{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1185","id":"T1185","name":"Browser Session Hijacking","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"dda7f4f938d2fe1a730a5347905298f3958b12bbe9206a1ea3e3ba80f80c3ed6","description":"Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.\n\nAnother example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185","external_id":"T1185"},{"source_name":"ICEBRG Chrome Extensions","description":"De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.","url":"https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"},{"source_name":"Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot","description":"Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.","url":"https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting"},{"source_name":"cobaltstrike manual","description":"Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf"},{"source_name":"Wikipedia Man in the Browser","description":"Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.","url":"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser"}],"platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Creation of a logon session with account and logon-type context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","logon_id","logon_type","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Attributes of existing logon sessions and their association with accounts or hosts.","collection_focus":"Collect supported session inventory and correlate session IDs with authentication, logon and logoff events.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["session_id","account","host","session_type"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of an endpoint network connection linked to a process.","collection_focus":"Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_guid","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","initiated"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"One process opening or accessing another process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_process_id","target_process_id","granted_access","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0020","name":"Process Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0020/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Observed modification or tampering of a running process.","collection_focus":"Use Sysmon ProcessTampering (25) for supported detections and corroborating EDR/memory evidence; it is not a record of every memory write.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","observation","sensor"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0020","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"observation":"process_image_changed","sensor":"lab-instrumentation"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0013","name":"User Account Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0013/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Account inventory and attributes at a point in time.","collection_focus":"Export an authorized directory/account inventory with stable IDs, roles, enabled state and collection time; compare snapshots without exposing credentials.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account_id","enabled","roles","inventory_time"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0013","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account_id":"user-lab-1","enabled":true,"roles":["lab-reader"],"inventory_time":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1185","id":"T1185","name":"Browser Session Hijacking","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1185/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1185/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":2,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"3e8207c5-fcd2-4ea6-9418-15d45b4890e4","title":"Potential Data Stealing Via Chromium Headless Debugging","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/3e8207c5-fcd2-4ea6-9418-15d45b4890e4.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_chromium_headless_debugging.yml","author":"Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"b3d34dc5-2efd-4ae3-845f-8ec14921f449","title":"Browser Started with Remote Debugging","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/b3d34dc5-2efd-4ae3-845f-8ec14921f449.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_remote_debugging.yml","author":"pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0507","name":"Detect browser session hijacking via privilege, handle access, and remote thread into browsers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--759a29fb-8697-46f7-baa3-a891b28c064e","relationship_id":"relationship--88d75e64-5f13-4017-a635-9a52e3458bb2","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1398","name":"Analytic 1398","guidance":"Adversary gains high integrity or special privileges (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege), locates a running browser process, opens it with write/inject rights, and modifies it (e.g., CreateRemoteThread / DLL load) to inherit cookies/tokens or establish a browser pivot. Optional step: create a new logon session or use explicit credentials, then drive the victim browser to intranet resources.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"BrowserList","description":"Set of monitored browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe). Adjust per fleet."},{"field":"AccessMaskSet","description":"Access rights implying injection (e.g., 0x1FFFFF, 0x1F3FF, VM_WRITE, VM_OPERATION, CREATE_THREAD). Tune by EDR mapping."},{"field":"SignerAllowList","description":"Allowed module signers within browser processes (e.g., Microsoft, Google). Helps flag unsigned/unknown ImageLoad into browsers."},{"field":"InternalCIDR","description":"Enterprise internal ranges or DNS suffixes to identify intranet pivoting via the browser."},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation interval (e.g., 10–20 minutes) linking privilege gain → access → modification → network usage."