{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1218.009","id":"T1218.009","name":"Regsvcs/Regasm","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"de8a84ce59d5a49d086e516892bfb5951f03fd79cce44f45747f04c25924c5e7","description":"Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nBoth utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009","external_id":"T1218.009"},{"source_name":"LOLBAS Regasm","description":"LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.","url":"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"},{"source_name":"LOLBAS Regsvcs","description":"LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.","url":"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"},{"source_name":"MSDN Regasm","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.","url":"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx"},{"source_name":"MSDN Regsvcs","description":"Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.","url":"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx"}],"platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1218","id":"T1218","name":"System Binary Proxy Execution","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["stealth"],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1218/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","some_candidates_require_elevation"],"telemetry_tags":["Module Load","Network Connection Creation","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1218/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":135,"atlas_basic":2,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Category-Combination Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#86-category-combination-anomaly"},{"title":"Conditional Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#5-conditional-anomaly"},{"title":"Edge Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#69-edge-anomaly"}]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":["Category-Combination Anomaly","Conditional Anomaly","Edge Anomaly"],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":16,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0056","name":"Windows Registry Key Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0056/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of Windows registry keys or values.","collection_focus":"Use RegistryEvent (12) and filter CreateKey/CreateValue as available; retain target object and process identity.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["registry_path","event_type","process_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0056","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Demo","event_type":"CreateKey","process_id":4200}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Registry value changes or registry object renames.","collection_focus":"Use RegistryEvent 13 for value-set and 14 for rename; compare against intended policy and keep original type/value where available.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["registry_path","event_type","value_type","value"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1218.009","id":"T1218.009","name":"Regsvcs/Regasm","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1218.009/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1218.009/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":4,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"0531e43a-d77d-47c2-b89f-5fe50321c805","title":"RegAsm.EXE Initiating Network Connection To Public IP","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"network_connection","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/0531e43a-d77d-47c2-b89f-5fe50321c805.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_regasm_network_activity.yml","author":"frack113","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"651f87f7-12db-47f9-84c5-f27b081b94b6","title":"RegAsm.EXE Execution Without CommandLine Flags or Files","status":"experimental","level":"low","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/651f87f7-12db-47f9-84c5-f27b081b94b6.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regasm_no_flag_or_dll_execution.yml","author":"frack113","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"e9f8f8cc-07cc-4e81-b724-f387db9175e4","title":"Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs With Uncommon Extension","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/e9f8f8cc-07cc-4e81-b724-f387db9175e4.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regasm_regsvcs_uncommon_extension_execution.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"cc368ed0-2411-45dc-a222-510ace303cb2","title":"Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/cc368ed0-2411-45dc-a222-510ace303cb2.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regasm_regsvcs_uncommon_location_execution.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0361","name":"Detecting .NET COM Registration Abuse via Regsvcs/Regasm","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--9c03f003-b859-42c6-b16d-c0979dfc202b","relationship_id":"relationship--23d3f30e-9f30-4411-abba-04d31573205a","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1028","name":"Analytic 1028","guidance":"Abuse of Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe to execute arbitrary code embedded in .NET assemblies via [ComRegisterFunction]/[ComUnregisterFunction]. Behavioral chain: (1) Process creation of regsvcs/regasm with suspicious assembly paths/flags → (2) Assembly/DLL load inside regsvcs/regasm → (3) Registry writes to HKCR\\CLSID/ProgID during COM registration → (4) Optional child process or network activity spawned by installer/registration code.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"AssemblyPathRegex","description":"Environment-specific paths to flag (e.g., %TEMP%, Downloads, OneDrive, SMB shares). Helps suppress known-good installers."},{"field":"SuspiciousFlags","description":"Arguments like /unregister (/u), /codebase, /regfile which may indicate abuse. Tune per enterprise use of regasm/regsvcs."},{"field":"ParentProcessAllowList","description":"Legitimate parents (e.g., setup.exe, msiexec.exe). Analyst can prune false positives from Office or script hosts."},{"field":"KnownGoodAssemblies","description":"Hashes or publisher info for approved assemblies commonly registered in the environment."},{"field":"RegistryKeyAllowList","description":"Approved CLSIDs/ProgIDs written during sanctioned software installs."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window (e.g., 5–10 min) between file drop → regasm/regsvcs exec → registry writes → child activity."},{"field":"SignedToUnsignedTransition","description":"Alert if Microsoft-signed regasm/regsvcs loads or triggers unsigned assemblies/children."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4688","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1028","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1028","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"},{"component_id":"DC0056","component":"Windows Registry Key Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=12","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1028","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0056/"},{"component_id":"DC0063","component":"Windows Registry Key Modification","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=13, 14","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1028","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0063/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1028","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"WinEventLog:PowerShell","channel":"EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1028","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1028","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0361#AN1028","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0056","name":"Windows Registry Key Creation","tag":"Windows Registry Key Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0056/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1218","id":"T1218","name":"System Binary Proxy Execution","page":"detections/enterprise/T1218/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0331","name":"Agent Tesla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331","kind":"malware","description":"[Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331) has dropped RegAsm.exe onto systems for performing malicious activity.(Citation: SentinelLabs Agent Tesla Aug 2020) ","relationship_id":"relationship--30b4b9c6-1117-4242-80c4-fd7dc7016a08","references":[{"source_name":"SentinelLabs Agent Tesla Aug 2020","description":"Walter, J. (2020, August 10). Agent Tesla | Old RAT Uses New Tricks to Stay on Top. Retrieved December 11, 2020.","url":"https://labs.sentinelone.com/agent-tesla-old-rat-uses-new-tricks-to-stay-on-top/"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1038","name":"Execution Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1038","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.","relationship_id":"relationship--2d712b2d-a9a6-4efd-b37e-1219768bdde7","references":[]},{"id":"M1042","name":"Disable or Remove Feature or Program","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1042","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment.","relationship_id":"relationship--ce47df8d-02dc-4380-90f8-282e009ef0fe","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"71bfbfac-60b1-4fc0-ac8b-2cedbbdcb112","name":"Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.yaml","description":"Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required. Upon execution, \"I shouldn't really execute either.\" will be displayed.\n","inputs":{"output_file":{"description":"Location of the payload","type":"path","default":"%tmp%\\T1218.009.dll"},"source_file":{"description":"Location of the CSharp source_file","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1218.009\\src\\T1218.009.cs"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"The CSharp source file must exist on disk at specified location (#{source_file})\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"42859afc5e63c9295bf5ecbf6e7adcbfc199cb489d71962e69c57aeed4ea6ce0"},{"id":"fd3c1c6a-02d2-4b72-82d9-71c527abb126","name":"Regsvcs Uninstall Method Call Test","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":true,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.yaml","description":"Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required, Requires SNK. Upon execution, \"I shouldn't really execute\" will be displayed\nalong with other information about the assembly being installed.\n","inputs":{"output_file":{"description":"Location of the payload","type":"path","default":"$Env:TEMP\\T1218.009.dll"},"source_file":{"description":"Location of the CSharp source_file","type":"path","default":"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1218.009\\src\\T1218.009.cs"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"The CSharp source file must exist on disk at specified location (#{source_file})\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"0b14a0a1792515f149cabbdf7921fac12db4ea9269aba47f2710e77e7329b97d"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1559.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1559.001/","T1218.009":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1218.009/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1218.009","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0056","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Demo","event_type":"CreateKey","process_id":4200}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}}]}}
