{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"enterprise/T1134","id":"T1134","name":"Access Token Manipulation","domain":"enterprise","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134","source_file":{"file":"enterprise.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352","bytes":55271014},"source_object_sha256":"373a7ca55183edb582f9a20d7440cda2a13f1ea01ed046b346658725d3c8f4d2","description":"Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.\n\nAn adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAny standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134","external_id":"T1134"},{"source_name":"Pentestlab Token Manipulation","description":"netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.","url":"https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/"}],"platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[{"key":"enterprise/T1134.001","id":"T1134.001","name":"Token Impersonation/Theft","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1134.001/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1134.002","id":"T1134.002","name":"Create Process with Token","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1134.002/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1134.003","id":"T1134.003","name":"Make and Impersonate Token","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1134.003/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1134.004","id":"T1134.004","name":"Parent PID Spoofing","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1134.004/"},{"key":"enterprise/T1134.005","id":"T1134.005","name":"SID-History Injection","page":"techniques/enterprise/T1134.005/"}],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0066","name":"Active Directory Object Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0066/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Modification of an Active Directory object attribute.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit Directory Service Changes with appropriate object SACLs on lab DCs; retain 5136 attribute/value and correlation context.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"},{"name":"Active Directory domain controllers","scope":"Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.","source_id":"ad"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["object_dn","attribute","before","after"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0066","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"object_dn":"CN=LabUser,OU=Lab,DC=example,DC=test","attribute":"description","before":"Lab account","after":"Lab account reviewed"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Attributes of existing logon sessions and their association with accounts or hosts.","collection_focus":"Collect supported session inventory and correlate session IDs with authentication, logon and logoff events.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["session_id","account","host","session_type"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Instrumented operating-system API calls and their return values.","collection_focus":"Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","api","path","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"One process opening or accessing another process.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_process_id","target_process_id","granted_access","action"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."}],"detection":{"key":"enterprise/T1134","id":"T1134","name":"Access Token Manipulation","domain":"enterprise","platforms":["Windows"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134","technique_page":"techniques/enterprise/T1134/","page":"detections/enterprise/T1134/","status":"rule_source_available","counts":{"sigma":2,"atlas_basic":1,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[{"id":"7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0","title":"HackTool - NoFilter Execution","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"product":"windows","service":"security","definition":"Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_hktl_nofilter.yml","author":"Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r)","kind":"sigma"},{"id":"2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09","title":"Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation","status":"test","level":"high","logsource":{"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"},"data_path":"data/detection-rules/2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09.json","source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/sigma/blob/b249e9683190cffdcaf188ccbfb90bf4759844e1/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_user_anomaly.yml","author":"Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)","kind":"sigma"}],"atlas_basic":[{"id":"atlas-basic-t1134-1","technique_id":"T1134","title":"T1134 Access Token Manipulation","kind":"basic","source_url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/attack-basic-detection-rule-catalog/#privilege-escalation","source_path":"docs/attack-basic-detection-rule-catalog.md","source_line":89,"pinned_source_url":"https://github.com/anpa1200/anomaly-detection-atlas/blob/e1f75007376022b2f596e413bea8612e514a5aa3/docs/attack-basic-detection-rule-catalog.md#L89","source_file_sha256":"396a87e3d8da74d170684c0f377fe5dc11cd1a486d4f2f89f7fbe94deaaa2a1e","source_row_sha256":"9fbaa7cee044078e9d83ebbca0448a8f6aa331bac6888115992da575cb30f8d5","validation":"published_concept_not_executable_or_live_validated","logic":"MATCH(token_duplication_or_impersonation_event) AND process NOT_IN approved_impersonation_processes -> ALERT","log_sources":[{"title":"Windows Security Event Logs","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/security-log-source-taxonomy/#23-windows-security-event-logs"},{"title":"Endpoint Detection and Response