},{"field":"ParentAllowList","description":"Legitimate tools that may automate browsers (e.g., Selenium drivers). Reduce FPs by allowlisting."},{"field":"UserContext","description":"Scope analytics to high-value users, admin workstations, or servers where browsers shouldn’t be automated."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0088","component":"Logon Session Metadata","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4672","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1398","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0088/"},{"component_id":"DC0013","component":"User Account Metadata","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4673","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1398","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0013/"},{"component_id":"DC0067","component":"Logon Session Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4624, 4648","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1398","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0067/"},{"component_id":"DC0035","component":"Process Access","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=10","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1398","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0035/"},{"component_id":"DC0020","component":"Process Modification","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=8","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1398","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0020/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1398","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"},{"component_id":"DC0082","component":"Network Connection Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=3, 22","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN1398","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0507#AN1398","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0082/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0067","name":"Logon Session Creation","tag":"Logon Session Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0067/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","tag":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0082","name":"Network Connection Creation","tag":"Network Connection Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0082/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0020","name":"Process Modification","tag":"Process Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0020/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0013","name":"User Account Metadata","tag":"User Account Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0013/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0154","name":"Cobalt Strike","page":"tools/S0154/","kind":"selected_framework","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S9003","name":"evilginx2","page":"tools/S9003/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0154","name":"Cobalt Strike","page":"tools/S0154/","kind":"selected_framework","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S9003","name":"evilginx2","page":"tools/S9003/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0154","name":"Cobalt Strike","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154","kind":"malware","description":"[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) can perform browser pivoting and inject into a user's browser to inherit cookies, authenticated HTTP sessions, and client SSL certificates.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--ad7f635b-7775-4706-8577-eee00612c996","references":[{"source_name":"cobaltstrike manual","description":"Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf"},{"source_name":"Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020","description":"Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20210708035426/https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual43.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0266","name":"TrickBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266","kind":"malware","description":"[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) uses web injects and browser redirection to trick the user into providing their login credentials on a fake or modified web page.(Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016)(Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Trickbot Nov 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--20cf444d-b538-4971-b054-3d749aa945f0","references":[{"source_name":"Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016","description":"Reaves, J. (2016, October 15). TrickBot: We Missed you, Dyre. Retrieved August 2, 2018.","url":"https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2016/10/trickbot-we-missed-you-dyre"},{"source_name":"IBM TrickBot Nov 2016","description":"Keshet, L. (2016, November 09). Tricks of the Trade: A Deeper Look Into TrickBot’s Machinations. Retrieved August 2, 2018.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/tricks-of-the-trade-a-deeper-look-into-trickbots-machinations/"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Totbrick Oct 2017","description":"Pornasdoro, A. (2017, October 12). Trojan:Win32/Totbrick. Retrieved September 14, 2018.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/Totbrick"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro Trickbot Nov 2018","description":"Anthony, N., Pascual, C.. (2018, November 1). Trickbot Shows Off New Trick: Password Grabber Module. Retrieved November 16, 2018.","url":"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-shows-off-new-trick-password-grabber-module/"}]},{"id":"S0331","name":"Agent Tesla","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331","kind":"malware","description":"[Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331) has the ability to use form-grabbing to extract data from web data forms.