{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1205.002","id":"T1205.002","name":"Socket Filters","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"2191edce3e80ffaf8344aba38e8c67a46b4649b5ae6e9952322c86f4dc0b7c51","description":"Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.\n\nTo establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572).(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)\n\nFilters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`.  Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002","external_id":"T1205.002"},{"source_name":"exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors","description":"ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022.","url":"https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf"},{"source_name":"Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020","description":"Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021.","url":"https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf"},{"source_name":"haking9 libpcap network sniffing","description":"Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008 Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022.","url":"http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf"}],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1205","id":"T1205","name":"Traffic Signaling","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["command-and-control","persistence","stealth"],"platforms":["Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1205/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Command Execution","Network Connection Creation","Network Traffic Content","Network Traffic Flow","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1205/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"guidance_only","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0079","name":"Driver Load","page":"telemetry/DC0079/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Loading of a driver into the running OS.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon DriverLoad (6) and retain image path, hash and signature result; distinguish load from file installation.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["driver_path","action","signature_status"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0079","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"driver_path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.sys","action":"load","signature_status":"lab_fixture_only"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Installation or registration of a service.","collection_focus":"Collect service-install auditing through Audit Security System Extension where supported, plus Service Control Manager/System logs and the new service configuration.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","executable","actor"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0060","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","action":"install","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","actor":"lab-admin"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1205.002","id":"T1205.002","name":"Socket Filters","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","macOS","Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1205.002/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1205.002/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0162","name":"Socket-filter trigger → on-host raw-socket activity → reverse connection (T1205.002)","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--b4cdf164-9cb7-4cad-bdc3-81b5574f364a","relationship_id":"relationship--829a3356-ec45-4101-8eb0-f0c168ff8f03","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0462","name":"Analytic 0462","guidance":"Adversary installs/uses packet-capture or raw-socket capability (WinPcap/Npcap, wpcap/packet DLLs or raw socket attach) and sets a filter. A crafted inbound packet is observed; within a short window the host process that loaded capture libraries initiates an outbound connection (e.g., reverse shell) to the packet origin.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0462","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Seconds to correlate inbound trigger → process library load/driver start → outbound connect (default 120s)."},{"field":"CaptureLibIndicators","description":"DLL/driver names to match (wpcap.dll, packet.dll, npcap.sys, npf.sys) – extend for EDR drivers in your fleet."},{"field":"AllowedInstallers","description":"Signed/expected processes allowed to install/start Npcap (software distribution tools)."},{"field":"ReversePorts","description":"Likely egress ports to watch after trigger (4444, 53, 80/443, 8080, high ephemeral)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0060","component":"Service Creation","name":"WinEventLog:System","channel":"EventCode=7045","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0462","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0462","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0060/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0462","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0462","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0462","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0462","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0079","component":"Driver Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=6","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0462","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0462","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0079/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0462","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0462","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Single, low-volume inbound packet (REJ/S0/OTH or uncommon dport/protocol) from src_ip followed by outbound SF connection to src_ip.","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0462","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0462","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN0463","name":"Analytic 0463","guidance":"Process creates a raw/packet socket and attaches a (e)BPF filter (setsockopt SO_ATTACH_FILTER/ATTACH_BPF or bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD)). Immediately after a matching inbound packet, the same process binds/connects outward to a remote host (reverse shell or beacon).","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0463","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"UserContext","description":"Flag raw-socket activity outside privileged daemons (root-only by default)."},{"field":"MinPayloadEntropy","description":"If using packet content (Zeek), treat high-entropy single-packet triggers as suspicious."