Telemetry","url":"https://1200km.com/anomaly-detection-atlas/security-log-source-taxonomy/#1-endpoint-detection-and-response-telemetry"}]}],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0283","name":"Behavior-chain detection for T1134 Access Token Manipulation on Windows","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0283","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--774bbba8-45c2-403d-a445-3a64b3679faf","relationship_id":"relationship--d4efc88e-7544-42f4-ae47-a73acc22885a","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN0786","name":"Analytic 0786","guidance":"Detection of suspicious token manipulation chains: use of token-related APIs (e.g., LogonUser, DuplicateTokenEx) or commands (runas) → spawning of a new process under a different security context (e.g., SYSTEM) → mismatched parent-child process lineage or anomalies in Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) token/PPID data → abnormal lateral or privilege escalation activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0283#AN0786","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"TimeWindow","description":"Correlation time between suspicious API usage, runas, and process creation (e.g., 5–10m)."},{"field":"AllowedServiceAccounts","description":"Whitelist of service accounts permitted to spawn SYSTEM-level processes."},{"field":"KnownAdminTools","description":"Legitimate administrative utilities that trigger token changes."},{"field":"ParentProcessAnomalyThreshold","description":"Deviation threshold for PPID mismatches detected via ETW."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0088","component":"Logon Session Metadata","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=4672, 4634","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0786","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0283#AN0786","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0088/"},{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=1","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0786","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0283#AN0786","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"},{"component_id":"DC0035","component":"Process Access","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=10","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0786","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0283#AN0786","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0035/"},{"component_id":"DC0021","component":"OS API Execution","name":"ETW:Token","channel":"token_analysis: API calls such as DuplicateTokenEx or ImpersonateLoggedOnUser","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0786","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0283#AN0786","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0021/"},{"component_id":"DC0066","component":"Active Directory Object Modification","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"EventCode=5136","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN0786","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0283#AN0786","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0066/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0066","name":"Active Directory Object Modification","tag":"Active Directory Object Modification","page":"telemetry/DC0066/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0088","name":"Logon Session Metadata","tag":"Logon Session Metadata","page":"telemetry/DC0088/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0021","name":"OS API Execution","tag":"OS API Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0021/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0035","name":"Process Access","tag":"Process Access","page":"telemetry/DC0035/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0363","name":"Empire","page":"tools/S0363/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0378","name":"PoshC2","page":"tools/S0378/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0194","name":"PowerSploit","page":"tools/S0194/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0633","name":"Sliver","page":"tools/S0633/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[{"id":"38602f432e5c","title":"Lab Architecture — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-02","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c.md","source_sha256":"51e18974e1481d1b83f58c3bff3a997c21e58fd027e2a159389ace500f2bc289","tool_ids":["S0633"]},{"id":"91339316f0df","title":"Attack Playbook — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-04","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df.md","source_sha256":"9b81bd1fd3daa8174dfb523b4b050f4710e62a9ce176029571975b56f6d246a0","tool_ids":["S0633"]}]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0363","name":"Empire","page":"tools/S0363/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0378","name":"PoshC2","page":"tools/S0378/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0194","name":"PowerSploit","page":"tools/S0194/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]},{"id":"S0633","name":"Sliver","page":"tools/S0633/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[{"id":"38602f432e5c","title":"Lab Architecture — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-02","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-02-lab-architecture-operation-dragonrx-38602f432e5c.md","source_sha256":"51e18974e1481d1b83f58c3bff3a997c21e58fd027e2a159389ace500f2bc289","tool_ids":["S0633"]},{"id":"91339316f0df","title":"Attack Playbook — Operation DragonRx","published_at":"2026-05-04","url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df/","original_url":"https://medium.com/@1200km/attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df","archive_path":"docs/articles/2026/2026-05-04-attack-playbook-operation-dragonrx-91339316f0df.md","source_sha256":"9b81bd1fd3daa8174dfb523b4b050f4710e62a9ce176029571975b56f6d246a0","tool_ids":["S0633"]}]}],"software":[{"id":"S0038","name":"Duqu","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038","kind":"malware","description":"[Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) examines running system processes for tokens that have specific system privileges. If it finds one, it will copy the token and store it for later use. Eventually it will start new processes with the stored token attached. It can also steal tokens to acquire administrative privileges.