{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1204.003","id":"T1204.003","name":"Malicious Image","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"86a09ff0b0bf0ef023635881175620ed6ec3f12b32f09a93b769657dcbc6ac31","description":"Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)\n\nAdversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003","external_id":"T1204.003"},{"source_name":"Summit Route Malicious AMIs","description":"Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.","url":"https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/"},{"source_name":"Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021","description":"Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved October 7, 2026.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220106180157/https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf"}],"platforms":["IaaS","Containers"],"environments":["cloud","containers"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1204","id":"T1204","name":"User Execution","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["execution"],"platforms":["Linux","Windows","macOS","IaaS","Containers"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","containers","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1204/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required","disposable_tenant_and_cost_controls"],"telemetry_tags":["Application Log Content","Container Creation","Container Start","File Access","File Creation","File Modification","Instance Creation","Instance Start","Network Connection Creation","Network Traffic Content","Process Creation"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0072","name":"Container Creation","tag":"Container Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0072/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0077","name":"Container Start","tag":"Container Start","page":"telemetry/DC0077/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","tag":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0076","name":"Instance Creation","tag":"Instance Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0076/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0080","name":"Instance Start","tag":"Instance Start","page":"telemetry/DC0080/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1204/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":7,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":5,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"cannot_simulate_yet","candidate_count":0,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":[]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0072","name":"Container Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0072/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Container runtime","description":"Creation of a runtime container object.","collection_focus":"Collect runtime create events and image/container IDs; correlate with API audit to establish the initiating identity.","providers":[{"name":"Docker Engine events","scope":"Daemon lifecycle events for containers and images; collect continuously.","source_id":"docker"},{"name":"Kubernetes API audit","scope":"Control-plane context in Kubernetes, not a replacement for runtime observations.","source_id":"k8s"}],"configuration":["Subscribe to the lab daemon event stream with filters for the relevant object/action; send it to a durable collector.","Record runtime/container ID, image digest, action, timestamp and host. Join orchestrator identities where available.","Use a protected collector connection. Docker socket access is privileged; never expose it publicly or grant it to the website."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["container_id","image_digest","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0072","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"container_id":"lab-container-1","image_digest":"sha256:bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb","action":"create"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Runtime event history is bounded and can be lost without continuous collection. Image tags are mutable; pin digests. A lifecycle event is not a full process or file audit.","sources":[{"id":"docker","title":"Docker engine event stream","url":"https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/system/events/"},{"id":"k8s","title":"Kubernetes audit policies and backends","url":"https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per workload image and namespace: rare process starts, unexpected image/privilege changes and new network relationships. Use workload/deployment identity, not short-lived container IDs alone."},{"id":"DC0077","name":"Container Start","page":"telemetry/DC0077/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Container runtime","description":"A runtime container entering the started state.","collection_focus":"Collect runtime start events and join creation, image and later process activity. An orchestrator request alone is insufficient.","providers":[{"name":"Docker Engine events","scope":"Daemon lifecycle events for containers and images; collect continuously.","source_id":"docker"},{"name":"Kubernetes API audit","scope":"Control-plane context in Kubernetes, not a replacement for runtime observations.","source_id":"k8s"}],"configuration":["Subscribe to the lab daemon event stream with filters for the relevant object/action; send it to a durable collector.","Record runtime/container ID, image digest, action, timestamp and host. Join orchestrator identities where available.","Use a protected collector connection. Docker socket access is privileged; never expose it publicly or grant it to the website."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["container_id","action","runtime"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0077","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"container_id":"lab-container-1","action":"start","runtime":"lab-docker"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Runtime event history is bounded and can be lost without continuous collection. Image tags are mutable; pin digests. A lifecycle event is not a full process or file audit.","sources":[{"id":"docker","title":"Docker engine event stream","url":"https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/system/events/"},{"id":"k8s","title":"Kubernetes audit policies and backends","url":"https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per workload image and namespace: rare process starts, unexpected image/privilege changes and new network relationships. Use workload/deployment identity, not short-lived container IDs alone."