole June 2020","description":"Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0262","name":"QuasarRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262","kind":"tool","description":"If the [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) client process does not have administrator privileges it will add a registry key to `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` for persistence.(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT)(Citation: CISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018) ","relationship_id":"relationship--3e3a5bf5-1e90-45d2-b90a-3b919f5425d5","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018","description":"CISA. (2018, December 18). Analysis Report (AR18-352A) Quasar Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. Retrieved August 1, 2022.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-352A"},{"source_name":"GitHub QuasarRAT","description":"MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018.","url":"https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT"}]},{"id":"S0265","name":"Kazuar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265","kind":"malware","description":"[Kazuar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265) adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.(Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--1cb54b2e-5f2d-4d1b-9fda-9b17f49de65b","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017","description":"Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/"}]},{"id":"S0266","name":"TrickBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266","kind":"malware","description":"[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) establishes persistence in the Startup folder.(Citation: ESET Trickbot Oct 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--e84c3f01-fb77-40e6-8507-42bc500bd928","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Trickbot Oct 2020","description":"Boutin, J. (2020, October 12). ESET takes part in global operation to disrupt Trickbot. Retrieved March 15, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/10/12/eset-takes-part-global-operation-disrupt-trickbot/"}]},{"id":"S0267","name":"FELIXROOT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0267","kind":"malware","description":"[FELIXROOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0267) adds a shortcut file to the startup folder for persistence.(Citation: ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--eaed4cbc-d5d1-4274-af09-62d98ae1afc7","references":[{"source_name":"ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018","description":"Cherepanov, A. (2018, October). GREYENERGY A successor to BlackEnergy. Retrieved November 15, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ESET_GreyEnergy.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0268","name":"Bisonal","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268","kind":"malware","description":"[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) has added itself to the Registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code> for persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) ","relationship_id":"relationship--7b909310-43e8-4870-ab62-d6078f27a785","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018","description":"Hayashi, K., Ray, V. (2018, July 31). Bisonal Malware Used in Attacks Against Russia and South Korea. Retrieved August 7, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/"},{"source_name":"Talos Bisonal Mar 2020","description":"Mercer, W., et al. (2020, March 5). Bisonal: 10 years of play. Retrieved January 26, 2022.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html"}]},{"id":"S0270","name":"RogueRobin","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0270","kind":"malware","description":"[RogueRobin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0270) created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--fe86edf0-d69f-48bc-bdb7-7fd8a8dbcb82","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018","description":"Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/"}]},{"id":"S0330","name":"Zeus Panda","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0330","kind":"malware","description":"[Zeus Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0330) adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.(Citation: Talos Zeus Panda Nov 2017)(Citation: GDATA Zeus Panda June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--db6220f4-9e1c-487c-9b8d-e016565817e3","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Zeus Panda Nov 2017","description":"Brumaghin, E., et al. (2017, November 02). Poisoning the Well: Banking Trojan Targets Google Search Results. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/zeus-panda-campaign.html#More"},{"source_name":"GDATA Zeus Panda June 2017","description":"Ebach, L. (2017, June 22). Analysis Results of Zeus.Variant.Panda. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://cyberwtf.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/panda-whitepaper.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0331","name":"Agent Tesla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331","kind":"malware","description":"[Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331) can add itself to the Registry as a startup program to establish persistence.(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018)(Citation: SentinelLabs Agent Tesla Aug 2020) ","relationship_id":"relationship--0ecaa94b-3ad8-4de5-9cf2-81069676cfa3","references":[{"source_name":"Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018","description":"Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html"},{"source_name":"SentinelLabs Agent Tesla Aug 2020","description":"Walter, J. (2020, August 10). Agent Tesla | Old RAT Uses New Tricks to Stay on Top. Retrieved December 11, 2020.","url":"https://labs.sentinelone.com/agent-tesla-old-rat-uses-new-tricks-to-stay-on-top/"}]},{"id":"S0332","name":"Remcos","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332","kind":"tool","description":"[Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332) can add itself to the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> for persistence.(Citation: Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--1be18787-844d-4135-9781-e5b6a8e76d14","references":[{"source_name":"Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017","description":"Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/remcos-a-new-rat-in-the-wild-2.html"}]},{"id":"S0334","name":"DarkComet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0334","kind":"malware","description":"[DarkComet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0334) adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.(Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)(Citation: Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--aeb0762f-0d0e-43b8-be6f-413f60097e02","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014","description":"TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/DARKCOMET"},{"source_name":"Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018","description":"Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2012/06/you-dirty-rat-part-1-darkcomet/"}]},{"id":"S0336","name":"NanoCore","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336","kind":"malware","description":"[NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336) creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.(Citation: Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--dd417d31-d129-44ac-8a9f-b14b79235dfa","references":[{"source_name":"Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018","description":"Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved September 25, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20240522112705/https://cofense.com/blog/nanocore-rat-resurfaced-sewers/"}]},{"id":"S0337","name":"BadPatch","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0337","kind":"malware","description":"[BadPatch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0337) establishes a foothold by adding a link to the malware executable in the startup folder.(Citation: Unit 42 BadPatch Oct 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--11d37d18-3ad6-41ed-a99e-f1cc9d524c6c","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 BadPatch Oct 2017","description":"Bar, T., Conant, S. (2017, October 20). BadPatch. Retrieved November 13, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-badpatch/"}]},{"id":"S0338","name":"Cobian RAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0338","kind":"malware","description":"[Cobian RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0338) creates an autostart Registry key to ensure persistence.(Citation: Zscaler Cobian Aug 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--22260fda-fb95-4cf4-9e23-ba8662157c1f","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler Cobian Aug 2017","description":"Yadav, A., et al. (2017, August 31). Cobian RAT – A backdoored RAT. Retrieved November 13, 2018.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/cobian-rat-backdoored-rat"}]},{"id":"S0340","name":"Octopus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340","kind":"malware","description":"[Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) achieved persistence by placing a malicious executable in the startup directory and has added the <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> key to the Registry.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--850d1949-38bc-4cb2-be8f-22d249ebfaf5","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Octopus Oct 2018","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018.","url":"https://securelist.com/octopus-infested-seas-of-central-asia/88200/"}]},{"id":"S0341","name":"Xbash","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0341","kind":"malware","description":"[Xbash](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0341) can create a Startup item for persistence if it determines it is on a Windows system.(Citation: Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--3341ad26-c7a8-4e42-a095-a49e65fde843","references":[{"source_name":"Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018","description":"Xiao, C. (2018, September 17). Xbash Combines Botnet, Ransomware, Coinmining in Worm that Targets Linux and Windows. Retrieved November 14, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/"}]},{"id":"S0345","name":"Seasalt","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0345","kind":"malware","description":"[Seasalt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0345) creates a Registry entry to ensure infection after reboot under <code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\currentVersion\\Run</code>.(Citation: McAfee Oceansalt Oct 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--b228cc3b-a428-42e4-b6f3-994fe790e329","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Oceansalt Oct 2018","description":"Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, October 18). ‘Operation Oceansalt’ Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group. Retrieved November 30, 2018.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-operation-oceansalt.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0348","name":"Cardinal RAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0348","kind":"malware","description":"[Cardinal RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0348) establishes Persistence by setting the  <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load</code> Registry key to point to its executable.(Citation: PaloAlto CardinalRat Apr 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--df05fecd-1eee-4139-8090-794a3310b478","references":[{"source_name":"PaloAlto CardinalRat Apr 2017","description":"Grunzweig, J.. (2017, April 20). Cardinal RAT Active for Over Two Years. Retrieved December 8, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-cardinal-rat-active-two-years/"}]},{"id":"S0353","name":"NOKKI","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353","kind":"malware","description":"[NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>.(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--534cf936-84e8-49ff-a616-90267467decd","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018","description":"Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-new-konni-malware-attacking-eurasia-southeast-asia/"}]},{"id":"S0355","name":"Final1stspy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0355","kind":"malware","description":"[Final1stspy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0355) creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--11471266-5136-4cd8-a1ef-d847f33ab6de","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018","description":"Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/"}]},{"id":"S0356","name":"KONNI","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356","kind":"malware","description":"A version of [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has dropped a Windows shortcut into the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--475d30ee-999c-470c-b4b3-eed40d1db799","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Konni May 2017","description":"Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html"}]},{"id":"S0363","name":"Empire","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363","kind":"tool","description":"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) can modify the registry run keys <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> for persistence.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)","relationship_id":"relationship--6cc7fc62-740a-47c4-988c-bdd9c5880c3f","references":[{"source_name":"Github PowerShell Empire","description":"Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.","url":"https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire"}]},{"id":"S0367","name":"Emotet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367","kind":"malware","description":"[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) has been observed adding the downloaded payload to the <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> key to maintain persistence.(Citation: Symantec Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018)(Citation: Picus Emotet Dec 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--3236ca50-2342-455a-b258-6a085cae8fc2","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Emotet Jul 2018","description":"Symantec. (2018, July 18). The Evolution of Emotet: From Banking Trojan to Threat Distributor. Retrieved March 25, 2019.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/evolution-emotet-trojan-distributor"},{"source_name":"US-CERT Emotet Jul 2018","description":"US-CERT. (2018, July 20). Alert (TA18-201A) Emotet Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A"},{"source_name":"Picus Emotet Dec 2018","description":"Özarslan, S. (2018, December 21). The Christmas Card you never wanted - A new wave of Emotet is back to wreak havoc. Retrieved March 25, 2019.","url":"https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/the-christmas-card-you-never-wanted-a-new-wave-of-emotet-is-back-to-wreak-havoc.html"}]},{"id":"S0371","name":"POWERTON","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0371","kind":"malware","description":"[POWERTON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0371) can install a Registry Run key for persistence.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)","relationship_id":"relationship--e4465d76-d212-4f14-8493-c9c5d7c8a6f4","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT33 Guardrail","description":"Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html"}]},{"id":"S0373","name":"Astaroth","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373","kind":"malware","description":"[Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) creates a startup item for persistence. (Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--e772ce2d-bc2b-4e7f-af67-700737c75d2c","references":[{"source_name":"Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018","description":"Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved September 25, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200302071436/https://cofense.com/seeing-resurgence-demonic-astaroth-wmic-trojan/"}]},{"id":"S0375","name":"Remexi","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0375","kind":"malware","description":"[Remexi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0375) utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: Securelist Remexi Jan 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--64f1da46-93a7-4e70-8702-801dbaf26206","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Remexi Jan 2019","description":"Legezo, D. (2019, January 30). Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities. Retrieved April 17, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538/"}]},{"id":"S0381","name":"FlawedAmmyy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381","kind":"malware","description":"[FlawedAmmyy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381) has established persistence via the `HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run` registry key.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--442ff7a8-149b-4d26-933a-033ba25b9838","references":[{"source_name":"Korean FSI TA505 2020","description":"Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.","url":"https://www.fsec.or.kr/user/bbs/fsec/163/344/bbsDataView/1382.do?page=1&column=&search=&searchSDate=&searchEDate=&bbsDataCategory="}]},{"id":"S0382","name":"ServHelper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0382","kind":"malware","description":"[ServHelper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0382) may attempt to establish persistence via the <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code> run key.(Citation: Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--62bf46b4-69b3-4a32-bcbb-c9d960e3039a","references":[{"source_name":"Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019","description":"Vilkomir-Preisman, S. (2019, April 2). New ServHelper Variant Employs Excel 4.0 Macro to Drop Signed Payload. Retrieved September 16, 2024..","url":"https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/new-servhelper-variant-employs-excel-4-0-macro-to-drop-signed-payload"}]},{"id":"S0385","name":"njRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385","kind":"malware","description":"[njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385) has added persistence via the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code> and dropped a shortcut in <code>%STARTUP%</code>.