(Citation: Kaspersky Duqu 2.0)","relationship_id":"relationship--968610c5-7fa5-4840-b9bb-2f70eecd87fa","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky Duqu 2.0","description":"Kaspersky Lab. (2015, June 11). The Duqu 2.0. Retrieved April 21, 2017.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150906233433/https://securelist.com/files/2015/06/The_Mystery_of_Duqu_2_0_a_sophisticated_cyberespionage_actor_returns.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0058","name":"SslMM","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0058","kind":"malware","description":"[SslMM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0058) contains a feature to manipulate process privileges and tokens.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)","relationship_id":"relationship--93d83b03-8367-4655-84a5-9abaee885700","references":[{"source_name":"Baumgartner Naikon 2015","description":"Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.","url":"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07205555/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0194","name":"PowerSploit","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194","kind":"tool","description":"[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194)'s <code>Invoke-TokenManipulation</code> Exfiltration module can be used to manipulate tokens.(Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012)(Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)","relationship_id":"relationship--56b59fda-e96d-443d-9f45-e4cc967c911a","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub PowerSploit May 2012","description":"PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.","url":"https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit"},{"source_name":"PowerSploit Documentation","description":"PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.","url":"http://powersploit.readthedocs.io"}]},{"id":"S0203","name":"Hydraq","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203","kind":"malware","description":"[Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can adjust token privileges.(Citation: Symantec Hydraq Jan 2010)","relationship_id":"relationship--d68ff9e8-0766-49ea-8ddc-4308347c5bac","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Hydraq Jan 2010","description":"Lelli, A. (2010, January 11). Trojan.Hydraq. Retrieved February 20, 2018.","url":"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011114-1830-99"}]},{"id":"S0363","name":"Empire","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363","kind":"tool","description":"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) can use [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194)'s <code>Invoke-TokenManipulation</code> to manipulate access tokens.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)","relationship_id":"relationship--9bd9e08d-efda-4710-8158-9e915dce16d9","references":[{"source_name":"Github PowerShell Empire","description":"Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.","url":"https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire"}]},{"id":"S0378","name":"PoshC2","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378","kind":"tool","description":"[PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) can use Invoke-TokenManipulation for manipulating tokens.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2)","relationship_id":"relationship--cb498ebf-bdb4-476c-9b7a-1a83c19d03fb","references":[{"source_name":"GitHub PoshC2","description":"Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.","url":"https://github.com/nettitude/PoshC2_Python"}]},{"id":"S0446","name":"Ryuk","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446","kind":"malware","description":"[Ryuk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0446) has attempted to adjust its token privileges to have the <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code>.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--fa049cca-da7d-4d89-ac34-cab537ce0235","references":[{"source_name":"CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019","description":"Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/"}]},{"id":"S0562","name":"SUNSPOT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562","kind":"malware","description":"[SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code>.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--339e74c4-5e3a-4272-966f-f5542d255d0a","references":[{"source_name":"CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021","description":"CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/"}]},{"id":"S0576","name":"MegaCortex","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576","kind":"malware","description":"[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) can enable <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and adjust token privileges.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)","relationship_id":"relationship--fcfb5392-d5d3-451d-be1f-3cdb5ee264d8","references":[{"source_name":"IBM MegaCortex","description":"Del Fierro, C. Kessem, L.. (2020, January 8). From Mega to Giga: Cross-Version Comparison of Top MegaCortex Modifications. Retrieved February 15, 2021.","url":"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/from-mega-to-giga-cross-version-comparison-of-top-megacortex-modifications/"}]},{"id":"S0607","name":"KillDisk","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607","kind":"malware","description":"[KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has attempted to get the access token of a process by calling <code>OpenProcessToken</code>. If [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) gets the access token, then it attempt to modify the token privileges with <code>AdjustTokenPrivileges</code>.