},{"field":"AFPacketAllowList","description":"System services allowed to open AF_PACKET (dhclient, keepalived, LLDP, monitoring agents)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"socket(AF_PACKET|AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, *), setsockopt(… SO_ATTACH_FILTER|SO_ATTACH_BPF …), bpf(cmd=BPF_PROG_LOAD), open/openat path=\"/dev/bpf*\" (BSD/macOS-like) or setcap cap_net_raw.","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0463","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0463","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"linux:osquery","channel":"family=AF_PACKET or protocol raw; process name not in allowlist.","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0463","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0463","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Rare inbound packet characteristics (ICMP/UDP/TCP to uncommon port) from src_ip followed ≤TimeWindow by outbound SF from same host to src_ip.","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0463","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0463","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN0464","name":"Analytic 0464","guidance":"Process opens /dev/bpf* (libpcap) or loads NetworkExtension filter, then after a crafted inbound packet the same process initiates an outbound connection to the trigger origin.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0464","platforms":["macOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"BPFDevicePath","description":"Alternate BPF device paths if customized (default /dev/bpf*)."},{"field":"DeveloperMode","description":"Relax thresholds on known developer tooling hosts (Xcode, instrumenting tools)."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"OpenBSM:AuditTrail","channel":"open/openat of /dev/bpf*; ioctl BIOCSETF-like operations.","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0464","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0464","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"macos:unifiedlog","channel":"First outbound connection from the same PID/user shortly after an inbound trigger.","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0464","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0464","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"Inbound one-off packet to uncommon port → outbound SF to same src_ip within TimeWindow.","platforms":["macOS"],"analytic_id":"AN0464","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0162#AN0464","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0079","name":"Driver Load","tag":"Driver Load","page":"telemetry/DC0079/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0060","name":"Service Creation","tag":"Service Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0060/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0587","name":"Penquin","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587","kind":"malware","description":"[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) installs a `TCP` and `UDP` filter on the `eth0` interface.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--cdf000de-7faa-4251-b1f0-d08e043ef16a","references":[{"source_name":"Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020","description":"Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021.","url":"https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1123","name":"PITSTOP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123","kind":"malware","description":"[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can listen and evaluate incoming commands on the domain socket, created by PITHOOK malware, located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd` for a predefined magic byte sequence. [PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can then duplicate the socket for further communication over TLS.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--cbf7fc6b-ba23-4771-9a32-945cfbf7a72a","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024","description":"Lin, M. et al. (2024, February 27). Cutting Edge, Part 3: Investigating Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Exploitation and Persistence Attempts. Retrieved March 1, 2024.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/investigating-ivanti-exploitation-persistence"}]},{"id":"S1161","name":"BPFDoor","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161","kind":"malware","description":"[BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) uses BPF bytecode to attach a filter to a network socket to view ICMP, UDP, or TCP packets coming through ports 22 (ssh), 80 (http), and 443 (https). When [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161)  finds a packet containing its “magic” bytes, it parses out two fields and forks itself. The parent process continues to monitor filtered traffic while the child process executes the instructions from the parsed fields.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023)","relationship_id":"relationship--698640b5-aa2a-45cf-ad49-2f2b13c5e1ea","references":[{"source_name":"Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023","description":"Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman and Eliran Nissan. (2023, May 10). BPFDoor Malware Evolves – Stealthy Sniffing Backdoor Ups Its Game. Retrieved September 19, 2024.","url":"https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/bpfdoor-malware-evolves-stealthy-sniffing-backdoor-ups-its-game"},{"source_name":"Sandfly BPFDoor 2022","description":"The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.","url":"https://sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/"}]},{"id":"S1224","name":"CASTLETAP","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1224","kind":"malware","description":"[CASTLETAP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1224) can listen for a specialized ICMP packet for activation on compromised network devices.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)","relationship_id":"relationship--1631ddf9-4cce-458f-870d-94dd2e83dbf2","references":[{"source_name":"Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day","description":"Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.","url":"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1037","name":"Filter Network Traffic","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.","relationship_id":"relationship--8bcfefd1-20c7-4784-ae07-3e693ecff605","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1572":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1572/","T1205.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1205.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1205.002","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0079","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"driver_path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.sys","action":"load","signature_status":"lab_fixture_only"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0060","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"LabService","action":"install","executable":"C:\\Lab\\service.exe","actor":"lab-admin"}}]}}