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--85482d65-d2ac-4d79-8ee4-da653e73aa8f","references":[{"source_name":"Fidelis njRAT June 2013","description":"Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2013, June 28). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1009: \"njRAT\" Uncovered. Retrieved June 4, 2019.","url":"https://www.threatminer.org/_reports/2013/fta-1009---njrat-uncovered-1.pdf"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro njRAT 2018","description":"Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/autoit-compiled-worm-affecting-removable-media-delivers-fileless-version-of-bladabindi-njrat-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S0386","name":"Ursnif","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386","kind":"malware","description":"[Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.(Citation: TrendMicro PE_URSNIF.A2)(Citation: TrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM)","relationship_id":"relationship--084fc3bc-5e50-47fb-97d1-75fa00b6ed79","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro PE_URSNIF.A2","description":"Trend Micro. (2014, December 11). PE_URSNIF.A2. Retrieved June 5, 2019.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/PE_URSNIF.A2?_ga=2.131425807.1462021705.1559742358-1202584019.1549394279"},{"source_name":"TrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM","description":"Sioting, S. (2013, June 15). BKDR_URSNIF.SM. Retrieved June 5, 2019.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/BKDR_URSNIF.SM?_ga=2.129468940.1462021705.1559742358-1202584019.1549394279"}]},{"id":"S0389","name":"JCry","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389","kind":"malware","description":"[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) has created payloads in the Startup directory to maintain persistence. (Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--1ffba98c-788b-47e0-a67c-9d3700e86ec5","references":[{"source_name":"Carbon Black JCry May 2019","description":"Lee, S.. (2019, May 14). JCry Ransomware. Retrieved June 18, 2019.","url":"https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/05/14/cb-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-jcry-ransomware-pretends-to-be-adobe-flash-player-update-installer/"}]},{"id":"S0396","name":"EvilBunny","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0396","kind":"malware","description":"[EvilBunny](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0396) has created Registry keys for persistence in <code>[HKLM|HKCU]\\…\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>.(Citation: Cyphort EvilBunny Dec 2014)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--030958f2-615b-4c80-a1ec-38ed335da413","references":[{"source_name":"Cyphort EvilBunny Dec 2014","description":"Marschalek, M.. (2014, December 16). EvilBunny: Malware Instrumented By Lua. Retrieved June 28, 2019.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150311013500/http://www.cyphort.com/evilbunny-malware-instrumented-lua/"}]},{"id":"S0397","name":"LoJax","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0397","kind":"malware","description":"[LoJax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0397) has modified the Registry key <code>‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute’</code> from <code>‘autocheck autochk *’</code> to <code>‘autocheck autoche *’</code> in order to execute its payload during Windows startup.(Citation: ESET LoJax Sept 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--3f4700e6-71a4-4995-b173-00974a528905","references":[{"source_name":"ESET LoJax Sept 2018","description":"ESET. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved July 2, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0409","name":"Machete","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409","kind":"malware","description":"[Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) used the startup folder for persistence.(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--7e6995cc-c917-4ac7-84e1-5dbf661f29cd","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Machete Aug 2014","description":"Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/el-machete/66108/"},{"source_name":"Cylance Machete Mar 2017","description":"The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019.","url":"https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html"}]},{"id":"S0414","name":"BabyShark","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0414","kind":"malware","description":"[BabyShark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0414) has added a Registry key to ensure all future macros are enabled for Microsoft Word and Excel as well as for additional persistence.(Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)","relationship_id":"relationship--ab322e5c-dfd2-45dd-bee1-59aec9d1d840","references":[{"source_name":"CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky","description":"CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a"},{"source_name":"Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019","description":"Unit 42. (2019, February 22). New BabyShark Malware Targets U.S. National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved October 7, 2019.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/"}]},{"id":"S0417","name":"GRIFFON","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0417","kind":"malware","description":"[GRIFFON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0417) has used a persistence module that stores the implant inside the Registry, which executes at logon.(Citation: SecureList Griffon May 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--bdbd9cce-7d32-4e87-8036-3e602a3783b9","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList Griffon May 2019","description":"Namestnikov, Y. and Aime, F. (2019, May 8). FIN7.5: the infamous cybercrime rig “FIN7” continues its activities. Retrieved October 11, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/fin7-5-the-infamous-cybercrime-rig-fin7-continues-its-activities/90703/"}]},{"id":"S0428","name":"PoetRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428","kind":"malware","description":"[PoetRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0428) has added a registry key in the <RUN> hive for persistence.(Citation: Talos PoetRAT April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--e7f60c3a-5b9e-4175-8bac-72773f580dad","references":[{"source_name":"Talos PoetRAT April 2020","description":"Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html"}]},{"id":"S0433","name":"Rifdoor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0433","kind":"malware","description":"[Rifdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0433) has created a new registry entry at <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Graphics</code> with a value of <code>C:\\ProgramData\\Initech\\Initech.exe /run</code>.(Citation: Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--52d12577-199c-41a6-92d6-28d26c023aea","references":[{"source_name":"Carbon Black HotCroissant April 2020","description":"Knight, S.. (2020, April 16). VMware Carbon Black TAU Threat Analysis: The Evolution of Lazarus. Retrieved May 1, 2020.","url":"https://www.carbonblack.com/2020/04/16/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-the-evolution-of-lazarus/"}]},{"id":"S0439","name":"Okrum","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0439","kind":"malware","description":"[Okrum](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0439) establishes persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019) ","relationship_id":"relationship--cab93d90-f8de-4bb3-8868-11b8d9a2ddf9","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Okrum July 2019","description":"Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ESET_Okrum_and_Ketrican.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0441","name":"PowerShower","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0441","kind":"malware","description":"[PowerShower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0441) sets up persistence with a Registry run key.(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--79bae99a-8480-4857-834b-fa823adca4c6","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Inception November 2018","description":"Lancaster, T. (2018, November 5). Inception Attackers Target Europe with Year-old Office Vulnerability. Retrieved May 8, 2020.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-inception-attackers-target-europe-year-old-office-vulnerability/"}]},{"id":"S0442","name":"VBShower","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0442","kind":"malware","description":"[VBShower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0442) used <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\\\[a-f0-9A-F]{8}</code> to maintain persistence.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--9cf55e84-53d2-4ec9-aaed-1df38ea08af1","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019","description":"GReAT. (2019, August 12). Recent Cloud Atlas activity. Retrieved May 8, 2020.","url":"https://securelist.com/recent-cloud-atlas-activity/92016/"}]},{"id":"S0444","name":"ShimRat","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0444","kind":"malware","description":"[ShimRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0444) has installed a registry based start-up key <code>HKCU\\Software\\microsoft\\windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> to maintain persistence should other methods fail.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)","relationship_id":"relationship--6435caf7-2493-4cfb-9ddc-2f672c220251","references":[{"source_name":"FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang","description":"Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.","url":"https://foxitsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/fox-it_mofang_threatreport_tlp-white.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0446","name":"Ryuk","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446","kind":"malware","description":"[Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--e168a29f-c975-4ae9-8ab9-470bb03ae706","references":[{"source_name":"CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019","description":"Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/"}]},{"id":"S0449","name":"Maze","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0449","kind":"malware","description":"[Maze](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0449) has created a file named \"startup_vrun.bat\" in the Startup folder of a virtual machine to establish persistence.(Citation: Sophos Maze VM September 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--1075f27d-8675-4819-b23b-50d390092c95","references":[{"source_name":"Sophos Maze VM September 2020","description":"Brandt, A., Mackenzie, P.. (2020, September 17). Maze Attackers Adopt Ragnar Locker Virtual Machine Technique. Retrieved October 9, 2020.","url":"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/09/17/maze-attackers-adopt-ragnar-locker-virtual-machine-technique/"}]},{"id":"S0455","name":"Metamorfo","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455","kind":"malware","description":"[Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has configured persistence to the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\\Spotify\\Spotify.exe</code> and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.(Citation: Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020)(Citation: FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018)(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--4be5482c-2a58-41af-a7d7-477c596b4622","references":[{"source_name":"Medium Metamorfo Apr 2020","description":"Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.","url":"https://medium.com/@chenerlich/the-avast-abuser-metamorfo-banking-malware-hides-by-abusing-avast-executable-ac9b8b392767"},{"source_name":"ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019","description":"ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/03/casbaneiro-trojan-dangerous-cooking/"},{"source_name":"FireEye Metamorfo Apr 2018","description":"Sierra, E., Iglesias, G.. (2018, April 24). Metamorfo Campaigns Targeting Brazilian Users. Retrieved July 30, 2020.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/04/metamorfo-campaign-targeting-brazilian-users.html"},{"source_name":"Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020","description":"Zhang, X. (2020, February 4). Another Metamorfo Variant Targeting Customers of Financial Institutions in More Countries. Retrieved July 30, 2020.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/another-metamorfo-variant-targeting-customers-of-financial-institutions"}]},{"id":"S0456","name":"Aria-body","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456","kind":"malware","description":"[Aria-body](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0456) has established persistence via the Startup folder or Run Registry key.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--76701e52-cfce-4294-91e4-485fad7c8f0f","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint Naikon May 2020","description":"CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/naikon-apt-cyber-espionage-reloaded/"}]},{"id":"S0458","name":"Ramsay","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458","kind":"malware","description":"[Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--96062ede-31e8-4777-8b81-39e8a9e8b88e","references":[{"source_name":"Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020","description":"Antiy CERT. (2020, April 20). Analysis of Ramsay components of Darkhotel's infiltration and isolation network. Retrieved March 24, 2021.","url":"https://www.programmersought.com/article/62493896999/"}]},{"id":"S0461","name":"SDBbot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461","kind":"malware","description":"[SDBbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0461) has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. (Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--7333e2da-7aa5-4559-a03d-5818883d62d5","references":[{"source_name":"IBM TA505 April 2020","description":"Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200420201624/https://securityintelligence.com/posts/ta505-continues-to-infect-networks-with-sdbbot-rat/"},{"source_name":"Proofpoint TA505 October 2019","description":"Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ta505-distributes-new-sdbbot-remote-access-trojan-get2-downloader"}]},{"id":"S0471","name":"build_downer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0471","kind":"malware","description":"[build_downer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0471) has the ability to add itself to the Registry Run key for persistence.(Citation: Trend Micro Tick November 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--5266fdd9-f62e-4412-b5d0-d26ba6d5a1ab","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Tick November 2019","description":"Chen, J. et al. (2019, November). Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data. Retrieved June 9, 2020.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/Operation-ENDTRADE-TICK-s-Multi-Stage-Backdoors-for-Attacking-Industries-and-Stealing-Classified-Data.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0483","name":"IcedID","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483","kind":"malware","description":"[IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) has established persistence by creating a Registry run key.(Citation: IBM IcedID November 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--cabd44af-9804-4f83-98e0-927719057a62","references":[{"source_name":"IBM IcedID November 2017","description":"Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/new-banking-trojan-icedid-discovered-by-ibm-x-force-research/"}]},{"id":"S0484","name":"Carberp","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484","kind":"malware","description":"[Carberp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484) has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.(Citation: Prevx Carberp March 2011)","relationship_id":"relationship--23bc50df-16da-4b2d-89b3-1a74c7602aa2","references":[{"source_name":"Prevx Carberp March 2011","description":"Giuliani, M., Allievi, A. (2011, February 28). Carberp - a modular information stealing trojan. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20231227000328/http://pxnow.prevx.com/content/blog/carberp-a_modular_information_stealing_trojan.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0491","name":"StrongPity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0491","kind":"malware","description":"[StrongPity](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0491) can use the <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> Registry key for persistence.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--d5e9478c-439e-4ec5-8317-6d769dedc68a","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Promethium June 2020","description":"Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html"}]},{"id":"S0499","name":"Hancitor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0499","kind":"malware","description":"[Hancitor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0499)  has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: FireEye Hancitor)","relationship_id":"relationship--57c700c6-e301-4433-84bd-722934f9d922","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Hancitor","description":"Anubhav, A., Jallepalli, D. (2016, September 23). Hancitor (AKA Chanitor) observed using multiple attack approaches. Retrieved August 13, 2020.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/09/hancitor_aka_chanit.html"}]},{"id":"S0500","name":"MCMD","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0500","kind":"tool","description":"[MCMD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0500) can use Registry Run Keys for persistence.(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--f5a39799-22d3-42e6-b524-bd93744b0149","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks MCMD July 2019","description":"Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis"}]},{"id":"S0512","name":"FatDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512","kind":"malware","description":"[FatDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0512) has used <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--603725ac-1b50-482d-b3f5-f657fdd082af","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Dukes October 2019","description":"Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0513","name":"LiteDuke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513","kind":"malware","description":"[LiteDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0513) can create persistence by adding a shortcut in the <code>CurrentVersion\\Run</code> Registry key.