},{"id":"DC0015","name":"Image Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0015/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Creation or registration of a virtual-machine image in a cloud environment.","collection_focus":"Collect VM image create/register APIs from the cloud control plane; retain source instance/disk, image ID and final state. Container image events are a separate concept.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["image_id","source_instance","action","state"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0015","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"image_id":"image-lab-1","source_instance":"vm-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0076","name":"Instance Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0076/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"Creation/provisioning of a compute instance.","collection_focus":"Collect launch/create request and completion state, retaining instance ID, image, region and initiating principal.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["instance_id","image_id","action","state"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0076","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"instance_id":"vm-lab-1","image_id":"image-lab-1","action":"create","state":"provisioning"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0080","name":"Instance Start","page":"telemetry/DC0080/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Cloud control plane","description":"A request to start a stopped compute instance and its resulting state.","collection_focus":"Collect start APIs and instance-state transitions with request IDs; distinguish accepted from completed.","providers":[{"name":"AWS CloudTrail","scope":"Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","scope":"Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.","source_id":"azure"},{"name":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","scope":"Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.","source_id":"gcp"}],"configuration":["In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.","Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.","Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["instance_id","action","state_before","state_after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0080","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"instance_id":"vm-lab-1","action":"start","state_before":"stopped","state_after":"pending"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.","sources":[{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"ec2","title":"AWS EC2 API logging with CloudTrail","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html"},{"id":"azure","title":"Azure Monitor Activity Log","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/fundamentals/activity-log"},{"id":"gcp","title":"Google Cloud Audit Logs","url":"https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1204.003","id":"T1204.003","name":"Malicious Image","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["IaaS","Containers"],"environments":["cloud","containers"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1204.003/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1204.003/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0248","name":"User Execution – Malicious Image (containers & IaaS) – pull/run → start → anomalous behavior (T1204.003)","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--ee7bd8ff-fbfd-4bb2-9d23-cf3f6ed342c7","relationship_id":"relationship--3ce513f0-6c41-477f-a35d-42d0ec2f8171","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0691","name":"Analytic 0691","guidance":"CONTAINERS (Docker/K8s/containerd): A user pulls an untrusted image from a public/unknown registry and then creates/starts a container from that image. Shortly after start, the container spawns unexpected utilities (e.g., curl/wget/bash/python), or makes outbound network connections atypical for the namespace/workload. The analytic correlates Image Creation/Download → Container Creation → Container Start → Command Execution/Network activity within a short window and with a consistent image digest.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0691","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ImageRegistryAllowList","description":"Approved registries/namespaces (e.g., ECR/GCR/ACR org repos)."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation window from image pull to container activity (e.g., ≤15m)."},{"field":"SuspiciousBinaries","description":"Executables treated as high-risk when run in app containers (bash, sh, curl, wget, nc, powershell for Windows containers)."},{"field":"NamespaceScope","description":"K8s namespaces that should never pull from Internet or run mutable tags."},{"field":"OutboundCIDRBlockList","description":"Destination networks/domains that should not be contacted by containers."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0015","component":"Image Creation","name":"containerd:events","channel":"Image pull from untrusted registry (name NOT IN allowlist) or new digest never seen before","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0691","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0691","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0015/"},{"component_id":"DC0072","component":"Container Creation","name":"kubernetes:audit","channel":"create: Pod/Container created with image tag 'latest' or mutable tag; imagePullPolicy=Always; noDigest=true","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0691","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0691","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0072/"},{"component_id":"DC0077","component":"Container Start","name":"kubernetes:events","channel":"start: ContainerStarted or Pulling image → Started container","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0691","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0691","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0077/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"execve: Process in container namespace executes curl|wget|bash|sh|python|nc with outbound args","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0691","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0691","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"New egress from container IP/namespace to Internet or non-approved CIDRs/ASNs","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN0691","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0691","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN0692","name":"Analytic 0692","guidance":"IAAS (Cloud images/VMs): A new VM/instance is launched from a non-approved or newly-seen image (AMI/GCP Image/Azure Image). On first boot, cloud-init/user-data or embedded agents download code, spawn system utilities, or open outbound C2/mining traffic. The analytic correlates Instance/Image Creation → Instance Start → in-guest Process/Command Execution and/or anomalous network traffic.