{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1195","id":"T1195","name":"Supply Chain Compromise","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"a9a0da9b42fa5882bcc1922e8ee0d0530e1ef64dd9f3846968a3d4be78d35738","description":"Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx overview 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.  ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195","external_id":"T1195"},{"source_name":"Avast CCleaner3 2018","description":"Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.","url":"https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities"},{"source_name":"Krebs 3cx overview 2023","description":"Brian Krebs. (2023, April 20). 3CX Breach Was a Double Supply Chain Compromise. Retrieved May 22, 2025.","url":"https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/04/3cx-breach-was-a-double-supply-chain-compromise/"},{"source_name":"Command Five SK 2011","description":"Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20160309235002/https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf"},{"source_name":"IBM Storwize","description":"IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.","url":"https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E"},{"source_name":"Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012","description":"O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http:/www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf"},{"source_name":"Schneider Electric USB Malware","description":"Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.","url":"https://www.se.com/us/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/"},{"source_name":"Trendmicro NPM Compromise","description":"Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Dofoil 2018","description":"Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.","url":"https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/"}],"platforms":["Linux","Windows","macOS","SaaS"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","saas"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1195.001","id":"T1195.001","name":"Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1195.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1195.002","id":"T1195.002","name":"Compromise Software Supply Chain","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1195.002/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1195.003","id":"T1195.003","name":"Compromise Hardware Supply Chain","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1195.003/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0059","name":"File Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0059/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"File attributes such as path, size, timestamps, ownership and cryptographic hash.","collection_focus":"Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","size_bytes","sha256","owner_uid"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0061","name":"File Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0061/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Changes to file data or attributes.","collection_focus":"Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0020","name":"Process Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0020/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Observed modification or tampering of a running process.","collection_focus":"Use Sysmon ProcessTampering (25) for supported detections and corroborating EDR/memory evidence; it is not a record of every memory write.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","observation","sensor"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0020","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"observation":"process_image_changed","sensor":"lab-instrumentation"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1195","id":"T1195","name":"Supply Chain Compromise","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Linux","Windows","macOS","SaaS"],"environments":["cloud","cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem","saas"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1195/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1195/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":1,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":1,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9","title":"Octopus Scanner Malware","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"windows","category":"file_event"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_mal_octopus_scanner.yml","author":"NVISO","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[{"id":"atlas-basic-t1195-1","technique_id":"T1195","title":"T1195 Supply Chain Compromise","kind":"basic","source_url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/attack-basic-detection-rule-catalog/#initial-access","source_path":"docs/attack-basic-detection-rule-catalog.md","source_line":48,"pinned_source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/anomaly-detection-atlas/blob/e1f75007376022b2f596e413bea8612e514a5aa3/docs/attack-basic-detection-rule-catalog.md#L48","source_file_sha256":"396a87e3d8da74d170684c0f377fe5dc11cd1a486d4f2f89f7fbe94deaaa2a1e","source_row_sha256":"7338effc0c7ae2f4d5971b0df8597eb3ba05f6811b6c9488ddd536bc9900eb1a","validation":"published_concept_not_executable_or_live_validated","logic":"MATCH(installed_package_hash NOT_IN approved_manifest OR signature_invalid OR publisher NOT_IN approved_publishers) -> ALERT","log_sources":[{"title":"Package and Software Installation Logs","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/security-log-source-taxonomy/#18-package-and-software-installation-logs"},{"title":"Application-Control Logs","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/security-log-source-taxonomy/#19-application-control-logs"},{"title":"Artifact Repository Logs","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/security-log-source-taxonomy/#94-artifact-repository-logs"}]}],"atlas_anomaly":[{"id":"atlas-anomaly-t1195-1","technique_id":"T1195","title":"Compromised software or update installation — T1195 Supply Chain Compromise","kind":"anomaly","source_url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/attack-statistical-anomaly-mapping/#supply-chain-installation","source_path":"docs/attack-statistical-anomaly-mapping.md","source_line":37,"pinned_source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/anomaly-detection-atlas/blob/e1f75007376022b2f596e413bea8612e514a5aa3/docs/attack-statistical-anomaly-mapping.md#L37","source_file_sha256":"9d38eaa6306863918e8193f267fb063270260e50b013928dc97893d5e74bf144","source_row_sha256":"9d34ca7bae76189cf1bb249798aae36aed0d08cef2902ea0622f719aa917b553","validation":"published_concept_not_executable_or_live_validated","comparison_unit":"package, publisher, and installation population.","expected_behavior":"approved packages originate from known publishers and produce consistent post-install behavior.","deviation":"novel package-publisher combination or synchronized behavioral shift across many endpoints.","anomaly_types":[{"title":"Category-Combination 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copy","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/reports/cti-ir/mandiant-sunburst-supply-chain.html"},{"title":"original source","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor/"}]}],"anomaly_types":[{"title":"Category-Combination Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#86-category-combination-anomaly"},{"title":"Population Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#9-population-anomaly"},{"title":"Synchronization Anomaly","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/statistical-anomaly-taxonomy/#33-synchronization-anomaly"}],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0537","name":"Behavioral detection for Supply Chain Compromise (package/update tamper → install → 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(2022, June 16). Raccoon Stealer is Back with a New Version. Retrieved August 1, 2024.","url":"https://medium.com/s2wblog/raccoon-stealer-is-back-with-a-new-version-5f436e04b20d"}]},{"id":"S1213","name":"Lumma Stealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213","kind":"malware","description":"[Lumma Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213) has been delivered through cracked software downloads.