(Citation: Bitdefender Agent Tesla April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--5bbbd951-0c4a-4293-b0a8-27751b953882","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Agent Tesla April 2020","description":"Arsene, L. (2020, April 21). Oil & Gas Spearphishing Campaigns Drop Agent Tesla Spyware in Advance of Historic OPEC+ Deal. Retrieved May 19, 2020.","url":"https://labs.bitdefender.com/2020/04/oil-gas-spearphishing-campaigns-drop-agent-tesla-spyware-in-advance-of-historic-opec-deal/"}]},{"id":"S0384","name":"Dridex","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384","kind":"malware","description":"[Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) can perform browser attacks via web injects to steal information such as credentials, certificates, and cookies.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--3f3fffec-6c91-45e2-8c4c-d1c7bdcde76b","references":[{"source_name":"Dell Dridex Oct 2015","description":"Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.","url":"https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation"}]},{"id":"S0386","name":"Ursnif","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386","kind":"malware","description":"[Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) has injected HTML codes into banking sites to steal sensitive online banking information (ex: usernames and passwords).(Citation: TrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM)","relationship_id":"relationship--eafddae6-8e14-491b-82af-40ddaccb99c6","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro BKDR_URSNIF.SM","description":"Sioting, S. (2013, June 15). BKDR_URSNIF.SM. Retrieved June 5, 2019.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/BKDR_URSNIF.SM?_ga=2.129468940.1462021705.1559742358-1202584019.1549394279"}]},{"id":"S0483","name":"IcedID","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483","kind":"malware","description":"[IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) has used web injection attacks to redirect victims to spoofed sites designed to harvest banking and other credentials.  [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483) can use a self signed TLS certificate in connection with the spoofed site and simultaneously maintains a live connection with the legitimate site to display the correct URL and certificates in the browser.(Citation: IBM IcedID November 2017)(Citation: Juniper IcedID June 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--c5e3e18d-124e-4ae2-a95c-9db8f6d53000","references":[{"source_name":"IBM IcedID November 2017","description":"Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/new-banking-trojan-icedid-discovered-by-ibm-x-force-research/"},{"source_name":"Juniper IcedID June 2020","description":"Kimayong, P. (2020, June 18). COVID-19 and FMLA Campaigns used to install new IcedID banking malware. Retrieved July 14, 2020.","url":"https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/covid-19-and-fmla-campaigns-used-to-install-new-icedid-banking-malware"}]},{"id":"S0484","name":"Carberp","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484","kind":"malware","description":"[Carberp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484) has captured credentials when a user performs login through a SSL session.(Citation: Prevx Carberp March 2011)(Citation: Trusteer Carberp October 2010)","relationship_id":"relationship--4c7a0e49-6b38-417a-881b-6f9474ea4ec2","references":[{"source_name":"Prevx Carberp March 2011","description":"Giuliani, M., Allievi, A. (2011, February 28). Carberp - a modular information stealing trojan. Retrieved September 12, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20231227000328/http://pxnow.prevx.com/content/blog/carberp-a_modular_information_stealing_trojan.pdf"},{"source_name":"Trusteer Carberp October 2010","description":"Trusteer Fraud Prevention Center. (2010, October 7). Carberp Under the Hood of Carberp: Malware & Configuration Analysis. Retrieved July 15, 2020.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20111004014029/http://www.trusteer.com/sites/default/files/Carberp_Analysis.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0530","name":"Melcoz","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0530","kind":"malware","description":"[Melcoz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0530) can monitor the victim's browser for online banking sessions and display an overlay window to manipulate the session in the background.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--577796a0-efbb-4023-9083-a76f97bec6f8","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020","description":"GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.","url":"https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/"}]},{"id":"S0531","name":"Grandoreiro","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531","kind":"malware","description":"[Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) can monitor browser activity for online banking actions and display full-screen overlay images to block user access to the intended site or present additional data fields.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)(Citation: IBM Grandoreiro April 2020)(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--7ac62413-be9a-40ef-996d-017c04f04d5b","references":[{"source_name":"Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020","description":"GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.","url":"https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/"},{"source_name":"IBM Grandoreiro April 2020","description":"Abramov, D. (2020, April 13). Grandoreiro Malware Now Targeting Banks in Spain. Retrieved November 12, 2020.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/grandoreiro-malware-now-targeting-banks-in-spain/"},{"source_name":"ESET Grandoreiro April 2020","description":"ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/"}]},{"id":"S0631","name":"Chaes","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631","kind":"malware","description":"[Chaes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0631) has used the Puppeteer module to hook and monitor the Chrome web browser to collect user information from infected hosts.