(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)","relationship_id":"relationship--d84bda97-a8d5-4886-8172-c5a794b681af","references":[{"source_name":"Trend Micro KillDisk 2","description":"Gilbert Sison, Rheniel Ramos, Jay Yaneza, Alfredo Oliveira. (2018, January 15). KillDisk Variant Hits Latin American Financial Groups. Retrieved January 12, 2021.","url":"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/a/new-killdisk-variant-hits-financial-organizations-in-latin-america.html"}]},{"id":"S0622","name":"AppleSeed","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622","kind":"malware","description":"[AppleSeed](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0622) can gain system level privilege by passing <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> to the <code>AdjustTokenPrivilege</code> API.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--57aa85a9-8484-4a1a-947f-3d266d2b3c7d","references":[{"source_name":"Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021","description":"Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.","url":"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/"}]},{"id":"S0625","name":"Cuba","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0625","kind":"malware","description":"[Cuba](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0625) has used <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and <code>AdjustTokenPrivileges</code> to elevate privileges.(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--c280ba3f-7210-4608-b895-d29932938fe7","references":[{"source_name":"McAfee Cuba April 2021","description":"Roccio, T., et al. (2021, April). Technical Analysis of Cuba Ransomware. Retrieved June 18, 2021.","url":"https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-cuba-ransomware.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0633","name":"Sliver","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633","kind":"tool","description":"[Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0633) has the ability to manipulate user tokens on targeted Windows systems.(Citation: Bishop Fox Sliver Framework August 2019)(Citation: GitHub Sliver C2)","relationship_id":"relationship--5a25798a-eca1-4841-b422-95aa3bf025e3","references":[{"source_name":"Bishop Fox Sliver Framework August 2019","description":"Kervella, R. (2019, August 4). Cross-platform General Purpose Implant Framework Written in Golang. Retrieved July 30, 2021.","url":"https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/sliver"},{"source_name":"GitHub Sliver C2","description":"BishopFox. (n.d.). Sliver. Retrieved September 15, 2021.","url":"https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/"}]},{"id":"S0666","name":"Gelsemium","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666","kind":"malware","description":"[Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) can use token manipulation to bypass UAC on Windows7 systems.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)","relationship_id":"relationship--ba218c07-3cde-4555-a150-0c8daff51cee","references":[{"source_name":"ESET Gelsemium June 2021","description":"Dupuy, T. and Faou, M. (2021, June). Gelsemium. Retrieved November 30, 2021.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eset_gelsemium.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0697","name":"HermeticWiper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697","kind":"malware","description":"[HermeticWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697) can use `AdjustTokenPrivileges` to grant itself privileges for debugging with `SeDebugPrivilege`, creating backups with `SeBackupPrivilege`, loading drivers with `SeLoadDriverPrivilege`, and shutting down a local system with `SeShutdownPrivilege`.(Citation: Qualys Hermetic Wiper March 2022)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--2a41b67c-60d5-4784-a5a8-99a60a3f9202","references":[{"source_name":"Qualys Hermetic Wiper March 2022","description":"Dani, M. (2022, March 1). Ukrainian Targets Hit by HermeticWiper, New Datawiper Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2022.","url":"https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/03/01/ukrainian-targets-hit-by-hermeticwiper-new-datawiper-malware"},{"source_name":"Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022","description":"Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.","url":"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/"}]},{"id":"S1060","name":"Mafalda","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1060","kind":"malware","description":"[Mafalda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1060) can use `AdjustTokenPrivileges()` to elevate privileges.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--c353c2cd-cc78-4d7c-a3b0-5aa1d927368b","references":[{"source_name":"SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022","description":"SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.","url":"https://docs.google.com/document/d/1e9ZTW9b71YwFWS_18ZwDAxa-cYbV8q1wUefmKZLYVsA/edit#heading=h.lmnbtht1ikzm"}]},{"id":"S1068","name":"BlackCat","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1068","kind":"malware","description":"[BlackCat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1068) has the ability modify access tokens.