(Citation: Cybereason LumaStealer Undated)(Citation: Fortinet LummaStealer 2024)(Citation: TrendMicro LummaStealer 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--082eb8f7-d6e6-48c4-8fb9-7a4b02003ea4","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro LummaStealer 2025","description":"Buddy Tancio, Fe Cureg, and Jovit Samaniego, Trend Micro. (2025, January 30). Lumma Stealer’s GitHub-Based Delivery Explored via Managed Detection and Response. Retrieved March 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/a/lumma-stealers-github-based-delivery-via-mdr.html"},{"source_name":"Fortinet LummaStealer 2024","description":"Cara Lin, Fortinet. (2024, January 8). Deceptive Cracked Software Spreads Lumma Variant on YouTube. Retrieved March 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/lumma-variant-on-youtube"},{"source_name":"Cybereason LumaStealer Undated","description":"Cybereaon Security Services Team. (n.d.). Your Data Is Under New Lummanagement: The Rise of LummaStealer. Retrieved March 22, 2025.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-rise-of-lummastealer"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0034","name":"Sandworm Team","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers on forums to achieve initial, untargetetd access in victim environments.(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) ","relationship_id":"relationship--f9eca2ae-009b-434a-bf31-66bc1f98d9ba","references":[{"source_name":"mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm","description":"Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf"}]},{"id":"G0049","name":"OilRig","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) has leveraged compromised organizations to conduct supply chain attacks on government entities.(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Simnavaz October 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--93056830-b48c-4b60-8edf-7f143ce6dd70","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro Earth Simnavaz October 2024","description":"Fahmy, M. et al. (2024, October 11). Earth Simnavaz (aka APT34) Levies Advanced Cyberattacks Against Middle East. Retrieved November 27, 2024.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/j/earth-simnavaz-cyberattacks.html"}]},{"id":"G1003","name":"Ember Bear","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has compromised information technology providers and software developers providing services to targets of interest, building initial access to ultimate victims at least in part through compromise of service providers that work with the victim organizations.(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor)","relationship_id":"relationship--b0be4fe2-f93c-4b7b-8cd4-d0f8a3508c26","references":[{"source_name":"Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor","description":"Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10, 2023.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1013","name":"Application Developer Guidance","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions rather than pulling the latest version on build.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks)","relationship_id":"relationship--3c740c2b-293a-4f6b-98a8-dde4a215eea1","references":[{"source_name":"Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks","description":"Daniel Krivelevich and Omer Gil. (n.d.). Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220316130828/https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/"}]},{"id":"M1016","name":"Vulnerability Scanning","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1016","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)","relationship_id":"relationship--d5be72df-7267-4524-85fa-a497a0cd8052","references":[{"source_name":"OWASP Top 10","description":"OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.","url":"https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project"}]},{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Implement robust user account management practices to limit permissions associated with software execution. Ensure that software runs with the lowest necessary privileges, avoiding the use of root or administrator accounts when possible. By restricting permissions, you can minimize the risk of propagation and unauthorized actions in the event of a supply chain compromise, reducing the attack surface for adversaries to exploit within compromised systems.","relationship_id":"relationship--aa751028-fabd-40d6-aedd-26b850a80056","references":[]},{"id":"M1033","name":"Limit Software Installation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1033","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Where possible, consider requiring developers to pull from internal repositories containing verified and approved packages rather than from external ones.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks)","relationship_id":"relationship--dd26d63b-ecd5-4523-8871-c2d5c8523005","references":[{"source_name":"Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks","description":"Daniel Krivelevich and Omer Gil. (n.d.). Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20220316130828/https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/"}]},{"id":"M1046","name":"Boot Integrity","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1046","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.","relationship_id":"relationship--08911cc4-20be-4499-8b19-f4c6151a7172","references":[]},{"id":"M1051","name":"Update Software","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1051","kind":"course-of-action","description":"A patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation.","relationship_id":"relationship--9c41bfe8-99bc-4aed-a8b9-9e19794a6c59","references":[]}],"candidates":[{"id":"82a9f001-94c5-495e-9ed5-f530dbded5e2","name":"Octopus Scanner Malware Open Source Supply Chain","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"command_prompt","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":1,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1195/T1195.yaml","description":"This test simulates an adversary Octopus drop the RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db\n[octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain](https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain/)\n[the-supreme-backdoor-factory](https://www.dfir.it/blog/2019/02/26/the-supreme-backdoor-factory/)\n","inputs":{"rat_payload":{"description":"RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db","type":"path","default":"$env:TEMP\\ExplorerSync.db"}},"dependencies":[{"description":"ExplorerSync.db must exist on disk at specified location (#{rat_payload})\n"}],"source_definition_sha256":"840cbd5349289ceeefc24760ec9763394e18d92af9d6422ac3f03fa5f49f3e38"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1195":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1195/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1195","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0059","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"/opt/lab/demo.txt","size_bytes":64,"sha256":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","owner_uid":1000}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0061","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","attribute":"content_hash","before":"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","after":"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0020","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"observation":"process_image_changed","sensor":"lab-instrumentation"}}]}}