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--cf130e28-dbd6-4312-ba0a-a3cbcf05c064","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020","description":"Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/hubfs/dam/collateral/reports/11-2020-Chaes-e-commerce-malware-research.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0650","name":"QakBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650","kind":"malware","description":"[QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) can use advanced web injects to steal web banking credentials.(Citation: Cyberint Qakbot May 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--a64c16bf-284e-4a74-a5c9-bcaee4d36313","references":[{"source_name":"Cyberint Qakbot May 2021","description":"Cyberint. (2021, May 25). Qakbot Banking Trojan. Retrieved September 27, 2021.","url":"https://blog.cyberint.com/qakbot-banking-trojan"},{"source_name":"Kaspersky QakBot September 2021","description":"Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/"}]},{"id":"S1201","name":"TRANSLATEXT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1201","kind":"malware","description":"[TRANSLATEXT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1201) has the ability to use form-grabbing and event-listening to extract data from web data forms.(Citation: Zscaler Kimsuky TRANSLATEXT) ","relationship_id":"relationship--54a3ec14-70cd-4c2f-b482-b10d44a1a713","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler Kimsuky TRANSLATEXT","description":"Park, S. (2024, June 27). Kimsuky deploys TRANSLATEXT to target South Korean academia. Retrieved October 14, 2024.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/kimsuky-deploys-translatext-target-south-korean-academia#technical-analysis"}]},{"id":"S1207","name":"XLoader","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1207","kind":"malware","description":"[XLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1207) can conduct form grabbing, steal cookies, and extract data from HTTP sessions.(Citation: Google XLoader 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--a251b2a7-b46d-415a-859f-a3b510dcc66e","references":[{"source_name":"Google XLoader 2017","description":"Nart Villeneuve, Randi Eitzman, Sandor Nemes & Tyler Dean, Google Cloud. (2017, October 5). Significant FormBook Distribution Campaigns Impacting the U.S. and South Korea. Retrieved March 11, 2025.","url":"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/formbook-malware-distribution-campaigns/"}]},{"id":"S9003","name":"evilginx2","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9003","kind":"tool","description":"[evilginx2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9003) can inject custom POST arguments into requests to silently enable \"Remember Me\" options during authentication to stay logged in across browser sessions.(Citation: Breakdev Evilginx 2.2 NOV 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--7641ab63-39e1-4cd2-8e9c-9bd1ce6da370","references":[{"source_name":"Breakdev Evilginx 2.2 NOV 2018","description":"Gretzky, K. (2018, November 22). Evilginx 2.2 - Jolly Winter Update. Retrieved January 27, 2026.","url":"https://breakdev.org/evilginx-2-2-jolly-winter-update"}]},{"id":"S9044","name":"Kali365","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9044","kind":"malware","description":"[Kali365](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9044) has gathered browser session information and allows affiliate threat actors to replay stolen browser sessions within their own environment.(Citation: Artic Wolf Labs Kali365 Device Code April 2026)","relationship_id":"relationship--dbfe9e7c-c94b-4bc3-b2e1-3513754f13b7","references":[{"source_name":"Artic Wolf Labs Kali365 Device Code April 2026","description":"Artic Wolf Labs. (2026, April 24). Token Bingo: Don’t Let Your Code be the Winner. Retrieved July 30, 2026.","url":"https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/token-bingo-dont-let-your-code-be-the-winner/"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0094","name":"Kimsuky","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has the ability to use form-grabbing to extract emails and passwords from web data forms.(Citation: Zscaler Kimsuky TRANSLATEXT) ","relationship_id":"relationship--9275c60f-61ee-46f5-a37b-99b2713d1522","references":[{"source_name":"Zscaler Kimsuky TRANSLATEXT","description":"Park, S. (2024, June 27). Kimsuky deploys TRANSLATEXT to target South Korean academia. Retrieved October 14, 2024.","url":"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/kimsuky-deploys-translatext-target-south-korean-academia#technical-analysis"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1017","name":"User Training","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Close all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.","relationship_id":"relationship--8d6d88c3-dbfe-492a-8c4c-ee4bfc10bdc3","references":[]},{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique.","relationship_id":"relationship--a9f79f14-d160-4be5-8bbe-ad0b52770b9f","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1213.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1213.002/","T1185":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1185/","T1548.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1548.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1185","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0067","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"LAB\\analyst","logon_id":"0x12345","logon_type":3,"source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0082","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","initiated":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0020","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"observation":"process_image_changed","sensor":"lab-instrumentation"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0013","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account_id":"user-lab-1","enabled":true,"roles":["lab-reader"],"inventory_time":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z"}}]}}