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--608ecdef-db04-419b-b453-0aeb538c7093","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Dukes October 2019","description":"Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0531","name":"Grandoreiro","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531","kind":"malware","description":"[Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) can use run keys and create link files in the startup folder for persistence.(Citation: IBM Grandoreiro April 2020)(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--5463f157-7cab-4e9d-bb68-6179972087b6","references":[{"source_name":"IBM Grandoreiro April 2020","description":"Abramov, D. (2020, April 13). Grandoreiro Malware Now Targeting Banks in Spain. Retrieved November 12, 2020.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/grandoreiro-malware-now-targeting-banks-in-spain/"},{"source_name":"ESET Grandoreiro April 2020","description":"ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/"}]},{"id":"S0532","name":"Lucifer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0532","kind":"malware","description":"[Lucifer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0532) can persist by setting Registry key values <code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\QQMusic</code> and <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\QQMusic</code>.(Citation: Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--25022051-be2f-4cc2-b61a-3de03fc3e8d6","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020","description":"Hsu, K. et al. (2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. Retrieved November 16, 2020.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/lucifer-new-cryptojacking-and-ddos-hybrid-malware/"}]},{"id":"S0534","name":"Bazar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534","kind":"malware","description":"[Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) can create or add files to Registry Run Keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--f373c8d3-3182-4977-b333-87493458d340","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Bazar July 2020","description":"Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9’S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles"},{"source_name":"NCC Group Team9 June 2020","description":"Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/"}]},{"id":"S0546","name":"SharpStage","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0546","kind":"malware","description":"[SharpStage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0546) has the ability to create persistence for the malware using the Registry autorun key and startup folder.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) ","relationship_id":"relationship--3698b20c-408a-4873-9284-19b2106bfaab","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020","description":"Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0553","name":"MoleNet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0553","kind":"malware","description":"[MoleNet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0553) can achieve persitence on the infected machine by setting the Registry run key.(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020) ","relationship_id":"relationship--5d036e42-7ce2-499d-b693-12504c8615ca","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020","description":"Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/Molerats-in-the-Cloud-New-Malware-Arsenal-Abuses-Cloud-Platforms-in-Middle-East-Espionage-Campaign.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0561","name":"GuLoader","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561","kind":"malware","description":"[GuLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0561) can establish persistence via the Registry under <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>.(Citation: Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--d02d208e-2b9a-4613-bc89-df3953ad9576","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 NETWIRE April 2020","description":"Duncan, B. (2020, April 3). GuLoader: Malspam Campaign Installing NetWire RAT. Retrieved January 7, 2021.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/"}]},{"id":"S0568","name":"EVILNUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568","kind":"malware","description":"[EVILNUM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568) can achieve persistence through the Registry Run key.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)(Citation: Prevailion EvilNum May 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--1ec23e24-e63e-4c35-ad0d-637880ce7bb6","references":[{"source_name":"Prevailion EvilNum May 2020","description":"Adamitis, D. (2020, May 6). Phantom in the Command Shell. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20221209052853/https://www.prevailion.com/phantom-in-the-command-shell-2/"},{"source_name":"ESET EvilNum July 2020","description":"Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/09/more-evil-deep-look-evilnum-toolset/"}]},{"id":"S0570","name":"BitPaymer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570","kind":"malware","description":"[BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570) has set the run key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> for persistence.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--5ec68d1c-9ba8-4f9c-b185-f4e8482a66b2","references":[{"source_name":"Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018","description":"Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-the-evolution-of-indrik-spider-from-dridex-wire-fraud-to-bitpaymer-targeted-ransomware/"}]},{"id":"S0582","name":"LookBack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0582","kind":"malware","description":"[LookBack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0582) sets up a Registry Run key to establish a persistence mechanism.(Citation: Proofpoint LookBack Malware Aug 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--928977f5-9602-4020-b8e8-31a8e3881225","references":[{"source_name":"Proofpoint LookBack Malware Aug 2019","description":"Raggi, M. Schwarz, D.. (2019, August 1). LookBack Malware Targets the United States Utilities Sector with Phishing Attacks Impersonating Engineering Licensing Boards. Retrieved February 25, 2021.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/lookback-malware-targets-united-states-utilities-sector-phishing-attacks"}]},{"id":"S0586","name":"TAINTEDSCRIBE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586","kind":"malware","description":"[TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as “Narrator.exe” for persistence.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1  TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--7d667946-e6f1-418b-9ad3-0e3689dfaaa7","references":[{"source_name":"CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1  TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020","description":"USG. (2020, May 12). MAR-10288834-2.v1 – North Korean Trojan: TAINTEDSCRIBE. Retrieved March 5, 2021.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133b"}]},{"id":"S0608","name":"Conficker","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608","kind":"malware","description":"[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Trend Micro Conficker)","relationship_id":"relationship--9020cfe5-99b4-48ba-ac48-bcf20697c575","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Conficker","description":"Trend Micro. (2014, March 18). Conficker. Retrieved February 18, 2021.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/conficker"}]},{"id":"S0622","name":"AppleSeed","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622","kind":"malware","description":"[AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) has the ability to create the Registry key name <code>EstsoftAutoUpdate</code> at <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft/Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--e1cf08cf-e483-44a1-bdfe-cdfa424d69e5","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021","description":"Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S0630","name":"Nebulae","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0630","kind":"malware","description":"[Nebulae](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0630) can achieve persistence through a Registry Run key.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--52fb6aab-7a55-437d-8a2f-d3f84bf98a2f","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Naikon April 2021","description":"Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/396/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-NAIKON-creat5397-en-EN.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0631","name":"Chaes","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631","kind":"malware","description":"[Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) has added persistence via the Registry key <code>software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run\\microsoft windows html help</code>.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--a307922f-1cd2-4f95-aaa4-dcd40a8fcaab","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020","description":"Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/11-2020-Chaes-e-commerce-malware-research.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0632","name":"GrimAgent","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0632","kind":"malware","description":"[GrimAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0632) can set persistence with a Registry run key.(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--251b010d-270f-44a3-8546-ce7cde631ab7","references":[{"source_name":"Group IB GrimAgent July 2021","description":"Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.","url":"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/grimagent/"}]},{"id":"S0635","name":"BoomBox","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0635","kind":"malware","description":"[BoomBox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0635) can establish persistence by writing the Registry value <code>MicroNativeCacheSvc</code> to <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--cba3f208-4db7-486b-adb1-311910b0382d","references":[{"source_name":"MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021","description":"MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/"}]},{"id":"S0640","name":"Avaddon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640","kind":"malware","description":"[Avaddon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0640) uses registry run keys for persistence.(Citation: Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--cfda1087-90e8-46f3-9751-06e2140f2f2c","references":[{"source_name":"Arxiv Avaddon Feb 2021","description":"Yuste, J. Pastrana, S. (2021, February 9). Avaddon ransomware: an in-depth analysis and decryption of infected systems. Retrieved August 19, 2021.","url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.04796.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0644","name":"ObliqueRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0644","kind":"malware","description":"[ObliqueRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0644) can gain persistence by a creating a shortcut in the infected user's Startup directory.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--4a34355b-dcbb-41a7-b562-167a76c93d9e","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Oblique RAT March 2021","description":"Malhotra, A. (2021, March 2). ObliqueRAT returns with new campaign using hijacked websites. Retrieved September 2, 2021.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/02/obliquerat-new-campaign.html"}]},{"id":"S0647","name":"Turian","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647","kind":"malware","description":"[Turian](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0647) can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--7a1dd7b6-f759-4580-b658-e1b5abf12d89","references":[{"source_name":"ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021","description":"Adam Burgher. (2021, June 10). BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian. Retrieved September 1, 2021","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/backdoordiplomacy-upgrading-quarian-turian/"}]},{"id":"S0649","name":"SMOKEDHAM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0649","kind":"malware","description":"[SMOKEDHAM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0649) has used <code>reg.exe</code> to create a Registry Run key.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--70b1afda-98b8-4c7c-ad41-ceb2b45af5d4","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021","description":"FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html"}]},{"id":"S0650","name":"QakBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650","kind":"malware","description":"[QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) can maintain persistence by creating an auto-run Registry key.(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot May 2020)(Citation: Crowdstrike Qakbot October 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware September 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--2cb6835c-e6e6-46d5-b5d2-45846eac3b74","references":[{"source_name":"Crowdstrike Qakbot October 2020","description":"CS. (2020, October 7). Duck Hunting with Falcon Complete: A Fowl Banking Trojan Evolves, Part 2. Retrieved September 27, 2021.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/"},{"source_name":"Group IB Ransomware September 2020","description":"Group IB. (2020, September). LOCK LIKE  A PRO. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220119114433/https://groupib.pathfactory.com/ransomware-reports/prolock_wp"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro Qakbot May 2020","description":"Mendoza, E. et al. (2020, May 25). Qakbot Resurges, Spreads through VBS Files. Retrieved September 27, 2021.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/ph/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/qakbot-resurges-spreads-through-vbs-files"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro Qakbot December 2020","description":"Trend Micro. (2020, December 17). QAKBOT: A decade-old malware still with new tricks. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0011282"}]},{"id":"S0652","name":"MarkiRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0652","kind":"malware","description":"[MarkiRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0652) can drop its payload into the Startup directory to ensure it automatically runs when the compromised system is started.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--45f150d4-a917-4862-bcee-170be75415cd","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021","description":"GReAT. (2021, June 16). Ferocious Kitten: 6 Years of Covert Surveillance in Iran. Retrieved September 22, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/ferocious-kitten-6-years-of-covert-surveillance-in-iran/102806/"}]},{"id":"S0660","name":"Clambling","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0660","kind":"malware","description":"[Clambling](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0660) can establish persistence by adding a Registry run key.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)(Citation: Talent-Jump Clambling February 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--3777379a-469f-453e-a270-450c8b1eba9b","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020","description":"Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-uncovering-DRBcontrol.pdf"},{"source_name":"Talent-Jump Clambling February 2020","description":"Chen, T. and Chen, Z. (2020, February 17). CLAMBLING - A New Backdoor Base On Dropbox. Retrieved November 12, 2021.","url":"https://www.talent-jump.com/article/2020/02/17/CLAMBLING-A-New-Backdoor-Base-On-Dropbox-en/"}]},{"id":"S0662","name":"RCSession","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0662","kind":"malware","description":"[RCSession](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0662) has the ability to modify a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)(Citation: Profero APT27 December 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--ab1d783b-d6b3-439c-a5f4-701a8cae4c6a","references":[{"source_name":"Profero APT27 December 2020","description":"Global Threat Center, Intelligence Team. (2020, December). APT27 Turns to Ransomware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210104144857/https://shared-public-reports.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/APT27+turns+to+ransomware.pdf"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020","description":"Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-uncovering-DRBcontrol.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0663","name":"SysUpdate","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0663","kind":"malware","description":"[SysUpdate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0663) can use a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--c9768a3e-1556-488e-8a9e-55389fd1752e","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021","description":"Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/d/iron-tiger-apt-updates-toolkit-with-evolved-sysupdate-malware-va.html"}]},{"id":"S0665","name":"ThreatNeedle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0665","kind":"malware","description":"[ThreatNeedle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0665) can be loaded into the Startup folder (`%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\OneDrives.lnk`) as a Shortcut file for persistence.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--25d44b9e-3645-4fe7-96b0-3c2c31b90ac0","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021","description":"Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/"}]},{"id":"S0666","name":"Gelsemium","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666","kind":"malware","description":"[Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) can set persistence with a Registry run key.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--2dde8a3e-773e-4a7f-82e4-dbcaa8cb94c8","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Gelsemium June 2021","description":"Dupuy, T. and Faou, M. (2021, June). Gelsemium. Retrieved November 30, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eset_gelsemium.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0669","name":"KOCTOPUS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669","kind":"malware","description":"[KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669) can set the AutoRun Registry key with a PowerShell command.