(Citation: Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022)(Citation: Sophos BlackCat Jul 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--fe3bcb4a-bb14-4068-a9d3-be2f68137f51","references":[{"source_name":"Sophos BlackCat Jul 2022","description":"Brandt, Andrew. (2022, July 14). BlackCat ransomware attacks not merely a byproduct of bad luck. Retrieved December 20, 2022.","url":"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/07/14/blackcat-ransomware-attacks-not-merely-a-byproduct-of-bad-luck/"},{"source_name":"Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022","description":"Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence. (2022, June 13). The many lives of BlackCat ransomware. Retrieved December 20, 2022.","url":"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/"}]},{"id":"S1210","name":"Sagerunex","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210","kind":"malware","description":"[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) finds the `explorer.exe` process after execution and uses it to change the token of its executing thread.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--8a3ea312-1ae9-4fa0-ba5b-d3b918ff6394","references":[{"source_name":"Symantec Bilbug 2022","description":"Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.","url":"https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments-cert-authority"}]},{"id":"S1242","name":"Qilin","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242","kind":"malware","description":"[Qilin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242) can use an embedded [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) module for token manipulation.(Citation: Picus Qilin MAR 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--0a068599-574d-4df3-8b05-6194e7366cc4","references":[{"source_name":"Picus Qilin MAR 2025","description":"Hacioglu, S. (2025, March 10). Qilin Ransomware: Exposing the TTPs Behind One of the Most Active Ransomware Campaigns of 2024. Retrieved September 26, 2025.","url":"https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/qilin-ransomware"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0030","name":"Lotus Blossom","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030) has retrieved process tokens for processes to adjust the privileges of the launch process or other items.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--4fc87cbb-73ac-448a-9e81-3f2346de0d42","references":[{"source_name":"Cisco LotusBlossom 2025","description":"Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.","url":"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lotus-blossom-espionage-group/"}]},{"id":"G0037","name":"FIN6","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) has used has used Metasploit’s named-pipe impersonation technique to escalate privileges.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--671cfed4-4809-4f53-a6b0-ff4da289e406","references":[{"source_name":"FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019","description":"McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.","url":"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html"}]},{"id":"G0108","name":"Blue Mockingbird","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0108","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Blue Mockingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0108) has used JuicyPotato to abuse the <code>SeImpersonate</code> token privilege to escalate from web application pool accounts to NT Authority\\SYSTEM.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)","relationship_id":"relationship--6d3d48ff-ea37-4626-8148-4111163e95e3","references":[{"source_name":"RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020","description":"Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.","url":"https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1018","name":"User Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018","kind":"course-of-action","description":"An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require.  ","relationship_id":"relationship--3c5f6c2a-7940-4cdc-8b25-811e33d9b96a","references":[]},{"id":"M1026","name":"Privileged Account Management","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.(Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)\n\nAdministrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft runas)","relationship_id":"relationship--b82ceba5-d988-472d-acd4-b7b1bc49ebbc","references":[{"source_name":"Microsoft Create Token","description":"Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Create a token object. Retrieved December 19, 2017.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object"},{"source_name":"Microsoft Replace Process Token","description":"Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Replace a process level token. Retrieved December 19, 2017.","url":"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/replace-a-process-level-token"},{"source_name":"Microsoft runas","description":"Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017.","url":"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1134.001":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1134.001/","T1134.002":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1134.002/","T1134":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/enterprise/T1134/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"enterprise/T1134","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0066","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"object_dn":"CN=LabUser,OU=Lab,DC=example,DC=test","attribute":"description","before":"Lab account","after":"Lab account reviewed"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0088","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"session_id":"lab-session-1","account":"LAB\\analyst","host":"lab-host-1","session_type":"interactive"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0021","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"api":"CreateFileW","path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0035","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_process_id":4200,"target_process_id":4300,"granted_access":"0x1000","action":"open_process"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}}]}}