{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1137.002","id":"T1137.002","name":"Office Test","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"e586be2288943a44afa12042e5bdfb3adaa19a012bdcde0c4b710e25e9635efa","description":"Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nThere exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n\nAdversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002","external_id":"T1137.002"},{"source_name":"Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy","description":"Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/"},{"source_name":"Hexacorn Office Test","description":"Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.","url":"http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/"}],"platforms":["Windows","Office Suite"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1137","id":"T1137","name":"Office Application Startup","domain":"enterprise","level":"technique","parent_id":null,"tactics":["persistence"],"platforms":["Windows","Office Suite"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"page":"techniques/enterprise/T1137/","constraints":["isolated_authorized_lab","procedure_review_required","telemetry_configuration_required"],"telemetry_tags":["Application Log Content","File Creation","Process Creation","User Account Modification","Windows Registry Key Modification"],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0010","name":"User Account Modification","tag":"User Account Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0010/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"detections":{"page":"detections/enterprise/T1137/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":8,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"anomaly_types":[]},"detection_status":"rule_source_available","anomaly_tags":[],"tool_tags":[],"tool_references":[],"visibility":"source_mapped","telemetry_status":"mapped","classification":"can_simulate","candidate_count":1,"implementation":"not_integrated","methods":["automated"]},"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"A module or library being loaded into a running process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","image_loaded","signed","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Registry value changes or registry object renames.","collection_focus":"Use RegistryEvent 13 for value-set and 14 for rename; compare against intended policy and keep original type/value where available.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["registry_path","event_type","value_type","value"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1137.002","id":"T1137.002","name":"Office Test","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows","Office Suite"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1137.002/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1137.002/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":2,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68","title":"Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"macos","category":"process_creation"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_office_susp_child_processes.yml","author":"Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"3d27f6dd-1c74-4687-b4fa-ca849d128d1c","title":"Office Application Startup - Office Test","status":"test","level":"medium","logsource":{"category":"registry_event","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/3d27f6dd-1c74-4687-b4fa-ca849d128d1c.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_office_test_regadd.yml","author":"omkar72","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0315","name":"Detect Persistence via Office Test Registry DLL Injection","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--cb0a01e5-d88a-4ac8-a70a-1472c5dccd10","relationship_id":"relationship--579ccb1f-91d2-4933-9067-6f07af17446d","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0880","name":"Analytic 0880","guidance":"Adversaries create the 'Office Test\\Special\\Perf' registry key and specify a malicious DLL path that is auto-loaded when an Office application starts. This DLL is injected into the Office process memory space and can provide persistent execution without requiring macro enablement.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0880","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"RegistryPath","description":"Path to 'Office test\\Special\\Perf' may vary by Office version, 32/64-bit, or architecture (HKCU vs HKLM)"},{"field":"DLLPath","description":"Injected DLL may reside in different user-writable locations (e.g., %APPDATA%, %TEMP%, or network shares)"},{"field":"OfficeProcessName","description":"Process name (e.g., winword.exe, excel.exe) may vary by Office deployment and usage"},{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Time between DLL registry creation and first Office execution may vary depending on user activity"},{"field":"UserContext","description":"Malicious DLL may target only specific users, necessitating correlation with interactive logon sessions"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0063","component":"Windows Registry Key Modification","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=13, 14","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0880","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0880","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0063/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0880","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0880","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=7","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0880","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0880","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"},{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0880","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0880","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Office-Alerts","channel":"Unexpected DLL or component loaded at Office startup","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0880","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0880","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]},{"id":"AN0881","name":"Analytic 0881","guidance":"Office application auto-loads a non-standard DLL during startup triggered via Office Test Registry key, often without macro warning banners. DLL persistence mechanism circumvents traditional macro defenses.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0881","platforms":["Office Suite"],"tuning":[{"field":"TrustedLocationBypass","description":"DLL may be placed in location trusted by Office configuration or signed to evade alerts"},{"field":"AuditPolicyScope","description":"Only specific tenants or users may have Office auditing enabled at granular DLL load level"}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0016","component":"Module Load","name":"m365:unified","channel":"Non-standard Office startup component detected (e.g., unexpected DLL path)","platforms":["Office Suite"],"analytic_id":"AN0881","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0881","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0016/"},{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"m365:office","channel":"Startup execution includes non-default component","platforms":["Office Suite"],"analytic_id":"AN0881","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0315#AN0881","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0016","name":"Module Load","tag":"Module Load","page":"telemetry/DC0016/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0063","name":"Windows Registry Key Modification","tag":"Windows Registry Key Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0063/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":{"key":"enterprise/T1137","id":"T1137","name":"Office Application Startup","page":"detections/enterprise/T1137/","note":"Related parent research only. Not inherited rule or anomaly coverage for this sub-technique."},"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G0007","name":"APT28","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) has used the Office Test persistence mechanism within Microsoft Office by adding the Registry key <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code> to execute code.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)","relationship_id":"relationship--d0560e25-020d-4cd6-b61c-5fc82a757edc","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy","description":"Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1040","name":"Behavior Prevention on Endpoint","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1040","kind":"course-of-action","description":"On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. (Citation: win10_asr)","relationship_id":"relationship--7b5bc34e-73b1-4f08-bef2-4e1307232f6d","references":[{"source_name":"win10_asr","description":"Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction"}]},{"id":"M1054","name":"Software Configuration","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1054","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)","relationship_id":"relationship--375f4ab4-542f-42f6-9577-f66a6e20f9ca","references":[{"source_name":"Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy","description":"Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/"}]}],"candidates":[{"id":"c3e35b58-fe1c-480b-b540-7600fb612563","name":"Office Application Startup Test Persistence (HKCU)","platforms":["windows"],"method":"automated","executor":"powershell","elevation_required":false,"dependency_count":2,"cleanup_defined":true,"review_status":"not_individually_reviewed","source_url":"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1137.002/T1137.002.yaml","description":"Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office\napplication is started. Key is used for debugging purposes. Not created by default & exist in HKCU & HKLM hives.\n","inputs":{},"dependencies":[{"description":"Microsoft Word must be installed\n"},{"description":"DLL files must exist on disk at specified location"}],"source_definition_sha256":"452947eff452a55dba5454b5b06c56158a2a4a0b670884a5528a3fd183e9e1fe"}],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"documented_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1137.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1137.002/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1137.002","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0016","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"image_loaded":"C:\\Lab\\demo.dll","signed":false,"action":"load"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0063","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"registry_path":"HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode","event_type":"SetValue","value_type":"DWORD","value":1}}]}}