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--f1796f08-a663-4189-8bdc-a89ecc13df57","references":[{"source_name":"MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021","description":"Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20211003035156/https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0670","name":"WarzoneRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0670","kind":"malware","description":"[WarzoneRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0670) can add itself to the `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` and `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\UIF2IS20VK` Registry keys.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f90920b-ab2e-4c79-95a5-5438c172a46d","references":[{"source_name":"Check Point Warzone Feb 2020","description":"Harakhavik, Y. (2020, February 3). Warzone: Behind the enemy lines. Retrieved December 17, 2021.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/warzone-behind-the-enemy-lines/"}]},{"id":"S0692","name":"SILENTTRINITY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692","kind":"tool","description":"[SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) can establish a LNK file in the startup folder for persistence.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--dd6eca67-574c-433a-8764-12cc802a0387","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019","description":"Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022.","url":"https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY/tree/master/silenttrinity/core/teamserver/modules/boo"}]},{"id":"S0696","name":"Flagpro","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696","kind":"malware","description":"[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) has dropped an executable file to the startup directory.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021) ","relationship_id":"relationship--83561fd5-18cf-47df-a412-45614f3142bd","references":[{"source_name":"NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021","description":"Hada, H. (2021, December 28).  Flagpro The new malware used by BlackTech. Retrieved March 25, 2022.","url":"https://insight-jp.nttsecurity.com/post/102hf3q/flagpro-the-new-malware-used-by-blacktech"}]},{"id":"S1018","name":"Saint Bot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018","kind":"malware","description":"[Saint Bot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1018) has established persistence by being copied to the Startup directory or through the `\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` registry key.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )","relationship_id":"relationship--a7ad3949-0d4d-49a8-a2cd-3a0d5857ba92","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021","description":"Hasherezade. (2021, April 6). A deep dive into Saint Bot, a new downloader. Retrieved June 9, 2022.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/04/a-deep-dive-into-saint-bot-downloader/"},{"source_name":"Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 ","description":"Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-targeted-outsteel-saintbot/"}]},{"id":"S1021","name":"DnsSystem","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1021","kind":"malware","description":"[DnsSystem](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1021) can write itself to the Startup folder to gain persistence.(Citation: Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--86b7352f-8cba-4a5e-ac0a-c79697d0bd25","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022","description":"Shivtarkar, N. and Kumar, A. (2022, June 9). Lyceum .NET DNS Backdoor. Retrieved June 23, 2022.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/lyceum-net-dns-backdoor"}]},{"id":"S1025","name":"Amadey","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1025","kind":"malware","description":"[Amadey](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1025) has changed the Startup folder to the one containing its executable by overwriting the registry keys.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)(Citation: BlackBerry Amadey 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--cf58d726-7674-4cdc-9ce1-9d7364aa4a0d","references":[{"source_name":"Korean FSI TA505 2020","description":"Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.","url":"https://www.fsec.or.kr/user/bbs/fsec/163/344/bbsDataView/1382.do?page=1&column=&search=&searchSDate=&searchEDate=&bbsDataCategory="},{"source_name":"BlackBerry Amadey 2020","description":"Kasuya, M. (2020, January 8). Threat Spotlight: Amadey Bot Targets Non-Russian Users. Retrieved July 14, 2022.","url":"https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2020/01/threat-spotlight-amadey-bot"}]},{"id":"S1026","name":"Mongall","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1026","kind":"malware","description":"[Mongall](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1026) can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value `EverNoteTrayUService`.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--f38fa132-2485-45aa-ad86-4608595adb65","references":[{"source_name":"SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022","description":"Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.","url":"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/aoqin-dragon-newly-discovered-chinese-linked-apt-has-been-quietly-spying-on-organizations-for-10-years/"}]},{"id":"S1027","name":"Heyoka Backdoor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1027","kind":"malware","description":"[Heyoka Backdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1027) can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value `EverNoteTrayUService`.(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--b26fc06b-507b-4fbd-bf07-b4e880ac85ab","references":[{"source_name":"SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022","description":"Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.","url":"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/aoqin-dragon-newly-discovered-chinese-linked-apt-has-been-quietly-spying-on-organizations-for-10-years/"}]},{"id":"S1029","name":"AuTo Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1029","kind":"malware","description":"[AuTo Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1029) can place malicious executables in a victim's AutoRun registry key or StartUp directory, depending on the AV product installed, to maintain persistence.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--0ef4030f-0af2-4b6e-bfb8-3fedc5af5a7e","references":[{"source_name":"MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021","description":"Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.","url":"https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/12/sidecopy-apt-connecting-lures-to-victims-payloads-to-infrastructure"}]},{"id":"S1035","name":"Small Sieve","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1035","kind":"malware","description":"[Small Sieve](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1035) has the ability to add itself to `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\OutlookMicrosift` for persistence.(Citation: NCSC GCHQ Small Sieve Jan 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--70613a9f-e8c2-44ba-a238-34acb0b7e5b8","references":[{"source_name":"NCSC GCHQ Small Sieve Jan 2022","description":"NCSC GCHQ. (2022, January 27). Small Sieve Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved August 22, 2022.","url":"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/NCSC-Malware-Analysis-Report-Small-Sieve.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1037","name":"STARWHALE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1037","kind":"malware","description":"[STARWHALE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1037) can establish persistence by installing itself in the startup folder, whereas the GO variant has created a `HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\OutlookM` registry key.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Mandiant UNC3313 Feb 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--434296ee-6296-4d0a-a72e-bebb914c9700","references":[{"source_name":"DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022","description":"FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK. (2022, February 24). Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks. Retrieved September 27, 2022.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-055a"},{"source_name":"Mandiant UNC3313 Feb 2022","description":"Tomcik, R. et al. (2022, February 24). Left On Read: Telegram Malware Spotted in Latest Iranian Cyber Espionage Activity. Retrieved August 18, 2022.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage"}]},{"id":"S1041","name":"Chinoxy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041","kind":"malware","description":"[Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) has established persistence via the `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` registry key and by loading a dropper to `(%COMMON_ STARTUP%\\\\eoffice.exe)`.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--6d4a7150-60f9-4ed5-b24b-088c76d6ab73","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020","description":"Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1044","name":"FunnyDream","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044","kind":"malware","description":"[FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1044) can use a Registry Run Key and the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--0a606064-9f7f-4ca9-a2c5-b80360433ff7","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020","description":"Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1053","name":"AvosLocker","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1053","kind":"malware","description":"[AvosLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1053) has been executed via the `RunOnce` Registry key to run itself on safe mode.(Citation: Trend Micro AvosLocker Apr 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--4c362fcd-939d-48e8-9279-731a663875b0","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro AvosLocker Apr 2022","description":"Trend Micro Research. (2022, April 4). Ransomware Spotlight AvosLocker. Retrieved January 11, 2023.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-avoslocker"}]},{"id":"S1066","name":"DarkTortilla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1066","kind":"malware","description":"[DarkTortilla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1066) has established persistence via the `Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Run` registry key and by creating a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.(Citation: Secureworks DarkTortilla Aug 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--2b3dc227-2ce1-41fa-8d1c-4c0d3685258d","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks DarkTortilla Aug 2022","description":"Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, August 17). DarkTortilla Malware Analysis. Retrieved November 3, 2022.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/darktortilla-malware-analysis"}]},{"id":"S1074","name":"ANDROMEDA","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074","kind":"malware","description":"[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) can establish persistence by dropping a sample of itself to `C:\\ProgramData\\Local Settings\\Temp\\mskmde.com` and adding a Registry run key to execute every time a user logs on.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--91e4cb6a-abe6-46e0-8730-b80ba1cca16f","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023","description":"Hawley, S. et al. (2023, February 2). Turla: A Galaxy of Opportunity. Retrieved May 15, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/turla-galaxy-opportunity"}]},{"id":"S1086","name":"Snip3","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1086","kind":"malware","description":"[Snip3](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1086) can create a VBS file in startup to persist after system restarts.(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--4d28e653-c023-45cf-bbbd-ade005bcd519","references":[{"source_name":"Telefonica Snip3 December 2021","description":"Jornet, A. (2021, December 23). Snip3, an investigation into malware. Retrieved September 19, 2023.","url":"https://telefonicatech.com/blog/snip3-investigacion-malware"}]},{"id":"S1111","name":"DarkGate","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111","kind":"malware","description":"[DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) installation includes AutoIt script execution creating a shortcut to itself as an LNK object, such as bill.lnk, in the victim startup folder.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018)(Citation: Rapid7 BlackBasta 2024) [DarkGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1111) installation finishes with the creation of a registry Run key.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--4739d942-9d7f-4d7b-8aaf-af5464f76d44","references":[{"source_name":"Ensilo Darkgate 2018","description":"Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/enter-the-darkgate-new-cryptocurrency-mining-and-ransomware-campaign"},{"source_name":"Rapid7 BlackBasta 2024","description":"McGraw, T. (2024, December 4). Black Basta Ransomware Campaign Drops Zbot, DarkGate, and Custom Malware. Retrieved December 9, 2024.","url":"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/12/04/black-basta-ransomware-campaign-drops-zbot-darkgate-and-custom-malware/"}]},{"id":"S1122","name":"Mispadu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1122","kind":"malware","description":"[Mispadu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1122) creates a link in the startup folder for persistence.(Citation: ESET Security Mispadu Facebook Ads 2019) [Mispadu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1122) adds persistence via the registry key `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`.(Citation: Metabase Q Mispadu Trojan 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--6c9c0332-bdd8-4692-af01-cc7ebc486a41","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Security Mispadu Facebook Ads 2019","description":"ESET Security. (2019, November 19). Mispadu: Advertisement for a discounted Unhappy Meal. Retrieved March 13, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/11/19/mispadu-advertisement-discounted-unhappy-meal/"},{"source_name":"Metabase Q Mispadu Trojan 2023","description":"Garcia, F., Regalado, D. (2023, March 7). Inside Mispadu massive infection campaign in LATAM. Retrieved March 15, 2024.","url":"https://www.metabaseq.com/mispadu-banking-trojan/"}]},{"id":"S1130","name":"Raspberry Robin","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130","kind":"malware","description":"[Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) will use a Registry key to achieve persistence through reboot, setting a RunOnce key such as: <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce\n{random value name} = “rundll32 shell32 ShellExec_RunDLLA REGSVR /u /s “{dropped copy path and file name}””\n</code>.(Citation: TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--2e443cd2-b77f-4bb9-8bbd-82e11ab389f2","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022","description":"Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/l/raspberry-robin-malware-targets-telecom-governments.html"}]},{"id":"S1138","name":"Gootloader","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1138","kind":"malware","description":"[Gootloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1138) can create an autorun entry for a PowerShell script to run at reboot.(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)","relationship_id":"relationship--41bec3ae-de2b-470b-b356-dd163bd20445","references":[{"source_name":"Sophos Gootloader","description":"Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). “Gootloader” expands its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022.","url":"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/03/01/gootloader-expands-its-payload-delivery-options/"}]},{"id":"S1145","name":"Pikabot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145","kind":"malware","description":"[Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) maintains persistence following system checks through the Run key in the registry.(Citation: Zscaler Pikabot 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--e039ba9f-a7d1-45a9-8ebc-d75fb31f4baa","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler Pikabot 2023","description":"Brett Stone-Gross & Nikolaos Pantazopoulos. (2023, May 24). Technical Analysis of Pikabot. Retrieved July 12, 2024.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-pikabot"}]},{"id":"S1150","name":"ROADSWEEP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150","kind":"malware","description":"[ROADSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150) has been placed in the start up folder to trigger execution upon user login.(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--961ad537-4280-420a-8c1d-0bc32147949a","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022","description":"MSTIC. (2022, September 8). Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government. Retrieved August 6, 2024.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/"}]},{"id":"S1160","name":"Latrodectus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160","kind":"malware","description":"\n[Latrodectus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1160) can set an AutoRun key to establish persistence.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--d7f1b78b-824d-4ddc-a4cc-3fd44d07c4d3","references":[{"source_name":"Latrodectus APR 2024","description":"Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/latrodectus-spider-bytes-ice"}]},{"id":"S1182","name":"MagicRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1182","kind":"malware","description":"[MagicRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1182) can persist using malicious LNK objects in the victim machine Startup folder.(Citation: Cisco MagicRAT 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--afbd40b8-5dde-4758-809f-ea0a21a7dca6","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco MagicRAT 2022","description":"Asheer Malhotra, Vitor Ventura & Jungsoo An, Cisco Talos. (2022, September 7). MagicRAT: Lazarus’ latest gateway into victim networks. Retrieved December 30, 2024.