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0692","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedImageCatalog","description":"Set of golden images/owners and digest/IDs allowed to launch."},{"field":"UserDataInspection","description":"Whether to alert when userData/cloud-init contains exec or download directives."},{"field":"FirstBootWindow","description":"Time after start considered first-boot (e.g., ≤30m) for correlation."},{"field":"VMTagScope","description":"Restrict detection to prod or internet-facing subnets to reduce noise."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0080","component":"Instance Start","name":"AWS:CloudTrail","channel":"RunInstances","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0692","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0692","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0080/"},{"component_id":"DC0076","component":"Instance Creation","name":"azure:activity","channel":"Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write: imageReference publisher NOT IN allowlist OR plan is new/unknown","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0692","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0692","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0076/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0692","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0692","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Flow","channel":"New VM egress to crypto-mining pools or non-approved Internet ranges within minutes of boot","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0692","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0248#AN0692","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0072","name":"Container Creation","tag":"Container Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0072/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0077","name":"Container Start","tag":"Container Start","page":"telemetry/DC0077/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0015","name":"Image Creation","tag":"Image Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0015/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0076","name":"Instance Creation","tag":"Instance Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0076/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0080","name":"Instance Start","tag":"Instance Start","page":"telemetry/DC0080/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1204","id":"T1204","name":"User Execution","page":"detections/enterprise/T1204/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G0139","name":"TeamTNT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) has relied on users to download and execute malicious Docker images.(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--6674eb2b-8295-4af4-b4d2-0659c15d3c71","references":[{"source_name":"Lacework TeamTNT May 2021","description":"Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 16, 2024.","url":"https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1017","name":"User Training","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Train users to be aware of the existence of malicious images and how to avoid deploying instances and containers from them.","relationship_id":"relationship--8f76b879-a168-4d87-b9f1-a06706d48e33","references":[]},{"id":"M1031","name":"Network Intrusion Prevention","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Network prevention intrusion systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity.","relationship_id":"relationship--7fa20508-8d9f-4070-8e8b-b71eefade05f","references":[]},{"id":"M1045","name":"Code Signing","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1045","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Utilize a trust model such as Docker Content Trust with digital signatures to ensure runtime verification of the integrity and publisher of specific image tags.(Citation: Content trust in Docker)(Citation: Content trust in Azure Container Registry)","relationship_id":"relationship--1694d196-8f00-44ee-802f-274a2c566a15","references":[{"source_name":"Content trust in Docker","description":"Docker. (2019, October 10). Content trust in Docker. Retrieved October 16, 2019.","url":"https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/content_trust/"},{"source_name":"Content trust in Azure Container Registry","description":"Microsoft. (2019, September 5). Content trust in Azure Container Registry. Retrieved October 16, 2019.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/container-registry/container-registry-content-trust"}]},{"id":"M1047","name":"Audit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Audit images deployed within the environment to ensure they do not contain any malicious components.","relationship_id":"relationship--b7f0b1ab-3a14-4944-aee0-8abdb24707c6","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1608.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1608.001/","T1036.005":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1036.005/","T1204.003":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1204.003/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1204.003","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0072","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"container_id":"lab-container-1","image_digest":"sha256:bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb","action":"create"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0077","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"container_id":"lab-container-1","action":"start","runtime":"lab-docker"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0015","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"image_id":"image-lab-1","source_instance":"vm-lab-1","action":"create","state":"pending"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0076","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"instance_id":"vm-lab-1","image_id":"image-lab-1","action":"create","state":"provisioning"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0080","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"instance_id":"vm-lab-1","action":"start","state_before":"stopped","state_after":"pending"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}