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lazarus-magicrat/"}]},{"id":"S1199","name":"LockBit 2.0","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1199","kind":"malware","description":"[LockBit 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1199) can use a Registry Run key to establish persistence at startup.(Citation: FBI Lockbit 2.0 FEB 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--1400cd29-916f-40fe-af7c-ec89ef7b75c8","references":[{"source_name":"FBI Lockbit 2.0 FEB 2022","description":"FBI. (2022, February 4). Indicators of Compromise Associated with LockBit 2.0 Ransomware. Retrieved January 24, 2025.","url":"https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2022/220204.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1207","name":"XLoader","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1207","kind":"malware","description":"[XLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1207) establishes persistence by copying its executable in a subdirectory of `%APPDATA%` or `%PROGRAMFILES%`, and then modifies Windows Registry Run keys or policies keys to execute the executable on system start.(Citation: Zscaler XLoader 2025)(Citation: Google XLoader 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--e10a8253-29d9-438b-bf10-3167d4f85fe8","references":[{"source_name":"Google XLoader 2017","description":"Nart Villeneuve, Randi Eitzman, Sandor Nemes & Tyler Dean, Google Cloud. (2017, October 5). Significant FormBook Distribution Campaigns Impacting the U.S. and South Korea. Retrieved March 11, 2025.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/formbook-malware-distribution-campaigns/"},{"source_name":"Zscaler XLoader 2025","description":"Zscaler Threatlabz. (2025, January 27). Technical Analysis of Xloader Versions 6 and 7 | Part 1. Retrieved March 11, 2025.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-xloader-versions-6-and-7-part-1"}]},{"id":"S1212","name":"RansomHub","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1212","kind":"malware","description":"[RansomHub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1212) has created an autorun Registry key through the `-safeboot-instance -pass` command line argument.(Citation: Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--280b3253-cc47-42e1-9339-dbaa06161b15","references":[{"source_name":"Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025","description":"Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.","url":"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/ransomhub-never-sleeps-episode-1/"}]},{"id":"S1213","name":"Lumma Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213","kind":"malware","description":"[Lumma Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213) has created registry keys to maintain persistence using `HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`.(Citation: Cybereason LumaStealer Undated)(Citation: Netskope LummaStealer 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--827bdd59-c6b9-43fe-9004-ab9a740e323a","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason LumaStealer Undated","description":"Cybereaon Security Services Team. (n.d.). Your Data Is Under New Lummanagement: The Rise of LummaStealer. Retrieved March 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-rise-of-lummastealer"},{"source_name":"Netskope LummaStealer 2025","description":"Leandro Fróes, Netskope. (2025, January 23). Lumma Stealer: Fake CAPTCHAs & New Techniques to Evade Detection. Retrieved March 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.netskope.com/blog/lumma-stealer-fake-captchas-new-techniques-to-evade-detection"}]},{"id":"S1228","name":"PUBLOAD","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228","kind":"malware","description":"[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`. (Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)","relationship_id":"relationship--8f43c516-a7f0-4d72-82ae-cd9c8eda4ffc","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022","description":"Asheer Malhotra, Jungsoo An, Kendall Mc. (2022, May 5). Mustang Panda deploys a new wave of malware targeting Europe. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/mustang-panda-targets-europe/"},{"source_name":"CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024","description":"CSIRT CTI. (2024, January 23). Stately Taurus Targets Myanmar Amidst Concerns over Military Junta’s Handling of Rebel Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://csirt-cti.net/2024/01/23/stately-taurus-targets-myanmar/"},{"source_name":"Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023","description":"Dex. (n.d.). New Mustang Panda’s campaing against Australia. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://lab52.io/blog/new-mustang-pandas-campaing-against-australia/"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024","description":"Lenart Bermejo, Sunny Lu, Ted Lee. (2024, September 9). Earth Preta Evolves its Attacks with New Malware and Strategies. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/i/earth-preta-new-malware-and-strategies.html"},{"source_name":"2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload","description":"Nick Dai, Vickie Su, Sunny Lu. (2022, November 18). Earth Preta Spear-Phishing Governments Worldwide. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/earth-preta-spear-phishing-governments-worldwide.html"}]},{"id":"S1230","name":"HIUPAN","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230","kind":"malware","description":"[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--cb62e9ed-6a69-439b-865a-bcda20c8a5e3","references":[{"source_name":"2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA","description":"Golo Muhr, Joshua Chung. (2025, May 15). Hive0154 targeting US, Philippines, Pakistan and Taiwan in suspected espionage campaign. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/hive0154-targeting-us-philippines-pakistan-taiwan"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024","description":"Lenart Bermejo, Sunny Lu, Ted Lee. (2024, September 9). Earth Preta Evolves its Attacks with New Malware and Strategies. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/i/earth-preta-new-malware-and-strategies.html"}]},{"id":"S1236","name":"CLAIMLOADER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1236","kind":"malware","description":"[CLAIMLOADER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1236) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`.(Citation: IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)","relationship_id":"relationship--3475a2ad-4cb7-4ec0-bb36-6e60355a03c3","references":[{"source_name":"IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025","description":"Golo Muhr, Joshua Chung. (2025, June 23). Hive0154 aka Mustang Panda shifts focus on Tibetan community to deploy Pubload backdoor. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/hive0154-mustang-panda-shifts-focus-tibetan-community-deploy-pubload-backdoor"},{"source_name":"2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA","description":"Golo Muhr, Joshua Chung. (2025, May 15). Hive0154 targeting US, Philippines, Pakistan and Taiwan in suspected espionage campaign. Retrieved August 4, 2025.","url":"https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/hive0154-targeting-us-philippines-pakistan-taiwan"}]},{"id":"S1239","name":"TONESHELL","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1239","kind":"malware","description":"[TONESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1239) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--53dadcc9-9f23-4057-8b75-bc893ee30a17","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023","description":"Lior Rochberger, Tom Fakterman, Robert Falcone. (2023, September 22). Cyberespionage Attacks Against Southeast Asian Government Linked to Stately Taurus, Aka Mustang Panda. Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-attacks-se-asian-government/"}]},{"id":"S1242","name":"Qilin","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242","kind":"malware","description":"[Qilin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242) has created a RunOnce autostart entry at `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce*aster = %Public%\\enc.exe` pointing to a dropped copy of itself in the Public folder.(Citation: Trend Micro Agenda Ransomware AUG 2022)(Citation: Halcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024)(Citation: Cisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--a2aaa018-7bcc-4ec1-b27e-c6672e390c32","references":[{"source_name":"Halcyon Qilin.B OCT 2024","description":"Halcyon RISE Team. (2024, October 24). New Qilin.B Ransomware Variant Boasts Enhanced Encryption and Defense Evasion. Retrieved September 26, 2025.","url":"https://www.halcyon.ai/blog/new-qilin-b-ransomware-variant-boasts-enhanced-encryption-and-defense-evasion"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro Agenda Ransomware AUG 2022","description":"Magdy, S. et al. (2022, August 25). New Golang Ransomware Agenda Customizes Attacks. Retrieved September 26, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/h/new-golang-ransomware-agenda-customizes-attacks.html"},{"source_name":"Cisco Talos Qilin Ransomware OCT 2025","description":"Takeda, T. et al. (2025, October 26). Uncovering Qilin attack methods exposed through multiple cases. Retrieved March 26, 2026.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uncovering-qilin-attack-methods-exposed-through-multiple-cases/"}]},{"id":"S1245","name":"InvisibleFerret","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1245","kind":"malware","description":"[InvisibleFerret](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1245) has established persistence within Windows devices by creating a .bat file “queue.bat” within the Startup folder to run a Python script.(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--daa688cf-80e7-4529-8456-332a7f42fa50","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024","description":"Seongsu Park. (2024, November 4). From Pyongyang to Your Payroll: The Rise of North Korean Remote Workers in the West. Retrieved October 17, 2025.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/pyongyang-your-payroll-rise-north-korean-remote-workers-west"}]},{"id":"S1247","name":"Embargo","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1247","kind":"malware","description":"[Embargo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1247) has modified the Windows Registry to start a custom service named irnagentd in Safe Mode.(Citation: ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--be24db0e-1ae0-4478-9b83-7d40d0f0a1c0","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024","description":"Jan Holman, Tomas Zvara. (2024, October 23). Embargo ransomware: Rock’n’Rust. Retrieved October 19, 2025.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/embargo-ransomware-rocknrust/"}]},{"id":"S9010","name":"GlassWorm","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9010","kind":"malware","description":"[GlassWorm](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9010) has set registry run keys for persistence in both `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` and `HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\`.(Citation: Koi Glassworm InvisibleCode October 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--6e18aefd-85d3-432e-9ebb-3dde28c4bc6c","references":[{"source_name":"Koi Glassworm InvisibleCode October 2025","description":"Idan Dardikman. (2025, October 18). GlassWorm: First Self-Propagating Worm Using Invisible Code Hits OpenVSX Marketplace. Retrieved April 10, 2026.","url":"https://www.koi.ai/blog/glassworm-first-self-propagating-worm-using-invisible-code-hits-openvsx-marketplace"}]},{"id":"S9018","name":"HeartCrypt","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9018","kind":"malware","description":"[HeartCrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9018) can set the `CurrentVersion\\Run` key to establish persistence.(Citation: Palo Alto HeartCrypt DEC 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--8d204453-9efc-4e91-8385-5be0e038a7e3","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto HeartCrypt DEC 2024","description":"Tujague, J., Bunce, D. (n.d.). Crypted Hearts: Exposing the HeartCrypt Packer-as-a-Service Operation. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/packer-as-a-service-heartcrypt-malware/"}]},{"id":"S9019","name":"PureCrypter","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9019","kind":"malware","description":"[PureCrypter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9019) can set multiple Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Zscaler PureCrypter JUN 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--742ac520-ebc2-4ac2-8083-2c2d601fda4f","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler PureCrypter JUN 2022","description":"Dumont, R. (2022, June 13). Technical Analysis of PureCrypter: A Fully-Functional Loader Distributing Remote Access Trojans and Information Stealers. Retrieved April 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-purecrypter"}]},{"id":"S9020","name":"LODEINFO","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9020","kind":"malware","description":"[LODEINFO](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9020) has used Registry run keys to set persistence.(Citation: ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--c28ef21a-d62b-45de-8cda-e80f0cb3accf","references":[{"source_name":"ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022","description":"Breitenbacher, D. (2022, December 14). Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities. Retrieved April 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/12/14/unmasking-mirrorface-operation-liberalface-targeting-japanese-political-entities/"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024","description":"Trend Micro. (2024, November 19). Spot the Difference: Earth Kasha's New LODEINFO Campaign And The Correlation Analysis With The APT10 Umbrella. Retrieved April 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/k/lodeinfo-campaign-of-earth-kasha.html"}]},{"id":"S9032","name":"MuddyViper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9032","kind":"malware","description":"[MuddyViper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9032) has the ability to establish persistence by configuring its installation directory as a Windows Startup folder by setting the following Registry values to `%APPDATALOCAL%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PPBCompatCache\\ManagerCache`:  `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup` and `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup`.(Citation: ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025)     ","relationship_id":"relationship--e888ca4d-7970-4f35-a7f1-a2f9a14b2f22","references":[{"source_name":"ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025","description":"ESET Research. (2025, December 2). MuddyWater: Snakes by the riverbank. Retrieved February 17, 2026.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/"}]},{"id":"S9034","name":"Tsundere Botnet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9034","kind":"malware","description":"[Tsundere Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9034) has created a value in the `HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` Registry key, ensuring that it is run at login.(Citation: SecureListUbiedo_Tsundere_Nov2025)(Citation: CAL_MuddyWater_Mar2026) ","relationship_id":"relationship--7118797d-8bb1-4404-8f00-d02113c7dd7d","references":[{"source_name":"CAL_MuddyWater_Mar2026","description":"Ctrl-Alt-Intel. (2026, March 4). MuddyWater Exposed: Inside an Iranian APT operation . Retrieved April 6, 2026.","url":"https://ctrlaltintel.com/research/MuddyWater/"},{"source_name":"SecureListUbiedo_Tsundere_Nov2025","description":"Ubiedo, L. (2025, November 20). Blockchain and Node.js abused by Tsundere: an emerging botnet. Retrieved April 6, 2026.","url":"https://securelist.com/tsundere-node-js-botnet-uses-ethereum-blockchain/117979/"}]},{"id":"S9037","name":"RustyWater","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9037","kind":"malware","description":"[RustyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9037) has established persistence by adding `C:\\ProgramData\\CertificationKit.ini` to a Windows startup Registry key or to a Run or RunOnce Registry key.(Citation: CloudSEK_RustyWater_Jan2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--600e55f7-1a72-4289-9c4c-b66798a58776","references":[{"source_name":"CloudSEK_RustyWater_Jan2026","description":"Awasthi, P. (2026, January 8). Reborn in Rust: Muddy Water Evolves Tooling with RustyWater Implant. Retrieved March 19, 2026.","url":"https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/reborn-in-rust-muddywater-evolves-tooling-with-rustywater-implant"}]},{"id":"S9051","name":"The Gentlemen Ransomware","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051","kind":"malware","description":"[The Gentlemen Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051) has written registry keys within HKLM and HKCU to gain persistence device wide and to have redundancy.   [The Gentlemen Ransomware](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9051) has added registry keys to maintain persistence through `reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run /v GupdateS /t REG_SZ /d “<malware_path>” /f` and `reg add HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run /v GupdateU /t REG_SZ /d “<malware_path>” /f`.(Citation: MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026)(Citation: CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--9d757133-336a-491b-807b-5d8c1591cf45","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026","description":"Check Point Research. (2026, April 20). DFIR Report – The Gentlemen & SystemBC: A Sneak Peek Behind the Proxy. Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/dfir-report-the-gentlemen/"},{"source_name":"MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, May 28). The Gentlemen ransomware: Dissecting a self-propagating Go encryptor . Retrieved September 18, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/28/the-gentlemen-ransomware-dissecting-a-self-propagating-go-encryptor/"}]},{"id":"S9053","name":"MiniJunk","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053","kind":"malware","description":"[MiniJunk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053) has been executed using the auto-run registry key `HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\MigAutoPlay` that executes the benign windows executable `MigAutoPlay`.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--18ca258c-d465-44f1-98c6-57bd908577a9","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025","description":"Check Point. (2025, September 22). Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe. Retrieved September 24, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/"}]},{"id":"S9059","name":"MiniBike","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9059","kind":"malware","description":"[MiniBike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9059) has established persistence through the creation of registry keys to include `HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\OneDriveFileCoAuth.exe`.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024) ","relationship_id":"relationship--9158527d-c4f7-4088-89b1-d62dc35bf196","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024","description":"Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, February 27). When Cats Fly: Suspected Iranian Threat Actor UNC1549 Targets Israeli and Middle East Aerospace and Defense Sectors. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east"}]},{"id":"S9060","name":"MiniBus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9060","kind":"malware","description":"[MiniBus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9060) has created persistence through the use of autostart registry keys to include `HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\OneDriveCoUpdate`.(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--bce14354-c728-417c-b2d2-2d62e9c57300","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024","description":"Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, February 27). When Cats Fly: Suspected Iranian Threat Actor UNC1549 Targets Israeli and Middle East Aerospace and Defense Sectors. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0004","name":"Ke3chang","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"Several [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)","relationship_id":"relationship--dcb733f7-0b36-4b25-82d4-c332810562a7","references":[{"source_name":"NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong","description":"Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/"}]},{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--1829d419-0145-4a47-bb1e-ff00e647b5ff","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020","description":"Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html"}]},{"id":"G0010","name":"Turla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"A [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> to establish persistence. Additionally, a [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) custom executable containing Metasploit shellcode is saved to the Startup folder to gain persistence.(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito May 2018)(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--4f2450a7-d2d2-4063-9dd5-cac396a3215c","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Turla Mosquito May 2018","description":"ESET Research. (2018, May 22). Turla Mosquito: A shift towards more generic tools. Retrieved July 3, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/05/22/turla-mosquito-shift-towards-generic-tools/"},{"source_name":"ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018","description":"ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf"},{"source_name":"ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024","description":"Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moon-backdoors-lunar-landing-diplomatic-missions/"}]},{"id":"G0012","name":"Darkhotel","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.(Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)","relationship_id":"relationship--d021d378-a5ff-4020-972c-cc9152e824b0","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Darkhotel","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08070903/darkhotel_kl_07.11.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0016","name":"APT29","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)","relationship_id":"relationship--343d285a-e910-487b-8e85-dc87cdb63be3","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant No Easy Breach","description":"Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/no-easy-breach-derby-con-2016/66447908"}]},{"id":"G0019","name":"Naikon","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) has modified a victim's Windows Run registry to establish persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--2a896410-d7cd-4b58-a7d6-4878bc64113b","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Naikon April 2021","description":"Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/396/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-NAIKON-creat5397-en-EN.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0021","name":"Molerats","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--aa4038e3-451f-4ad7-acc7-5c971825967b","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019","description":"GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.","url":"https://securelist.com/gaza-cybergang-group1-operation-sneakypastes/90068/"}]},{"id":"G0022","name":"APT3","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap)","relationship_id":"relationship--cc705bf0-ba29-443e-9cd5-aef247505210","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye Operation Double Tap","description":"Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html"}]},{"id":"G0024","name":"Putter Panda","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"A dropper used by [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024) installs itself into the ASEP Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> with a value named McUpdate.(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)","relationship_id":"relationship--55120727-0b7f-4d6a-a881-d17bdc9c85ba","references":[{"source_name":"CrowdStrike Putter Panda","description":"Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.","url":"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0026","name":"APT18","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT18](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0026) establishes persistence via the <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> key.(Citation: Anomali Evasive Maneuvers July 2015)(Citation: PaloAlto DNS Requests May 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--e47f03aa-09b3-45a2-927d-b2cd96e7c444","references":[{"source_name":"Anomali Evasive Maneuvers July 2015","description":"Shelmire, A. (2015, July 06). Evasive Maneuvers by the Wekby group with custom ROP-packing and DNS covert channels. Retrieved November 15, 2018.","url":"https://www.anomali.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop"},{"source_name":"PaloAlto DNS Requests May 2016","description":"Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved November 15, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/"}]},{"id":"G0027","name":"Threat Group-3390","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027)'s malware can add a Registry key to `Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` for persistence.(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux)","relationship_id":"relationship--64d59c09-1ecd-4711-b2b8-e46d4ffc7ede","references":[{"source_name":"Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux","description":"Daniel Lunghi. (2023, March 1). Iron Tiger’s SysUpdate Reappears, Adds Linux Targeting. Retrieved March 20, 2023.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/iron-tiger-sysupdate-adds-linux-targeting.html"},{"source_name":"Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018","description":"Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.","url":"https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/"}]},{"id":"G0032","name":"Lazarus Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--6ab291a5-8061-4ad4-a6a7-07a6142e4c27","references":[{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster RATs","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220608001455/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-RAT-and-Staging-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"Novetta Blockbuster","description":"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"},{"source_name":"Lazarus APT January 2022","description":"Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/"},{"source_name":"McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018","description":"Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/lazarus-resurfaces-targets-global-banks-bitcoin-users/"}]},{"id":"G0035","name":"Dragonfly","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)","relationship_id":"relationship--c6d4f484-bb75-4012-b756-f043e962aaa6","references":[{"source_name":"US-CERT TA18-074A","description":"US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.","url":"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"}]},{"id":"G0037","name":"FIN6","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--4b45b720-a606-4c52-a28a-2ef298f9b42f","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN6 April 2016","description":"FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190807112824/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0040","name":"Patchwork","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--3f954be4-205c-4cec-92f9-36715e204a49","references":[{"source_name":"Cymmetria Patchwork","description":"Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20180825085952/https:/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling_Patchwork.pdf"},{"source_name":"TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017","description":"Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0046","name":"FIN7","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--74859e2a-7a8f-4b87-b75c-7286b3de685c","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN7 April 2017","description":"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"},{"source_name":"FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018","description":"Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html"}]},{"id":"G0047","name":"Gamaredon Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: unit42_gamaredon_dec2022)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon Sept2024) ","relationship_id":"relationship--f2d0fd0d-7bfc-4f3e-bd78-2d691c476046","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Gamaredon June 2020","description":"Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/"},{"source_name":"CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021","description":"CERT-EE. (2021, January 27). Gamaredon Infection: From Dropper to Entry. Retrieved February 17, 2022.","url":"https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/tale_of_gamaredon_infection.pdf"},{"source_name":"TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020","description":"Kakara, H., Maruyama, E. (2020, April 17). Gamaredon APT Group Use Covid-19 Lure in Campaigns. Retrieved May 19, 2020.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/"},{"source_name":"ESET Gamaredon Sept2024","description":"Rusnák, Z. (2024, September 26). Cyberespionage the Gamaredon way: Analysis of toolset used to spy on Ukraine in 2022 and 2023. Retrieved October 30, 2024.","url":"https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/cyberespionage-gamaredon-way.pdf"},{"source_name":"unit42_gamaredon_dec2022","description":"Unit 42. (2022, December 20). Russia’s Trident Ursa (aka Gamaredon APT) Cyber Conflict Operations Unwavering Since Invasion of Ukraine. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/trident-ursa/"}]},{"id":"G0048","name":"RTM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048) has used Registry run keys to establish persistence for the [RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) Trojan and other tools, such as a modified version of TeamViewer remote desktop software.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--09381138-b93b-4b0d-b82d-c21d452ff514","references":[{"source_name":"ESET RTM Feb 2017","description":"Faou, M. and Boutin, J. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"},{"source_name":"Group IB RTM August 2019","description":"Skulkin, O. (2019, August 5). Following the RTM Forensic examination of a computer infected with a banking trojan. Retrieved May 11, 2020.","url":"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/rtm"}]},{"id":"G0050","name":"APT32","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.(Citation: Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017)(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--f4a0f496-b47c-4bdf-affb-b57fb17203db","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017","description":"Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-cobalt-kitty-apt"},{"source_name":"Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017","description":"Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.","url":"https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf"},{"source_name":"ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019","description":"Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/20/fake-or-fake-keeping-up-with-oceanlotus-decoys/"}]},{"id":"G0051","name":"FIN10","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN10](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051) has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.(Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)","relationship_id":"relationship--75b383eb-5483-4c44-a721-ee1cffa6edb7","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN10 June 2017","description":"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/rpt-fin-10-anatomy-of-a-cyber-en.pdf"},{"source_name":"Github PowerShell Empire","description":"Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.","url":"https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire"}]},{"id":"G0056","name":"PROMETHIUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--788d02cb-7a20-4115-9428-b55e598374ce","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Promethium June 2020","description":"Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html"}]},{"id":"G0059","name":"Magic Hound","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--0a507d28-ef6b-417b-a968-e82608e8b6a8","references":[{"source_name":"DFIR Phosphorus November 2021","description":"DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023.","url":"https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/"},{"source_name":"Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017","description":"Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021","description":"MSTIC. (2021, November 16). Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity – MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021. Retrieved January 12, 2023.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021"}]},{"id":"G0060","name":"BRONZE BUTLER","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060) has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--d20b659b-3595-4171-9beb-668ab26bf398","references":[{"source_name":"Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017","description":"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"}]},{"id":"G0064","name":"APT33","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) has deployed a tool known as [DarkComet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0334) to the Startup folder of a victim, and used Registry run keys to gain persistence.(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--d15c3d84-9e21-41ac-9728-f97183b63ec6","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Elfin Mar 2019","description":"Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Holmium June 2020","description":"Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/"}]},{"id":"G0065","name":"Leviathan","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--2851e8fa-0622-42db-b7b7-4e051fc5fbeb","references":[{"source_name":"Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017","description":"Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets"},{"source_name":"FireEye Periscope March 2018","description":"FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"}]},{"id":"G0067","name":"APT37","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067)'s has added persistence via the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code>.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Talos Group123)","relationship_id":"relationship--0500bac5-bc50-4529-ae5f-b4e1a85fa7d7","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT37 Feb 2018","description":"FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt37-reaper-the-overlooked-north-korean-actor.pdf"},{"source_name":"Talos Group123","description":"Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html"}]},{"id":"G0069","name":"MuddyWater","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has added Registry Run key <code>KCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SystemTextEncoding</code> to establish persistence.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--55d44c4e-c864-4e6f-ac33-62f13cd08f0e","references":[{"source_name":"Talos MuddyWater May 2019","description":"Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, May 20). Recent MuddyWater-associated BlackWater campaign shows signs of new anti-detection techniques. Retrieved June 5, 2019.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/05/recent-muddywater-associated-blackwater.html"},{"source_name":"Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018","description":"Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 10). MuddyWater expands operations. Retrieved November 2, 2018.","url":"https://securelist.com/muddywater/88059/"},{"source_name":"Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022","description":"Malhortra, A and Ventura, V. (2022, January 31). Iranian APT MuddyWater targets Turkish users via malicious PDFs, executables. Retrieved June 22, 2022.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/01/iranian-apt-muddywater-targets-turkey.html"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021","description":"Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/earth-vetala---muddywater-continues-to-target-organizations-in-t.html"},{"source_name":"Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017","description":"Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.","url":"https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/"},{"source_name":"FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018","description":"Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html"}]},{"id":"G0070","name":"Dark Caracal","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070)'s version of [Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) adds a registry key to <code>HKEY_USERS\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> for persistence.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--74fd87b9-3aff-4278-a408-11ae470082e5","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018","description":"Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0073","name":"APT19","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"An [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\\</code>.(Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)","relationship_id":"relationship--04558d61-aa04-46b5-a65f-921011ac9621","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016","description":"Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/new-attacks-linked-to-c0d0s0-group/"}]},{"id":"G0078","name":"Gorgon Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0078","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Gorgon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0078) malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--313082d2-c493-4053-80c1-06300aeea8e0","references":[{"source_name":"Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018","description":"Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/08/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/"}]},{"id":"G0080","name":"Cobalt Group","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--bd5bc949-6b6b-4511-87f7-3a439a4681da","references":[{"source_name":"Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017","description":"Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018.","url":"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cobalt"}]},{"id":"G0081","name":"Tropic Trooper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0081","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Tropic Trooper](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0081) has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--69cc4413-80b4-45ed-a993-db34fe32fabe","references":[{"source_name":"Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020","description":"Moore, S. et al. (2020, April 30). Anomali Suspects that China-Backed APT Pirate Panda May Be Seeking Access to Vietnam Government Data Center. Retrieved May 19, 2020.","url":"https://www.anomali.com/blog/anomali-suspects-that-china-backed-apt-pirate-panda-may-be-seeking-access-to-vietnam-government-data-center#When:15:00:00Z"},{"source_name":"TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020","description":"Chen, J.. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air gapped Environments. Retrieved May 20, 2020.","url":"https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/Tech-Brief-Tropic-Trooper-s-Back-USBferry-Attack-Targets-Air-gapped-Environments.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0082","name":"APT38","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has also added registry run keys within `HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\MicrosoftUpdate` to enable persistence on Windows devices after reboot. (Citation: Microsoft Axios Compromise APR 2026) [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has executed a multiplatform implant that dropped a Registry Run key to `:\\ProgramData\\NodePackages\\` for persistence on Windows machines.(Citation: MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026) [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) has obtained boot- persistence on compromised systems independent of user logon by adding the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\scdev\\Parameters`.(Citation: MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--cc55ad3c-601b-4549-b080-adbde6b98629","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Axios Compromise APR 2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 1). Mitigating the Axios npm supply chain compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/04/01/mitigating-the-axios-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"},{"source_name":"MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, June 17). From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet. Retrieved September 30, 2026.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/17/postinstall-payload-inside-mastra-npm-supply-chain-compromise/"}]},{"id":"G0087","name":"APT39","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT39](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0087) has maintained persistence using the startup folder.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--0574a456-6327-4f07-94b0-58be6ecbf8b8","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT39 Jan 2019","description":"Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html"}]},{"id":"G0091","name":"Silence","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0091","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Silence](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0091) has used <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>, <code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--2d49852d-083e-4379-90e3-dcb0748be624","references":[{"source_name":"Group IB Silence Sept 2018","description":"Group-IB. (2018, September). Silence: Moving Into the Darkside. Retrieved May 5, 2020.","url":"https://go.group-ib.com/report-silence-en?_gl=1*d1bh3a*_ga*MTIwMzM5Mzc5MS4xNjk4OTI5NzY4*_ga_QMES53K3Y2*MTcwNDcyMjU2OS40LjEuMTcwNDcyMzU1Mi41My4wLjA."}]},{"id":"G0094","name":"Kimsuky","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence and modified the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce` Registry key.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)","relationship_id":"relationship--c5ae9551-e756-4b8b-9b78-515eba60acf5","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021","description":"An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html"},{"source_name":"CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky","description":"CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a"},{"source_name":"Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020","description":"Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.","url":"https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2020CrowdStrikeGlobalThreatReport.pdf"},{"source_name":"KISA Operation Muzabi","description":"KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220328121326/https://boho.or.kr/filedownload.do?attach_file_seq=2695&attach_file_id=EpF2695.pdf"},{"source_name":"Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013","description":"Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.","url":"https://securelist.com/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/57915/"}]},{"id":"G0096","name":"APT41","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) created and modified startup files for persistence.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB APT 41 June 2021) [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) added a registry key in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Svchost</code> to establish persistence for [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154).(Citation: FireEye APT41 March 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--6ad8e998-041f-491d-8691-4990022248e0","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye APT41 Aug 2019","description":"Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/rt-apt41-dual-operation.pdf"},{"source_name":"FireEye APT41 March 2020","description":"Glyer, C, et al. (2020, March). This Is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved April 28, 2020.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html"},{"source_name":"Group IB APT 41 June 2021","description":"Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021.","url":"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/colunmtk-apt41/"}]},{"id":"G0100","name":"Inception","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0100","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Inception](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0100) has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value \n <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\</code>.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--1215a807-77b4-465e-9c82-c4f023e668da","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014","description":"GReAT. (2014, December 10). Cloud Atlas: RedOctober APT is back in style. Retrieved May 8, 2020.","url":"https://securelist.com/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/68083/"}]},{"id":"G0102","name":"Wizard Spider","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) has established persistence via the Registry key <code>HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code> and a shortcut within the startup folder.(Citation: DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020)(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--f3cc3739-9dea-41c9-ac82-038b9c92bdb0","references":[{"source_name":"DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020","description":"DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"},{"source_name":"FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020","description":"Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html"}]},{"id":"G0106","name":"Rocke","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0106","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Rocke](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0106)'s miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)\t","relationship_id":"relationship--a1956344-1a2d-4193-bb20-0f65c98776fe","references":[{"source_name":"Talos Rocke August 2018","description":"Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/08/rocke-champion-of-monero-miners.html"}]},{"id":"G0112","name":"Windshift","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112) has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: BlackBerry Bahamut)","relationship_id":"relationship--6aeeb7e4-fc09-40a6-b071-c04df0f92928","references":[{"source_name":"BlackBerry Bahamut","description":"The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.","url":"https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/pdfviewer?file=/content/dam/blackberry-com/asset/enterprise/pdf/direct/report-spark-bahamut.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0121","name":"Sidewinder","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0121","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Sidewinder](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0121) has added paths to executables in the Registry to establish persistence.(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--5d43c968-d9d2-4687-949e-23888376f10c","references":[{"source_name":"Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020","description":"Rewterz. (2020, April 20). Sidewinder APT Group Campaign Analysis. Retrieved January 29, 2021.","url":"https://www.rewterz.com/threats/sidewinder-apt-group-campaign-analysis"},{"source_name":"Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020","description":"Rewterz. (2020, June 22). Analysis on Sidewinder APT Group – COVID-19. Retrieved January 29, 2021.","url":"https://www.rewterz.com/articles/analysis-on-sidewinder-apt-group-covid-19"},{"source_name":"Cyble Sidewinder September 2020","description":"Cyble. (2020, September 26). SideWinder APT Targets with futuristic Tactics and Techniques. Retrieved January 29, 2021.","url":"https://cybleinc.com/2020/09/26/sidewinder-apt-targets-with-futuristic-tactics-and-techniques/"}]},{"id":"G0126","name":"Higaisa","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Higaisa](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0126) added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--c0792868-a5da-4486-9b3b-cefbc2667e54","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020","description":"Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, June 4). New LNK attack tied to Higaisa APT discovered. Retrieved March 2, 2021.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/06/higaisa/"},{"source_name":"Zscaler Higaisa 2020","description":"Singh, S. Singh, A. (2020, June 11). The Return on the Higaisa APT. Retrieved March 2, 2021.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/return-higaisa-apt"}]},{"id":"G0128","name":"ZIRCONIUM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128) has created a Registry Run key named <code>Dropbox Update Setup</code> to establish persistence for a malicious Python binary.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--3d3fa163-626d-41b8-85c1-f815c458ad19","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020","description":"Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-31-leverages-covid-19-vaccine-theme-and-abuses-legitimate-online"}]},{"id":"G0129","name":"Mustang Panda","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has created the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\AdobelmdyU</code> to maintain persistence.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 November 2020) [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has also established persistence via the registry key `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`.(Citation: EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugX)(Citation: Sophos Mustang Panda PLUGX)","relationship_id":"relationship--c0561e30-556b-486b-a7fa-1be6feece584","references":[{"source_name":"EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugX","description":"EclecticIQ Threat Research Team. (2023, February 2). Mustang Panda APT Group Uses European Commission-Themed Lure to Deliver PlugX Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://blog.eclecticiq.com/mustang-panda-apt-group-uses-european-commission-themed-lure-to-deliver-plugx-malware"},{"source_name":"Proofpoint TA416 November 2020","description":"Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2020, November 23). TA416 Goes to Ground and Returns with a Golang PlugX Malware Loader. Retrieved April 13, 2021.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta416-goes-ground-and-returns-golang-plugx-malware-loader"},{"source_name":"Sophos Mustang Panda PLUGX","description":"Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, September 8). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets Government Officials. Retrieved September 9, 2025.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-president-targets-government-officials"}]},{"id":"G0139","name":"TeamTNT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) has added batch scripts to the startup folder.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--19bede58-549b-4e7d-b206-6045370b9995","references":[{"source_name":"ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020","description":"AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021.","url":"https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-new-campaign-aka-chimaera"}]},{"id":"G0140","name":"LazyScripter","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) has achieved persistence via writing a PowerShell script to the autorun registry key.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--cb3117b7-3679-424d-bfb4-b28699cbba02","references":[{"source_name":"MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021","description":"Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20211003035156/https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0142","name":"Confucius","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) has dropped malicious files into the startup folder `%AppData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup` on a compromised host in order to maintain persistence.(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--decc0aea-70d2-42b8-8529-3049b9f5937f","references":[{"source_name":"Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021","description":"Uptycs Threat Research Team. (2021, January 12). Confucius APT deploys Warzone RAT. Retrieved December 17, 2021.","url":"https://www.uptycs.com/blog/confucius-apt-deploys-warzone-rat"}]},{"id":"G1014","name":"LuminousMoth","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Current Version\\Run`.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--856db86a-62a6-4545-898f-7eb44924cfde","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021","description":"Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/blog/labs/luminousmoth-plugx-file-exfiltration-and-persistence-revisited"},{"source_name":"Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021","description":"Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022.","url":"https://securelist.com/apt-luminousmoth/103332/"}]},{"id":"G1016","name":"FIN13","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1016","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN13](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1016) has used Windows Registry run keys such as, `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\hosts` to maintain persistence.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--9992c76b-149d-4842-80b5-dbd37f0369be","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022","description":"Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin13-cybercriminal-mexico"}]},{"id":"G1018","name":"TA2541","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1018","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[TA2541](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1018) has placed VBS files in the Startup folder and used Registry run keys to establish persistence for malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--07efd7ec-332f-43fd-8ffc-6f50c32c4f55","references":[{"source_name":"Proofpoint TA2541 February 2022","description":"Larson, S. and Wise, J. (2022, February 15). Charting TA2541's Flight. Retrieved September 12, 2023.","url":"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/charting-ta2541s-flight"}]},{"id":"G1036","name":"Moonstone Sleet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Moonstone Sleet](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036) used registry run keys for process execution during initial victim infection.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--9c3459f4-8c8e-4650-bd21-ad506a1a3ee9","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/28/moonstone-sleet-emerges-as-new-north-korean-threat-actor-with-new-bag-of-tricks/"}]},{"id":"G1039","name":"RedCurl","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1039","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[RedCurl](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1039) has established persistence by creating entries in `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`.(Citation: group-ib_redcurl1)(Citation: group-ib_redcurl2)  ","relationship_id":"relationship--d97c5cd6-97e9-4684-a598-1e31406c7e2c","references":[{"source_name":"group-ib_redcurl1","description":"Group-IB. (2020, August). RedCurl: The Pentest You Didn’t Know About. Retrieved August 9, 2024.","url":"https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl/"},{"source_name":"group-ib_redcurl2","description":"Group-IB. (2021, November). RedCurl: The Awakening. Retrieved August 14, 2024.","url":"https://www.group-ib.com/resources/research-hub/red-curl-2/"}]},{"id":"G1043","name":"BlackByte","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1043","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[BlackByte](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1043) has used Registry Run keys for persistence.(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--d7c2abc3-4f02-438f-b146-731351135075","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft BlackByte 2023","description":"Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/"}]},{"id":"G1046","name":"Storm-1811","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1046","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Storm-1811](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1046) has created Windows Registry Run keys that execute various batch scripts to establish persistence on victim devices.(Citation: rapid7-email-bombing)","relationship_id":"relationship--0f1d0255-d27c-40d6-9c01-b2c9e9331f93","references":[{"source_name":"rapid7-email-bombing","description":"Tyler McGraw, Thomas Elkins, and Evan McCann. (2024, May 10). Ongoing Social Engineering Campaign Linked to Black Basta Ransomware Operators. Retrieved January 31, 2025.","url":"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/05/10/ongoing-social-engineering-campaign-linked-to-black-basta-ransomware-operators"}]},{"id":"G1052","name":"Contagious Interview","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Contagious Interview](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052) has established persistence using [InvisibleFerret](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1245) malware to place a .bat file in the Startup Folder.(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--e84ffff2-59d1-4655-8fbe-b97bbf8e2f9f","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024","description":"Seongsu Park. (2024, November 4). From Pyongyang to Your Payroll: The Rise of North Korean Remote Workers in the West. Retrieved October 17, 2025.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/pyongyang-your-payroll-rise-north-korean-remote-workers-west"}]},{"id":"G1055","name":"VOID MANTICORE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Windows Registry entries to autorun stage two malware payloads to maintain persistence.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--b1bb8990-c773-46aa-8415-b69028d1b4a9","references":[{"source_name":"FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026","description":"FBI. (2026, March 20). FBI Flash: FLASH-20260320-001:Government of Iran Cyber Actors Deploy Telegram C2 to  Push Malware to Identified Targets. Retrieved April 20, 2026.","url":"https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260320.pdf"}]},{"id":"G1056","name":"TeamPCP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[TeamPCP](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1056) has dropped malware into the Windows Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Aikido TeamPCP Telnyx MAR 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--1eae2e76-cd0b-496e-b121-fa9fac51e6fc","references":[{"source_name":"Aikido TeamPCP Telnyx MAR 2026","description":"Eriksen, C. (2026, March 27). Popular telnyx package compromised on PyPI by TeamPCP. Retrieved July 16, 2026.","url":"https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-canisterworm"}]},{"id":"G1059","name":"NIMBUS MANTICORE","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1059","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[NIMBUS MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1059) has utilized auto-run registry keys to execute benign Windows executables that trigger the execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025)(Citation: Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024)        ","relationship_id":"relationship--c3e633f5-857d-45a9-86f1-8c71ac484cc7","references":[{"source_name":"CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025","description":"Check Point. (2025, September 22). Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe. Retrieved September 24, 2026.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/"},{"source_name":"Mandiant_UNC1549_Feb2024","description":"Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, February 27). When Cats Fly: Suspected Iranian Threat Actor UNC1549 Targets Israeli and Middle East Aerospace and Defense Sectors. Retrieved September 28, 2026.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east"}]}],"mitigations":[],"candidates":[{"id":"14fdc3f1-6fc3-4556-8d36-aa89d9d42d02","name":"secedit used to create a Run key in the HKLM Hive","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"secedit allows to manipulate the HKLM hive of the Windows registry. This test creates a Run key with the keyname calc having calc.exe as the value in the HKLM hive.\n[Reference](https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d)\n","inputs":{"ini_file":{"description":"INI config template","type":"string","default":"$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1547.001\\src\\regtemplate.ini"},"secedit_db":{"description":"Custom secedit db","type":"string","default":"mytemplate.db"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"f91c3459ad1d1abb9a7d73992ce4f4dbee0e494a27454295007ede64af0d4f2e"},{"id":"1d958c61-09c6-4d9e-b26b-4130314e520e","name":"HKLM - Modify default System Shell - Winlogon Shell KEY Value ","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This test change the default value of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell from \"explorer.exe\" to the full path of \"C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe\" \nto log a change to the key's default value without breaking boot sequence. \nAn atacker will alternatively replace this with a custom shell. \n","inputs":{"payload":{"description":"what to run","type":"string","default":"C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"a4d977038980fe40b6faec5ce128bdec8a25fcc525b57c2e05d62575687cfe51"},{"id":"24e55612-85f6-4bd6-ae74-a73d02e3441d","name":"Add Executable Shortcut Link to User Startup Folder","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"Adds a non-malicious executable shortcut link to the current users startup directory. Test can be verified by going to the users startup directory and checking if the shortcut link exists. ","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"8d22b715d168f9c7111f91e1f12158f578e1748a32ee520e54c4ff9d95a135f6"},{"id":"2cb98256-625e-4da9-9d44-f2e5f90b8bd5","name":"Suspicious vbs file run from startup Folder","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"vbs files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to maintain persistance. Upon execution, \"T1547.001 Hello, World VBS!\" will be displayed twice. \nAdditionally, the new files can be viewed in the \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\"\nfolder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"f81a5540727871ad2455a92ba4fcd070044746a60ac120a57d66a028b9eeb216"},{"id":"522c390e-8c86-497c-b37e-79a4eb072a89","name":"Turla Mosquito Run Key Persistence via rundll32 DLL Export","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"Imitates the Registry Run key persistence used by Turla's Mosquito backdoor.\n\nUpon successful execution, an `auto_update` value is written to the current user's Run key pointing to a\nrundll32 invocation of the (benign, by default) DLL.\n\nReference: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf\n","inputs":{"backdoor_dll":{"description":"Path to the DLL the Run key will invoke via rundll32 (stands in for the Mosquito backdoor).","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\calc.dll"},"backdoor_dll_url":{"description":"URL to download the stand-in DLL from if it is not present on disk","type":"url","default":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1047/bin/calc.dll"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"The DLL that the Run key will point to must exist on disk at #{backdoor_dll}\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"679479e740c74863fe7b7f0544e9d6c4122ce6ade305f72d187ac70ccdb88a4c"},{"id":"554cbd88-cde1-4b56-8168-0be552eed9eb","name":"Reg Key RunOnce","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"RunOnce Key Persistence.\n\nUpon successful execution, cmd.exe will modify the registry to load AtomicRedTeam.dll to RunOnceEx. Output will be via stdout. \n","inputs":{"thing_to_execute":{"description":"Thing to Run","type":"path","default":"C:\\Path\\AtomicRedTeam.dll"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"f403b93ceddd3bea2c0e8ee766bd727c3b644be6d005279240594f1dd1691a6e"},{"id":"5b6768e4-44d2-44f0-89da-a01d1430fd5e","name":"Suspicious bat file run from startup Folder","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"bat files can be placed in and executed from the startup folder to maintain persistance\n\nUpon execution, cmd will be run and immediately closed. Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\"\nfolder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"325f51c997f574df36160a5795d8875b0addc713fae22c9e85ad9224658573e6"},{"id":"6e1666d5-3f2b-4b9a-80aa-f011322380d4","name":"Creating Boot Verification Program Key for application execution during successful boot","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"Microsoft allows users to define a custom boot verification program for those situations by creating the registry key “HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\BootVerificationProgram” and setting the value of ImagePath to the path of boot verification program.Threat Actor\ncan abuse by creating this registry key and providing a malicious application to be executed during successful boot\n","inputs":{"malicious_file":{"description":"Application to be executed during successful boot","type":"string","default":"C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"cd1ec7115bb1012b1ffe511737ba6d2932b83d1fdf2846586465b915595b814b"},{"id":"8834b65a-f808-4ece-ad7e-2acdf647aafa","name":"Change Startup Folder - HKCU Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This test will modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders  -V \"Startup\" value \nto point to a new startup folder where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires system restart\n","inputs":{"new_startup_folder":{"description":"new startup folder to replace standard one","type":"string","default":"$env:TMP\\atomictest\\"},"payload":{"description":"executable to be placed in new startup location ","type":"string","default":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"c815a13eb94b677526e0f88c5e516ea035f791327201fb22b517bb07354650ca"},{"id":"9dc7767b-30c1-4cc4-b999-50cab5e27891","name":"SystemBC Malware-as-a-Service Registry","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This Atomic will create a registry key called socks5_powershell for persistance access\nhttps://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/systembc-powershell-version-68c9aad0f85c\n","inputs":{"reg_key_value":{"description":"Thing to Run","type":"path","default":"powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File"},"reg_key_path":{"description":"Path to registry key to update","type":"path","default":"HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"cc66553355a94f236cc605f8ee997625ff239ed7b64f9c59c0b8aab56f5df6c4"},{"id":"a70faea1-e206-4f6f-8d9a-67379be8f6f1","name":"HKCU - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This test will create a new value under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run to launch calc.exe on boot. \n*Requires reboot\n","inputs":{"target_key_value_name":{"description":"registry value to crate on target key","type":"string","default":"atomictest"},"payload":{"description":"payload to execute","type":"string","default":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"1491501d1acbaca8bf39009b517b476e135c754c80ee26d5e32d764791a727e2"},{"id":"acfef903-7662-447e-a391-9c91c2f00f7b","name":"Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup Value","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This test will modify the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders -V \"Common Startup\" \nvalue to point to a new startup folder where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires system restart\n","inputs":{"new_startup_folder":{"description":"new startup folder to replace standard one","type":"string","default":"$env:TMP\\atomictest\\"},"payload":{"description":"executable to be placed in new startup location ","type":"string","default":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"aba8344273ca08a95b0a27d92d28a4c19a6b68f55f1e22c66287e7c312ab3e94"},{"id":"b051b3c0-66e7-4a81-916d-e6383bd3a669","name":"Allowing custom application to execute during new RDP logon session","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"When a users logs in to a computer via RDP,Windows will search for the key in HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\\Wds\\rdpwd registry\nBy default, rdpclip is the value stored. An attacker with administrator privileges can alter the value stored to allow for the custom application to execute during RDP login session.The test will allow running cal rather rdpclip when a user logs in via RDP\n","inputs":{"malicious_app":{"description":"Application to be executed during successful RDP session","type":"string","default":"calc"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"1bbec7d6223d5f01a7acb23883b0bca1c76b798a76dfe31170ced340e383d0ed"},{"id":"b5c9a9bc-dda3-4ea0-b16a-add8e81ab75f","name":"HKLM - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This test will create a HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run key value to launch calc.exe on boot. \n*Requires reboot\n","inputs":{"target_key_value_name":{"description":"registry value to crate on target key","type":"string","default":"atomictest"},"payload":{"description":"payload to execute","type":"string","default":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"25a60cdb211cc2fb598fb5393df258c55a382e1a3280e5e8d5ca1da60e5234cb"},{"id":"bda6a3d6-7aa7-4e89-908b-306772e9662f","name":"Add persistance via Recycle bin","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"Add a persistance via Recycle bin [vxunderground](https://github.com/vxunderground/VXUG-Papers/blob/main/The%20Persistence%20Series/Persistence%20via%20Recycle%20Bin/Persistence_via_Recycle_Bin.pdf)\nUser have to clic on the recycle bin to lauch the payload (here calc)\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"c44033af7d1e6cc88b854220668caff2389eea5c1c89bd5bdde5b92f85e2261b"},{"id":"befc2b40-d487-4a5a-8813-c11085fb5672","name":"Modify BootExecute Value","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This test modifies the BootExecute registry value to \"autocheck autoche *\", which can be used to simulate an adversary's attempt to tamper with the system's boot process. \nReference - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf\nNOTE that by not saving the correct value, you may inhibit your system from booting properly. Only run on a test system. There is a reg export before running the Atomic.\n","inputs":{"registry_value":{"description":"Registry value to set","type":"string","default":"autocheck autoche *"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"5d7a8011c80c8e48705dfb828664fce6c0a303aaf919e288c37fda791ab34019"},{"id":"dade9447-791e-4c8f-b04b-3a35855dfa06","name":"Suspicious jse file run from startup Folder","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"jse files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to maintain persistance.\nUpon execution, \"T1547.001 Hello, World JSE!\" will be displayed twice. \nAdditionally, the new files can be viewed in the \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\"\nfolder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"4ce2f4f78f7998cd353f238ed94d85ee55072a0a662739e9fe14ffb56d9df0d6"},{"id":"de47f4a0-2acb-416d-9a6b-cee584a4c4d1","name":"Add persistence via Windows Context Menu","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This atomic test add persistence taking advantage of the  Windows Context Menu [Hexacorn](https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/07/29/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-82/)\nUser have to right click on the main screen or in the white space of the opened folder (e.g. Size Modify).\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"9773c11cf5f9d02fea625a69a259e8f8057a1ac1c273201ce10cfdcad4c65cd7"},{"id":"e55be3fd-3521-4610-9d1a-e210e42dcf05","name":"Reg Key Run","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"Run Key Persistence\n\nUpon successful execution, cmd.exe will modify the registry by adding \\\"Atomic Red Team\\\" to the Run key. Output will be via stdout. \n","inputs":{"command_to_execute":{"description":"Thing to Run","type":"path","default":"C:\\Path\\AtomicRedTeam.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"9c0d03a52e08549bb2fe6a531f5f62a878a1ed6d9b3a3813e3b91270c3f6e407"},{"id":"eb44f842-0457-4ddc-9b92-c4caa144ac42","name":"PowerShell Registry RunOnce","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"RunOnce Key Persistence via PowerShell\nUpon successful execution, a new entry will be added to the runonce item in the registry.\n","inputs":{"thing_to_execute":{"description":"Thing to Run","type":"path","default":"powershell.exe"},"reg_key_path":{"description":"Path to registry key to update","type":"path","default":"HKLM:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"51c597c1dc364e64771a8004d34cb8b521b788847e2f4edffbb4e304531ee533"},{"id":"f7fab6cc-8ece-4ca7-a0f1-30a22fccd374","name":"HKLM - Append Command to Winlogon Userinit KEY Value","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":0,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml","description":"This test will append a command to the  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit value to launch calc.exe on boot.\n* Requires reboot\n","inputs":{"payload":{"description":"what to run","type":"string","default":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"}},"dependencies":[],"source_definition_sha256":"85ccb98ba59f901605e49a3b75e0478d2578934ede4dfd4d0f88159a1becda73"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1036":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1036/","T1547.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1547.001/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1547.001","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}}]}}
